#twitter discussions

[duume]

who you should fight in kj8

yoko: you're safe to try but don't expect an actual fight. let's say you give yoko a note inviting him to the roof for a fight later that day. he will misread it and never show up. the next day he will act like nothing happened.

hina: don't fight hina. you absolutely do not stand a chance, no matter what you think. there is no situation under which you can win. he will use anything at his disposal to utterly defeat you.

maru: perhaps you've reached a breaking point following a series of gags you don't understand and that no one can explain to you. maybe you're feeling frisky since he's out of shape at moment. but the minute you go in for a punch, you will regret it. maru will apologize. you will become best friends.

ryo: he seems like an easy target but is not one who you should take lightly. if you challenge him, you will be be met with an onslaught of very pointed insults which hurt you deeply. you will walk away crying and in more pain than if you'd physically fought him.

subaru: an easy win. he looks tough, but will immediately roll onto the floor and curl up into the fetal position. he will call out in a sing-songy voice for help. kick him in the throat and he is done for.

ohkura: he is impossible to beat because he is impossible to fight. he will never in any way try to combat you because it's too much work.

yasu: shame on you, first off. why would you fight this angel? in any case, he would not want to fight, however, if it came to it you would be easily defeated. afterwards he would give you a manicure to make up for any hard feelings.

uchi: an impossible win. you go in for the punch, but his form is just a holographic projection. a strange scent fills the room. you are knocked out, then wake up the next day, unsure of ever encountering him.

[nicholasgrinshaw-blog]

it seems to me that when i die these words will be written on my stone "louis tops"

[fullforceofthewind-blog]

War and Peace

REPOST FROM: 8 December 2010 

The concepts of war and peace, and the prevalence of armed conflict, has been a subject for discussion amongst various people on Twitter lately (See also, Thinking Strategicallyfor an alternative view). One of my cousins has been following some of these discussions, and has this to add: (he refuses to get a Twitter account for fear of losing his thesis - a sensible move, I think!).

I would contend that you and your Twitter friends are too focussed on war. This is a video contending that it is the least violent time ever, as defined by a man dying at the hands of another man, whether that be in a war, a drive by shooting or a fight over the village goat. Which would seem to me to be as objective a measure as we can reach! http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/steven_pinker_on_the_myth_of_violence.html

 I would like to take this further. These are issues that are not new, and I will probably be raising more questions than answers, as ever is the case when attempting to define 'war'. But I think it is important to bear these in mind, and chew on them as food for thought.

 David Keen has raised the of the difficulty in distinguishing between war and peace in his article 'War and Peace: What's the difference?' in volume 7 of the International Peacekeeping journal (also partially available on Google Books). In the article he explains the similarities in intra-state conflicts between the time of 'war' and the time of 'peace.'

 Part of our discussion on Twitter covered the concept of whether WikiLeaks and (al-Qa'ida) fall under the jurisdiction of war or peace. Do we treat WikiLeaks as an enemy organisation, with its members as enemy combatants? This is dodgy ground. War-time is often treated as an exceptional situation, with exceptional circumstances that will include the introduction of 'temporary' powers and legislation. This is acceptable in inter-state wars when there are clear-cut declarations of war, and subsequent surrenders.

But in conflicts where the combatants are 'irregular' - whether guerilla fighters such as the IRA or the Taliban, or individuals who are members of a transnational organisation such as al-Qa'ida and WikiLeaks - there is no clear-cut beginning or cessation of hostilities. Indeed, with the case of al-Qa'ida and WikiLeaks, I think it's wise to see them as part of the scenery - they are symptoms of our changing world and are here to stay (indeed, WikiLeaks is not the first whistle-blower organisation, just the loudest, see Cryptome). Laura Donohue completed a study of temporary powers in the United Kingdom between 1922 and 2000, in which she found that 'terminology notwithstanding, there is nothing temporary about temporary emergency legislation.' (Page 85, fn. page 102)

 Since the 1980s the definition of security has been expanding beyond 'military' security to include political, economic, societal and environmental security. Some have criticised this concept of security due to the militarised connotations of 'security'. However, a quick glance at the national security strategies of the United Kingdom (I assume that if the UK is doing it, the US did it first) in the past two decades demonstrate the broad interpretation of security. The 'military' aspects of security aside, considering WikiLeaks and al-Qa'ida with the same attitude one might have toward rising sea levels or an ageing population encourages a calmer long-term, low-key strategic outlook.

 As we embark on the second decade of the twenty-first century, clearly defined wars are becoming less and less common. Conflicts can seem to be very common (due to greater media coverage) and more protracted (to our impatient Western concepts of time). We could interpret this in a Fukuyaman or Kaplanite sense, in which we over-react and declare that the world is now anarchic and without order.

 Alternatively, I think we should see the evolution of security and threats to our security as a good thing, because life is gradually becoming more peaceable (for some more than others, admittedly). If we treat WikiLeaks and al-Qa'ida as part of the fabric of the current age - one dominated by 'peace' - rather than an exceptional circumstance, our response to these threats is likely to be less exaggerated, not over-reactive, and thus less damaging to our everyday lives.

[fullforceofthewind-blog]

AQ, Afghanistan and National Security

REPOST FROM: 10 December 2010

I am posting this following a discussion among various people I follow on Twitter, in which they were discussing the association between AQ and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the continuing operations there to nullify the country as a safe haven.

Preface:

This is an early version of a chapter of the dissertation I wrote in the third year of my Bachelor's degree. The dissertation was a discussion of what stance Britain should take vis-a-vis failed states. The excerpt linked to below argues that since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the threat from international jihadis is no longer associated with failed states, and that overseas intervention exacerbates the threat from jihadi terrorism.

Click link to see excerpt in GoogleDocs

Based on these conclusions, I believe that intervention in Afghanistan is not serving to reduce the threat from terrorism, and is indeed exacerbating it. However, as a side-note, I don't think we should leave based on the fact that we should start what we finished, and do our best to create a sustainably stable country in Afganistan.

Also, I realise this is a massive escalation from a Twitter debate. Haha.

Author's note: I do not claim to be an expert. My conclusions are based on the readings listed below (in other words, I reserve the right to be completely wrong). Comments would be greatly appreciated, even if it simply consists of "STFU you are totally wrong GTFO". Though supporting evidence would also be appreciated. Just to clarify, any comments made won't do anything toward affecting my marks - I graduated earlier this year.

Sources:

Art, Robert J. and Richardson, Louise, Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.

Atwan, Abdel Bari. The Secret History of al-Qa’ida. London: Abacus, 2006.

Burke, Jason. Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam. 3rd ed. London: Penguin, 2007.

English, Richard. Terrorism: How to Respond. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Husain, Ed. The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw and Why I Left. London: Penguin, 2007.

Laqueur, Walter. The Age of Terrorism. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987.

Sayyid, S. A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism. 2nd ed. London: Zed Books, 2007.

Simons, Anna and David Tucker. “The Misleading Problem of Failed States: a ‘socio-geography’ of terrorism in the post-9/11 era.” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 387-401.

Wilkinson, Paul. Homeland Security in the UK: Future preparedness for terrorist attack since 9/11. London: Routledge, 2007.

Shortly after writing this passage I came across this work which confirmed my conclusions (but with far greater depth and eloquence), and I heartily recommend: John Mackinlay. The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to bin Laden. London: Hurst, 2009.