#when prophecy fails

[barbaragenova]

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Imagine, for a moment, that a group of people are convinced that in a few months a cataclysmic flood will destroy the North American continent. They also believe that, minutes before the catastrophe, a vehicle will arrive from outer space, swoop up this small band of believers, and carry them to safety on a distant planet. Suppose that these people are not wild-eyed kooks wearing white robes and carrying signs saying “REPENT!” but are intelligent, sensible people with nice homes, loving families, and good jobs. In accordance with their belief, they have quit their jobs and given away their money and possessions (who needs money and possessions on a far-off planet?). Now they are eagerly awaiting the arrival of the spaceship and the beginning of their adventure, which will take place precisely at midnight on December 21. How will these people feel and what will they do on December 22, assuming of course that North America still exists and the spaceship did not arrive? This question would be interesting to just about anyone. In 1954, though, it was particularly interesting to Leon Festinger, a brilliant young experimental social psychologist who was in the process of inventing a new theory of human behavior—the theory of cognitive dissonance—which was soon to emerge as the most exciting theory in social psychology. Essentially, the theory defined dissonance as the mental turmoil that is produced when a person holds two ideas that are incompatible: for example, the cognition “I know smoking can kill me” and the cognition “I’m smoking two packs a day.” Because dissonance is uncomfortable, people will try to reduce it by changing one or both cognitions to make them more consonant with each other. In this case, smokers could either give up cigarettes or justify smoking on some other grounds (“smoking reduces my anxiety”; “it keeps me from overeating”). The more important the issue and the greater the degree of a person’s commitment to it, the greater the dissonance—and the greater the need to reduce it. When Festinger learned of this doomsday group, by reading an account of “Mrs. Keech” and her predictions in a local newspaper, he saw a made-to-order way of putting his theory to the test. The members of her group had put themselves in a classic dissonance condition: They had made a specific prediction; they had publicly committed themselves to it; and they had taken actions in support of that belief that were virtually irrevocable. As one member of the group, a physician, put it: “I’ve given up just about everything. I’ve cut every tie: I’ve burned every bridge. I’ve turned my back on the world. I can’t afford to doubt. I have to believe.”

Elliot Aronson, from the foreword to Leon Festinger’s When Prophecy Fails

[triste-le-roy]

Cover to Leon Festinger, Henry W Riecken, & Stanley Schachter’s When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the World (unknown artist/designer, 1964).

(via Amazon)

[thelarrative-blog]

Oh god....I'm scrolling through the Larry tag on Twitter and apparently, Louis's denial is making Larries believe that Larry is more real than ever! Reasons: Louis said in another interview that he likes documentaries about conspiracy theories, Louis and Harry weren't asked together on video, he "stuttered and avoided the question," he said "people can believe what they want to believe" and he was looking down while answering.

What Festinger failed to understand is that prophecies, per se, almost never fail. They are instead component parts of a complex and interwoven belief system which tends to be very resilient to challenge from outsiders. While the rest of us might focus on the accuracy of an isolated claim as a test of a group's legitimacy, those who are part of that group—and already accept its whole theology—may not be troubled by what seems to them like a minor mismatch. A few people might abandon the group, typically the newest or least-committed adherents, but the vast majority experience little cognitive dissonance and so make only minor adjustments to their beliefs. They carry on, often feeling more spiritually enriched as a result.

Even without this sacred disclaimer, it's easy enough for a believer to reinterpret and revise the details of a prediction so that it fits whatever facts are on the ground. The research literature is littered with such examples. When atomic energy didn't sweep over the Earth to herald the Second Coming on Christmas Day 1967, the Universal Link group cheerfully reinterpreted their prophecy as pertaining to a spiritual force, rather than a physical effect. When flying saucers never announced their presence to humankind in 1976, the Unarian sect gently reworked its prophecy to refer more broadly to some point in "the future," while blaming limited human minds for misunderstanding the aliens' grand plan. When a Pentecostal group led by the God-channelling housewife Mrs. Shepard emerged after more than a month from self-built fallout shelters, they were pleased that the divinely ordained nuclear holocaust had not come to pass—and grateful for having passed a test of their faith.In fact, so many studies have been conducted on unfulfilled prophecies from religions large and small that they were compiled into a fascinating book from 2000, Expecting Armageddon. None of the groups described reacted to the unexpected persistence of the world with a zealous drive for new members, and most made just minor adjustments to their beliefs.

For those not waiting for the world to end in a storm of fire and light it is easy to write off the believers as deluded, but Festinger was not so wide of the mark when he suggested that we adapt to even the most unlikely of contradictions using nothing more than our methods of everyday rationalization. The faithful could just as easily be those who stubbornly stand by disgraced politicians, failed ideologies, dishonest friends, or cheating spouses, even when reality highlights the clearest of inconsistencies. Armageddon is unlikely to arrive this weekend, but most of us have lived through it many times before.

http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2011/05/prophecy_fail.html

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"I've had to go a long way. I've given up just about everything. I've cut every tie: I've burned every bridge. I've turned my back on the world. I can't afford to doubt. I have to believe."

— Cult member Dr. Armstrong, quoted in Leon Festinger's When Prophecy Fails

[starlitsilver]

currently reading "when prophecy fails", a book written in 1956 about failed doomsday movements. it's weird to think about what these kinds of movements looked like before the internet era

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Classical Freudian theory predicted that the ventilation of aggressive energy, in verbal or physical abuse, would be “cathartic,” leading to a reduction in hostility. But dissonance theory predicted that those who ventilate aggression against an individual will be in a state of dissonance: “I am a good, kind person” and “I just did a pretty mean thing to that guy.” Few people want to reduce dissonance by deciding they aren’t so good or kind after all; much easier to reduce it by justifying the harm they cause: “He deserved everything he got.” And if he deserved it, further aggression is warranted. This is why dissonance theory predicted that acts of abuse and aggression do not reduce violence, but often ensure its escalation. And that is exactly what they do.

Elliot Aronson, from the foreword to Leon Festinger’s When Prophecy Fails

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Theoretically, what is the situation of the individual believer at the pre-disconfirmation stage of such a movement? He has a strongly held belief in a prediction—for example, that Christ will return—a belief that is supported by the other members of the movement. By way of preparation for the predicted event, he has engaged in many activities that are entirely consistent with his belief. In other words, most of the relations among relevant cognitions are, at this point, consonant. Now what is the effect of the disconfirmation, of the unequivocal fact that the prediction was wrong, upon the believer? The disconfirmation introduces an important and painful dissonance. The fact that the predicted events did not occur is dissonant with continuing to believe both the prediction and the remainder of the ideology of which the prediction was the central item. The failure of the prediction is also dissonant with all the actions that the believer took in preparation for its fulfillment. The magnitude of the dissonance will, of course, depend on the importance of the belief to the individual and on the magnitude of his preparatory activity. In the type of movement we have discussed, the central belief and its accompanying ideology are usually of crucial importance in the believers’ lives and hence the dissonance is very strong—and very, painful to tolerate. Accordingly we should expect to observe believers making determined efforts to eliminate the dissonance or, at least, to reduce its magnitude. How may they accomplish this end? The dissonance would be largely eliminated if they discarded the belief that had been disconfirmed, ceased the behavior which had been initiated in preparation for the fulfillment of the prediction, and returned to a more usual existence… But frequently the behavioral commitment to the belief system is so strong that almost any other course of action is preferable. It may even be less painful to tolerate the dissonance than to discard the belief and admit one had been wrong… The dissonance is too important and though they may try to hide it, even from themselves, the believers still know that the prediction was false and all their preparations were in vain. The dissonance cannot be eliminated completely by denying or rationalizing the disconfirmation. But there is a way in which the remaining dissonance can be reduced. If more and more people can be persuaded that the system of belief is correct, then clearly it must, after all, be correct. Consider the extreme case: if everyone in the whole world believed something there would be no question at all as to the validity of this belief. It is for this reason that we observe the increase in proselyting following disconfirmation. If the proselyting proves successful, then by gathering more adherents and effectively surrounding himself with supporters, the believer reduces dissonance to the point where he can live with it.

Leon Festinger, from When Prophecy Fails