not so bite-sized case digests

law student from ph | 23

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DIGEST | Esteban vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 146646-49 (March 11, 2005)

criminal procedure; jurisdiction of sandiganbayan; offenses committed in relation to office

FACTS: Two Informations for violation of RA 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995) and two other Informations for acts of lasciviousness were filed against Judge Rogelio Esteban before the Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Judge Esteban has been soliciting sexual demands upon his casual employee, Ana Mae Simbajon, such as demanding her to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for her permanent appointment. It was also alleged that he once embraced her, kissed her all over her face, and touched her right breast which prompted Simbajon to file a complaint against him. It was expressly stated in the Informations that these acts were done in relation to his office or position.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged considering that they were not committed in relation to his office as a judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction in this case

RULING: Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction in this case because the crimes committed were intimately connected to his office.

Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by RA 8249, provides:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

In People v. Montejo, the Supreme Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. This is in accordance with the rule that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. Hence, where the information is wanting in specific factual averments to show the intimate relationship/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case.

In this case, it was alleged in the Information that Simbajon was constrained to approach Judge Esteban as she needed his recommendation. But he imposed a condition before extending such recommendation — she should be his girlfriend and must report daily to his office for a kiss. There can be no doubt, therefore, that petitioner used his official position in committing the acts complained of. While it is true that public office is not an element of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, nonetheless, he could not have committed the crimes charged were it not for the fact that as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC of Cabanatuan City, he has the authority to recommend the appointment of Ana May as bookbinder. In other words, the crimes allegedly committed are intimately connected with his office.

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. The Informations contain allegations showing that the acts of lasciviousness were committed by petitioner in relation to his official function.

Therefore, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction in this case.

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DIGEST | Gonzales vs. CA G.R. No L-37453 (May 25, 1979)

credible witnesses; succession

FACTS: On June 24, 1961, Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition for the probate of the will of Isabel Andres Gabriel. The will was written in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in Manila.

Petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales (Isabel’s niece), opposed the petition mainly alleging that the witnesses to the will were not credible. She contended that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. She further argued that the term “credible” should have the same meaning under the Naturalization Law.

ISSUE: W/N there is a need to introduce independent proof of the credibility of the witnesses (NO)

HELD:  Article 820 of the Civil Code provides for the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills, while Article 821 sets forth the disqualifications from being a witness.

Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this Code.

Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:

(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,

(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.

Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty, and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 are complied with and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821. Such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise.

“Credible Witness” under Naturalization Law

Under the Naturalization Law, it is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are character witnesses. In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution.

In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.

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DIGEST | Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) vs. CA G.R. No. 93891 (March 11, 1991)

pollution control law; p.d. 984; enviromental law

FACTS: On September 22, 1988, the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) issued an ex parte Order directing Solar Textile Finishing Corporation to immediately cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations. It was alleged that they were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. Two inspections from November 1986 and September 1988 of Solar’s facilities showed that their Wastewater Treatment Plant was non-operational and that their effluents showed the presence of pollutants on an excessive level of what was permissible under PD 984 or the “Pollution Control Law”. It was concluded that they were in violation of Section 8 of the said law which prohibits, among others, the drainage into any of the water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines any matter that shall cause pollution.

Solar then filed a petition for preliminary injunction. Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the Court declared the Writ of Execution against Solar null and void.

The Board claimed that under PD 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater and the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by them. They further contended that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the river provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar.

Solar, on the other hand, contended that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." According to them, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Board may issue an immediate cease and desist ex parte order against Solar

RULING: Yes. Section 7(a) of PD 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders whenever:

(a) the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or

(b) such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by them."

It is not always essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by them." The determination of "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life” is only necessary when the effluents or discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission.

The two inspections conducted in 1986 and 1988 concluded that there was at least prima facie evidence that the effluents from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical substances. Furthermore, the previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 1985 directing it to cease and refrain from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Notably, the Board refrained from issuing the ex parte order until re-inspections were conducted on 1988.

The law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations further provide that should the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contest the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. Solar should have availed of this remedy instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution.

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DIGEST | Hyatt Taxi vs. Catinoy  G.R. No. 143204 (June 26, 2001)

termination by employer; labor standards

Catinoy was not allowed to work even after his preventive suspension.Catinoy filed a complaint for illegal suspension, and thereafter amended it to constructive dismissal.

Facts: Catinoy was a taxi driver of Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc. He is also a member and officer of Hyatt Taxi Employees Association. One day he found out that his desk was forcibly opened and found out that it was the acting union president, Saturnino, who opened it to retrieve some documents particularly the list of union members.  An argument began that ended in blows where Catinoy was injured so he filed a criminal complaint for physical injuries against Saturnino (1ST CASE). The union asked the company to suspend them both for fighting and a memo was issued. It said that company rules and the union’s by laws had been violated so they were put on suspension for 30 days.

Catinoy, aggrieved by the preventive suspension since he was not the aggressor, filed a complaint for illegal suspension (2ND CASE), unpaid wages, and damages against both the association-union and management.

After 30 days of suspension, he reported for work, but he was not allowed to because of the criminal complaint and illegal suspension cases he filed. Since there was no response from Respondent company, complainant decided to amend his complaint to include constructive dismissal as an additional cause of action since he was not allowed to resume his employment after the lapse of his preventive suspension.

The LA ruled that there was illegal preventive suspension and constructive dismissal.

NLRC affirmed it but did not award back wages because there was no concrete showing of illegal dismissal and it was only constructive illegal dismissal.

The CA reversed it and ruled that there was illegal dismissal and awarded full back wages.

Issue: WON there was constructive dismissal? (YES)

Ruling: The factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, which the NLRC initially adopted, show that respondent was not taken back by petitioner after the 30-day suspension period that petitioner imposed on respondent had lapsed. Clearly, constructive dismissal had already set in when the suspension went beyond the maximum period allowed by law. Section 4, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules provides that preventive suspension cannot be more than the maximum period of 30 days. Hence, we have ruled that after the 30-day period of suspension, the employee must be reinstated to his former position because suspension beyond this maximum period amounts to constructive dismissal.

Hyatt’s contention: Alleges that it was Catinoy who went AWOL and who refused to resume his work because he could not account for union funds.

Held: Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC rejected petitioner's claims. We affirm the rejection. It bears stressing that in illegal dismissal cases, it is the employer who has the burden of proof.

Since Hyatt claims that Catinoy abandoned his work, Hyatt has to establish the concurrence of the following: (1) the employee's intention to abandon employment and (2) overt acts from which such intention may be inferred—as when the employee shows no desire to resume work. Hyatt failed to make out its case of abandonment. There were no overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that Catinoy had no intention of returning to work anymore. Also, the fact that Catinoy filed a complaint against his employer within a reasonable period of time belies abandonment.

Constructive dismissal does not always involve forthright dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation, benefit and privileges. There may be constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.

Here, what made it impossible or unacceptable for Catinoy to resume work was Hyatt’s insistence that Catinoy first desist from filing his criminal complaint against the acting president of the union and to withdraw his complaint for illegal suspension against them before he could be allowed to return to work. Catinoy refused and amended his complaint to include constructive dismissal. Catinoy’s refusal to yield to petitioner's conditioned offer to take him back is understandable for he has every right not to bargain away his right to prosecute his complaints in exchange for the employment to which he was in the first place rightfully entitled.

From the time that petitioner failed to recall respondent to work after the expiration of the suspension period, taken together with petitioner's precondition that respondent withdraw the complaints against the acting president of the union and against petitioner itself, respondent's security of tenure was already undermined by petitioner. Petitioner's actions undoubtedly constitute constructive dismissal.

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DIGEST | Republic of the Philippines vs. Ortigas G.R. No.171496 (March 3, 2014)

expropriation; just compensation; bill of rights

Facts: Respodent Ortigas and Company Ltd. Partnership was the owner of a 70,278sqm property in Pasig City. Upon the request of DPWH, Ortigas caused the segregation of its property into five lots and reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover project. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A, a 1,445-square-meter portion of its property, for the road widening of Ortigas Avenue. Ortigas also caused the annotation of the term "road widening" on its title. The title was then inscribed with an encumbrance that it was for road widening and subject to Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.

The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only 396 square meters of the 1,445-square-meter allotment for the project. Consequently, Ortigas further subdivided Lot 5-B-2-A into two lots: one which was used for the road widening and the other which was unused.

Petition

On February 14, 2001, Ortigas filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the government Lot 5-B-2-A-1.7 Ortigas alleged that the DPWH requested the conveyance of the property for road widening purposes. Despite due notice to the public, no one appeared to oppose Ortigas’ petition.

Among other things, Ortigas, through their liason officer Mr. Romulo Rosete, alleged that they were not compensated for the use of the property.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition, alleging that Ortigas' property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the government pursuant to Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, (Property Registration Decree).

Section 50. Subdivision and consolidation plans. Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do not constitute a subdivision project as defined and provided for under P.D. No. 957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries, streets, passageways and waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.

If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands together with the approved technical descriptions and the corresponding owner’s duplicate certificate of title is presented for registration, the Register of Deeds shall, without requiring further court approval of said plan, register the same in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended: Provided, however, that the Register of Deeds shall annotate on the new certificate of title covering the street, passageway or open space, a memorandum to the effect that except by way of donation in favor of the national government, province, city or municipality, no portion of any street, passageway, waterway or open space so delineated on the plan shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner without the approval of the Court of First Instance of the province or city in which the land is situated.

Both the RTC and CA denied the Republic’s motions.

Issue: WON Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to the Republic only by donation, in accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

Held: No.

Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not apply in a case that is the proper subject of an expropriation proceeding

Respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government. It must be compensated because its property was taken and utilized for public road purposes.

Republic’s reliance on Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree is erroneous. Section 50 contemplates roads and streets in a subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built on a private property that was taken from an owner for public purpose. A public thoroughfare is not a subdivision road or street.

When there is taking of private property for some public purpose, the owner of the property taken is entitled to be compensated.

There is taking when the following elements are present:

1.      The government must enter the private property;

2.      The entrance into the private property must be indefinite or permanent;

3.      There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property;

4.      The property is devoted to public use or purpose;

5.      The use of property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

All of the above elements are present in this case. Petitioner’s construction of a road on Ortigas’ property for the use of the general public is an obvious permanent entry on petitioner’s part. Given that the road was constructed for general public use stamps it with public character, and coursing the entry through the DPWH gives it a color of legal authority. As a result of petitioner’s entry, Ortigas may not enjoy the property as it did before.

Subdivision roads/streets are primarily for private use

Not all lots delineated as roads and streets form part of subdivision roads and streets that are subject to Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree. Subdivision roads and streets are constructed primarily for the benefit of the owners of the surrounding properties. They are, thus, constructed primarily for private use — as opposed to delineated road lots taken at the instance of the government for the use and benefit of the general public. In this case, the lot was reserved for road widening at the instance of the Republic.

Since the Constitution proscribes taking of private property without just compensation, any taking must entail a corresponding appropriation for that purpose. Public funds, however, may only be appropriated for public purpose as employment of public funds to benefit a private individual constitutes malversation. Therefore, private subdivision streets not taken for public use may only be donated to the government.

In contrast, when the road or street was delineated upon government request and taken for public use, as in this case, the government has no choice but to compensate the owner for his or her sacrifice, lest it violates the constitutional provision against taking without just compensation.

As with all laws, Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree cannot be interpreted to mean a license on the part of the government to disregard constitutionally guaranteed rights.

The right to compensation under Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution was put in place to protect the individual from and restrain the State’s sovereign power of eminent domain. Thus, while the government’s power to take for public purpose is inherent and immense, it is delimited by the right of an individual to be compensated.

Title to the subject lot remains under respondent Ortigas’ name. The government is already in possession of the property but is yet to acquire title to it. To legitimize such possession, petitioner Republic of the Philippines must acquire the property from respondent Ortigas by instituting expropriation proceedings or through negotiated sale, which has already been recognized in law as a mode of government acquisition of private property for public purpose.