Introduction; Japanese Tank Doctrine from 1930′s to 1945
When I was planning out this series at first I was unsure where I should place this segment, whether I should just put it somewhere around the middle of the series as I go or have it at the end as an addendum. After some thought I decided that detailing how the Japanese used their tanks would probably be the best place to start, then get into the fine details of Japanese tanks and tank doctrine, most likely mentioning and restating many of the points I’ve made in this post again to better detail how changing doctrine resulted in changing tank designs. So, here goes…
Japan is unique in that in the 1930’s and World War II it was the only non-western nation to build it’s own tank force, and while among military history buffs American, Soviet, German, and British tanks are famous, Japanese tanks are a relatively unknown afterthought. Japan’s first experience with tank warfare occurred during World War I when the British donated two Whippet Tanks to the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) in 1918, which were deployed in Japan’s intervention during the Russian Civil War. In the early 1920’s Japan purchased several French Renault FTs, which spurred more Japanese interest in tank warfare and design. Japan’s tank program began in 1925 when it attempted to design and build it’s first indigenous tank, which was a failure. The first successful tank, the Type 89 I-Go medium tank was adopted in 1928, and the first deployment of tanks in combat occurred in 1932 with the First Battle of Shanghai.
Type 89 I-Go during the Battle of Shanghai, 1932
In those early days of tank warfare, there was much debate as to how tanks were supposed to be used with almost all major powers agreeing that tanks were primarily to be used for infantry support. Japan was no exception, with Japanese tank doctrine up until World War II primarily focused on using medium tanks to support infantry assaults on enemy positions. These tanks sported guns that were of relatively high caliber and low velocity and were primarily used to lob high explosive shells in order to destroy enemy fortifications such as pillboxes, machine gun nests, rifle pits, and trenches. While these guns and shells were effective against soft targets, they were often ineffective against other tanks or armored vehicles. Medium tanks were also very slow so that infantry could keep pace with them. Faster light tanks, armored cars, and tankettes were to be used similar to the cavalry by acting as reconnaissance vehicles, escorts, and skirmishers. While this was official doctrine, it was not uncommon for light tanks and armored cars to be pressed into the same combat role as medium tanks. Since most Japanese military operations in the 1930’s occurred in China the Japanese could get away with this. The Chinese lacked anti-tank weaponry and only had a token tank force of their own, leaving Japanese armored forces practically uncontested during the 1930′s.
Japanese tank doctrine and development radically changed between 1939 and 1941 as a result of two events. First was the Japanese invasion of Mongolia, a disastrous campaign leading to the Battle of Khalkin Gol where Soviet armored forces and anti-tank guns revealed Japanese tanks to be woefully behind in technology. Second and most important was Germany’s infamous blitzkrieg across Europe spearheaded by their Panzer divisions. Whereas before doctrine held that tanks were for infantry support, the Germans demonstrated that tanks were a powerful offensive weapon in their own right. The Japanese attempted to shift their tank doctrine from the old style of tanks supporting infantry, to the new German style of armored warfare with infantry supporting tanks. This, however, proved impossible and was too little, too late for several reasons. First the war shifted to other parts of the Pacific which were mostly either dense jungle, mountains, or small islands with terrain not conducive to maneuver warfare. Second, Japanese priorities moved away from tanks as naval forces became more important. Japan had limited amounts of steel and most was used to support the Imperial Japanese Navy in order to maintain what was now a massive maritime empire. This not only included warships and naval aircraft, but the hundreds if not thousands of supply ships needed to support both the navy and the army.
Japanese Empire in 1942, the conquest of a large island empire forced Japan to redirect resources away from tank production and design in order to maintain a large navy.
As a result Japanese tank production suffered, peaking in 1941 and sharply decreasing thereafter.
The only country where Japan could conduct mobile tank warfare was in China, however this was foiled by American involvement in World War II when the United States started supplying the Chinese Army with anti-tank weapons and Sherman tanks. The new Sherman tank could easily curbstomp most Japanese tanks, whose piddly little guns fired shells that merely bounced off the Sherman’s thicker armor. Even infantry anti tank weapons such as the bazooka could easily make short work of Japanese tanks. Thus in China the Japanese went from being the unquestioned master of armored warfare to being completely dominated by Chinese and Allied forces. Blitzkrieg in China was not gonna happen.
Chinese Sherman Tank in Burma
In the rest of the Pacific Theater, as a result of terrain Japanese tanks were mostly used as infantry support or static defense. In island warfare they were usually entrenched in fortified positions, with the chassis buried and only the turret sticking out.
The Japanese had some dedicated anti-tank guns, but usually not enough, resulting in such entrenched tanks being expected to act in an anti-tank role. This was a very flawed idea, not only because tanks that are immobile make poor tanks, but as I mentioned in the previous paragraph Japanese tanks could not compete with the American Sherman as well as other Allied tanks such as the British Matilda. Such fortified, stationary tanks also made easy pickings for infantry who could knock it out with anti-tank weapons or rush it’s position and destroy it with bombs.
The final phase of Japanese tank warfare during this era I would call the “desperation phase”. This occurred during the final years of the war when it was clear that Japan would lose and Japanese forces resorted to tactics such as suicide bombs and kamikaze strikes. On a few occasions Japanese tank forces conducted what were essentially armored “banzai charges”, which were massive, suicidal frontal assaults against Allied forces with disastrous results. On the night of June 16th, 1944, during the US invasion of Saipan 44 Japanese tanks conducted one such charge against American Marines, who were supported by a platoon of M4A2 Sherman tanks and 75mm anti tank half tracks. After a short battle, all but a few of the tanks were knocked out and destroyed with minimal American losses. In other battles smaller but similar tank assaults occurred with similar results. In 1945 a company of Japanese tanks attempted a similar attack against a force of 100 Soviet T-34 tanks during the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. Rather than obey orders from the Imperial Government to surrender, the company chose to go out in a blaze of glory, and the Soviets obliged without suffering any casualties.
In the next installment I’m going to get into individual tanks models and the history of Japanese tank development.
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