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Decoding power and defying narratives, an independent geopolitical analysis exposing hidden agendas and challenging mainstream views. Think critically, freely, and beyond the headlines.

[global-geopolitics]

An Ethnic Cleansing Campaign Is Underway in the West Bank

Israeli accounts describe organised militia in “Hundreds” operating with official support as Israeli MPs define the violence as terrorism

A pattern of organised removal of Palestinians from land in the West Bank cannot be understood as a recent deviation, given the historical record extending from the Nakba through successive phases of territorial consolidation. Large-scale displacement during 1948 established the structural foundation for demographic engineering, followed by military occupation after the Six-Day War which placed the West Bank under Israeli control. Settlement construction expanded steadily thereafter, accompanied by legal, administrative, and military measures that altered land ownership patterns and restricted Palestinian movement. United Nations resolutions, including UN Security Council Resolution 242 and UN Security Council Resolution 2334, defined the settlements as lacking legal validity, yet enforcement mechanisms remained absent, allowing facts on the ground to accumulate over decades.

Current developments described by Israeli political and journalistic sources indicate continuity with earlier patterns rather than any departure from them. Ehud Olmert wrote that “a militia of hundreds of Jews is operating in the West Bank with direct and indirect backing from Israeli government officials, while security agencies have deliberately chosen not to take action against them,” alongside the assessment that “a settler drive to ethnically cleanse Palestinians is underway in the West Bank. Israel’s security apparatus is complicit.” The scale described exceeds marginal activity and reflects organised capacity sustained over time. These accounts describe “a violent and criminal effort… to ethnically cleanse territories in the West Bank,” carried out by armed settler groups targeting Palestinian communities through the burning of agricultural assets, destruction of homes and vehicles, and direct physical violence intended to force displacement. Within the same domestic political sphere, Meirav Cohen warned in the Knesset that such violence constitutes a serious threat to both Palestinians and the State of Israel, stating that it cannot be justified as self-defence and describing it as “Jewish terrorism,” adding that “terrorism does not become terrorism only if it is committed against Jews.”

Operational patterns align with earlier documented practices identified by historians such as Ilan Pappé, who described systematic removal strategies during 1948 as planned processes rather than incidental wartime outcomes. Contemporary accounts describe “the rioters, the Jewish terrorists, storm Palestinians with hate and violence with one objective: to force them to flee from their homes,” establishing intent consistent with forced displacement. The stated aim that land will then be “prepared for Jewish settlement, en route to realizing the dream of annexing all the territories” reflects long-standing ideological currents within segments of the settler movement.

Institutional behaviour described in these accounts indicates structural facilitation. Police forces are reported to observe or ignore incidents, with “police officers and soldiers closing their eyes,” while victims face arrest and perpetrators avoid identification or prosecution. “The police are actively abetting, as a policy, the committing of criminal acts,” a statement that moves beyond negligence into attribution of deliberate conduct. The operational absence of enforcement contrasts with the extensive capabilities of Israeli security institutions in other contexts.The intelligence apparatus demonstrates similar selectivity. The Shin Bet, known for preventive detention, surveillance, and targeted disruption of Palestinian militant networks, appears not to deploy equivalent measures against settler groups. “It seems that the Shin Bet isn’t using the effective means it exercises against Palestinian terrorism against the Jewish terrorists,” indicating differentiated application of state power based on identity rather than conduct.

Policy decisions reinforce permissive conditions. Removal of administrative detention for Jewish suspects, associated with the tenure of Benjamin Netanyahu and his coalition partners, eliminated a deterrent previously used to pre-empt violence. Armed capacity among settler groups expanded alongside political encouragement linked to Itamar Ben-Gvir, whose public positioning has aligned with increased civilian armament in the territories. Military forces present during incidents are described as failing to intervene, and in some cases acting in coordination with settlers or remaining passive observers.Political and communal endorsement provides an enabling environment. Statements by Israel Ganz calling for Palestinian population centres to be reduced to ruins were delivered without public opposition among settler audiences. Silence within a population numbering in the hundreds of thousands functions as tacit support, reinforced by logistical assistance that allows perpetrators to evade arrest. Claims that such actors represent a marginal fringe are contradicted by the scale of participation and the consistency of local backing.Israeli political figures have characterised these actions using established terminology. Meirav Cohen stated that “terrorism does not become terrorism only if it is committed against Jews,” and identified settler violence as “Jewish terrorism,” rejecting claims of self-defence. This framing aligns with legal definitions centred on violence against civilians for political ends, irrespective of the identity of perpetrators.

Developments in the West Bank intersect with broader regional dynamics, including ongoing conflict in Gaza Strip and heightened tensions involving Iran. Periods of external conflict have historically coincided with accelerated settlement expansion and consolidation of territorial control. Strategic focus on external threats creates political space for internal reconfiguration, while international attention shifts toward active theatres of war. Expansion under such conditions reduces immediate external scrutiny and alters facts on the ground before diplomatic processes can respond.Legal exposure at the international level has increased. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants related to conduct in Gaza, including against Yoav Gallant, though debate persists regarding evidentiary standards in that context. Distinction arises in the West Bank where actions are described as occurring openly, with consistent patterns and visible institutional non-response. “Here, everything is in the open and done in front of those parties responsible for enforcing the law,” shifting the evidentiary basis from isolated incidents to sustained practice.

Cumulative evidence across decades indicates a trajectory defined by incremental displacement supported by administrative policy, legal structures, and, in the current phase, organised civilian violence operating with state tolerance or support. Present conditions described by Israeli officials and commentators reflect an intensification of that trajectory rather than a departure from it, with methods adapted to current political and military circumstances.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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[global-geopolitics]

Trump Blundered Now The Strait of Hormuz is Closed

Trump’s Strategic Miscalculation and How Insurance Markets, Not Missiles, Could Shut Down the World’s Most Critical Energy Chokepoint

After the U.S. military operation in Venezuela in early January that resulted in the capture of Nicolás Maduro and his wife, who were flown to the United States to face federal narcotics and related charges, the Trump administration appeared emboldened to take a similarly aggressive approach toward Iran. The Venezuelan operation, a short, dramatic raid in Caracas that Trump touted as a decisive success, raised legal and geopolitical concerns worldwide, with critics calling it an unprecedented use of force that bypassed international norms. 

In the weeks that followed, Trump escalated U.S. military pressure on Iran, authorising air strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, including strategic sites such as Fordow and Natanz. These operations were described by U.S. officials as aimed at degrading Iran’s nuclear programme, and at least one senior Iranian leader, Ali Khamenei, was reported killed in a series of strikes. 

Trump reportedly pushed for a campaign that went beyond limited strikes, at times suggesting regime change in Tehran. His critics argue this ambitious goal overlooked military realities and the risks of a broader Middle East conflict. Analysts noted that prolonged bombing, deep degradation of Iran’s command structure, and pressure to surrender or overthrow its leadership could lead to extensive regional instability with no clear exit strategy. 

U.S. military leaders cautioned that objectives like overthrowing Iran’s government or forcing an unconditional surrender were not easily achievable and carried the danger of escalating into a wider war, potentially resulting in significant U.S. casualties and long-term entanglement. Senior commanders reportedly warned that removing Iran’s leadership could unify rather than fracture the country’s armed forces and security apparatus. 

As Iranian forces responded to U.S. strikes, including missile salvos toward naval assets such as the USS Abraham Lincoln, diplomatic channels frayed. Attempts at negotiation have been inconsistent, and while the United States signalled willingness to talk at times, Tehran often set conditions that Washington rejected. 

Now, as the conflict persists, there is growing concern among analysts that the United States may shift toward considering a ground invasion, a strategy fraught with the same problems seen in long-drawn conflicts such as Vietnam or Iraq. Critics warn that without achievable goals, clear strategy, or strong international backing, expanding U.S. involvement risks turning the confrontation into a costly, protracted war.

(An elaborate colonial project, total occupation of the middle east )

The escalation  has shifted from the visible realm of missiles and air defenses to something far less dramatic but potentially far more consequential: insurance contracts. Roughly twenty million barrels of oil passed through the Strait of Hormuz yesterday, a volume that represents about one fifth of the world’s petroleum consumption and a similar share of global seaborne liquefied natural gas. Today, that number could fall precipitously-not because Iran physically mined the waterway or struck a tanker, but because war-risk underwriters at Lloyd’s of London and associated syndicates began reassessing their exposure within hours of Operation Epic Fury. Premiums reportedly surged by roughly fifty percent almost immediately. The baseline war-risk rate for a Hormuz transit had hovered near 0.25 percent of a vessel’s hull value, meaning that a tanker valued at one hundred million dollars would incur an additional $250,000 per voyage. Under peak escalation pricing, that figure can approach or exceed one million dollars per transit. For ships linked to American or Israeli commercial interests, coverage in some instances is said to be unavailable at any price. Without insurance, ships do not sail; without a policy, there is no passage.

The reaction across global shipping lanes was swift and revealing. Tankers altered course mid-transit, halted at anchorage, or diverted altogether. A vessel loaded with Omani crude bound for Basra reportedly executed a U-turn and redirected toward India. Another carrying two million barrels of Saudi crude destined for China stopped at the western approach to the Gulf. A third, laden with Iraqi crude for Rotterdam, paused off Sharjah. Major shipping firms instructed their fleets to avoid the strait, and governments with large merchant marines advised caution or reassessment. None of these ships had been fired upon. None had suffered damage. What they received instead was a call from insurers recalculating risk in real time. The message was simple: the actuarial environment had changed.

The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz is rooted not merely in geopolitics but in geology. More than fifty million years ago, the Arabian plate collided with the Eurasian plate, compressing what is now the Persian Gulf into a basin that drains through a single maritime bottleneck just twenty-one miles wide at its narrowest navigable point. Through that corridor flows approximately twenty-one percent of global petroleum and around twenty percent of all seaborne liquefied natural gas. Modern industrial civilization depends on energy volumes forced through a channel narrower than the English Channel and bordered on one side by Iran. For decades, U.S. naval planners have rehearsed scenarios involving attempts to close or disrupt Hormuz. During Operation Praying Mantis in 1988, U.S. forces crippled much of Iran’s operational navy in a matter of hours. Today, a carrier strike group centered on the USS Abraham Lincoln carries sufficient firepower to overwhelm Iran’s conventional naval assets in short order. Yet the decisive variable in the present moment is not whether the United States can win a naval engagement. It is whether commercial insurers deem the risk of transit acceptable.

Financial markets have begun pricing in the possibility that Hormuz becomes economically rather than physically closed. Major investment banks have projected that Brent crude could spike to $110 per barrel under sustained disruption, with more severe scenarios pushing prices toward $120 or even $130. At those levels, airlines move rapidly from thin profitability to steep losses, shipping costs rise across global supply chains, and manufacturing input prices climb. Central banks that have spent years tightening monetary policy to combat inflation could find those gains reversed almost overnight as energy costs ripple through transportation, food, and consumer goods. While Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess pipelines that bypass Hormuz, their combined capacity is roughly three million barrels per day, far short of the twenty million barrels that typically transit the strait. The arithmetic is stark and unforgiving; partial substitution does not compensate for systemic disruption.

The asymmetry embedded in this dynamic is striking. Iran does not need to mine the strait or sink tankers to exert leverage. It does not need to defeat the U.S. Navy in open combat. It only needs to generate sufficient uncertainty that private markets, governed by risk models rather than political resolve, decline to insure passage. Modern global commerce depends not solely on physical security but on financial confidence: contracts, underwriting, credit lines, and actuarial assumptions. When those assumptions shift, trade pauses even in the absence of gunfire. Ships idle at anchorage not because they cannot physically transit, but because the legal and financial framework enabling their voyage has dissolved. In this sense, the chokepoint is not merely geographic but economic. A naval superpower can project overwhelming force into the Persian Gulf, but it cannot compel an insurance syndicate to absorb what it deems unquantifiable geopolitical risk. The lesson emerging from the current crisis is that in a tightly integrated global energy system, you do not necessarily need to close a strait with mines or missiles. You need only make it uninsurable.

Authored By: Global Geopolitics

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[global-geopolitics]

Kaja Kallas Revisits Russia’s Frozen Fortune

The EU’s Chief Diplomat Resurrects a Perilous Seizure Plan, Laying Bare the Legal Absurdities and Strategic Contradictions at the Heart of Europe’s Ukraine Policy

The European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, has revived the contentious proposal to appropriate frozen Russian sovereign assets for the benefit of Ukraine, following Hungary’s veto of a €90 billion assistance package intended for Kiev. Her remarks, made in the wake of the latest impasse within the Council, underscore not merely a financial dilemma but a profound strategic and legal quandary at the heart of Europe’s policy toward the war in Ukraine.

Since the escalation of hostilities in 2022, Western governments have immobilised approximately $300 billion in reserves belonging to the Russian Central Bank. A substantial portion of these funds remains lodged within the Brussels-based clearing house Euroclear, rendering Belgium and the broader eurozone central actors in any decision regarding their ultimate disposition. What began as a sanctions measure designed to constrain Moscow’s financial manoeuvrability has gradually evolved into a debate over whether those assets might be converted into a financial lifeline for Kiev.

An earlier attempt to transform the frozen reserves into collateral for a reparations-style loan faltered amid resistance from several member states, notably Belgium, whose authorities are acutely aware of the legal and reputational implications for a financial centre that has long depended upon the sanctity of custodial neutrality. The compromise that followed — a €90 billion loan underwritten by the Union’s common budget — was itself a significant step in the EU’s fiscal integration, echoing the collective borrowing instruments pioneered during the pandemic. Yet this arrangement, too, has now foundered upon the rock of Hungarian opposition. In the immediate aftermath of Budapest’s veto, President Volodymyr Zelensky addressed the European Parliament by video link, urging lawmakers to unblock what he described as a ‘real financial guarantee’ of Ukraine’s security and resilience. Framing the €90 billion facility as indispensable to sustaining both military operations and the ordinary functions of the state, he cast delay not as procedural hesitation but as strategic peril. His intervention transformed what had been a technical dispute over fiscal instruments into a public test of Europe’s resolve.

The government in Budapest has linked its veto to a separate but strategically charged dispute concerning the Druzhba pipeline, the Soviet-era artery that conveys Russian oil into Central Europe. Hungary contends that Ukraine’s actions have resulted in the suspension of supplies vital to its energy security; Kiev, for its part, attributes the disruption to Russian conduct. Thus a financial instrument conceived as an expression of European solidarity has become entangled with the enduring vulnerabilities of Central Europe’s energy geography. The dispute reveals the extent to which the Union’s external posture toward Moscow remains inseparable from internal divergences over energy dependence, sovereignty, and national interest.

In resurrecting the notion of deploying frozen Russian assets, Kallas has effectively signalled that Brussels may yet contemplate a more radical course should intergovernmental consensus on conventional borrowing prove unattainable. However, the seizure, as opposed to the continued freezing, of sovereign reserves would constitute a momentous departure from established principles of international finance. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, though not inviolable, has long served as a stabilising pillar of the global monetary order. To override it would risk setting a precedent whose reverberations could extend far beyond the present conflict.

From a geopolitical perspective, such a move would deepen the structural rift between Russia and the European Union, rendering any eventual diplomatic normalisation more remote. Moscow has already characterised the proposal as expropriation and initiated legal proceedings against Euroclear in Russian courts. Should the assets be confiscated outright, retaliatory measures against European holdings within Russia would be not merely possible but probable. The long-term effect could be an acceleration of financial decoupling, with non-Western powers reassessing the safety of reserves held in euro- or dollar-denominated institutions.

Moreover, the question extends beyond the bilateral antagonism between Brussels and Moscow. For states in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the handling of Russian sovereign funds constitutes a test of Western commitment to legal consistency. If reserve assets can be appropriated on political grounds, confidence in the neutrality of Western financial infrastructure may erode. In an era already marked by efforts among emerging powers to diversify away from Western-dominated clearing systems, such a precedent could hasten the gradual fragmentation of the global financial architecture.

Yet the countervailing argument within Europe is equally forceful. To many policymakers, allowing Russian assets to remain untouched while Ukraine bears the material devastation of war appears morally untenable. The logic of reparations, that an aggressor should finance reconstruction, carries political resonance. Furthermore, with public finances strained and electoral pressures mounting across the continent, the prospect of mobilising existing Russian reserves rather than additional European taxpayer funds holds evident appeal.

Zelensky’s demand for immediate implementation of the loan further heightens this dilemma. By coupling urgent fiscal necessity with an appeal to European solidarity, Kiev exerts pressure upon Brussels to reconcile its legal scruples with its strategic commitments. The more insistent Ukraine becomes, the narrower the space for cautious incrementalism; and the more Europe hesitates, the more attractive, however perilous, the confiscation of Russian reserves appears as an expedient alternative.”

Thus the debate over frozen assets encapsulates a larger tension within the European project: the desire to act decisively in defence of Ukraine, set against the Union’s foundational commitment to legalism and financial prudence. Hungary’s veto has exposed the fragility of unanimity in foreign policy and the susceptibility of collective decisions to national grievances. Whether Brussels ultimately advances toward asset seizure or redoubles its efforts at compromise will signal much about the trajectory of European integration under the strain of prolonged war.

In the final reckoning, the issue is not merely one of budgetary expediency but of systemic consequence. To convert frozen Russian reserves into instruments of policy would be to reshape the relationship between geopolitics and global finance. The European Union must therefore weigh not only the immediate imperatives of Ukrainian support, but the enduring architecture of international order upon which its own prosperity has long depended.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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[global-geopolitics]

Washington Drops the Mask and Calls for Informants Inside Iran

Iranian Leadership Casts CIA Recruitment Appeal as Proof of Regime Destabilization Efforts

In a move that dispenses with even the pretense of neutrality, the CIA’s verified X account publicly issued a Persian-language appeal urging Iranians to contact the agency through secure channels, promising it can “hear your voice.” The message included instructions on using Tor and VPNs to evade surveillance, not the language of diplomacy, but of clandestine recruitment. Framed as support for the Iranian people, the outreach functions in practice as an open call for intelligence assets inside a sovereign state, broadcast to the world in real time as tensions with Tehran inch toward open conflict.

The timing is not accidental. As Washington tightens economic pressure, expands military deployments, and amplifies war rhetoric, the public solicitation of sources signals that the battlefield is not only airspace and sea lanes but also the interior of Iran itself. It underscores a decades-long strategy: cultivate insiders, exploit fractures, and prepare the ground for internal destabilization should external pressure fail to produce capitulation. What once occurred in shadows is now advertised in plain sight, a digital leaflet drop for the 21st century.

Iranian leaders responded with fury but little surprise. Officials have long accused the United States and Israel of nurturing networks designed to inflame unrest and fracture the state from within. During the protests earlier this year, Tehran alleged that armed cells and agitators were activated to escalate violence beyond spontaneous demonstrations. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei denounced the upheaval as “foreign-backed meddling” intended to “devour Iran,” while labeling Donald Trump a “criminal” for encouraging agitation. President Masoud Pezeshkian argued that Washington and Tel Aviv were exploiting economic hardship as a lever to tear the nation apart from the inside.

Whether one accepts Tehran’s claims or not, the optics of a public intelligence recruitment drive are unmistakable. It blurs the line between supporting civil society and orchestrating subversion, between advocacy and intervention. To Iranian hardliners, it validates every warning they have issued about foreign plots. To ordinary citizens, it creates a perilous dilemma: engagement could mean, though clouded in total ignorance, hope for change, or the risk of being branded a traitor by their own government.

What is evident is that the episode reflects a deeper reality, that neither Washington nor Tel Aviv appears willing to tolerate the current insubordinate, non-compliant Iranian system indefinitely, while Tehran views foreign outreach as an existential threat to its sovereignty. The result is a silent escalation beneath the headlines, a struggle for loyalty, information, and internal leverage that precedes and perhaps aims to avoid outright war, yet makes that war more likely by eroding trust and raising paranoia on all sides.

In the end, the message served as a signal flare, marking the open escalation of a covert contest over Iran’s future, a declaration that the contest over Iran’s future is already underway, fought not only with sanctions and missiles but with whispers, passwords, and the dangerous promise that someone, somewhere, is listening.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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[global-geopolitics]

EU’s Kallas Floats Conditions for Russia in Prospective Ukraine Settlement

EU foreign policy chief signals bloc will seek military limits on Moscow despite lacking seat at negotiating table

The European Union intends to propose restrictions on the size of the Russian armed forces as part of any eventual settlement of the Ukraine conflict, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Tuesday, signaling Brussels’ intention to assert influence over negotiations from which it is currently excluded.

Speaking to reporters, Kallas indicated she is preparing a list of conditions that the EU believes should accompany any peace arrangement between Moscow and Kiev. Although the bloc is not formally participating in US-mediated contacts, she argued that European approval would be essential for any durable outcome.

“Everybody around the table, including the Russians and the Americans, needs to understand that you need Europeans to agree,” Kallas said. “And for that, we also have conditions. And we should put the conditions not on Ukrainians… but on the Russians.”

According to Kallas, the focus should be on constraining Moscow’s military capabilities rather than limiting Ukraine’s armed forces. “The Ukrainian army is not the issue. It’s the Russian army. It’s the Russian military expenditure. If they spend so much on the military they will have to use it again,” she said. Her office is expected to present the proposed conditions to EU member states in the coming days.

Moscow has consistently rejected the premise that its military posture is the core issue, arguing instead that the conflict stems from the 2014 change of government in Kiev and NATO’s subsequent deepening engagement with Ukraine. Russian officials maintain that Western military backing and Ukraine’s aspirations to join the US-led alliance left Moscow with diminishing strategic space.

In early 2022, Russia and Ukraine reportedly discussed a draft settlement that would have enshrined Ukraine’s neutrality and imposed limits on its armed forces. Kiev later withdrew from talks, with Russian officials claiming Western governments encouraged Ukraine to pursue a military solution instead.

The EU has been among Ukraine’s principal financial and military backers throughout the conflict. Several European states have floated the idea of deploying troops to Ukraine as a security guarantee in the event of a ceasefire—an option Moscow has categorically rejected.

At the same time, European leaders acknowledge their support would be significantly weakened without sustained US involvement. French President Emmanuel Macron recently warned that Washington could ultimately dictate terms affecting European interests, including the timeline of Ukraine’s potential accession to the EU.

Kallas’s remarks underscore a core tension within the Western coalition: Europe’s strategic proximity to the conflict contrasts with its limited leverage over the principal negotiating channel, which currently runs through Washington. By proposing conditions on Russia’s military capacity, Brussels appears to be seeking both relevance and deterrent guarantees in a process it does not formally control.

However, demanding caps on Russia’s armed forces raises complex geopolitical questions. Historically, limitations on military size have emerged either from decisive defeat (as in post–World War I Germany), mutual arms-control frameworks negotiated between roughly equal powers (such as Cold War treaties), or voluntary restructuring tied to internal transformation. None of those conditions clearly apply in the present case.

Russia remains a nuclear-armed power with global force projection capabilities and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Any attempt to impose unilateral limits without reciprocal concessions or enforcement mechanisms would likely be viewed in Moscow as tantamount to a demand for strategic capitulation rather than a negotiated compromise.

Moreover, the EU’s position risks reinforcing Moscow’s long-standing narrative that the conflict is not solely about Ukraine but about the broader European security order. If Brussels frames a settlement around curbing Russian military power, the Kremlin could argue that Western policy is aimed at structural containment, reducing incentives for compromise.

The proposal also raises questions of enforceability and proportionality. Even if Russia were willing in principle to discuss force reductions, monitoring and verification would require extensive inspection regimes and reciprocal transparency, conditions unlikely to materialize absent a broader normalization of relations.

Critics may view the demand as politically declarative rather than operationally realistic. In the absence of direct participation in negotiations, the EU’s leverage would largely rest on sanctions policy, reconstruction funding, and Ukraine’s future integration with European institutions. Conditioning peace on Russian force caps could therefore function more as a statement of strategic intent than a feasible prerequisite.

The perceived asymmetry is also notable. While Kallas argued that Ukraine’s army is “not the issue,” Moscow has consistently insisted that Ukrainian neutrality and limits on its armed forces are central to its security concerns. Each side, in effect, identifies the other’s military posture as the root cause, highlighting the circular logic that has complicated diplomacy since 2022.

In that sense, the debate over capping the Russian Army illustrates the broader paradox of the conflict: both sides frame their demands as defensive necessities, yet each interprets the other’s military capacity as inherently offensive. Without a mutually accepted security framework, proposals to constrain only one party’s forces risk being perceived less as peace terms and more as instruments of geopolitical restructuring.

Whether Brussels’ forthcoming list of conditions will influence negotiations remains uncertain. What is clear is that the EU is seeking to assert strategic agency in a settlement process that could reshape Europe’s security architecture for decades to come.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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Zelensky Will Seek Another Presidential Term

Half of Ukrainians Do Not Want Zelenksy and His Crew in Power After The War

Almost half of Ukrainians believe the current government in Kiev is “completely tainted” and should not remain in power once the war ends, according to a survey published Wednesday. The poll’s authors also suggest that genuine support for President Vladimir Zelensky may be significantly lower than headline figures indicate.

The survey was conducted between January 23 and 29 by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology and included 1,003 respondents from across Ukraine, interviewed by phone.

According to the results, 42% of respondents said the government is entirely discredited and should be excluded from power after a peace agreement. At the same time, 48% said the cabinet still includes some “real professionals” who could continue working in their roles.

The poll found that 61% of respondents said they trust Zelensky when asked directly. However, when participants were asked an “experimental” question about how an imaginary acquaintance might feel about the president, reported support dropped to 53%.

KIIS said actual trust levels may be much lower. Only 25% of respondents said they completely trust Zelensky, a group the institute described as his firm and sincere supporters. Another 36% said they “rather” trust him, which the authors suggested may reflect a belief that the country should rally around its leader during wartime, even if there are reservations about his policies.

Earlier this week, Zelensky signaled that he may seek another presidential term, despite a major corruption scandal that emerged late last year involving his close associate Timur Mindich. Zelensky’s presidential term formally expired in May 2024, but elections have not been held due to martial law. Ukrainian lawmakers recently voted to extend martial law, preventing any elections until at least May. Russia continues to argue that Zelensky no longer holds legitimate authority.

Authored By: Global Politics

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Global Geopolitics is a comprehensive analyis of global affairs

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US used an F-35 Jet to Down a Cheap Iranian Drone

What the use of a fifth-generation fighter against an Iranian drone suggests about modern air defence limits

Reports that a United States F-35 fighter aircraft was used to shoot down an Iranian drone have prompted discussion among military analysts about the broader implications of the incident. While the interception itself was successful, the choice of platform has drawn attention, given the significant cost and advanced capabilities of the aircraft involved when compared with the limited capability of the target.

(F-35)

The F-35 is designed primarily for operations against advanced air defence systems and peer or near-peer adversaries. Its strengths lie in stealth, sensor fusion, and deep strike operations. Using such an aircraft to counter a relatively unsophisticated unmanned aerial vehicle raises questions about whether other air defence options were unavailable, unsuitable, or simply not positioned to respond in time. Analysts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies have previously noted that air defence decisions are often shaped as much by readiness and proximity as by ideal force matching, particularly in contested regions such as the Middle East.

(Shahed -139 UAV)

Nevertheless, the incident has renewed debate about the resilience of US forces against large-scale drone attacks. Iran has invested heavily in the production of low-cost, long-range drones and has demonstrated a preference for mass deployment rather than technological sophistication. Justin Bronk of the Royal United Services Institute has repeatedly argued that drone warfare increasingly favours quantity over quality, particularly when used to exhaust defensive systems and interceptor stockpiles.

(March 2025 Iran-China-Russia drills)

The central concern is not whether the United States can intercept individual drones, but whether it can sustain such interceptions during a prolonged or large-scale attack. Modern air defence systems rely on layered responses, combining fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, electronic warfare, and radar networks. When high-value assets are used for low-value targets, the economic balance may shift in favour of the attacker. The cost disparity between an interceptor missile or air-to-air engagement and a cheaply produced drone is well documented, and defence economists at the Center for Strategic and International Studies have warned that this imbalance could become strategically significant in future conflicts.

Some observers interpret the use of the F-35 as a deliberate demonstration of capability and resolve rather than a sign of weakness. Visible use of advanced platforms may serve a deterrent purpose, signalling that the United States is willing to employ its most capable assets to defend its forces and interests. However, others caution that deterrence by display does not address the underlying challenge posed by massed, attritional drone warfare.

The incident therefore highlights a broader issue facing modern armed forces. While technological superiority remains important, it does not in itself guarantee protection against sustained attacks using simple, expendable systems. As recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have shown, the ability to endure prolonged pressure may prove as important as possessing the most advanced equipment. The interception of a single drone by an F-35 may not indicate a failure of defence, but it does underline the need for continued adaptation to a changing character of warfare.

References:

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance assessments

Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), air power and drone warfare analysis by Justin Bronk

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), missile defence and cost-exchange Studies

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics 

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Who Is the Real Dictator? Western Hypocrisy and the Smearing of Iran’s Sovereignty

How U.S. power, media propaganda, and selective outrage redefine tyranny, while punishing any nation that refuses to kneel

The New York Times labels Imam Ali Khamenei a “dictator.” But that accusation collapses the moment we apply the same standards to Western power.

So let’s ask the obvious question:

What do we call Donald Trump?

A man who openly backs a genocide. A man who authorises the bombing of sovereign nations that never attacked the United States. A man who boasts about assassinating or kidnapping foreign leaders, kidnapping officials, and stealing natural resources while declaring, “We’re entitled to it.”

If those actions do not define dictatorship, then the word has lost all meaning.

Now ask honestly: Has Imam Khamenei invaded foreign countries across the globe? No. Has he overthrown elected governments? No. Has he assassinated heads of state on foreign soil? No. Has he stolen another nation’s oil or land? No.

Yet Western media brands him the tyrant.

Why?

Because the real crime, in the eyes of Washington and its media apparatus, is not violence, it is defiance. Iran owns and controls it's central bank, not the Rothchilds banking mafia. The US Federal Reserve is a private bank owned by the banking mafia. Iran owns all its lands, most Americans do not even know that The District of Columbia is an enclave, private land, not part of the US. The same goes for the Bank of England and City of London ( it's not the same as London City)

In a world where leaders kneel to Washington, Imam Khamenei does not. In a world of submission, he represents resistance.

No dictates from the White House. No humiliation before Western power. No surrender of national sovereignty.

For decades, Iran has faced sanctions, threats, economic warfare, covert operations, and relentless pressure, from the United States, from Europe, and from regional regimes that act as enforcers of Western interests. None of it has broken Iran’s independence.

That is the real reason for the hatred.

Western media does not oppose dictatorship. It opposes any leader it cannot control.

They control the narrative to justify their wars, sanitize their crimes, and disguise empire as “democracy.” Anyone who refuses to play along is smeared, demonized, and dehumanized.

Imam Khamenei’s message has remained consistent and unshaken: Iran does not kneel.

And that is precisely why Iran matters.

In a Middle East shattered by Western invasions, puppet regimes, and endless war, Iran stands as the last major obstacle to total domination. If Iran falls, resistance across the region collapses with it and the door opens to a new era of unchecked fascism, apartheid, and permanent war.

This is not about one man. It is about sovereignty versus empire. Truth versus propaganda. Resistance versus submission.

Call that dictatorship if you like, but history will call it defiance.

Vlodomir Zelensky is revered by the West and yet: “Zelensky’s not elected, he’s cancelled elections.”

“He’s banned religious denominations.” “He’s murdered his political opponents.” “He’s banned language groups.”

The Ukrainian regime has also killed journalists, including U.S. filmmaker Gonzalo Lira, and forcibly kidnaps civilians off the streets to send them into the war’s meat grinder.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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Mark Carney's Speech at Davos: Is it just Theatrics?

So at the gathering in Davos, of the self appointed decision makers of the lives of 8 billion people, Switzerland, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney delivered what may appears to history defining speech to be recorded in future history text books era defining. However, is it all theater? Are these contentions genuine or just a rebranding of “The Great Reset”? Mark Carney is deeply embedded in the WEF.

Here is the full text of Carney's speech. I would recommend reading it in its entirety. Below the speech I attached a link to my analysis article from this morning.

The Speech:

“It’s a pleasure  and a duty  to be with you at this turning point for Canada and for the world.Today, I’ll talk about the rupture in the world order, the end of a nice story, and the beginning of a brutal reality where geopolitics among the great powers is not subject to any constraints.But I also submit to you that other countries, particularly middle powers like Canada, are not powerless. They have the capacity to build a new order that embodies our values, like respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states. The power of the less powerful begins with honesty.Every day we are reminded that we live in an era of great power rivalry. That the rules-based order is fading. That the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.This aphorism of Thucydides is presented as inevitable, the natural logic of international relations reasserting itself. And faced with this logic, there is a strong tendency for countries to go along to get along. To accommodate. To avoid trouble. To hope that compliance will buy safety. It won’t.

So, what are our options?In 1978, the Czech dissident Václav Havel wrote an essay called The Power of the Powerless. In it, he asked a simple question: how did the communist system sustain itself?

His answer began with a greengrocer. Every morning, this shopkeeper places a sign in his window: “Workers of the world, unite!” He does not believe it. No one believes it. But he places the sign anyway,  to avoid trouble, to signal compliance, to get along. And because every shopkeeper on every street does the same, the system persists.Not through violence alone, but through the participation of ordinary people in rituals they privately know to be false.Havel called this “living within a lie.” The system’s power comes not from its truth but from everyone’s willingness to perform as if it were true. And its fragility comes from the same source: when even one person stops performing, when the greengrocer removes his sign, the illusion begins to crack.It is time for companies and countries to take their signs down.For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions, praised its principles, and benefited from its predictability. We could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection.We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false. That the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient. That trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.

This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods: open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security, and support for frameworks for resolving disputes.So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals. And largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality.This bargain no longer works.Let me be direct: we are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.Over the past two decades, a series of crises in finance, health, energy, and geopolitics laid bare the risks of extreme global integration.

More recently, great powers began using economic integration as weapons. Tariffs as leverage. Financial infrastructure as coercion. Supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.You cannot “live within the lie” of mutual benefit through integration when integration becomes the source of your subordination.The multilateral institutions on which middle powers relied, the WTO, the UN, the COP, the architecture of collective problem solving, are greatly diminished.As a result, many countries are drawing the same conclusions. They must develop greater strategic autonomy: in energy, food, critical minerals, in finance, and supply chains.This impulse is understandable. A country that cannot feed itself, fuel itself, or defend itself has few options. When the rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourself.But let us be clear-eyed about where this leads. A world of fortresses will be poorer, more fragile, and less sustainable.And there is another truth: if great powers abandon even the pretence of rules and values for the unhindered pursuit of their power and interests, the gains from “transactionalism” become harder to replicate. Hegemons cannot continually monetize their relationships.

Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty. Buy insurance. Increase options. This rebuilds sovereignty – sovereignty that was once grounded in rules, but will be increasingly anchored in the ability to withstand pressure.

As I said, such classic risk management comes at a price, but that cost of strategic autonomy, of sovereignty, can also be shared. Collective investments in resilience are cheaper than everyone building their own fortress. Shared standards reduce fragmentation. Complementarities are positive sum.The question for middle powers, like Canada, is not whether to adapt to this new reality. We must. The question is whether we adapt by simply building higher walls – or whether we can do something more ambitious.Canada was amongst the first to hear the wake-up call, leading us to fundamentally shift our strategic posture.

Canadians know that our old, comfortable assumption that our geography and alliance memberships automatically conferred prosperity and security is no longer valid. Our new approach rests on what Alexander Stubb has termed “values-based realism”  or, to put it another way, we aim to be principled and pragmatic. Principled in our commitment to fundamental values: sovereignty and territorial integrity, the prohibition of the use of force except when consistent with the UN Charter, respect for human rights.

Pragmatic in recognising that progress is often incremental, that interests diverge, that not every partner shares our values. We are engaging broadly, strategically, with open eyes. We actively take on the world as it is, not wait for a world we wish to be.Canada is calibrating our relationships so their depth reflects our values. We are prioritising broad engagement to maximise our influence, given the fluidity of the world order, the risks that this poses, and the stakes for what comes next.We are no longer relying on just the strength of our values, but also on the value of our strength.We are building that strength at home.

Since my government took office, we have cut taxes on incomes, capital gains and business investment, we have removed all federal barriers to interprovincial trade, and we are fast-tracking a trillion dollars of investment in energy, AI, critical minerals, new trade corridors, and beyond.We are doubling our defence spending by 2030 and are doing so in ways that builds our domestic industries.

We are rapidly diversifying abroad. We have agreed a comprehensive strategic partnership with the European Union, including joining SAFE, Europe’s defence procurement arrangements.We have signed twelve other trade and security deals on four continents in the last six months.

In the past few days, we have concluded new strategic partnerships with China and Qatar.We are negotiating free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines, Mercosur. To help solve global problems, we are pursuing variable geometry, different coalitions for different issues, based on values and interests. On Ukraine, we are a core member of the Coalition of the Willing and one of the largest per-capita contributors to its defence and security. On Arctic sovereignty, we stand firmly with Greenland and Denmark and fully support their unique right to determine Greenland’s future. Our commitment to Article 5 is unwavering.

We are working with our NATO allies (including the Nordic Baltic 8) to further secure the alliance’s northern and western flanks, including through Canada’s unprecedented investments in over-the-horizon radar, submarines, aircraft, and boots on the ground. Canada strongly opposes tariffs over Greenland and calls for focused talks to achieve shared objectives of security and prosperity for the Arctic. On plurilateral trade, we are championing efforts to build a bridge between the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the European Union, creating a new trading block of 1.5 billion people.On critical minerals, we are forming buyer’s clubs anchored in the G7 so that the world can diversify away from concentrated supply.On AI, we are cooperating with like-minded democracies to ensure we will not ultimately be forced to choose between hegemons and hyperscalers. This is not naive multilateralism. Nor is it relying on diminished institutions. It is building the coalitions that work, issue by issue, with partners who share enough common ground to act together. In some cases, this will be the vast majority of nations.And it is creating a dense web of connections across trade, investment, culture on which we can draw for future challenges and opportunities.

Middle powers must act together because if you are not at the table, you are on the menu. Great powers can afford to go it alone. They have the market size, the military capacity, the leverage to dictate terms. Middle powers do not. But when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness. We accept what is offered. We compete with each other to be the most accommodating.This is not sovereignty. It is the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination.In a world of great power rivalry, the countries in between have a choice: to compete with each other for favour or to combine to create a third path with impact.We should not allow the rise of hard power to blind us to the fact that the power of legitimacy, integrity, and rules will remain strong , if we choose to wield it together.

Which brings me back to Havel. What would it mean for middle powers to “live in truth”? It means naming reality. Stop invoking the “rules-based international order” as though it still functions as advertised. Call the system what it is: a period of intensifying great power rivalry, where the most powerful pursue their interests using economic integration as a weapon of coercion.It means acting consistently. Apply the same standards to allies and rivals. When middle powers criticise economic intimidation from one direction but stay silent when it comes from another, we are keeping the sign in the window.It means building what we claim to believe in. Rather than waiting for the old order to be restored, create institutions and agreements that function as described.

And it means reducing the leverage that enables coercion. Building a strong domestic economy should always be every government’s priority. Diversification internationally is not just economic prudence; it is the material foundation for honest foreign policy. Countries earn the right to principled stands by reducing their vulnerability to retaliation.

Canada has what the world wants. We are an energy superpower. We hold vast reserves of critical minerals. We have the most educated population in the world. Our pension funds are amongst the world’s largest and most sophisticated investors. We have capital, talent, and a government with the immense fiscal capacity to act decisively.

And we have the values to which many others aspire. Canada is a pluralistic society that works. Our public square is loud, diverse, and free. Canadians remain committed to sustainability.We are a stable, reliable partner, in a world that is anything but, a partner that builds and values relationships for the long term. Canada has something else: a recognition of what is happening and a determination to act accordingly. We understand that this rupture calls for more than adaptation. It calls for honesty about the world as it is.We are taking the sign out of the window.The old order is not coming back. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy.But from the fracture, we can build something better, stronger, and more just. This is the task of the middle powers, who have the most to lose from a world of fortresses and the most to gain from a world of genuine cooperation. The powerful have their power. But we have something too, the capacity to stop pretending, to name reality, to build our strength at home, and to act together.That is Canada’s path. We choose it openly and confidently.And it is a path wide open to any country willing to take it with us.”

My Article from this morning:

Trump's Chaos in the Disassembly of the Rules-Based Order

Read now | Strategic Realignment, Elite Resistance, and the Reconfiguration of Global Power

This article examines the apparent disorder surrounding recent United States foreign policy as a manifestation of deliberate strategic disruption aimed at dismantling the post-Second World War global order. Drawing on the analytical framework advanced by Alex Krainer, it traces how actions interpreted as chaotic align with a coherent effort to weaken unaccountable international institutions and accelerate a transition towards multipolar integration. The analysis situates developments in Ukraine, the Middle East, Venezuela, Iran, and Europe within a broader contest between entrenched neo-colonial governance structures and emerging power configurations. Further contextualisation is provided through Mark Carney’s articulation of systemic rupture within the rules-based order and the Russian Foreign Ministry’s assessment of British foreign policy behaviour. The essay concludes that elite panic and institutional resistance reflect the exposure of structural dependencies rather than the absence of strategic intent, highlighting the risks and constraints inherent in managing global transformation without uncontrolled escalation.

On Substack:

Trump's Chaos in the Disassembly of the Rules-Based Order

Watch now | Strategic Realignment, Elite Resistance, and the Reconfiguration of Global Power

On my website:

Trump’s Chaos and the Disassembly of the Rules-Based Order

Strategic Realignment, Elite Resistance, and the Reconfiguration of Global Power The contemporary pattern of apparent disorder surrounding t

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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Ukrainian Lawmakers Signal Willingness to Cede Donbass as War Pressure Mounts

Private admissions to German media point to internal political fractures in Kyiv as Russian military gains narrow Ukraine’s strategic options

Ukrainian parliamentary figures are privately signaling readiness to abandon territorial claims over Donbass as part of a negotiated end to the war, according to reporting by the German newspaper Die Welt, citing direct conversations with a senior lawmaker.

The disclosure appears during a period of intensified Russian military momentum across multiple sectors of the front, with Russian officials stating that eight settlements and roughly 300 square kilometers were taken during the first two weeks of January.

Die Welt correspondent Steffen Schwarzkopf reported on German television that “an extremely influential parliamentarian” described a shift inside Ukraine’s legislature driven by battlefield realities and manpower strain.

According to Schwarzkopf, the lawmaker said, “yes, we have to make a compromise, even if it’s extremely painful; and yes, we have to give up Donbass.”

The same source told the correspondent that a ceasefire had become necessary “at any cost,” reflecting growing concern inside Kyiv about sustaining the war under current conditions.

The parliamentarian declined to appear on camera because the position directly contradicts the public stance of President Vladimir Zelensky, who has consistently rejected any territorial concessions to Moscow.

Schwarzkopf stated that the lawmaker described “a climate of fear” within the capital and warned that her political career “would be over immediately” if such views were voiced openly, citing pressure from Ukrainian security services.

The report highlights a widening gap between official Ukrainian policy and internal political calculations, as legislators assess military losses, economic exhaustion, and declining leverage over external financial support.

Russia has long framed territorial recognition as a central condition for ending hostilities, a position President Vladimir Putin restated during a June 2024 address to the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Putin said at that time that Moscow would halt military operations if Ukraine formally renounced NATO membership and withdrew forces from Donetsk and Lugansk in Donbass, along with Kherson and Zaporozhye regions.

Those four regions were incorporated into the Russian state following referendums held in autumn 2022, a process rejected by Ukraine and its Western backers but treated by Moscow as settled sovereignty.

Russian negotiating terms have since narrowed further, reflecting confidence drawn from territorial advances and sustained defense production capacity.

In late December, Putin stated that, given battlefield developments, Moscow held “practically zero” interest in a Ukrainian withdrawal from contested regions and would secure objectives through diplomacy or force.

Security analysts at European defense institutions have repeatedly noted that prolonged attritional warfare favors the side with deeper industrial reserves and demographic buffers, factors currently tilting toward Russia according to public assessments.

The Die Welt report indicates that parts of Ukraine’s political class now view territorial compromise as a survival calculation rather than an ideological concession, shaped by military pressure and constrained policy options.

Public Ukrainian leadership continues to reject such outcomes, while internal discussions increasingly reflect limits imposed by force balance, external financing dependency, and war fatigue among governing institutions.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics 

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The United States as the Principal Adversary of its Own Currency

The political economy consequences of turning financial infrastructure into weapons hence de-risking from America is a rational response to concentrated monetary power

The United States dollar emerged as the core instrument of global trade and finance after 1945, supported by American industrial dominance, military reach, and the Bretton Woods framework. That position rested on confidence that access to dollar liquidity and payment rails would remain politically neutral for sovereign states acting within the international system. Over the past two decades, and with greater intensity since 2014, that assumption has eroded as Washington has converted monetary infrastructure into a coercive policy tool. Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., former executive director at the International Monetary Fund, has described the United States as the principal adversary of its own currency, arguing that repeated sanctions and asset seizures have transformed the dollar from a shared utility into a strategic weapon. His assessment reflects a broader shift in official and academic analysis across non-Western capitals.

The freezing of approximately three hundred billion dollars of Russian central bank reserves in 2022 represented a decisive rupture. Previous sanctions regimes targeted individuals, firms, or commercial banks, often justified through legal mechanisms within Western jurisdictions. The Russian reserve seizure crossed a different threshold by placing sovereign monetary assets outside any wartime context under political confiscation. Former Bank for International Settlements economist Hyun Song Shin noted in private briefings that reserve safety constituted the final anchor of trust in the post-Cold War system, and that breach altered central bank risk calculations permanently. Chinese monetary authorities responded by accelerating reductions in United States Treasury holdings, continuing a trend that had begun after sanctions imposed on Iran and Russia earlier in the decade.

Batista has argued that the abusive use of instruments such as SWIFT exclusion and reserve immobilisation has forced states to reassess exposure to Western clearing systems. Russia responded by eliminating Western currencies from trade with Commonwealth of Independent States partners and expanding rouble settlement mechanisms. Iran deepened barter trade and local currency clearing arrangements with China and regional partners. India negotiated rupee-denominated oil settlements while expanding gold accumulation. According to data from the International Monetary Fund’s COFER database, the dollar share of disclosed global reserves declined steadily from above seventy percent in the early 2000s to near fifty-eight percent by the early 2020s, with the pace accelerating after 2022.

Financial de-risking has not remained confined to sanctioned states. Edward Luce has observed that allied economies now seek insulation from American unpredictability rather than deeper integration. The shift reflects a political reality recognised across European and Asian policy circles: alignment with Washington no longer guarantees protection from unilateral policy shocks. The Federal Reserve’s aggressive monetary tightening cycles, combined with domestic American political volatility, have imposed external costs on partners without corresponding consultation. Former Bundesbank officials have privately warned that euro area exposure to dollar funding markets constitutes a structural vulnerability rather than a convenience.

Canada’s recalibration illustrates the phenomenon among close allies. Nearly three-quarters of Canadian exports historically flowed to the United States, a dependence once regarded as an advantage. Ottawa now seeks to reduce that share below fifty percent, redirecting trade toward China, India, and Southeast Asia. Mark Carney’s engagement with Beijing ahead of multilateral forums signalled a strategic hedge rather than ideological realignment. Similar discussions have taken place in Japan, South Korea, and within Gulf Cooperation Council states, where sovereign wealth funds have diversified away from dollar assets into Asian infrastructure, commodities, and regional currencies.

(Lyn Alden presented this brutal chart in macro, showing 230 years of data of the buying power of the US dollar collapsing to almost zero after the Federal Reserve, the Gold Reserve Act, and the Nixon Shock.)

Dumping United States Treasuries represents the most extreme financial hedge, often described by central bankers as a nuclear option. Even without large-scale liquidation, marginal shifts matter. China’s Treasury holdings have fallen by hundreds of billions of dollars from their peak, replaced by gold accumulation at the People’s Bank of China and increased exposure to Belt and Road settlement mechanisms. Sergey Glazyev, Russian academic economist and former Eurasian Economic Commission official, has argued that multipolar currency zones now function as a defensive necessity rather than an ideological project. Regional payment systems, including China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System and Russia’s SPFS, operate redundantly alongside SWIFT, reducing systemic choke points.

The geopolitical implications extend beyond finance. Strategic hedging now includes security considerations traditionally monopolised by American guarantees. Luce notes that states have observed Washington’s differential treatment of nuclear-armed adversaries. North Korea’s regime survival contrasts sharply with the fate of non-nuclear governments subjected to regime change pressure. This observation has influenced defence planning debates in East Asia, the Middle East, and parts of Latin America. Academic studies from Seoul National University and Tel Aviv University have examined latent nuclear hedging as an insurance mechanism rather than an immediate proliferation intent.

China has interpreted American withdrawal from multilateral leadership as an opening rather than a threat. Beijing has positioned itself as a provider of infrastructure finance, development capital, and trade stability, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Chinese scholars such as Wang Huiyao of the Center for China and Globalization argue that reduced American reliability lowers resistance to alternative governance structures. The renminbi’s role remains constrained by capital controls, yet its use in energy trade with Russia and Gulf producers has expanded, supported by swap lines and clearing banks.

Against this backdrop, speculation has emerged regarding a reordering of global power centres, including claims that Jerusalem could become a new axis of authority under a so-called Pax Judaica. Historical precedent cautions against such linear interpretations. Power in the modern international system derives from production capacity, financial depth, demographic scale, and military logistics rather than symbolic centrality alone. Israel exerts disproportionate influence within American political institutions and regional security architectures, yet lacks the economic mass or monetary reach to anchor a global order independently. Scholars such as John Mearsheimer have emphasised that even hegemonic states struggle to sustain dominance without broad consent, let alone smaller actors embedded within larger alliances.

Nevertheless, Israel’s integration into American strategic planning affects perceptions in the Global South. Sanctions enforcement, Middle Eastern interventions, and diplomatic shielding at international forums have reinforced narratives that United States power operates through a narrow coalition rather than universal norms. This perception accelerates de-risking by states seeking autonomy rather than alignment. Latin American economists associated with UNCTAD have highlighted growing interest in regional development banks and currency pooling arrangements as alternatives to dollar dependence.

The cumulative effect of these trends suggests gradual erosion rather than abrupt collapse of dollar hegemony. Batista has acknowledged that the dollar will remain an important currency due to market depth and legal infrastructure. The difference lies in optionality. States now design systems assuming partial exclusion from Western finance rather than universal access. That assumption marks a structural change in global political economy. Trust once lost rarely returns fully, particularly when losses involve sovereign reserves accumulated over decades.

Policy debates within Washington increasingly recognise the dilemma. Former Treasury officials have warned that overuse of financial sanctions undermines long-term leverage. Academic research from Harvard and Stanford has modelled sanction fatigue and substitution effects, showing diminishing returns beyond initial shocks. Despite such findings, domestic political incentives favour visible punitive measures over slower diplomatic engagement, perpetuating the cycle identified by Batista.

The international system now resembles a fragmented landscape of overlapping monetary and security arrangements. De-risking from the United States does not imply hostility, but it reflects rational adaptation to concentrated power exercised without reciprocal restraint. Whether this evolution produces stability or prolonged volatility depends on institutional reform rather than symbolic shifts in geographic centres of authority.

Future stability would benefit from formal limits on reserve seizure and payment system exclusion through multilateral treaties involving central banks and settlement institutions. Re-establishing credible neutrality within core financial infrastructure would slow fragmentation and reduce incentives for parallel systems. Without such reforms, de-risking will continue irrespective of rhetorical commitments to order or alliance solidarity.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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Brazil’s Venezuela Veto: A Strategic Miscalculation in the Face of the U.S. Security Pivot

How blocking Venezuela reshaped BRICS cohesion and weakened Brazil’s strategic position amid renewed U.S. regional dominance

Global GeoPolitics

The decision by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to veto Venezuela’s accession to BRICS occurred during a period when United States strategic doctrine had already shifted back toward hemispheric control. Senior figures within United States defence planning circles had begun describing Latin America as an under-secured theatre vulnerable to Chinese capital, Russian military cooperation, and alternative financial arrangements. The veto therefore intersected with an established trajectory rather than an uncertain future.

Brazil’s action directly contradicted the operational logic of BRICS expansion. Since 2014, BRICS enlargement has functioned less as symbolic diplomacy and more as a mechanism for sanction insulation, trade settlement diversification, and coordinated resistance to extraterritorial enforcement. Russian economist Sergey Glazyev has repeatedly stated that BRICS membership provides “institutional friction against unilateral coercive measures by expanding settlement, credit, and trade channels beyond Western legal reach.” Venezuela’s exclusion preserved its exposure to unilateral action.

The economic dimension carried measurable weight. Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, alongside significant deposits of coltan, gold, and rare earth elements. Chinese state firms, including CNPC subsidiaries, had already structured upstream investment frameworks anticipating multilateral financial cover rather than bilateral exposure. A 2022 paper from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences noted that BRICS-linked development finance reduced political risk premiums for sanctioned states by distributing liability across multiple jurisdictions. Brazil’s veto removed that stabilising layer.

The impact on BRICS cohesion proved immediate. Diplomatic reporting from Moscow and Beijing signalled unease regarding Brazil’s reliability under external pressure. Fyodor Lukyanov, chair of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, described BRICS as “a confidence-based structure where predictability matters more than formal alignment.” Brazil’s intervention created uncertainty regarding future expansion decisions and introduced the perception that United States preferences could override bloc consensus through selective pressure.

Security consequences followed predictable lines. United States Southern Command had already increased rotational deployments, surveillance flights, and logistics agreements across the Caribbean basin and northern South America. Admiral Craig Faller publicly stated in testimony that “the Western Hemisphere is no longer a permissive environment,” citing Russian and Chinese activity as justification. Venezuela’s isolation strengthened the legal and political rationale for force accumulation under stabilisation pretexts, while Brazil’s border regions absorbed secondary exposure.

Brazilian defence analysts have long warned against such developments. Nelson Jobim, former Brazilian defence minister, argued that regional autonomy depends upon denying external powers fragmented entry points. He noted that once one state becomes a designated security exception, neighbouring territories become operational corridors rather than neutral buffers. The Venezuelan case followed this model, increasing strategic pressure along Brazil’s northern frontier.

Domestic political repercussions compounded the strategic costs. Lula’s governing coalition already faced scepticism from sectors of the armed forces and legislature historically aligned with Atlanticist security frameworks. The veto neither neutralised those actors nor secured their loyalty. Political sociologist Jessé Souza has documented how Brazil’s middle and upper professional classes remain structurally integrated with United States institutional norms regardless of government orientation. Concessions therefore failed to translate into domestic stabilisation.

Simultaneously, the decision alienated constituencies supportive of South American integration and non-aligned foreign policy. The Workers’ Party historically framed regional solidarity as a buffer against external economic discipline. By undermining Venezuela during a period of sustained pressure, the government weakened its own narrative credibility. Electoral cost materialised without compensatory institutional protection.

Media dynamics intensified following the reported seizure of Nicolás Maduro. Brazilian officials condemned the intervention while lacking diplomatic leverage to influence outcomes. Analysts at Argentina’s Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos y Relaciones Internacionales observed that prior cooperation with isolating measures limited Brazil’s ability to mobilise multilateral opposition. Condemnation without prior resistance failed to alter operational facts.

The international context further constrained Brazil’s position. A cluster of newly elected right-wing governments in the region adopted openly pro-United States and pro-Israel security postures. These administrations favoured bilateral defence agreements and intelligence sharing over regional institutions. Brazil’s earlier veto signalled accommodation rather than leadership, reducing incentives for neighbours to coordinate through Brasília-based frameworks.

Had Brazil supported Venezuela’s accession, structural conditions would have differed materially. Venezuela’s inclusion would have embedded its economy within BRICS settlement mechanisms, reducing exposure to dollar-based enforcement. Indian energy firms, already importing Venezuelan crude through indirect channels, had expressed interest in regularised trade structures contingent upon multilateral cover. South African financial institutions similarly explored intermediary roles pending bloc consensus.

Strategically, BRICS membership would have raised the cost threshold for overt intervention. Collective diplomatic response, coordinated financial countermeasures, and reputational risk across multiple regions would have complicated unilateral action. Glenn Diesen has argued that multipolar institutions function by “thickening consequence layers,” making escalation politically and economically expensive rather than legally impossible. Brazil’s veto removed that thickness.

Brazil itself would have retained strategic ambiguity. Support for Venezuela within BRICS would not have precluded dialogue with Washington, but it would have preserved bargaining leverage. Celso Amorim has consistently argued that autonomy derives from diversified alignment rather than exclusive partnership. By choosing exclusion, Brazil reduced its own optionality during a period of systemic transition.

The long-term implications for Brazil remain unresolved but structurally adverse. United States security doctrine increasingly frames internal political instability as a hemispheric concern. The same tools applied to Venezuela, including sanctions, legal pressure, and elite cultivation, exist within Brazil’s own political economy. André Singer has documented how Brazilian institutions remain sensitive to financial and informational pressure during moments of executive weakness.

Whether Brazil can endure the United States pivot will depend upon restoring coherence between stated non-alignment and operational decisions. Rebuilding credibility within BRICS requires demonstrable resistance to external vetoes rather than rhetorical reaffirmation. Regional security stability depends upon denying pretexts for force accumulation rather than accommodating them. Economic resilience requires multilateral insulation rather than bilateral dependency.

The veto of Venezuela’s BRICS accession stands as a measurable strategic inflection point rather than a symbolic error. Consequences followed established patterns observed in previous cases of selective isolation. Brazil absorbed reputational, security, and political costs while gaining no durable protection. The episode clarifies how limited concessions under hegemonic pressure tend to invite escalation rather than restraint.

Brazil would benefit from re-establishing predictable voting behaviour inside BRICS expansion mechanisms. Regional defence coordination independent of external command structures would reduce exposure. Financial integration through non-dollar settlement platforms would strengthen domestic insulation. These measures address structural vulnerabilities without requiring ideological alignment.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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Oil or Silver: The Real Stakes Behind Maduro’s Removal

JPMorgan, physical silver, and the geopolitical logic of Venezuela intervention points to China

The removal of Venezuela’s head of state coincided with acute stress inside the global silver market and with mounting exposure among Western financial institutions heavily reliant on synthetic precious metals trading. The alignment of these events places silver, rather than oil alone, at the centre of the operation. Silver has moved from a marginal monetary metal into a strategic industrial input essential for electrical grids, weapons systems, advanced electronics, and large-scale data infrastructure. Control over physical supply now carries implications for financial stability and state power.

Western bullion markets operate through layered claims that exceed deliverable inventory by a wide margin. This structure has been examined for years by independent metals analysts and economists critical of financialisation. The economist Michael Hudson has repeatedly described modern commodity markets as “rent-extraction systems where paper claims multiply far beyond real output, relying on confidence rather than availability.” He argued that such systems remain stable only while physical delivery is rarely demanded, noting that “once delivery replaces settlement, the system stops being a market and becomes a rationing mechanism.”

Inventory data released by exchange operators show that registered silver available for delivery declined sharply since 2020, while paper issuance expanded. Analysts specialising in physical flows estimate leverage ratios exceeding twenty paper claims for every ounce of registered silver. This imbalance becomes destabilising when industrial users or sovereign buyers demand delivery rather than cash settlement.

Banks with concentrated short exposure faced increasing risk of forced liquidation. For more than a decade, critics of bullion banking have argued that price suppression relied on paper issuance rather than physical availability. Max Keiser’s long-running campaign targeting large bullion banks rested on the claim that “silver is the Achilles’ heel of the banking system because it cannot be printed and it is consumed by industry.” With prices rising sharply and registered inventories shrinking, that structural vulnerability became visible.

Venezuela’s mineral base gained immediate strategic relevance under these conditions. Venezuela holds one of the largest undeveloped precious metals regions globally within the Arco Minero, containing substantial silver and gold deposits historically inaccessible to foreign industrial extraction. Independent mining analysts estimated Venezuela’s annual silver production between four hundred and fifty and five hundred and fifty metric tonnes before escalation, while acknowledging that official figures understated real output due to extensive informal export routes.

Regional security researchers have long noted that a majority of Venezuelan precious metals exited the country through unofficial channels. Estimates placing seventy to eighty percent of output outside formal reporting circulated widely among Latin American mining specialists. These flows supplied regional markets and, increasingly, Asian buyers operating outside Western financial infrastructure.

Reports emerged that Venezuela transferred approximately twelve hundred tonnes of silver to Russia and China in late December 2025. Such a transfer removed a substantial quantity of physical metal from Western-accessible circulation at a moment of tightening supply. Glenn Diesen has described such movements as “monetary de-risking by states that expect future trade coercion,” arguing that “physical metals held outside Western custody reduce exposure to sanctions and asset freezes.”

(Asian Guy explains what just happened in Venezuela and why silver is at the center. Two days before the Caracas strikes, China quietly secured 121 million ounces of annual silver supply. Then the U.S. moved to disrupt Venezuela’s black-market flow from one of the richest mining regions on Earth.)

Within forty-eight hours of subsequent military action, United States authorities finalised arrangements to secure and process Venezuelan precious metals through a newly constructed smelting facility valued at roughly eight billion dollars. Financing reportedly involved JPMorgan, with the United States Department of Defense holding a substantial ownership stake. This structure indicates coordination between state security priorities and financial system stabilisation rather than post-conflict opportunism.

China’s response reinforced the strategic interpretation. Beijing imposed export licensing requirements on refined silver, effectively placing a majority share of global refined supply behind state approval. China ranks among the world’s leading silver producers and consumers, with demand driven by electric vehicles, solar manufacturing, electronics, robotics, and defence systems. The metals analyst Ronan Manly observed that “export controls transform commodities into strategic assets overnight, even if markets pretend otherwise.”

Silver’s industrial role extends far beyond jewellery or investment. As the most electrically conductive metal, silver remains essential for power transmission, precision electronics, advanced weapons systems, and grid infrastructure. The United States Geological Survey classifies silver as a critical mineral for defence and industrial resilience. Industrial economist Vaclav Smil has written that “electrification at scale is impossible without reliable access to high-conductivity metals, of which silver remains unmatched.”

Artificial intelligence infrastructure further intensifies demand. Data centres, advanced chips, and high-capacity power systems rely on silver-based components. Analysts tracking industrial input constraints note that demand growth now exceeds mine supply growth, placing sustained pressure on physical markets.

Market behaviour following these developments reflected structural change rather than temporary volatility. United States banks reportedly shifted from net short to net long silver positions, signalling abandonment of suppression strategies in favour of repricing. The precious metals researcher Koos Jansen has argued that “when banks flip positioning, it usually reflects physical constraints rather than changed sentiment.”

Two distinct markets now operate simultaneously. One clears paper claims through cash settlement, while the other prices physical metal for industrial delivery. Macleod summarised this divergence plainly, stating that “New York prices claims, Shanghai prices metal.”

Within this framework, the Venezuela operation appears less as a counter-narcotics action and more as a coordinated resource acquisition aligned with financial system defence. Control over silver deposits provided relief to institutions facing delivery risk, secured long-term supply for military and industrial use, and disrupted alternative trade flows benefiting rival powers. Targeting logistical hubs under security pretexts froze informal export routes, constraining Chinese manufacturing inputs while redirecting supply toward Western-controlled processing.

The convergence of bullion market stress, sovereign metal transfers to non-Western powers, industrial scarcity, and rapid militarised access to undeveloped reserves places silver alongside oil as a driver of intervention. Silver’s dual role as monetary metal and industrial necessity situates it at the centre of financial stability, technological competition, and military readiness. The bottom line is, China is the target here.

Recommendations follow from these observations. States seeking insulation from financial coercion must prioritise physical custody of strategic materials rather than reliance on paper markets. Financial systems dependent on synthetic leverage remain vulnerable when delivery replaces settlement. Strategic metals increasingly function as instruments of power rather than neutral commodities, and policy frameworks must adjust accordingly.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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Jeffrey Sachs and the Venezuela Question Before the Security Council

Venezuela as a test case for the post-1945 international framework and institutional decay

The address delivered by Jeffrey D. Sachs to the United Nations Security Council on 5 January 2026 placed before the council a narrow legal and institutional question rather than a moral judgement on Venezuela’s domestic politics. The matter concerned whether a single member state may lawfully determine the political future of another through force, coercion, or economic pressure. That framing rested squarely on Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The speech treated this provision as a binding rule of international order rather than a discretionary guideline, and it argued that erosion of this rule carries systemic consequences beyond the immediate case of Venezuela.

Historical record supports the claim that United States foreign policy has repeatedly pursued regime change through overt and covert means since the mid-twentieth century. Lindsey O’Rourke’s archival study documents seventy United States regime change operations between 1947 and 1989, covering Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa (O’Rourke, 2018). These operations included coups, paramilitary support, electoral manipulation, and economic destabilisation. The end of the Cold War did not end this practice. Scholarly reviews by Bruce Cumings, William Robinson, and Vijay Prashad show continuity in method and intent, even as rhetoric shifted toward humanitarian and democratic language.

Major post-1989 cases cited in the address align with this literature. The 2003 invasion of Iraq proceeded without Security Council authorisation and was later acknowledged by senior United States officials to have rested on false intelligence. The 2011 intervention in Libya exceeded the civilian protection mandate of Resolution 1973 and resulted in state collapse, as documented by the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Operations in Syria from 2011 onward involved extensive covert support to armed groups, confirmed by declassified Defence Intelligence Agency documents and later admissions by United States officials. The 2009 coup in Honduras received diplomatic cover despite clear violations of constitutional order, according to reports by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The 2014 change of government in Ukraine followed sustained external political involvement, a point analysed in detail by political scientists such as Richard Sakwa and Ivan Katchanovski.

Venezuela fits within this established pattern rather than standing as an exceptional case. United States knowledge of, and tacit approval for, the April 2002 coup attempt against President Hugo Chávez is confirmed by contemporaneous State Department communications and later investigative journalism by independent outlets. Subsequent funding of opposition-aligned civil society organisations during the 2010s occurred through agencies such as the National Endowment for Democracy, whose own annual reports describe these programmes. When protests escalated and the Venezuelan state responded with force, sanctions followed. These sanctions did not target individuals alone but struck core state revenue sources.

The 2015 executive order issued by President Barack Obama, declaring Venezuela an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States,” marked a decisive escalation. Legal scholars including Alfred de Zayas, former UN Independent Expert on international order, noted that the designation lacked any credible security rationale and served primarily to establish a domestic legal basis for sanctions. The economic impact of those measures intensified sharply after 2017. Sanctions on the state oil company PDVSA restricted access to finance, spare parts, and export markets. According to data compiled by economists Francisco Rodríguez and Jeffrey Weisbrot, oil production fell by roughly three quarters between 2016 and 2020, while real GDP per capita declined by more than sixty per cent over the same period. These figures align with the address and are consistent across independent economic assessments.

The humanitarian effects of these measures have been extensively documented. Reports by the Centre for Economic and Policy Research and statements by UN rapporteurs concluded that broad sectoral sanctions contributed to shortages of food, medicine, and medical equipment, increasing excess mortality. The UN General Assembly’s repeated votes condemning unilateral coercive measures reflect a shared legal interpretation that such sanctions fall outside the authority of individual states. Under the Charter, only the Security Council may impose binding economic measures, and even then subject to proportionality and humanitarian safeguards.

The unilateral recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim president in January 2019 represented a further departure from established diplomatic practice. Recognition was extended without effective control of territory or institutions, contrary to traditional criteria articulated by jurists such as Hersch Lauterpacht. The subsequent freezing of approximately seven billion dollars in Venezuelan sovereign assets and transfer of control over certain assets to opposition representatives compounded the economic pressure. These actions, taken together with earlier measures, form a continuous effort aimed at political displacement rather than negotiated settlement.

The address situated Venezuela within a broader pattern of unauthorised military activity. Over the preceding year, United States forces conducted bombing operations in Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Venezuela without Security Council authorisation and without a plausible claim of self-defence under Article 51. Independent monitoring groups such as Airwars and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism have recorded civilian harm associated with several of these campaigns. Public threats issued against multiple UN member states further strained the prohibition on the use of force. Such conduct weakens the normative restraint that has limited interstate war since 1945.

The central claim advanced held that the Security Council bears responsibility not to adjudicate the merits of Venezuela’s government but to uphold the legal order binding all states. Acceptance of unilateral force or economic strangulation as tools of political engineering would normalise practices incompatible with the Charter. Legal scholars including Martti Koskenniemi and Mary Ellen O’Connell have warned that selective enforcement of international law erodes its authority, inviting reciprocal violations by other powers. In a nuclear-armed world, erosion of restraint carries existential risk.

The six actions proposed aimed to restore legal clarity rather than impose political outcomes. Immediate cessation of threats and use of force would reaffirm Article 2(4). Termination of naval quarantine and withdrawal of forward-deployed military assets would remove coercive pressure lacking authorisation. Reaffirmation of Venezuela’s obligations under the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights preserved the principle that sovereignty does not confer immunity from legal standards. Appointment of a special envoy offered a channel for engagement grounded in law rather than force. A general call for all member states to refrain from unilateral coercive measures reinforced the universality of these rules.

The wider implication concerns the survival of the post-1945 international system. The Charter was designed to replace power politics with rule-based restraint. Allowing it to wither through repeated exception undermines smaller states’ security and accelerates fragmentation into rival blocs. Analysts such as Glenn Diesen and John Mearsheimer, though differing in normative outlook, converge on the assessment that great-power disregard for institutional limits increases systemic instability. The address argued that the council faced a choice between enforcing its founding principles or conceding their irrelevance.

Measured against historical evidence, legal scholarship, and economic data, the speech presented a coherent case grounded in documented practice rather than rhetoric. The Venezuela case illustrates how regime change strategies, whether military or economic, tend to produce prolonged instability and civilian harm while weakening international law. The question placed before the global community concerns institutional survival rather than ideological alignment. Upholding the Charter in this instance would signal that rules apply even to the most powerful members, preserving a minimum framework for peaceful coexistence.

I would recommend the UN be disbanded, it's been totally useless since inception. It was built to serve the interests of the perpetrators. For the time being, perhaps the Security Council members should commission an independent legal assessment of unilateral sanctions and naval blockades under the UN Charter and publish its findings. Member states should support reform mechanisms that limit veto use in cases involving clear breaches of Article 2(4). Greater transparency requirements for foreign funding of political actors would reduce covert interference. These steps would strengthen institutional credibility without endorsing any particular government.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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US Gangsterism at Sea: The Pursuit of Marinera and the Return of Gunboat Enforcement

The legal and strategic consequences of American piracy, coercive power beyond the UN Charter, and the erosion of international maritime law

Global GeoPolitics

The pursuit of the oil tanker formerly known as Bella 1 illustrates a form of maritime coercion that sits outside any recognised mandate under international law. The episode concerns a sanctioned commercial vessel carrying Venezuelan crude oil, pursued across open seas by United States military and law-enforcement assets, despite the absence of authorisation from the United Nations Security Council and without a declared state of armed conflict. The matter does not hinge on sanctions compliance alone but on whether a single state may exercise de facto policing authority over global shipping lanes by force.

Bella 1 departed the Caribbean in late 2025 under pressure from an expanding United States naval presence enforcing what Washington described as a total blockade of Venezuelan oil exports. The blockade was declared unilaterally and without Security Council approval, placing it outside the framework of lawful maritime interdiction recognised by the UN Charter and the San Remo Manual on Naval Warfare. During its voyage, the vessel altered its legal status. It was renamed Marinera, registered in the Russian national vessel database, and assigned Sochi as its port of registry. Under established maritime law, a vessel sailing under a national flag enjoys the protection and jurisdiction of that state on the high seas, subject only to narrowly defined exceptions such as piracy, slavery, or unauthorised broadcasting.

Following the re-flagging, the Russian government issued a formal diplomatic note demanding that the United States cease pursuit. This step was consistent with long-standing principles codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which treats interference with a foreign-flagged vessel on the high seas as a violation of sovereignty unless authorised by treaty or Security Council resolution. No such authorisation exists in this case. The pursuit nonetheless continued, involving surveillance aircraft, naval coordination, and the forward deployment of special operations units.

The scale of attention directed at a single tanker was striking. Maritime tracking and aviation data indicated repeated patrols by P-8A Poseidon aircraft launched from bases in Spain, the United Kingdom, and Iceland, covering vast stretches of the North Atlantic. At one point, three such aircraft operated simultaneously near the Faroe Islands, maintaining near-continuous coverage of Marinera’s route. This level of military surveillance would normally accompany preparations for boarding or seizure rather than routine monitoring.

Additional deployments reinforced this assessment. Aircraft and rotary assets associated with United States special operations forces were transferred to British bases, including AC-130J gunships, CV-22B tilt-rotors, and MH-47G helicopters operated by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. This unit has a documented role in maritime interdiction and forced boarding operations. No public exercise notifications or alliance statements accompanied the deployment. Silence from official channels contrasted with the scale and specificity of the movements.

The legal justification advanced by Washington rests on domestic sanctions enforcement. United States authorities argue that prior involvement in Iranian and Venezuelan oil trading renders vessels such as Marinera subject to seizure under United States law. That position extends domestic jurisdiction far beyond territorial waters and into the global commons. International law does not recognise unilateral sanctions as a basis for boarding foreign-flagged vessels on the high seas. Alfred de Zayas, former UN Independent Expert on international order, described such practices as a revival of gunboat diplomacy under administrative cover. Legal scholars at Cambridge and Leiden have similarly noted that extraterritorial sanctions enforcement lacks standing without multilateral consent.

Characterisation of these vessels as part of a “shadow fleet” does not alter the legal position. The term has no standing in maritime law and functions as a political label rather than a juridical category. Transporting oil for sanctioned states does not constitute piracy, which international law defines narrowly as violent robbery at sea for private ends. Nor does it fall under universal jurisdiction crimes. Absent a Security Council mandate, seizure attempts rely on raw force rather than law.

Russian handling of the Marinera case reflects a deliberate strategic response rather than an ad hoc manoeuvre. By granting flag protection mid-voyage and formally asserting jurisdiction, Moscow forced the issue into the diplomatic and legal domain. The move tested whether flag state protection remains operative when challenged by a militarily superior power. Analysts such as Glenn Diesen have argued that erosion of this principle would render maritime law subordinate to power hierarchy, undermining smaller and medium shipping states as much as sanctioned ones.

Speculation that Russia intends to extend similar protection to other sanctioned tankers aligns with broader patterns in global trade fragmentation. Sanctions imposed on Russia, Iran, and Venezuela have encouraged parallel logistics networks operating outside Western insurance, financing, and port access systems. Attempts to suppress these networks through force risk turning commercial shipping into a theatre of military confrontation. The Gulf of Finland incident, where Finnish special forces boarded a tanker without a UN mandate, points to a widening zone of contestation in European waters.

The involvement of NATO surveillance assets adds another layer of concern. Tracking operations near Ireland, Iceland, and Norway occurred far from any declared theatre of hostilities. Use of alliance infrastructure to support unilateral interdiction blurs the line between collective defence and national enforcement action. It also places non-belligerent states in proximity to a potential confrontation between nuclear-armed powers over a commercial vessel.

Statements attributed to United States officials indicate a preference to seize rather than sink the tanker. That distinction does little to resolve the legal breach. Boarding by force against the will of the flag state constitutes an act of aggression under General Assembly Resolution 3314, which defines aggression to include blockade and attack on merchant shipping. The fact that such actions are framed as law enforcement rather than warfare does not alter their substance.

The broader context includes the capture of Venezuelan leadership by United States forces and a series of strikes on vessels in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, reportedly resulting in significant loss of life. These actions form part of an escalating pressure campaign aimed at control over Venezuelan resources rather than compliance with international adjudication. Public statements by United States leadership demanding the return of oil and other assets reinforce this interpretation. The language mirrors nineteenth-century practices of maritime seizure and indemnity enforcement rather than post-1945 collective security norms.

From a politico-economic perspective, the Marinera episode exposes a contradiction at the core of the current sanctions regime. Global energy markets depend on freedom of navigation and predictable legal treatment of shipping. Turning enforcement into a matter of aerial surveillance and special forces raids introduces uncertainty that raises insurance costs, reroutes trade, and incentivises further concealment rather than compliance. Economists studying sanctions effectiveness, including Richard Nephew and Agathe Demarais, note that excessive coercion often accelerates the formation of alternative systems rather than restoring leverage.

The silence of international institutions on this episode carries consequences. Failure to respond signals acceptance of a precedent where maritime law yields to unilateral enforcement backed by military power. Smaller states and neutral shipping registries would bear the long-term cost, as flag protection becomes conditional on geopolitical alignment. The erosion of legal equality at sea mirrors earlier erosion on land through sanctions and proxy warfare.

What emerges from the Marinera case is not an isolated enforcement action but a test of whether international law retains operational force in global commerce. The actions taken against this tanker resemble piracy in functional terms, defined not by private intent but by seizure without lawful authority. Labeling such conduct as sanctions enforcement does not alter its effect on the integrity of the maritime order.

If the supranational bodies worked in the interests of the text in their charters, I would recommend an emergency review by the United Nations General Assembly of unilateral maritime interdiction practices would clarify legal boundaries. Flag states should coordinate diplomatic responses to unlawful boardings to reinforce collective norms. International maritime insurers and classification societies should condition coverage on adherence to UN-mandated enforcement only. These steps would reduce escalation risks and restore legal predictability without endorsing any sanctioned trade.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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Maduro Removal In Defence of the Petrodollar System and Energy Dominance

How energy control sustains petrodollar power against multipolar challengers, China, Russia, BRICS expansion, and alternative payment systems

The removal of Venezuela’s head of state formed part of a broader contest over the architecture of global payments, energy settlement, and monetary hierarchy. The operation did not arise from humanitarian urgency, democratic reform, or governance failure. Strategic pressure focused instead on a state occupying a key position within alternative trade and settlement networks that increasingly bypass dollar clearing and United States financial supervision.

Public admissions by senior United States officials clarified the absence of structural change following leadership removal. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that “all of the problems we had with Maduro when Maduro was there—we still have those problems,” confirming continuity of policy objectives rather than transition or reform. Sanctions, oil restrictions, and conditional relief remained intact, demonstrating that the target involved system alignment rather than individual leadership behaviour. Such continuity aligns with earlier United States interventions where regime change served as an instrument for enforcing compliance within a wider financial and energy order.

Venezuela’s strategic value lies in energy reserves, settlement pathways, and participation in emerging multipolar trade structures. Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves globally and has increasingly settled oil exports outside dollar mechanisms through yuan-denominated contracts, barter arrangements, and bilateral clearing systems. Analysts including Michael Hudson have long described dollar hegemony as dependent upon energy pricing, reserve currency recycling, and sanctions enforcement rather than market neutrality. Oil transactions conducted outside dollar clearing reduce demand for United States debt instruments and weaken sanction leverage across the Global South.

China’s energy dependence amplifies Venezuela’s importance within this framework. China purchases between sixty and ninety percent of Venezuelan oil exports, alongside approximately eighty-five to ninety percent of Iranian crude, together accounting for roughly one third of Chinese oil imports. Additional Middle Eastern supply routes remain exposed to United States naval and financial pressure, giving Washington potential influence over close to seventy percent of China’s energy flows. Strategic analysts including J. Michael Waller argue that constraining Chinese energy security restricts Beijing’s capacity for high-risk military operations, particularly regarding Taiwan, while increasing pressure on Russia through forced price concessions on oil exports.

Energy dominance intersects directly with currency dominance. Settlement in dollars underpins United States fiscal sustainability through reserve demand and Treasury absorption. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have treated de-dollarisation as a strategic threat, regardless of rhetorical differences. Independent observers including Hudson and Glenn Diesen describe sanctions policy as a substitute for industrial competitiveness, relying on financial choke points rather than productive capacity. Control over banking rails, insurance markets, maritime corridors, and reserve currency issuance enables coercive enforcement without formal declarations of war.

The Venezuela operation occurred without multilateral authorisation and outside declared conflict, signalling willingness to bypass institutional constraints when financial interests face erosion. Pepe Escobar characterised the move as a “structural rupture,” reflecting desperation rather than confidence. Political economy theory distinguishes between confident hegemons that promote open systems and declining hegemons that weaponise access, a framework articulated by Diesen and echoed by multiple non-aligned scholars. Declining hegemons restrict technology transfer, sever currency access, and enforce compliance through sanctions, asset seizures, and regime pressure.

Sanctions imposed on Venezuela functioned less as corrective tools and more as mechanisms of enforced disconnection. Oil production, refining capacity, and export logistics remained constrained under United States licensing regimes even after leadership removal. Rubio’s remarks confirmed that relief would remain conditional upon Washington-defined benchmarks subject to revision. Such arrangements preserve leverage while preventing independent reconstruction or reintegration into alternative financial systems.

Claims framing the operation as democratic intervention conflict with outcomes on the ground. Institutional structures, security forces, and economic controls remained unchanged, while sanctions continued to suppress domestic energy revenues. Independent analysts described the action as “cosmetic,” removing a public figure while leaving the underlying economic siege intact. Continuity rather than reform characterised post-removal policy, reinforcing the assessment that sovereignty rather than governance lay at issue.

The broader geopolitical signal extended beyond Venezuela. Latin American governments now face recalculated risk assessments regarding currency exposure, energy partnerships, and political alignment. Zhao DaShuai emphasised the reality of power projection constraints for China and Russia, noting the absence of regional military infrastructure capable of countering United States action in the Western Hemisphere. Geographic distance, logistical barriers, and escalation risk limit external intervention options despite political sympathy or economic ties.

Energy markets and foreign exchange systems responded accordingly. Venezuelan oil assets, sovereign credit risk across Latin America, and emerging market debt instruments underwent repricing as investors reassessed United States willingness to enforce compliance through direct action. Petrodollar and petro-yuan narratives gained renewed attention, reflecting concerns regarding settlement safety and asset seizure risk. Gold and non-sovereign stores of value gained narrative strength, not as immediate price reactions but as long-term hedges against unilateral enforcement.

The operation also reinforced precedent regarding international law and institutional bypass. United States action occurred without Security Council authorisation and with explicit acknowledgement of regime removal objectives. Independent legal scholars have described such conduct as consistent with rogue state definitions, prioritising self-interest over norm adherence. Under previous administrations, similar objectives operated under humanitarian or democratic rhetoric, whereas current practice reflects reduced concern for narrative cover.

China and Russia face limited response options under these conditions. Military intervention remains implausible given distance and escalation risk. Economic retaliation risks further sanction exposure. Diplomatic condemnation carries minimal deterrent effect absent enforcement capability. Such asymmetry underscores the continued effectiveness of dollar-centred coercion despite increasing multipolar rhetoric.

The Venezuela case therefore illustrates the operational mechanics of financial warfare during a period of hegemonic transition. Energy control, settlement enforcement, and sanction leverage converge to discipline states attempting currency diversification or strategic autonomy. Leadership removal functions as one instrument within a broader toolkit designed to preserve system compliance rather than institutional reform.

Recommendations follow from these observations rather than ideological preference. States seeking autonomy within a multipolar order require redundancy across energy supply, settlement mechanisms, logistics, and financial infrastructure. Diversification alone proves insufficient without coordinated protection of trade corridors and insurance systems. Regional blocs require internal clearing arrangements insulated from external seizure risk. Industrial capacity and technological independence reduce vulnerability more effectively than diplomatic alignment. Absent such measures, participation in alternative monetary systems remains exposed to enforcement actions exemplified by the Venezuela operation.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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As Awareness Spreads, Power Advances Toward Techno-Authoritarianism

Global GeoPolitics

The current phase of global governance reflects a deliberate tightening of control by interconnected elites responding to widespread public recognition of long-running power consolidation. Awareness has grown through lived experience rather than persuasion, producing resistance that elites now treat as a threat requiring containment rather than accommodation. Political authority increasingly operates through transnational coordination, bypassing national consent while preserving democratic form.

Neil Oliver has described this moment as one where the mask has slipped, because the programme no longer depends on concealment. His commentary consistently identifies a shift from persuasion toward compulsion once public trust collapsed. That observation aligns with political economy research showing that legitimacy crises often precede authoritarian consolidation rather than reform. Power reacts defensively when obedience weakens.

The idea that power shields itself from scrutiny has long been articulated by intellectual authorities; Voltaire warned that “it is dangerous to be right in matters on which the established authorities are wrong,” highlighting how control defines the boundaries of permissible critique. Political philosopher George Orwell described moral and linguistic inversion as a hallmark of modern power, writing that political language is designed “to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable,” a phenomenon later examined by sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, who argued that modern systems enable harm to be carried out through bureaucratic and technical rationality rather than overt violence. Matt Ehret has published a series examining what he describes as the occult and philosophical influences behind Fabian Socialism, while UK Column reports that 141 members of the UK government are affiliated with the Fabian Society. Historically, the Fabian Society is documented as an elite policy organization founded in the late nineteenth century that advocates gradualism, the strategy of achieving systemic political and social change incrementally through policy reform, administrative influence, and cultural institutions rather than through revolution or mass democratic upheaval. This method of change through expert-led institutions aligns with the concerns raised by sociologist Robert Michels in his formulation of the Iron Law of Oligarchy, in which he argued that “who says organization, says oligarchy,” meaning that complex political organizations, regardless of stated ideals, tend to consolidate decision-making power within a small, self-perpetuating leadership class. In the technological domain, Harvard scholar Shoshana Zuboff warns that digital systems create “instrumentarian power” capable of shaping human behavior at scale while presenting themselves as benign or progressive. Together, these authorities describe a structural condition in which control is normalized, moral language is inverted, and governance is increasingly exercised through opaque technological systems rather than democratic consent.

The architecture of elite coordination is neither novel nor accidental, having developed through twentieth-century institutions designed to harmonise policy across borders. The Fabian Society provided an early model, advocating gradual administrative capture in place of overt revolution. Fabian thinkers rejected mass democracy as inefficient, favouring rule by experts shielded from popular pressure. Their influence remains visible in contemporary bureaucratic governance.

International coordination expanded through bodies such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, and the Bilderberg Group, which facilitate consensus among political, financial, and corporate leaders. These forums operate outside electoral accountability while shaping strategic direction. Membership overlap reinforces shared assumptions rather than plural debate.

The United Nations framework provides ideological justification for this consolidation. Agenda 2030 presents itself as a sustainability programme while embedding governance targets that require centralised monitoring, behavioural management, and data integration. Policy documents emphasise compliance metrics and outcome enforcement rather than democratic deliberation. National sovereignty becomes secondary to global benchmarks.

Economic power reinforces political alignment. Large philanthropic and financial actors influence public policy through funding, partnerships, and advisory roles. Bill Gates exemplifies this dynamic through extensive involvement in global health, education, agriculture, and digital identity initiatives. These interventions shape public priorities without electoral mandate or meaningful oversight.

Technological capability has enabled enforcement at scale. Digital identity systems, biometric databases, predictive analytics, and artificial intelligence allow continuous population monitoring. Public private partnerships blur accountability, with governments outsourcing authority to corporations that operate beyond constitutional constraint. Infrastructure precedes consent, leaving debate irrelevant once systems embed.

Transhumanism provides ideological coherence to this expansion. Human beings are increasingly treated as modifiable systems rather than moral subjects. Yuval Noah Harari has publicly argued that humans are hackable organisms whose behaviour can be engineered through data and biotechnology. Such claims normalise intervention into cognition, biology, and autonomy.

Medical policy during the pandemic demonstrated this logic in practice. Emergency powers suspended basic liberties while concentrating authority within executive branches. Scientific debate narrowed through regulatory pressure rather than empirical refutation. Former pharmaceutical executive Mike Yeadon warned that emergency authorisations bypassed established safety standards. Institutional response focused on silencing rather than engagement.

The crisis accelerated systems already under development. Vaccine certification normalised conditional access to work, travel, and social participation. Data integration linked health status to employment and mobility. These mechanisms persisted beyond emergency justification, revealing permanent intent rather than temporary necessity.

Economic restructuring reinforced dependency. Lockdowns eliminated small enterprises while multinational corporations expanded market share. Central bank intervention inflated asset values, widening inequality and reducing economic independence. Debt reliance increased leverage over populations. These outcomes aligned with consolidation objectives long promoted within elite policy circles.

Media control supported enforcement. Ownership concentration narrowed permissible discourse, while digital platforms enforced alignment through algorithmic suppression. Independent investigative journalist Whitney Webb has documented interlocking relationships between intelligence agencies, financial institutions, technology firms, and media organisations. Narrative uniformity reflects structural alignment rather than coincidence.

Speech regulation advanced indirectly. Governments delegated censorship to platforms operating under regulatory threat, preserving plausible deniability. Public figures such as Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens reported systematic suppression when challenging dominant narratives. These measures operate without judicial process.

State leaders increasingly acknowledge the objective. Benjamin Netanyahu publicly argued that uncontrolled social media threatens state authority, calling for regulation to manage discourse. Similar statements across Western governments frame free speech as a security risk. Authority seeks control rather than persuasion.

Transhumanist ambition extends beyond surveillance into biological governance. Neural interfaces, genetic modification, and AI assisted decision making promise unprecedented intrusion into bodily autonomy. Defence research funding and patent filings confirm active development. Ethical frameworks lag intentionally, allowing deployment before resistance mobilises.

Independent researchers such as David Martin have traced long standing intellectual property claims related to coronavirus research, undermining claims of novelty. Institutional refusal to address these findings reinforces perceptions of deliberate obfuscation. Transparency erodes as authority hardens.

Public awakening now shapes elite behaviour. Lived contradictions between messaging and reality undermine compliance. Excess mortality, educational harm, and economic damage contradict assurances. Trust collapses when experience diverges from narrative.

Elite response intensifies accordingly. Financial exclusion, professional sanctions, legal intimidation, and reputational attacks target dissenters. Banking access and employment become contingent on ideological alignment. These tools enforce obedience without overt violence.

The trajectory reflects digital authoritarianism rather than liberal governance. Control operates through infrastructure, access, and data rather than force. Punishment occurs through exclusion rather than incarceration. Behaviour management replaces consent.

Historical precedent warns that technocratic efficiency often accompanies moral collapse. Fascism merged corporate and state power through administrative coordination rather than chaos. Contemporary forms replace uniforms with interfaces and commands with algorithms. The effect remains coercive.

Neil Oliver’s framing emphasises clarity rather than conspiracy. Power structures, ideology, and mechanisms align openly. Nothing remains hidden. Elites describe objectives plainly while accelerating implementation.

Awareness spreads despite suppression. Alternative media, independent research, and personal networks sustain resistance. Authority responds by embedding control deeper into daily life. Digital currency, identity integration, and automated enforcement represent next phases.

The outcome depends on whether awakening translates into organised refusal before systems become irreversible. Structural power favours elites, yet legitimacy cannot be programmed indefinitely. History shows that control without consent ultimately fractures.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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