Jannie's Notes

It does not matter how slowly you go as long as you do not stop

[jannie-notes]

ART 1365

If two parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of real or personal property, but the instrument states that the property is sold absolutely or with a right of repurchase, reformation of the instrument is proper

exists, or a writing exists, but the parties do not intend it to express their

final  agreemeReformation is thus not available where no writing exists, or a writing exists, but the parties do not intend it to express their final agreement

Reformation is  that  remedy  by  means  of  which  a  written instrument is amended or rectified so as to express or conform to the real agreement or intention of the parties when by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident, the instrument fails to express such agreement or intention.

Reformation is  that  remedy  by  means  of  which  a  written

instrument is amended or rectified so as to express or conform to the

real agreement or intention of the parties when by reason of mistake,

fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident, the instrument fails to express

such agreement or intention.

FLORENCIA VELASQUES VS. JUSTO TEODORO (G.R. No. L-18666 February 17, 1923) Romualdez, J

In this case the heirs of Velasquez seek to recover title to, and possession of certain land.

There are 7 lands in total and the heirs of Velasquez said that they have in their possession 6 parcel of land owned by their parents as a conjugal property and 1 that is in possession of Justo Teodoro.

But Justo claimed that he bought the land from the heirs of a certain Leodegaria Valdes which also purched the land from Ramon Velasquez and by the terms of the document, the contract is one of sale

HOWEVER, in one of the clauses in the document, it appears that Velasquez did NOT reserve the right to repurchase the property, but bound himself to return the principal interest. Now, the contract is considered as a mortgage.

ISSUE: Whether the transfers of the subject lands are valid

HELD: the transfer of land is invalid. This aforementioned contract is a mortgage, thus upholding the judgment of the trial court that there was an assignment of error on the part of the respondents in considering the contract is one of sale. Ramon Velazquez did not acquire title to the property by virtue of the contract mentioned. He had no right to transfer it, as he did to Leodegaria Valdez.

[jannie-notes]

ARTICLE 1333

- Here, it is assumed that the party was prepared to assume the risk. This is especially true for agreements that are obviously aleatory in nature.

-to invalidate a contract, there must be 1) real error which is inevitable and 2) unknown facts

CASE:

DOMINGO REALTY, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. 126236 : January 26, 2007;LEONARDO QUISUMBING)

Acero constructed a factory building knowing that the property he was occupying is encroaching on a portion of the property of Domingo Realty. Under the Compromise Agreement, Acero promised to clear all structures within 60 days. But then, Acero filed a Motion to Nullify the Compromise Agreement on the ground of vagueness and mistake. The issue is WON the Compromise Agreement entered between petitioner and private respondent be set aside on the ground of vagueness and mistake. It was held that the agreement was valid. In the case at hand, Acero admitted that he is occupying some part of Domingo Realty’s property that is why he cannot claim mistake or error.

[jannie-notes]

EDGAR LEDONIO vs. CAPITOL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

(G.R. No. 149040; July 4, 2007Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes)

FACTS:

Ledonio obtained 2 loan amounting 60k fromMs. Picache, for which he executed promissory notes

He failed to pay any of the said loans

On 1 April 1989, Ms. Picache executed an Assignment of Creditin favor of respondentfor the consideration of P60,000.00

He denied obtaining any loan from Ms. Picache and questioned the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes, for they were the result of intimidation and fraud

Despite having the knowledge of the assignment of credit, Petitioner still failed to pay his indebtedness afterrepeated demands by respondent and its counsel.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent herein

Petitioner argued that he never gave consent to suchassignment of credit and therefore it should have noeffect

ISSUE:

WON consent of the debtor is required in an assignment ofcredit

HELD:

No, The Court herein ruled that in an assignment of credit, consent is immaterial. What the law requires is that the debtor would be duly notified upon the issuance of an assignment of credit to a third person. In the case at bar, the petitioner cannot deny that he wasn’t notified by the respondent when the assignment of credit happened. It can be reasonably presumed that when the respondent, together with their counsel, sent demand letters to the petitioner herein, the same had received them.

[jannie-notes]

ART 1301

Subrogation is the transfer to a third person of all the rights appertaining to the creditor.

In conventional subrogation, consent of all parties is essential: a) the debtor-because he becomes liable under the new obligation, b) the old creditor-because his credit is affected, and c) the new creditor- because he becomes a party to the obligation. Conventional subrogation takes place when a third person substitute the original creditor and the debtor

Conventional Subrogation vs. Assignment of Credit

-CS extinguishes the original obligation and creates a new one while AC, transfer of right does not extinguish the obligation. the transferee becomes the new creditor for the same obligation and consent of the debtor is not necessary, a mere notification would suffice for its validity

[jannie-notes]

ART. 1236. And 1237

WHO MAY PAY? a. the debtor himself, b. any third person

A 3rd person, whether he has the knowledge and consent of of the debtor, or whether he has interest in the obligation or not, may pay the obligation as expressly recognized by art. 1236 and 1237 however, this cannot be applied to a case of a third person who pays the redemption price on sales with right of repurchase because the vendor a retro is not a debtor.

RIGHTS OS A THIRD PERSON

He can recover from the debtor the entire amount which he has paid

He is subrogated to all of the rights of the creditor.

EXAMPLE:

In 2000, Stephen executed a promissory note promising to pay Zai 10k within the period of 4 years and was guaranteed by JC. In 2004, Noriel who is a third person, paid the entire indebtness with the knowledge and consent of Stephen, now, Noriel shall be subrogated to all the rights of Zai, not only against Stephen but also against JC. This is because, in art 1236 and 1237, stated that a third person who pays the obligation with the express approval of the debtor, he shall be legally subrogated to all the rights of the creditor, not only against the debtor, but even against third person. And now Noriel can demand reimbursement from Stephen of the 10kwhich he paid to Zai, if Stephen cannot pay because of insolvency, he can still proceed against JC for the recovery of the amount.

[jannie-notes]

ART 1204 AND 1205.

Art. 1204 is the general rule where it is only applicable when the right of choice belongs to the debtor however there is an exemption which is stated in art 1205, where it is applicable when the right of choice belongs to the creditor.

It is important to first ask the question of whether the debtor or creditor has the right of choice.

RIGHT OF CHOICE OF DEBTOR -  if the loss is because of fortuitous event, the debtor will not be held liable for damages. But if the loss is due to the fault of the debtor which is stated in art 1204, the creditor shall have a right to indemnity for damages taking the value of the last thing to be lost or service that became impossible. HOWEVER, if one or more but NOT ALL  things are lost, the creditor cannot hold the debtor liable for damages for the reason that the debtor can still comply with his obligation.

RIGHT OF CHOICE OF CREDITOR - if the loss is because of fortuitous event, then par 1 of art 1205 is applicable and the debtor cannot be held liable.But if the loss is due to the fault of the debtor, THE NO. 2 AND 3 OF ART 1205 IS APPLICABLE. If all things are lost the reditor may claim the price value of any one of them with indemnity for damages but if not all are lost, the creditor may claim any of those subsisting without any liability on the part of the debtor.

Example: Del is obliged to give Carol, at Carol's choice, either objects 1, 2, or 3. If all objects were lost through Del's fault, the value of the last thing lost with damages must be given to Carol.

[jannie-notes]

CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD CO. – the plaintiff here is a passenger of the said company. One time when he is riding the train he alighted from the said train while it is still moving and when he finally alighted, he step on a sack of watermelon and as a result he fell on the platform and because of the fall he rolled from the platform and was drawn under a moving car which resulted in his arm being crashed. The company said that the proximate cause is the alighting of plaintiff while the train is still moving but the plaintiff argued that the proximate cause is the negligence of the company allowing the sack of watermelon to be placed from the platform. It was held that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence because he is ignorant of the fact that there is a sack of watermelon in the platform and the court consider the plaintiff’s age, sex and physical condition in alighting the train and that it is his daily route and he was very familiar with the place.

NEGLIGENCE VS FRAUD

-Negligence is voluntary in nature in which another person suffers from damage or injury due to failure to observe diligence in short there is intent while fraud is the intentional proposition to evade normal fulfillment of the obligation in short there is abandonment.

[jannie-notes]

ART. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

GOOD FAITH -  if the either of the parties act in good faith, he shall be liable only for natural and probable consequences

BAD FAITH – if the obligor shows bad faith he will be held responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non performance of the obligation. Any renunciation is null and void.

Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Estrella O. Querimit

Facts: Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner bank and certain officials of the latter, alleging that the they refused to allow her to withdraw her time deposit evidenced by four certificates of deposit in the total amount of $60,000. The trial court ordered petitioner-bank and its officials to allow respondent to withdraw her time deposit plus accrued interests. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the trial court with the modification that petitioner-bank was solely liable because the latter has a personality separate from its officers and stockholders. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the CA.

Held: Petitioner-bank failed to prove that it had already made payment considering that the subject certificates of deposit were still in the possession of the depositors. The principle that payment, in order to discharge a debt, must be made to someone authorized to receive it is applicable to the payment of certificates of deposit. Petitioner should, thus, not have paid respondent’s husband or any third party the amount of the time deposit without requiring the surrender of the certificates of deposit. Laches would also not defeat respondent’s claim as she did not withdraw her deposit because she relied on petitioner bank’s assurance that the interest would accumulate annually even after maturity of the time deposit and she set aside the money therein for the retirement.

[jannie-notes]

ART 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the Courts, according to the circumstances.

Talks about the principle of the demandability of the responsibility of the obligor in case of negligence.

Negligence which already happened may be waived unlike in future negligence.

The court may increase and decrease the liability of the party at fault and may take the consideration of good faith and bad faith of the obligor or the conduct of the oblige when the damage was incurred.

KINDS OF NEGLIGENCE:

Culpa Contractual – is a breach of contract. It is a negligence of the obligor by virtue of which he is unable to perform his obligation arising from an existing contract because of the omission of diligence.

Culpa Aquiliana – or quasi-delict is a civil negligence that causes damage to others.

Culpa Criminal -  here there is no pre-existing obligation exempt not to harm others and will be held civilly liable in case of insolvency.

NEGLIGENCE (culpa) VS. FRAUD (dolo)

Negligence signifies an act or omission which is voluntary in character where the other person suffers damage or injury due to failure to observe diligence. The latter, however, is the conscious and intentional proposition to evade the normal fulfillment of the obligation. Negligence, if there is intent to cause damage or injury, fraud, if there is an abandonment, carelessness and lack of diligence.

EXAMPLE CASE:

Prudential Bank vs. CA–The complaint in this case arose when private respondent Aurora F. Cruz, with her sister as co-depositor, invested P200, 000.00 in Central Bank bills with the Prudential Bank at its branch in Quezon City. Susan Quimbo, one of the bank employees, assisted her all throughout the process and her dealings. Cruz was asked to sign a Withdrawal Slip for P196,122.98, representing the amount to be re-invested after deduction of the prepaid interest. Quimbo explained this was a new requirement of the bank. Several days later, Cruz received another Confirmation of Sale and a copy of the Debit Memo coming from Quimbo. On October27, 1986, Cruz returned to the bank and sought to withdraw her P200, 000.00. After verification of her records, however, she was informed that the investment appeared to have been already withdrawn by her. Cruz filed a breach of contract against the bank and demanded the return of her money with interest, plus damages and attorney’s fees. Cruz won the case in both the RTC and CA.

[jannie-notes]

REPUBLIC VS. HON. BAUTISTA

FACTS:

From the moment of acquisition until his death, Apolonio, Sr. had been the single and exclusive possessor and occupant, and no one had contested his ownership or staked an adverse claim against him thereon. He passed away in 1987, and his children, including responder Apolonio Jr. and his siblings, succeeded him. The siblings of Apolonio, Jr. relinquished their rights in favor of him in an extrajudicial settlement of their father's inheritance that was implemented by Apolonio, Srchildren. .'s As a result, the property was listed in Apolonio Jr.'s name for tax purposes.

The Government did not interpose any timely objection to the testimony of Apolonia, Jr. It did not also object to the documentary evidence (i.e., the deeds of absolute sale and tax declarations) offered by him. Hence, the MTC admitted all the evidence presented by Apolonia, Jr. In due course, the MTC granted Apolonia, Jr.'s application, and declared him as the owner in fee simple of the land, and confirmed his ownership thereof.

ISSUE:

WON Apolonio Jr. established his lawful occupation of the land as owner in fee simple; that the Government did not timely object to his testimony, and did not also controvert his evidence

HELD:

The Government has correctly insisted that the requisite period of possession of the property should conform to that provided forin Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which has limited the right to apply for judicial confirmation to citizens of the Philippines "who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been inopen, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of theapplication for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. x x x" The provision is reprised by Section14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), adopting the length of possession and occupation ofalienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

[jannie-notes]

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND VICENSIO

FACTS:

When she was still in her teens, the petitioner worked as a hostess in nightclubs. She had Cynthia Vicencio requested a change of last name from "Vicencio" to "Yu" in a petition. She claimed that she was born to spouses Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. yastmastmastmastmastmastmastmastmasti as Later, her parents' marriage was annulled, and her mother stopped using the Vicencio last name. After then, Fe wed Ernesto Yu. She had not known or even remembered her true father, Pablo, since she was a little child; instead, Ernesto Yu was and is her father. In spite of this, she continued to use the last name "Vicencio" in school and in other settings. Due to this circumstance, questions about her parentage and the reason behind her family name, Vicencio, were raised by both her classmates and their neighbors, which caused her great humiliation. She discussed the petition with her step-father, and he gave his approval. The Solicitor General opposed but the trial court granted the petition. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which held that it is for the best interest of Cynthia that her surname be changed. With regard to Cynthia's request to change her last name, the Solicitor General appealed, claiming that there was no justifiable basis for doing so.

ISSUE:

WON Cynthia be allowed to adopt the surname of his step-father?

HELD:

The requirement for granting a name change is that there must be a justifiable and legitimate justification for the request. The contested decision, as upheld by the appellate court, did not induce us to budge from the applicability of the general rule on surname usage, in particular the statute requiring that legitimate children shall primarily use the surname of their father. Due to the surname of the private response, there may be some confusion about her parentage. However, if we permit the private respondent to use her stepfather's last name even though she is not his lawfully adopted child, further uncertainty and serious legal repercussions could result. Although earlier rulings permitted stepfathers' surnames to be used even when adoption was not an option, these cases should be separated from the current one.

[jannie-notes]

CHUA VS CABANGBANG

FACTS:

When she was still in her teens, the petitioner worked as a hostess in nightclubs. She had affairs with a variety of men, but she gave birth to two children by a specific SySia Lay and one daughter by Victor Tan Villareal. She entrusted her youngest child to a Cebu friend. During the early years of the former, Mr. and Mrs. Cabangbang obtained custody of the other daughter, Betty (4 months old). They christened her Grace Cabangbang. The petitioner is now seeking to gain custody of Betty. She claims that Villareal abducted the child and brought her to the couple, who claim to have discovered the infant wrapped up in a bundle outside their residence's gate.

ISSUE:

WON the custody of the child can be granted back to the mother

HELD:

NO petitioner abandoned the child, thus she has lost her parental authority over the child. CFI ruled that the mother was unfit to have

 parental authority, as she is not an upright woman. But SC ruled that it was more of an abandonment rather than fitness that divests the mother with parental authority Art. 332 of the Civil Code The courts may deprive the parents of their parental authority or suspend the exercise of the same if they should treat their children with excessive harshness or should give them corrupting orders, counsels or examples, or should make them beg or abandon them. Therefore, abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving authority over the parent.

[jannie-notes]

TAN HOI VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

One of Tan Hoi's children, Tan Nam, was born on October 10, 1949, and was living in Hong Kong, according to the petition for naturalization that Tan Hoi submitted to the Court of First Instance of Manila. On December 28, 1956, the court, after hearing, granted the petition ordering that petitioner be admitted as citizen of the Philippines and that, upon prior compliance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 530, and after taking the required oath, a certificate of naturalization be issued to him which shall be registered in the civil registry as required by Act No. 3753.

One of the requirements for a naturalization applicant, according to Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, is that the applicant must have enrolled his minor children who are of school age in one of the public or private schools approved by the Office of Private Education and where Philippine history is taught as part of the curriculum. This Court has frequently stressed the significance of this condition in a number of cases where it has been indicated that it is mandatory. Because of the civil war in China at the time the applicant's children left the Philippines for China in 1937 and their inability to return when they were old enough to attend school as well as the fact that the applicant could not afford to pay for the return of his minor children to the Philippines in addition to the strict immigration policies in the Philippines, it was decided that these reasons were not acceptable justifications for failing to comply with the requirement.

ISSUE:

WON the right of a legitimate child can be a reason for the acquisition of the citizenship of the adopter

HELD:

It is contended that petitioner could not have brought his son Tan Nam to the Philippines for the reason that he has already been adopted by his godfather who was financially able to give him education and support with the logical result that his (petitioner’s) naturalization will not benefit him (his son) because under the law he will follow the citizenship of his adopting father. In the first place, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the child was in effect adopted as claimed it appearing that the alleged adoption is merely supported by petitioner’s affidavit. In the second place, this Court has already held that the rights of a legitimate child given to an adopted child, as stated in Article 341 of our Civil Code, do not include the acquisition of the citizenship of the adopterThe decision appealed from is reversed. We hereby declare that the oath of allegiance taken by petitioner on January 29, 1959 has no legal force and effect. The naturalization certificate issued to petitioner, if any, is hereby cancelled. No costs.

[jannie-notes]

CONDE VS. ABAYA

FACTS:

Casiano Abaya passed away in 1899 unmarried, although he left behind Paula Conde with two unacknowledged children. The two kids passed away in 1902 and 1903 while still minors. The mother filed a lawsuit seeking resolution of Casiano's intestate estate as well as recognition of the two as the deceased's natural children. The trial court decided that Conde was the rightful successor of the decedent's natural children and awarded the estate of Casiano to him despite Roman Abaya, the deceased's brother, objecting.

ISSUE:

WON an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of natural children may be brought in special probate proceedings

WON the mother of a natural child now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is claimed, was his natural father, also deceased, may bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child?  in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to be his natural father.

HELD:

Yes. If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful heirs of the deceased person are, or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge, under oath, and signed by the witness. Any party in interest whose distributive share is affected by the determination of such controversy, may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance determining such controversy to the Supreme Court, within the time and in the manner provided in the last preceding section.

No. The power to transmit the right of such action by the natural child to his descendants cannot be sustained under the law, and still less to his mother.

[jannie-notes]

BALUYOT VS BALUYOT

FACTS:

Petitioners Victoria and Ma Flordeliza Baluyot filed a petition for intervention in Special Proceedings entitled "Intestate Estate of Deceased Enrique Baluyut,'. The petition claimed that the petitioners, who are Enrique M. Baluyut's illegitimate children born out of marriage by the dead and the petitioners' mother and guardian (ad litem) Norma Urbano, have a legal claim to the inheritance of Enrique M. Baluyut. They were conceived and born when Norma Urbano shared a home with the deceased at a time when he was already married to Felicidad S. Baluyut, and they continued to possess and enjoy the status of the deceased's children throughout his lifetime as a direct result of the deceased's supporting and caring for them. Enrique's widow Felicidad S. Baluyut, who was chosen to administer his inheritance, objected to the intervention petition.

Following the trial, the RTC decided in favor of the intervenors Victoria, Ma Theresa, and Ma Flordeliza and mandated that Felicidad Baluyot provide them with a monthly maintenance payment from Enrique Baluyot's estate. Children are deemed to be the late Enrique Baluyot's compelled heirs according to New Civil Code Article 887. The petitioner filed for Motion for Reconsideration but RTC refused the said MR and held that a decision granting support is final and executor. The Court of Appeals overturned the RTC's judgment, rejected the intervention motion, and vacated the support order. Petitioner's appeal of the CA's ruling was rejected. The current petition for review on certiorari is the result.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners voluntarily recognized by the late Enrique M. Baluyut as his illegitimate spurious children?

HELD:

In an action for compulsory acknowledgment under paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code, a birth certificate which, on its face, was not signed by the supposed natural father is incompetent evidence on paternity. An illegitimate (spurious) child to be entitled to support and successional rights from his putative or presumed parents must prove his filiation to them. Filiation may be established by the voluntary or compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious) child. Recognition is voluntary when "made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing." It is compulsory when by court action the child brings about his recognition. It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed to have admitted that the appellant is the illegitimate spurious, not natural child of the deceased Marcos Paulino. Such an admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit from her alleged putative father. It is necessary to allege that her putative father had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment is essential and is the basis other right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father.

[jannie-notes]

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

The sole child of Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca is Rosalia Lugod. Her father had the petitioners, who are now adults. Rosalia requested letters of administration for her mother and father's inheritance after Maria Villafranca passed away. Juan Sanchez passed away before the proceedings could come to an end. Rosalia objected to a petition for letters of administration of Sanchez's assets brought by his illegitimate offspring.

With the aid of their attorneys, Rosalia and the father's illegitimate children signed a compromise agreement on October 30, 1969, in which they agreed to divide the possessions. Four drafts later, they finally did. On January 19, 1970, however, petitioners demanded that Rosalia deliver a shortfall of 24 hectares or toss the settlement agreement. They argued that the arrangement was unlawful since the court had not given its blessing. Later, the parties signed a memorandum of understanding on April 13, 1970.

ISSUE:

Was the compromise agreement valid even without the approval of the court?

HELD:

Yes. According to Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties agree to mutual concessions in order to avoid litigation or finish one that has already been started. It is a consensual contract, therefore it is complete upon the parties' convergence of thought. Judicial approval is not required for this. Given that the contract was signed only after four drafts, the parties must have entered into it consciously. When they learned the compromise deal contained mistakes, they even engaged into a memorandum of agreement that revised it. This demonstrates unequivocally that they agreed to the deal voluntarily.

[jannie-notes]

Consunji vs Losano

FACTS:

The applicant relies on the provisions of a notarial document dated April 12, 1904, by which Dolores Singian, the widow of Domiciano Tison, sold the property in question to the applicant, reserving a right to repurchase on the terms and conditions outlined in the deed. The applicant asserts that the property in question was the separate property of Dolores Singian, his vendor, who inherited it from her father, and that her husband Domiciano Tison. According to the information on file, Domiciano Tison did not possess any real estate in the area where the subject land is located before he obtained the issuance of the composition title in his own person. He acknowledged and stated that some lands in the area belonged to his wife Dolores as separate property (bienes propios).

This evidence, along with the evidence found in various other private documents outlining Dolores Singian's share of her father's estate, tends strongly to support the trial court's conclusion that the majority of the land described in the composition title belonged to her ancestors and was passed down to her by them, and that the remaining portion of the land described in the composition title was acquired by or for her. Upon the complete record, we are of opinion that the evidence sustains the determination by the trial court that the greater part of the land indicated in the composition title was the independent property of Dolores. Singian was inherited by her from her father, who passed away in 1879, and the rest was her separate property, bought with or on her behalf using money from her own estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land in question is a paraphernal or conjugal property

HELD:

It is a paraphernal property. The husband was the legal administrator of the conjugal property at the time he obtained the composition title to the land in his own name, and it is obvious that he must be held to have done so either by accident during the preparation of the formal deed or as a step toward transferring the title to her name through a later conveyance that for some reason was never executed.