Pretend Play, and The Growing Human Mind
Play is one concept that has proven hard for theorists to truly capture in terms of a definition that can be generalised. As it stands it seems apt for those wishing to use the concept to apply it in a subjective context. Pretend play has caused debate regarding the role it performs when considering the development of children. This essay will review theories postulated by psychologists regarding the importance of pretend play on the development of the child, but ultimately, I aspire to defend the view that pretend play is an important component of positive development. I shall achieve this by finding fault in arguments postulated by Lillard et al in 2013, and providing evidence for the importance of pretend play as a development unique to creatures of a particular intelligence level.
The main focus is pretend play; however pretend play is a manifestation of two independent concepts; pretence and play. Pretence is a psychological process, whereby imagination is used to construct unreal scenarios and objects (Woolley & Tullos, 2008). The importance for imagination for the human brain and on the same foot advances the link between behaviours like pretend play and imagination. Creativity is largely rooted in imagination, as it takes the ability to mentally construct innovative idea for one to be creative, and childhood pretend play is significant for the development of a creative adult mind (Taylor, 2013).
Pretence then is a concept centred on other concepts like imagination, allowing one to pretend to be in an alternate reality as compared to the one they are actually experiencing. Play is not necessarily rooted in just pretence; there are various forms of play that individuals are capable of engaging in. Play is often linked to learning, the development of knowledge through experience, and is not unique to humans, but seems to occur across species (Gopnik & Walker, 2013).
Lillard et al (2013) suggest a definition of play on criteria that is made up of four notions: flexibility, which is the idea that real actions or activities are distinct from play activities in outward appearance; positive affect, which is basically the idea that people who are engaged in play activity seem to be enjoying their experiences; non-reality, which is not the same thing as pretence but is involved in pretence, non-reality can be understood as the tendency for play activity to be constructed using realistic components, but not necessarily literal in meaning as with other actions carried out on a normal basis; intrinsic motivation, is the notion that agents who engage in play are not doing so out of obligation, it seems to be an activity that is carried out by choice.
Inferring from the ideas developed above, it seems that pretend play would be a type of play that has an extended sense of non-reality that is infused with imagination. Play is not limited to just pretend play as there are various forms of play, one such type is physical play which is characterised by the carrying out of play activity that involves physically playing with each other or involves extensive active play, and this form of play is understood to assist with emotional control, and social interaction (Lillard, et al., 2013).
Woolley and Tullos (2008) characterise pretend play as a product of five parts or considerations for a criterion. This criteria includes a) the act of carrying out known activities without the required objects, b) animating an object that is naturally inanimate, c) irrational outcomes are endorsed by the participants, d) the subject pretends to be someone else, basically the adoption of an alternate identity, and e) the replacement of objects with other objects for the purpose of play (Woolley & Tullos, 2008).
There are multiple factors that contribute to why thinkers seem to be inclined to hold that there is a link (correlation) between pretend play and positive development, even leading some to the conclusion that there is not only a correlation, but a cause and effect relationship. Lillard et al (2013) purport three potential relationships that can account for the link between pretend play and positive development: the view that pretend play is crucial for positive development, secondly that pretending is one of many ways of achieving positive development of certain aspects (understood as equifinality), and finally that pretend play may just be a by-product of the presence of another ability and thus pretend play is not a catalyst part of the development of children, but rather an epiphenomenon of a capability that is in itself necessary. By attaching pretend play to his concept of the zone of proximal development, Vygotsky believed that pretend play is essential for optimal development as it facilitates the learning of distinguishing figurative and literal, to grasp the concept of semiotics (symbols), which is a clear assertion of the belief that pretend play is crucial for positive development (Lillard, et al., 2013).
The crucial and equifinality perspective are in particular advancing a causal relationship between pretend play and positive development. Development in itself includes multiple facets, however thinkers who are aligned to the causal relationship perspectives (equifinality and crucial) are largely interested in a set of domains which are the most affected by pretend play: non-social cognitive aptitudes, social skills, theory of mind (social cognition), symbolic understanding (language), narrative skills, and self-regulation (Lillard, et al., 2013). The first of the domains, non-social cognitive aptitudes, is of particular importance to my analysis. Non-social cognitive aptitudes are mental dispositions which are internal to the agent, in essence these are the thoughts one has and these aptitudes are largely the capabilities (whether high or low), of the individual to utilise their cognitive powers to navigate life’s demands. The domain of, non-social cognitions aptitudes, is a domain constructed by sub-domains: creativity, intelligence, reasoning, conservation, and problem solving. Researchers of the relationship between pretend play and cognitive development, and are inclined to align with the crucial and equifinality perspectives, advance that a higher level of engagement in pretend play is a cause of a greater level of creativity, problem solving, conservation of objects, intelligence, and reasoning (Lillard, et al., 2013). Correlational studies looking to find a relationship between pretend play and these sub-domains should result in a strong and positive relationship with the entire domain of non-social cognitive aptitudes and pretend play, and that would require that the relationship between pretend play and each of the sub-domains is also consistent with a positive and strong relationship, for the causal (crucial) perspective, a positive and strong correlation between the involved variables is necessary, and the lack of such consistency poses a problem for the crucial relationship argument. It is not as detrimental for the equifinality perspective and it is strongly aligned with the epiphenomenal perspective (Lillard, et al., 2013). Analysis of studies available with regards to the sub-domains of non-social cognitive aptitudes has revealed variations in the correlational studies carried out for creativity, and with regards to experimental studies, unmasked researchers compromised the evidence that there is a cause and effect relationship void of influence from the play ethos. The play ethos is the strong belief that researchers possess that sees people preserve a positive idea of the effects of play in terms of development. Intelligence showed a much stronger degree of relation with pretend play, but failed to allude to directionality, in essence it is hard to determine whether play affects intelligence, or if intelligence leads to a greater degree of pretend play (Lillard, et al., 2013).
Problem solving reveals more relationships with a different form of play, construction play (play that involves the building of things), so it is not very well aligned with pretend play being crucial for the development of problem solving, when looking at the evidence provided. Reasoning, this is the logical navigation of premises to arrive at a valid conclusion, is one sub-domain that seemingly has a relationship with fantastical play and not only that, but is positively affected by the involvement in pretend play. However with that mentioned it still appears that the leap to conclude pretend play as crucially involved in positive reasoning is too great an assertion, because it is not clear that fantasy is the only way for children to be prompted to take into consideration the premises involved. Such an objection is detrimental to the crucial perspective, but is supportive of the equifinality perspective and is still consistent with epiphenomenalism (Lillard, et al., 2013). The consideration of objects as retaining their intrinsic qualities even though they undergo apparent changes is the cognitive process of conservation. The similarity between pretend play and conservation rests with the requirement for children to mentally preserve reality, but still accept conceptions of alternate realistic scenarios. The correlational studies reviewed for conservation and pretend play reveal no apparent natural correlation between pretend play and conservation, and this is unfavourable for the crucial causal perspective. Not only is it unfavourable it is largely fatal, as it is impossible to infer a causal relationship when there is no correlational relationship to begin with. However, a training study carried out by Golomb and Cornelius (1977) resulted in findings that alluded to equifinality being a viable possible relationship, as conservation was better for children with more pretend play training, and conservation was just as good with conservation training which seems to suggest that it’s not exclusively pretend play that is beneficial for conservation. Unfortunately for the supporters of the crucial causal and equifinality perspectives, this study is also consistent with epiphenomenalism, furthermore so when one considers that replication of this study with masked experimenters failed (Lillard, et al., 2013).
The development of non-social cognitive aptitudes with regards to pretend play does not yield conclusive evidence to support the crucial causal perspective and thus casts doubt over whether this is a justified approach or if it is the spawn of the play ethos. Analysis of correlational studies offered inconsistency in creativity, no relationship (null) for conservation, and intelligence revealed a relationship with pretend play, but the question is with regards to the direction of the relationship. Reasoning is completely unsupported for crucial causality, but is supported for equifinality, granted that there is a discrepancy with this result in the form of lack of replication. Ultimately it seems intelligible to accept epiphenomenalism, as it is supported by these findings (Lillard, et al., 2013).
In response to Lillard et al (2013), Walker and Gopnik propose a reconsideration of the evidence on offer, and not in the sense of reviewing the findings of those studies again but in terms of altering the broad concepts of what pretend play is and what cognitive mechanisms are. The advancement is calling for finer and more detailed concepts that will actually take into consideration the minute mechanisms that are involved in child development. Furthermore, Lillard et al gave a definition of pretend play that is very hard to produce in most lab settings, because the criteria (flexibility, non-reality, positive affect, and intrinsic motivation) is drenched with spontaneity and that is not easy to control or manipulate (Walker & Gopnik, 2013). Lillard et al. admitted that the research on pretend play’s role on development (if any) is incomplete thus there is an obvious need for further research, Walker and Gopnik (2013) believe that the initial movement towards achieving this is the discovery of a framework that will unify the role of pretend play, because at this current point it is fragmented (Walker & Gopnik, 2013).
One avenue that is being looked at with a magnifying glass is the idea of causal knowledge and how it is assimilated by the child, so it is not so much the information itself but how the child develops a system to allow them to be able to revise their knowledge over time. Learning this process seems to be connected to the capability that humans possess that allows us to be able to construct imagined worlds, scenarios and objects to allow us to create comparisons and draw deductions (reason) in respect to structuring causal knowledge with these conclusions. In essence, causal models are dependent on one accounting for how a change in the cause will lead to a change in the effect, if I drink more alcohol I will become more intoxicated, if I do not drink alcohol at all I should (all things considered) be sober. Working through this counterfactual process in the mental space requires imagination (Walker & Gopnik, 2013). Using the above foundation, it follows that activity in childhood that actively induces consideration of the factual and then considering counterfactuals is positively connected to development of the ability to process causal knowledge. Pretend play is one such activity that allows children to engage with counterfactual reasoning cognitively. Causal chains are followed very well by children when they are engrossed in their imagined worlds, and this encourages improvement of causal learning. Even though exploratory play also allows children to engage with causal sequences of the natural world, pretend play also incorporates consideration of causal sequences of possible worlds and that is the difference (Walker & Gopnik, 2013).
Examining the literature offered by Lillard et al. the idea of causal cognition is congruent with multiple domains and that is what fuels the call for a more unified framework, as this fragmented structure cannot accommodate the concept of causal cognition well (Walker & Gopnik, 2013).
Lillard et al. advanced very good points regarding the need for more research in terms of this topic and they have also alerted people to the possible fatality that the play ethos could have for the credibility of positive conclusions, as it may lead to a bias. With that considered it becomes apparent that the Lillard et al. literature was too critical of the studies they reviewed as they ultimately concluded that pretend play is not developmentally significant, using premises that berated methodological issues in their studies. It is not very sound logical work to conclude that play is not significant, because people have made mistakes in their efforts to uncover a causal relationship between pretend play and positive development; it is only human error and not a reflection of the phenomenon in itself (Weisberg, Hirsh-Pasek, & Golinkoff, 2013).
Personally, I may be an unconscious pawn to the ‘play ethos’ effects, but I am in agreement with Weisberg, Hirsh-Pasek, and Golinkoff (2013). The fact that humans have been subject to errors in their pursuit to prove pretend play as crucially significant for optimal development, does not necessarily mean that there are no links between pretend play and positive development, it may be that it is in the equifinal sense and that is something that is plausible. Furthermore they, along with Walker and Gopnik (2013), call for a more detailed look at the definitions of play, and the domains believed to be affected. Walker and Gopnik (2013) call for particular definitions and variables that are not as broad and this only makes sense because specificity will decrease the likelihood of multiple issues and will help researchers cull out errors, which would easily allow for better results and more credible findings. I hold that the causal cognition approach is an important step forward because it is offering sound arguments and with further research we could discover truth, not just plausibility.
Reference List
Gopnik, A., & Walker, C. M. (2013). The relationship between causal learning and pretend play. American Journal of Play, 6(1), 15-28.
Lillard, A. S., Lerner, M. D., Hopkins, E. J., Dore, R. A., Smith, E. D., & Palmquist, C. M. (2013). The impact of pretend play on children's development: a review of the evidence. Psychological bulletin, 139(1), 1-34.
Taylor, M. (2013). Imagination (Chapter 28). In P.D. Zelazo (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Developmental Psychology (Vol. 1: Body and Mind) (pp. 791-831). New York: OUP
Walker, C. M., & Gopnik, A. (2013). Pretense and Possibility- A Theoretical Proposal About the Effects of Pretend Play on Develpment: Comment on Lillard et al. (2013). Psychological Bulletin, 139(1), 40-44.
Weisberg, D. S., Hirsh-Pasek, K., & Golinkoff, R. M. (2013). Embracing Complexity: rethinking the relation between play and learnin: Comment on Lillard et al. (2013). Psychological Bulletin, 139(1), 35-39.
Woolley, J.D., & Tullos, A. (2008). Imagination and fantasy. In M. Haith & J. Benson (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Infant and Early Childhood Development (pp. 117-127). Academic Press.
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