Gotta Love Groupon
This afternoon, I got a call from Alex at Groupon. Here is the full transcript of the voicemail:
"Hey Max, it's um, Alex from Groupon. I just wanted to...uh...really quickly touch base and talk to you a little bit about that...ah...offer we ran with you last summer...uh...for the walking tours and just hear how it went and talk to you a little bit about the customers that did come in and what their experience was like and just see...yeah...just overall hear how it went for ya. Um, so we can look forward and see if there is something else we can...um...do this year. My number is (312)--------. Give me a call back whenever you get a chance. Again, uh, my name is Alex and I'll hopefully talk to you soon."
I didn't bother calling Alex back, but if I did, my response would be: "Hey Alex, this is Max from CityRover. First, I don't run a bar, restaurant, coffee shop, or spa, so customers don't 'come in' for a walking tour -- they actually come out for one. Second, yeah, um, we never actually ran a deal last summer for the...uh...walking tours. You see, we signed the paperwork and you guys promised to run the deal by a certain date, but you never actually ran it. Then you guys promised you'd run the deal before a second deadline, but that never happened either. It's not your fault, though. You probably just joined a month ago. I was dealing with a salesperson named Victoria, who probably jumped ship before you started. So yeah, um, I don't think I will be running anything with you guys -- this year or like um, ever."
Now, sarcasm and sentence fillers aside, I thought this voicemail was the perfect proof of the kind of mire Groupon is in. It's an example of Groupon's right arm (sales) not knowing what the left arm (editing/scheduling) is doing. But the fact that Alex from Groupon actually thought we ran a deal last summer doesn't really come as a surprise, given my own experience with Groupon last year and all the recent headlines about the company. Pre-IPO, Groupon was criticized for using aggressive accounting metrics, including counting the merchant revenue portion of a deal as their own revenue, which essentially doubled their top-line figures (what drugs were they taking when they thought that would fly with the SEC and the markets?). And just this week, Groupon restated its fourth quarter earnings and reported "material weakness in its internal controls." No surprise there, and Alex just confirmed the announcement for me personally.
In my book, Walking Away From Wall Street, I devoted an entire chapter to my experience dealing with various deal sites and the lessons learned when I first launched my walking tour business. Here is an excerpt from that chapter about my interaction with Groupon specifically:
A chapter focused on deal sites wouldn’t be complete without a Groupon story, so I would like to share mine. In late May, 2011, I received a call from a Groupon sales representative namedVictoria. She told me she noticed I had run a couple of deals with some of Groupon’s smaller competitors recently and was wondering if I would be interested in doing something with Groupon. She stressed the company’s enormous scale and the potential benefits for my brand. I was hesitant at first because I didn’t want to flood the market with too many CityRover deals, but since this was before CityRover broke into the Top 10 on TripAdvisor, I figured a deal with the dominant player in the daily deal space had the potential to generate a lot of exposure going into the peak travel season. I figured if I could negotiate a favorable revenue sharing arrangement and set a ceiling on the maximum number of vouchers available for sale, then it would make sense.
I was able to get Victoria to agree to a 60/40 revenue split, as opposed to their normal 50/50 split, and to cap the number of available vouchers at 500. Another important caveat that I gave was that I wanted the deal to run no later than mid-July. She said that it was doable. We got the paper work out of the way quickly and I sent Groupon the required copy and images. The pending step was for me to approve the final deal copy the day prior to the scheduled run date.
June passed without a confirmed run date for our deal, as did July. Finally, on the 8th of August I received an email from Victoria, in which she apologized for the delay and informed me that she was trying to get the deal slotted in the next few weeks. I responded the same day:
From: Max
To: Victoria
Subject: Re: Groupon Update
Hi Victoria,
This delay is not a good reflection on the way Groupon conducts business. We had discussed a mid-July time frame at the latest. Now, we are looking at late Aug (if that). Your shop’s priority seems to be on cramming the pipeline with offerings rather than on fulfilling agreements with individual merchants. If we are to still run a deal, we’ll need to review the offerings, because I’ve adjusted pricing/duration on my end a bit. And to be honest, the 60/40 split after the 50% discount looks a lot less appealing to me now, given that business has been booming for me in the last couple of months. Regards, Max
Victoria responded with an apology and a statement about how Groupon was trying to figure out ways to run more quality deals per day without bombarding their subscribers. She promised a run date of August 27th and against my better judgment, I agreed.
I never heard from Victoria again. The deal we agreed on back in May never ran, and I vowed never to do business with Groupon. And what did they care? There were thousands of spa and manicure deals to replicate and plenty of bars and restaurants desperate for foot traffic.
-- End of excerpt --
In short, I am not surprised that Groupon, at yesterday's close of $14.18, is down 30% from its IPO price of $20 and 46% from its first day's close of $26. Putting aside consumer-facing issues like deal fatigue and inbox competition, Groupon clearly can't even get the merchant side of the business right, and they are nothing without merchants willing to sacrifice the bulk of their gross margins to run a deal with the "Deal King." But Groupon, with its remaining valuation of $9 billion, has to know that kings sometimes lose their crowns (and occasionally, their heads).














