tannertan36
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Aqua Utopia｜海の底で記憶を紡ぐ
Discoholic 🪩
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Kiana Khansmith
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I'd rather be in outer space 🛸
izzy's playlists!
Mike Driver
let's talk about Bridgerton tea, my ask is open
Claire Keane
if i look back, i am lost
Xuebing Du
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@mohgmaxxing
i fucked up the timing on some of the polls. god damn it. well. not really sure how to proceed. u can't edit them and im at work rn so i wouldn't be able to do anything until i'm home. might have to start a new poll
saw engels is winning and we must abort
cant allow that
i fucked up the timing on some of the polls. god damn it. well. not really sure how to proceed. u can't edit them and im at work rn so i wouldn't be able to do anything until i'm home. might have to start a new poll
saw engels is winning and we must abort
All Marx scholarship shall be written in Linear B from now on
not me. i'm doing esperanto
toki pona breakaway faction
Slipper lobsters go seriously hard. No fr they’re so swag and full of merriment
What if I was a slipper lobster and you were an isopod and we were best friends and ate a carcass
The Sunwapta River roars over rainbow-haloed Sunwapta Falls, Canada
National Geographic | June 1980
what's the idea behind coercion not being ipso facto bad? how does this apply to the abolish schools discourse?
first off have to bracket this by saying i've never discussed coercion at length, because it doesn't tend to be used particularly formally, and because i'm allergic to the cats in the narko squat. but, to the point: there's no big idea behind it. that's just it—if you want to claim something is ipso facto bad, you have to do the moral legwork there; you have to own the edge cases. when you don't do this, you really mean something like 'X phenomenon in many cases causes Y phenomenon, where i find Y bad'. in the case of coercion, people don't tend to explain why it's bad very seriously, because it doesn't actually make any sense to claim that something ipso facto bad becomes un-bad when it's, like, legitimated through some procedure, and attempting to redraw the lines such that it’s only coercion when not legitimated in this fashion stretches credulity. but on the other hand nearly all of us are comfortable with *some* uses; we just try to bracket them in a way which makes them appear non-problematic.
a clearer example of what i’m talking about with more straightforward ramifications would be domination, because we can pick out a more definitive account to consider. we can basically read it as the capacity to affect the choice set of another party; at first blush this makes sense & leads us towards an account of freedom. the trouble is that i’m always in-principle in the position to affect the choice set of a third party, because even something as basic as a market transaction affects something like supply or price in a fashion that renders the choice fundamentally different. the ability to buy something at a dollar and the ability to buy something at a dollar and a penny are different choices, as is the ability to access a good for which one has to queue at t=1 or t=2. but, we don’t even have the conceptual capacity to talk about what it would mean for agents to only make ramification-less choices in this way. it’s ultimately purely specious. the classic example in the literature is that refusing to let a neighbour without a pool use your pool at odd hours of the day is dominating them, but if anything this undersells how badly domination overgeneralises.
i understand coercion and domination aren’t precisely the same, but they’ve been read together by domination theorists to the point where you can appreciate how applying force to change the calculus of the choices before someone is once again a species of this sort of power-over.
the overall way in which to situate my lack of care for concepts of coercion etc., though, comes in the fact i don’t think personal identity or metaphysical conceptions of the subject hold water, & so i find most conceits of autonomy & so on fall apart in much the same way. i’m not a rights-thinker, or a contract-thinker, or a duty-thinker, or other species of liberal.
it’s a neat question how that squares with the abolition of schools, because i do have the sort of gut moral sentiments that seem to comport with this philosophical position fairly awkwardly, though. another example that came to mind recently was my profound distaste for the whole voluntary-death moral panic. ultimately i do think it’s possible to square the circle, but it requires a deeper ethical sketch than i have space for here. to take a very quick stab: when we don’t find ourselves possessed of the idea that moral facts are out there to be discovered by clever metaphysicians, we’re forced to, well, ask questions, and make our peace with using language to do so. in other words, we listen! this is something that perfectionisms, whether of the hedonistic-utilitarian or aristotelian bent, do not.
my scepticism towards schools, aside from sheer horror at the idea of telling someone how i want to dispose of the next ten years of their life, is a scepticism towards knowing what kind of person you ought to develop into. i can help you develop into the kind of person that would bring you satisfaction, and i can tell you the requirements of those rules, but i would never presume to you know your good. because ultimately the aggregate social good i’m looking for comprise, along with everyone else’s, your evaluation of your life as a whole anyway!
starter watching john holloway's "reading capital" lecture and this quote from marx's notebook v made me feel pretty teary-eyed. want to go back to reading and thinking more about communism again and what this quote means. there are a few theoretical stuff i want to look at too especially in terms of how Marx conceived this "wealth" and how it affects perceptions of precapitalist societies like Greece and Rome. don't know if people have important issues/critiques with the categories he uses here but just found it inspiring and had an emotional reaction to it / helped approximate a wonder it's been hard for me to articulate about people and the world after being numb for a bit. affected me in a similar way the opening of 'injury impoverished' did
if you're not a socialist at 25 you have no heart.
if you're not a communist at 35 you have no swag.
as old wad used to say if you dont play skyrim at 40 you’re heartless
what do you think of william clare roberts saying that communism can have markets in his debate with martin hagglund?
'can x have y'/'does x abolish y' is always such a funny form of debate to me; at the end of the day it always hinges on conceptual redescription of these hotly contested terms, right? we can set up either a thin concept of x where it refers to a single condition, or we can take x in with all its contradictory historical valences; and we can set up a concept of y which makes it impossible to abolish, or collapse the concept of y into a sort of heavily-asterisked bad-y which can be abolished simply by making the things about y we consider bad no longer the case.
maybe this is surprising considering how much time i spend on something that looks suspiciously close to cookshop-receipt-writing,
sidenote 1, pt 1: i would argue that the only concern that motivates me to do a little cooking in my work is the understandable fear (i think implicitly shared by wcr) that this (already impossibly broad) set of possibilities is one that we can't even show exists.
but i tend to think the concept of communism has precious little determinate content. because the historical movement is both more or less dead & composed of people of people with wildly different programmatisms, in this sort of programmatic content i tend to use 'communism' very loosely, to include anything in 'the purposive replacement of generalised commodity production with... something else...'.
sidenote 1, pt 2: to recapitulate something that happens in the middle third of my book, we want to avoid the sort of useless conceptual redescription that happens when i swap out my market for a computer or set of social arrangements that do what markets do and converge on doing them how markets do them, because this would invite the question 'why bother?'. so, to get down to brass tacks we replace the concept of generalised commodity production in this thin conception of communism for a concept of what commodity production, per marx's whole thing in capital, necessarily does wrong apropos of social valuation. but then the sort of wall we run into is that people fail to meet the criterion we got out of marx everywhere we apply it: in c&c, in an ideal-type description of soviet FtAL planning, even in cogp!
i realise i've walked myself into a trap here, though, because i've done just the things i warned u about: i attempted to walk out of the terms of the question by setting up a very thin conception of communism, and then pretended that the concept of generalised commodity production was unproblematic.
sidenote 2: it's not; not because marx does a particularly poor job setting up commodity production conceptually, but because a description of an ideal average (the only level at which you can make the deductions he does) is necessarily unhelpful for the task of figuring out the fit between the stylised model and the world, even if you're able to prove, as he does, that it has a sort of shaping dynamic, wherein a social process itself described in the model forces us to behave more & more according to the entities of the model. this shaping dynamic is powerful, but definitely not sufficient for any commodity production to become totally generalised: see, for instance, the very slow entry of the sort of human activities which fall under the bracket of 'social reproduction' into the sphere of commodity exchange. it's unclear what the theoretical maximum even is--can we conceive of every interaction being commodity exchange--or why we ought to understand it to be reachable. and where this commodity exchange is only partially realised, the strong conclusions you reach in capital don't quite hold; every good is knocked off its true gcp value by the existence of a non-commodified basic good; the pseudo-natural laws needed to make these categories coherent don't quite obtain.
we're not going to make all parties happy, but what matters to me here when it comes to defining communism such that it has these boundary conditions, is something like the pragmatic rationale we give in conceptual engineering. as i say above, the minimum thing i consider to be specific about communism in the book is the resolution of the problem we attribute to commodity production, something akin to what wcr sets up as domination, although i do not find domination theory persuasive for the same reason i do not ultimately find theories of freedom broadly construed persuasive. communism is defined this way because it makes the rationale for its coming into existence readily apparent, and in the same stroke excludes all the other things we've tried.
exhausting preliminary stuff aside, let me get to the meat of your question. as for wcr: i would actually argue, as odd as it sounds, that he doesn't say communism can have markets--even though he says we likely will have markets in some places. he makes a subtler point, one whose intellectual honesty inspires in me genuine admiration, although i could not disagree more: that there is a tension between actually realising this freedom from market domination (allowing the concept for a second), and radical democratic theory, particularly one that necessitates a great deal of devolution, rousseauian plebiscites, & all. he says, in other words, that we are lying to ourselves in believing that the general will would coalesce in the way marx has it without a type of authority that marx doesn't argue for, a type of sociation we might find abhorrent, a vision of reconciliation we might find silly... furthermore, the mechanism of a wholesale replacement for market valuation ('planning' is a very poor descriptor) is necessarily one that is incompatible with the fact democratic polities may choose indifference to one another; it requires the production of a kind of information there is no reason to assume every polity may have, and the valuation decisions it makes are almost certain to cut against majoritarian wish-lists.
this all is to say, wcr reads social republicanism as radical democracy against communism, and in so doing argues that we ought to choose the former, biting the bullet on the difficulty of showing it necessarily entails the latter. i would make a similar argument, actually, just in favour of communism over republicanism-slash-democracy: democratic theory has near-zero appeal to me, because i believe a properly elaborated means of social valuation, the sort we need to replace the multitool of the market, is itself as normatively forceful, as good a grounds for practical reason at the state little, as anything possibly could be, and in its wake arguments about freedom (as wcr himself notes!) strike me as little more than residual liberalism.
I really need to sit down and read in depth about the history of autism as a category just to have context and be able to situate myself in the discourse/terms i'm surrounded with every day
Since I got summoned on this post by @m-tea I’ll make some brief points:
Autism has been understood many different ways. Early theorists had different theories ranging from biological to psychoanalytic. Cold mothers were thought to be to blame for an extended period.
In the latter half of the 1900s, people began to question psychoanalytic, psychiatric, and bioessentialist framings. In this time, autism became anyone’s game. One of the main things I would note is that autism was widely thought of in this period as a potential temporary state or an environmentally triggered condition—so potential etiology through trauma.
Phenomenologists like Eugene Minkowski, Gregory Bateson, and RD Laing theorized autism as an initial stage or component of schizophrenia. I find these theories the most useful personally.
Throughout these other theories, biological research continued. There’s some good evidence of genetic/physical etiology of autism (particularly things like exposures to toxins in the womb or in young childhood). However along with the good research also came shit like the “extreme male brain” theory.
Beginning in the 90s, there was a resurgence of psychiatric approaches to autism/neurodiversity more broadly. Some of this was driven by money, some by arrogance, some for insurance against liability (the need for intervention in order not to get sued). Autism is increasingly diagnosed, leading to mass panic. Probably this is due to a mixture of pathologizing children who don’t need intervention and increasing environmental toxins. Autism is now a discrete disability/identity which most people seek to separate entirely from the norm.
Thanks @vitos-ordination-song!!
Ok i was writing this as a comment but it started getting long so:
Ian Hacking has some papers and/or talks specifically on how autistic/autism as a category came to be and how the category and the people in the category had a mutually constitutive (?) effect on each other. what Hacking calls Interactive Kinds or the Looping Effect of psychiatric classifications.
I haven’t read it but have been meaning to forever so if you decide to check it out, let me know and I’ll try and read along!
oh that's really interesting thank you both so much!!!
on top of these really great resources here’s winnicott’s description from his conference papers in Talking About Children
i support a minimum program of free housing for bears like in goldilocks and the three bears
anyone remember the spongebob sound like bababoobopbop
godmorgen
my metaethical position is we should let sleeping dogs lie and bourgeois society’s domination by time doesnt give them enough time to just sleep so we gotta get rid of bourgeois society
BABAR THE BARBARIAN
communism will be when dogs can vote
- The Jack Notebooks volume ii
this can be read in 2 major ways either we love animals even more or by then we dont have to vote on things bc its communism
communism will be when dogs can vote
