When I set about selecting a photograph to accompany this article, I wanted a simple panorama of Rigaās skyline, or perhaps a recognisable tourist attraction, but instead stumbled across this seemingly insignificant shot of four friends standing beside a plaque featuring the four regions of Latvia. Though at first glance, it remains a snapshot from any tourist album, it captures something important to Latviaās future: the friendship between people who would have, at one point, been considered enemies simply by nature of their heritage. Two pairs of feet in this photograph belong to German girls, one pair to a Latvian, and one pair to a Russian.
In an email correspondence, Valters Nollendorfs, the director of the Museum of the Occupation of Latvia, summarised Latviaās 19th-20th-century master narrative as that of:
āā¦the small emerging Latvian nation under the rule of Germans and Russians. It has to use all its cunning and strength manoeuvring between both, at times collaborating with one or the other until it succeeds in establishing an independent sovereign state with the help of distant friends in the West when the warring German and Russian empires collapse and no longer can control Latvian aspirations to be free.ā
In other words, Latvia has consistently been torn between Germany and Russia ā at one point constructing the enemy of Germans, and now constructing the enemy of Russians. In the paper I presented at the Negotiating Ideologies II conference in Edinburgh, I argued that it is precisely this disparate construction of historical narrative between Russia and Latvia which continues to creates problems for the two nations. However, using the example of the Latvian-Russian border disagreement, concluded in 2007, I demonstrated that narrative can be deconstructed for the sake of compromise.
Latvia and Russia immediately differed ā and continue to differ ā on their understanding of the Soviet Unionās legacy. When Russia accepted the USSRās foreign assets and liabilities, it was perceived by Latvia to be a statement as to the Russian nation as a continuation, rather than a succession, of this entity ā the difference being whether it also inherited the crimes committed by the former regimes, and must apologise for them.
Of course, the existing relationship between the two countries developed within a context influenced by history, memory, and by the unbalanced power relations of the past, and cannot be divorced from it. Because the Soviet narrative was ā and is ā often repeated by Russia, which has historically held the authority to speak for Latvia, the dispute between the two countries in regards to collective memory is intensified by Latviaās national historiography having been repressed or censored within the USSR. Latvian independence, above all, meant the right to assert and seek recognition of its own construction of history and memory.
The main point of contestation was Russiaās insistence that Latvia joined the union voluntarily in 1940, as opposed having been occupied and its self-determination illegally suspended. Latviaās historiography paints the interwar years as a flourishing, cultural awakening of the country and its people, whereas Russia continues to invoke the Latvian Riflemenās role in the creation of the Soviet state ā thereby challenging Latviaās attempts to dictate its past.
Latviaās government sought to establish a new identity, and to manifest and legitimise national aspirations and concerns internationally ā an identity distinctly separate from the Soviet identity mandated previously. At the foundation of this identity lies the 1920 Soviet-Latvian Peace Treaty, which affirms Latviaās grand narrative: the country was a modern, independent state, economically stable, with additional territory, and was betrayed by Soviet Russia, who went against this treaty in order to force Latvia into the USSR. In these terms, Latvia views its Soviet period as a suspension of independence, and the theme of its regained independence becomes the restoration of assets from this 1920 treaty. It is this document which Latvia attempted to justify, legally, in the physical manifestation of narrative incongruence.
The area which I refer to as Abrene-Pytalovo is the reason for the lengthy border dispute between Russia and Latvia. Though the territory historically belonged to Russia, in the 1920 treaty, it was signed over to Latvia and renamed Abrene. Shortly after Latvia joined the USSR, it was āgiftedā back to Russia. If Latvia were to win the legal case and regain Abrene-Pytalovo, it would go a long way in legitimising the Treaty, and hence its construct of identity.
Russiaās counter-argument relied on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and claims that the 1920 treaty was voided following Latviaās entry into the USSR. As Russia believes itself to have inherited the Soviet Unionās treaties on the basis of succession principles, which simultaneously prompts Latvia to regard it as the continuation of the Soviet state, the 1920 treaty is arguably valid and applicable to contemporary Russia.
Stalemate, stemming from a confrontation of Latvia and Russiaās separate historical recollections and narratives and entering the physical realm through dispute over a territory which either are legally entitled to, continued. Latvia recognised its weaker position ā both in the need to demonstrate to the European Union its ability for compromise, and through economic pressure from Russia ā and officially renounced all claims to Abrene-Pytalovo in 2007.
Latvian political scientist Nils Muiznieks explains that, āpolitically, it was very difficult for the Latvian political elite to renounce all claims to Abrene, as this appeared to run counter to the grand narrative of restoration...it was only when the Constitutional Court engaged in some legal acrobatics and ruled that Abrene had not been a traditional part of core Latvian territory and that legal continuity was not at risk that the issue was resolved within Latvia and the border treaty could enter into force[1]ā.
Though, inevitably, the tensions arising from incompatible narratives will remain ā Latvia and Russia, due to their reliance on these narratives as a means of national identity, may perhaps never agree on history ā both have realised that relations must improve, and have used narrative compromise as a method of solving or bypassing these disagreements. The signing of the border treaty depicted a progression in how conflict is resolved between the two countries. Latvia demonstrated an ability to rework historical narrative for the benefit of improving foreign relations. If the improvement of this relationship is to continue, these compromises must emanate from both parties.
Itās a good sign that, in the interpersonal realm, four friends have managed to avoid the weight of their own historical context and to come together for an unforgettable trip to Riga.
[1] Muižnieks, N. (ed) 2011. The Geopolitics of History in Latvian-Russian Relations.Ā
Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Ā Riga: AcademicĀ Press of the University of Latvia.
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