April 16th 1746 saw the Battle of Culloden.
Much has been said about the site of the battle and the Prince has been criticised for “choosing” the moor.
Three sites were scouted in the 48 hours leading up to the battle, they knew Cumberland’s army was coming, their had been skirmishes in the week or so before this day, things were coming to a head.
The first site as at Dalcross Castle, which John Sullivan, the Irish adjutant and quartermaster general, rejected, because the distance across the ravine would have been too small to protect the Jacobite army from British musket fire from the other side.
The second was on the south side of the Nairn, chosen by Lord George Murray. This was poor ground, did not protect the road to Inverness and was vulnerable to British mortar fire from the other side of the river. It is clear that this site was a prelude to retreat and the dissolution of the army, because it was not an effective battle site.
The third site was about 1km east of where the battle was eventually fought, and John Sullivan drew up the army there on 15 April. It was on higher and less boggy ground than the final battlefield, and both wings of the army could see each other, which they could not in the next day’s sleet and rain. No one ‘chose’ the site of the battle on Drummossie Moor as a preference: it was the line closest to headquarters at Culloden House which could defend the road to Inverness.
Many of those soldiers who were asleep after the failed night attack on the 15th had retreated to the grounds of Culloden House, and there was little time to form them up as the British Army approached on the morning of the battle.
Some had urged the Prince to fall back into the hills and glens, split into units and launch a guerrilla campaign, historians can’t agree who ruled this out, some say Lord Murray, others Prince Charles, some a mixture of the two, no matter what it never happened, as we all know.
The battle began around before mid-day, the 9,000 well-rested Government troops advanced downwind across the Moor towards their exhausted opponents who faced directly into the north-east wind and its accompanying sleet. The Prince’s forces numbered about 6,000 and were in two lines. The left flank of the front line was held by the three regiments of MacDonalds, highly resentful that they were not in their traditional place of honour on the right, held by the Atholl Brigade.
In the centre were some of the best of the Jacobite infantry, veterans of the victories at Prestonpans and Falkirk: Lord Lovat’s Frasers, the MacLeans, Mackintoshes, McLachlans and Chisholms. Weak in artillery, the Jacobite frontline could see Cumberland’s gunners unlimbering and loading their batteries of cannon. Receiving no order to unleash the fearsome Highland charge, by far their best weapon, they must have known what was coming.
And come it did; Cumberland opened fire with roundshot across the unobstructed moorland. Behind his artillery, the Duke’s own front line consisted of six regular infantry battalions; the Royal Regiment on the right, opposite the MacDonalds, with Barrell’s Regiment on the left, facing the Athollmen. The second line contained six more infantry battalions, with yet three more in a third line alongside two squadrons of light cavalry. Out on his flanks were the feared heavy Dragoons: Cobham’s on the right, Kerr’s on the left. All was ready for the Jacobite charge.
Cumberland’s infantry had been given intensive training on how to deal with the onrushing Highlander, claymore in right hand, targe on his left. Having fired his Brown Bess musket, each man was to use his socketed bayonet to attack the opponent on his right front, trusting that his own comrade to his immediate left would do the same.
This was designed to avoid the parrying effect of the targe and inflict a disabling wound in the first shock of contact.
For a full half-hour the Government artillery thundered on unchallenged, roundshot and then grapeshot hammering into the Prince’s waiting battalions. Still no order to charge came as scores of men went down, thinning the ranks and producing frantic calls from officers and men to be released to the charge. Eventually they went off anyway.
The MacDonalds crashed in to Barrell’s Regiment, overrunning the front line before losing momentum and being shot and bayoneted by the upcoming second rank. Elsewhere the charge was even less successful; depleted by cannon fire and decimated by the rolling volleys of the infantry, Highland courage and dash proved no match for regular infantry discipline. The charge reeled backwards leaving up to a thousand dead in front of and among the Government positions.
Cumberland ordered a general advance and unleashed his cavalry. What had been a battle was now a rout. It had lasted an hour.
Jacobite casualties are estimated at 1,500 dead, with an unknown number of wounded and fugitives bayoneted and shot in the merciless pursuit that followed.Cumberland lost only 59 dead and 250 wounded, the only senior officer to die being Lord Robert Kerr, commander of grenadiers in Barrell’s Regiment and a son of the Marquess of Lothian.
It was over; the military neutralisation of the Highlands was about to begin.
The ease in which the Government troops surprised Cumberland, and he surprised further when the Jacobites did not regroup and force another battle, he certainly expected another, but none came, around 1000 gathered the following day at Ruthven Barracks, where a written order from Prince Charles told them to “seek their own safety” and disband. But, for many, surrendering was too dangerous an option.
As time went on, the risks of Jacobites handing themselves in became clear. The mood of the Ruthven meetings was downcast. Many fought on to avoid capture or because the risk of surrendering was high. In June, a number of Jacobites went into Fort William after the British government promised six weeks’ immunity. Captain Scott drowned them in a salmon net.
Jacobites engaged in low-level disruption, raiding and protection of vulnerable tenantry as well as recruitment to the Irish Brigade and probably Scottish regiments in French service, including Ecossais Royales.
Assassinations of unpopular government officers or sympathisers were also recorded. The British government still considered the Jacobite threat to be “major” at this time with around 12,000 to 13,000 soldiers deployed across the entire country – from Berwick and Stranraer to Elgin, Forres, Stonehaven, Inverbervie and Montrose – by the end of August 1746.
As government forces mobilised, significant units of armed Jacobites continued to appear in the field. At the end of April, 120 armed MacGregor men were recorded in Balqhuidder after marching home ‘colours flying and pipes playing’ with the Army unwilling to tackle or pursue Jacobite units that maintained discipline.
One battalion of Lochiel’s regiment was still operational in May – as were 500 men under Clanranald. Orkney remained under Jacobite control until late that month and, despite British attacks, four local Jacobite lairds remained successfully hidden
Clans made concerted attempts to resist Cumberland and his men with around a dozen chiefs meeting at Mortlaig in early May. At the meeting… they entered into a bond for their mutual defence and agreed never to lay down their arms, or make a general peace without the consent of the whole,” according to an 1832 account by James Browne.
“By the bond of association, the chiefs agreed…to raise on behalf of the prince and in defence of their country, as many able-bodied armed men as they could on their respective properties.”
Around 600 men gathered later that month across the north and west but the clans “ultimately did not have the time or morale to raise or retain enough men in the field.
Although a unified response failed to materialise, Jacobites remained active across Scotland. Jacobite expresses – the non-stop delivery of letters by horse – continued until August. A British regiment was deployed across Banffshire in the summer of 1746 with insurgents reported in Argyll that September.
Arms were surrendered in the Mearns right into the summer of 1748. British atrocities were carried out against innocent victims, but there were plenty of continuing Jacobite threats and remained so for some time, this led to the building of roads and bridges, to make it easier for troops to be deployed into the heart of the country, many still used to this day, these projects and the act of proscription meant the end of the old Highland way of life.
Many of us have made our pilgrimages to Culloden to pay our respects to those that died that day, and to the commemorations, both on the day, and at the one at midnight the night before, I hope you all take a moment and remember the brave men who fell that day and afterwards…………
