Rakesh Krishnan Simha

THE INSIDE TRACK

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How Russian scientists cracked the secret of a Vedic ritual drink

(To the left of the altar is the king (priest), who is holding a mushroom over the fire. Opposite him is a warrior in a jacket with a “tail” and a belted quiver)

One of the most mysterious drinks in the history of tipple is Soma – a drink of ritual importance to the ancient Indians. Drinking Soma was supposed to confer immortality, with the two leading gods Indra and Agni portrayed as consuming it in copious quantities.

The consumption of Soma by ordinary humans is attested in Vedic ritual. The Rig Veda, which was composed more than 5000 year ago, says: “We drank soma, we became immortal, we came to the light, we found gods.” The Iranians call it Hoama in the sacred Avesta.

Although the descendants of the ancient Hindus and Zoroastrians continue to perform their age-old rituals, the identity of the plant from which Soma was extracted or fermented was lost.

Non-psychoactive substitutes came to be used in place of the elusive Soma. Over the past 200 years, a number of candidates have been put forward, including cannabis, rhubarb, ginseng, opium and wild chicory.

(The unique find is reviving thanks to restorers. From left to right: N. P. Sinitsina, a top grade fine art restorer (textiles and leather), head of the Leather Restoration Group with the Department of Non-Conventional Restoration Technologies at the Grabar All-Russian Art, Scientific and Restoration Center (Moscow); Ye. S. Sinitsina, a fine art restorer with the same department; and O. S. Popova, a fabric restorer with the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts (Moscow)

Soma detectives

However, Russian archaeologists may have solved the puzzle. In 2009, while digging at a deep burial chamber in the forests of Mongolia, a Russian-Mongolian expedition from the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (SB RAS) discovered embroidered woollen textiles dating back two millennia.

Although the archaeologists’ work is not yet complete, the first fragments restored have revealed some stunning facts. The fragments of the textile found were parts of a carpet composed of several cloths of dark-red woollen fabric.

It had made quite a journey – the cloth was spun in Syria or Palestine, embroidered in north-western India and ended up in Mongolia. The discovery is nothing less than miraculous because of its improbability.

Natalia V. Polosmak, Chief Researcher, SB RAS, writes: “Finding it 2000 years later is a pure chance; its amazingly good condition is almost a miracle. How it made its way to the grave of a person it was not meant for will long, if not forever, remain a mystery.”

The embroidery depicts an ancient Zoroastrian ceremony centred around a mushroom. In the middle of the composition, to the left of the altar is the king or priest, who is dressed in a smart, long embroidered kaftan gaping open at the bottom. He is focused on the mushroom in his hands.

Polosmak says the “divine mushroom” resembles the well-known psychoactive species psilocybe cubensis. “The weight of evidence suggests that soma, the ancient ritual drink, has been prepared from the mushrooms of family strophariaceae which contains the unique nervous system stimulator psilocybin.”

All researchers agree that ancient Indians and Iranians used for cult purposes a drink containing a psychoactive substance. The debate is about the identity of the drink and how it affected the consciousness of those who consumed it.

(The embroidered cloth covered the narrow space between the burial chamber walls and the coffin. On top of it was a layer of blue clay. Photo by Ye. Bogdanov)

Story of the carpet

According to Polosmak, the men depicted on the carpet are either of Indo-Scythians (Saka) or Indo-Parthian stock. They are performing a ritual that indicates they acknowledge a form of Zoroastrianism – proof of this is the symbol of Ahura Mazda, the god of the Iranians, represented by the sacred fire altar.

The mushroom that the king (or priest) is holding in his hands can be an offering to the fire or it can be sanctified by the fire before being used to make the sacred drink.

“The north-western India of that time, where, in all the likelihood, the ritual is taking place, was the meeting place of three ethnos, three cultures – Indian, Iranian, and Greek. Each of them had their own gods: tolerance and worshiping not only of one’s own but also of alien gods was a common thing.”

Polosmak explains further: “To get to the root of the consecration unfolding before us, we should pay attention to such seemingly insignificant details as depictions of bees and butterflies strewn all over the cloth. These insects are the most ancient symbols of worship, and used to have meanings very different from the present one.”

The bee was the symbol of honey, Indra, Vishnu and Krishna. The Atharva Veda – the fourth and last Veda – compares spiritual pursuit with honey making. The antiseptic properties of honey made it critical while preserving some foodstuffs. In Mexico, for example, honey has long been used to preserve mushrooms containing psilocybin.

The butterfly too had connotations of longevity. In Greek mythology, a butterfly personified the goddess of the soul, Psyche. The Greek word psyche means both soul and butterfly. In fine arts, a soul was often depicted as a butterfly either flying out of a funeral fire or travelling to Hades. The word soul often means “divine fire”.

(Strewn all over the cloth are the depictions of bees and butterflies. Their presence can symbolize the Other World – the world of souls, the world of ancestors, where warriors get after they have tasted sacred mushrooms)

(On the altar the flame burns – two tongues on the sides and an S-shaped sign in the middle. The flame of king’s fireplace mounted on the altar is a symbol of royal grandeur)

“The butterflies and bees depicted in the background of the canvas may have symbolised the kingdom of souls – the Other World – the world of ancestors, where the warriors got to after having consumed sacred mushrooms,” says Polosmak.

“Now the puzzle fits together. The insects and the mushroom are closely connected and make the surrounding world miraculous.” Recall what the Rig Veda says: “We drank soma, we became immortal, we came to the light, we found gods.”

This brings to the prescient words of another Russian genius. Indologist and Rig Veda translator Tatiana Yelizarenkova wrote exactly a decade before the Mongolian finds: “Judging by the Rig Vedic hymns, Soma was not only a stimulating but a hallucinating drink. It is difficult to be more particular not only because none of the candidates satisfies all the Soma properties and matches the Soma descriptions found in the hymns only partially but primarily because the language and style of the Rig Vedic as an archaic cult monument reflecting the poetic features of ‘Indo-European poetic speech’ is a formidable obstacle to Soma identification. The answer may be provided by archaeologists and their finds in north-western India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (and not in the far-away Central Asia).”

A priest with the divine mushroom in his hand. Drawn from the carpet by Ye. Shumakova. The “divine mushroom” embroidered on the carpet resembles Psilocybe cubensis in its habit, shape of the cap, and stitches along the cap margin that look like radial folding or veil remnant. Dark inclusions on the stalk may depict the annulus that blackens because of falling spores. The mushrooms of genus Psilocybe, like many other species of family Strophariaceae, contain the psychoactive substance psilocybin. On the left is a king/priest with a mushroom in his hand. Drawing of the carpet by Ye. Shumakova. On the right is the fruit body of P. cubensis, grown on elephant dung (India). From: (Stamets, 1996). In the center is a diagram of P. cubensis fruit body. From: (Guzmán, 1983)

At a pub near you

The mystery of the drink that gave immortality to the gods and vigour to the ancient Indians and Iranians has finally been solved. It remains to be seen if a clever entrepreneur will try and reverse engineer it from the recipe gleaned by Russian researchers from a 2000 year old carpet fragment.

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The S-400 air defence system will give India the unprecedented capability of taking out aircraft and missiles while they are still in enemy airspace.

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Is Russia Still a Viable Defence Partner for India?

Despite the trust deficit and some quality issues, India must continue to buy Russian weapons because a strong defence industry in that country is a hedge against a Western weapons cartel. Plus, India will have leverage over who else Moscow sells weapons to. 

In March 2017, the Russian government owned television channel RT tweeted an image of the benign Hindu god Vishnu to illustrate a story on black magic. Despite protests from several Indians, including this writer who was employed with RT’s parent company at that time, the offensive tweet is still online. In September, RT did it again when its website uploaded a disgusting video of a destitute Indian woman giving birth on a footpath.

It isn’t clear why RT, which was established to counter the negative reporting of the Western media, was pissing on India. Indians are used to witnessing such hateful imagery in CNN and the BBC, but when the media of a friendly nation splashes such images it is bizarre and shocking. Coming in the backdrop of India and Russia drifting away from each other – geopolitically, economically and more importantly as defence partners –such unflattering news coverage may have been okayed by the Kremlin.

Although Russia continues to have a substantial (68 per cent) share of India’s defence imports, in the coming years Moscow is unlikely to be India's primary weapons supplier. That title will either go to the US or Israel which are rushing in with a spate of manufacturing deals.

India’s military forces seem to have bonded with their American and Israeli counterparts and there’s a synergy with these two countries which is missing from ties with Russia. The geopolitical windfall India has landed from awarding weapons contracts to the US in particular is incalculable. The complete isolation of Pakistan in Washington is a direct result of the billions of weapons India has purchased from the US. It also helps that President Donald Trump is a seasoned businessman who sees India’s market potential unlike some American politicians and liberal left journalists who suffer from an atavistic hatred for India.

In contrast, India-Russia ties seem to be in a state of limbo. One major reason is US economic sanctions. With virtually the entire Western world ganging up against them, Russians are feeling cornered, forcing Moscow into a bear hug with Beijing. China is gradually replacing Europe as the top buyer of Russian oil, gas and minerals. This dependence on the opportunistic Chinese isn’t something the Russians like, but there’s nothing they can do about it under the current geopolitical circumstances. In this backdrop, India cannot expect much from its relationship with Russia.

Bilateral arms deals lack the fanfare of the Soviet era. On top of it India has been furiously diversifying its arms imports because Russia is unable to sort out its unreliable spares supply chain even as Moscow goes slow on transfer of technology. There is also a sense of frustration in the Indian military establishment with the quality of some Russian weapons, especially the MiG-29K which seems likely to be replaced in the near future with American or French maritime fighters. While India should cop some blame for not entering into an airtight agreement on servicing and spares, the Russians seem to have adopted a completely unhelpful attitude when the Navy is facing a crisis. So from both sides, there is a push against each other.

Why India switched to Russian weapons

Before exploring whether India should give Russia the status of a major weapons provider, it is worth looking at the history of bilateral defence ties. Initially, Moscow was interested in supplying weapons to Pakistan rather than India because it was hopeful of cultivating influence in the strategically important country. However, the Pakistanis spurned Soviet overtures as they did not want to be friends with a communist regime. (This is typical of Pakistanis who even today act holier than the Arabs. The Arabs themselves had no problems being close allies of the ‘godless’ Soviet Union.)

Moscow’s ambivalence towards New Delhi ended with the split in the communist bloc in the 1960s. As China turned from a loyal ally to an implacable enemy, Russia finally agreed to sell high performance weapons to India. The Indo-Russian defence ties went into fast-forward mode after US President Richard Nixon visited Pakistan in July 1969 and it looked like Islamabad was acting as a go-between for a Nixon-Zhao Enlai summit. It was the prospect of a US-China-Pakistan alliance that drove Russia and India into each other’s arms, resulting in a flood of weaponry to India.

Russian provided over 70 per cent of India’s requirements – from MiG-21 supersonic fighters to T-55 tanks, howitzers, Foxtrot class submarines, destroyers, surface to air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and Petya and Osa class missile boats which rained hell on Karachi in the 1971 War to many more weapons too numerous to list here. Although these were stripped down export versions, did not complain. Not only were Russian weapons cheaper in comparison with Western equipment, Moscow sweetened the deal by accepting rupee payments and long-term loans. What was not to like! What’s more, the Russians allowed India to licence build these weapons, although this sometimes led to the scrapping of indigenous weapons such as the Marut fighter which performed commendably in the 1971 War.

Kozyrev’s folly – India turns West

If hell is run by an Indian, there is a special place in it for Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister from 1990 to 1996. Kozyrev, who wanted close ties with the West, had declared after the Soviet Union was dissolved that the new Russia would no longer give special importance to India and would in fact treat India and Pakistan as equals. So basically, the country that was indirectly responsible for the deaths of 15,000 Soviet lives during the 10-year Afghanistan War was preferred over friendly India.

Deepa Ollapally of George Washington University writes in the paper ‘Indo-Russian Strategic Relations: New Choices and Constraints’, “Kozyrev relegated India to a secondary role.”

It was under his watch that India diversified away from Russia. “Then Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao had no choice but to diversify India's security links as its most crucial erstwhile ally continued to labour in confusion and anxiety over its economic and political status, with no clear signal regarding its foreign policy preferences.”

Kozyrev currently lives in Miami where he has acquired money and a nice tan. He slams Putin to the delight of his American backers (or perhaps handlers). If Kozyrev was indeed an American asset then US intelligence agencies deserve some credit for pulling India away from the Russian camp.

New Delhi has since splurged billions of dollars on American weapons systems such as 12 C-130J Super Hercules aircraft ($2 billion), eight P-8I long-range maritime patrol aircraft ($2.1 billion), 10 C-17 Globemaster-III strategic airlift aircraft ($4.1 billion), and 145 ultralight M177 howitzers ($438 million) and 22 Apache attack helicopters and 15 Chinook heavy-lift choppers ($2.5 billion).

The Indian market could get even more difficult for Russian weapons manufacturers. According to a US Congressional Research Service report titled ‘Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations 2008-2015’, “This pattern of Indian arms purchases indicates that Russia will likely face strong new competition from other major weapons suppliers for the Indian arms market, and it can no longer be assured that India will consistently purchase its major combat systems.”

Russia: Geared for war

Russian weapons have ended up in all sorts of places, but few countries have deployed them with spectacular success as the Indians. The Indian Air Force (IAF) used MiG fighters brilliantly against Pakistan in the 1971 War and 1999 Kargil War. In contrast Syrian and Egyptian MiGs were shot down like flies by the Israelis. In the 1982 air war over Bekaa Valley, the Israeli Air Force down 80 Syrian MiGs for the probable loss of a solitary fighter. Instead of taking evasive measures or staying for the fight, Syrian pilots were known to eject the moment they heard the missile lock beep in their cockpits.

Clearly, training, superior morale and motivation are more important than hardware. In response to frequent crashes of IAF aircraft, a former air chief is on record that he’d rather lose pilots during training than in war. Benjamin Lambeth of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says the IAF trains for a "high intensity, high stakes" conflict. Keeping in mind the possibility of a two-front war, the IAF puts its pilots and aircraft through the wringer.

The point is it doesn’t matter whether India deploys Russian, French or American systems. Because the Indian military trains hard, it will also fight hard, run innovative manoeuvres and carry the day on the battlefield.

Also, the Indian military has acquired a qualitative edge against Pakistan with the arrival of 4th generation aircraft such as the MiG-29, Krivak class battleships, Chakra I and II nuclear powered submarines and the aircraft that catapulted India into the major league – the Sukhoi Su-30MKI (Flanker).

It needs to be kept in mind that from the 1950s (when the US started pumping in massive quantities of ultra modern weapons) to the mid 1980s, India was always playing catch-up with the Pakistanis. It was the arrival of the MiG-29 that ended the F-16 threat, and it is the Flanker that has decisively and – perhaps permanently – tilted the military balance in India’s favour.

Besides endowing India pilots with a well-earned reputation for dash and panache, the Sukhoi Flanker has changed the IAF’s combat philosophy. The aircraft’s massive combat payload, extended range and super-manoeuvrability make it a first strike weapon that could cripple enemy forces within the first few hours of war. It is now poised to acquire an even deadlier edge once it is mated with the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.

There is no equivalent Western aircraft that can come remotely close to the Flanker in terms of firepower and combat abilities. The F-22 stealth jet is said to be slightly superior but it is not an attack aircraft but an interceptor. Besides, American combat philosophy is different from the Russian way as it does not stress on dogfights but in massed attacks that overwhelm the enemy. This strategy will work perfectly against relatively small air forces such as Iraq and Libya but its effectiveness is highly suspect against the well-defended airspaces of Russia or China. Such aircraft therefore may not be ideal for countries like India which cannot afford to conduct thousand bomber raids.

The Russian armaments industry may be a shadow of its former self, but it still has a lot of firepower which India is interested in. These include the S-400 Triumf air defence system, new generation armoured personnel carriers, stealth vessels, and personal combat weapons such as sniper rifles. Also, the one area in which not even the US can help in is nuclear powered submarines which are critical for nuclear war fighting. Only Russia has nuclear subs which are just as good or better than the American ones. Russia also provided the technical assistance for building the indigenous nuclear submarine Arihant. And while the US may or may not supply carrier aircraft launch technology, the Russians are supplying most of the critical components for India’s next aircraft carrier INS Vishal.

A key difference between Western and Russian weapons is that the former are produced by private companies. Therefore there are often commercial and political interests involved in the development of these systems. On the other hand, Russian defence companies are state owned, and because their weapons are primarily meant for the defence of Russia, they are meant to work.

Where earlier, Russia used to export only stripped down export versions of its best weapons, today the scene is different. For instance, the Indian version of the Flanker, the Su-30MKI, is a far superior fighter than the version flown by the Russian Air Force (RuAF), which lacks the funds to order the top of the line MKI version. It is only recently that the RuAF ordered limited numbers of the Su-30 SM version which is based on the IAF’s MKI.

Therefore, Russia can be expected to offer select customers such as India the crown jewels of its defence sector simply to keep those assembly lines humming. In comparison, the Western governments are extremely reluctant to share top of the line defence technology with India.

Key reasons to buy Russian

India should not make the same mistake twice. In the Cold War, India and the US completely boycotted each other, leading to much heartburn on both sides. Once the Russian arms pipeline was in full flow, India had little interest in American hardware. The situation worsened under the cunning President Bill Clinton who while pretending to be a friend of India, enforced an across the board ban on technology exports to the country.

A similar situation could arise in relations with Russia if not managed properly. As leading private sector players enter into manufacturing agreements with Western defence companies, India should keep a pipeline open with Russia.

The main reason for continuing to buy Russian is to ensure a robust defence industry in that country. If Russia ceases to be a leading weapons maker, it will lead to a virtual Western-Chinese cartel in the coming decades. Since buying from China isn’t feasible, New Delhi’s only option will be the US and the EU. We do not want another era of dependency, this time on the fickle West, after escaping from the Russian bear’s hug. France’s extreme reluctance in bringing down the price of the Rafale is a pointer to what could happen when you lack alternatives.

The second but equally important reason is to have some leverage over the Russians so they do not throw open the gates for Pakistan. If India stops buying Russian weapons, the trickle of weapons (a few vintage Mi-35 gunships currently) to Pakistan could turn into a torrent. In 2015, while offering to sell the powerful Su-35 Super Flanker to Pakistan, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said he favoured increased military cooperation between Islamabad and Moscow, saying it would not negatively impact ties with India.

Ryabkov’s statements clearly vindicate Rao’s decision to wean India away from over-dependence on Russia. It also shows Russian weapons could end up in the wrong hands. The Russian minister was overruled by his superiors in the Kremlin who do not want to lose the much larger Indian market. India should ensure that it always has such leverage.

(This article was originally published in Geopolitics magazine.)

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Foxbat over Pakistan: When the IAF MiG-25 broke the sound barrier over Islamabad

More than 20 years ago, an Indian Air Force MiG-25 flew over Pakistan and photographed strategic installations near Islamabad. Accelerating up to Mach 2 and climbing to 65,000 ft, the aircraft dropped a large sonic boom as it exited Pakistani airspace. The PAF scrambled its F-16s,  but the Mach 3.2 Foxbat was too fast and high for them. The IAF’s message was loud and clear: “We can fly over Pakistan any time and there’s not a thing you can do.”

In May 1997 a MiG-25R aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) flew deep into Pakistani airspace on a reconnaissance mission, photographed sensitive defence sites and broke the sound barrier, sending a powerful sonic boom over Islamabad. Before the Pakistanis could figure out what had hit them or scramble their fighter aircraft, the intruding MiG-25 – codenamed Foxbat by NATO – was back in Indian airspace.

Details of the missions are classified, so it remains a mystery why the Indian pilot chose to reveal his presence over a heavily populated area of Pakistan. Some sources like Spyflight, a website dedicated to reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, have speculated that the MiG-25 pilot wanted to show that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was India’s bunny.

“The aircraft entered Pakistani airspace subsonically (below the speed of sound) at around 65,000 ft and was undetected,” says Spyflight. “Then having overflown and photographed strategic installations near the capital, Islamabad, the aircraft turned back towards India. Perhaps to rub the Pakistanis’ noses in it, the Foxbat pilot decided to accelerate up to Mach 2 and dropped a large sonic boom as he exited Pakistani airspace. A number of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) F-16As were scrambled, but had insufficient time to make an effective intercept.”

India denied the incident but Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, believed that the Foxbat photographed strategic installations near Islamabad. Air Power International says the Pakistan government considered the breaking of the sound barrier as deliberate: to make the point that the PAF had no aircraft in its inventory which could come close to the cruising height of the MiG-25.

Flying at speeds approaching Mach 3 – 3700 kph – at altitudes ranging from 65,000 to 90,000 ft, the MiG-25s flew faster and higher than anything the enemy had. Flying at the edge of space, the aircraft was virtually undetectable to Pakistan’s radar network. Only the sonic boom and the fact that it was flying at an unusually low level allowed a Pakistani forward operating base to trace the Foxbat and scramble a couple of F-16As from Sargodha air base.

But chasing the Foxbat was pointless. Sources in the PAF told Air Power International there was no need to intercept an aircraft flying at 65,000 feet as the F-16 could climb to an altitude of only 50,000 feet.

Peering across the border

For a 25 year period that stretched from 1981 to 2006, eight MiG-25s of the Trisonics squadron based in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, flew unchallenged over Pakistan (and sometimes Tibet), taking countless high definition photographs and radar images of the situation on the ground. Plus, they recorded electronic emissions from Pakistani and Chinese military communication networks. On an average they flew 10-15 missions a month.

The MiG-25 was Russia’s secret weapon against American bombers and therefore was not supplied to even its closest Warsaw Pact allies. However, the defection of the traitor Viktor Belenko in 1976 compromised secrecy and it became available for export. Aviation expert Shiv Aroor quotes former IAF Chief Idris Latif: “I was shocked and delighted to learn that the Soviets were actually offering MiG-25 Foxbats to us in 1980. I phoned up Mrs (Indira) Gandhi and she told me to go ahead and make a decision….The Foxbat was the best in the world and it was made available to us.”

Tough as nails

Although the photographs taken by the Trisonics remain classified, legendary aviation author Yefim Gordon offers a glimpse into the secretive world of these high-performance jets.

The Foxbat R has no defensive armament but relies on its Mach 3 speed and its high operating ceiling to escape any attacker. In 'MiG-25 Foxbat, MiG-31 Foxhound: Russia's Defensive Front Line' Gordon writes: “The MiG-25RB (reconnaissance/strike version) and its versions were popular with their crews due to their exceptional performance: high speed, excellent picture quality, the ability to reconnoitre large areas in a single sortie and low vulnerability to enemy fire.”

The Foxbat spy plane could detect parked aircraft, trains, ships and visualise the condition of bridges and similar structures. The IAF often flew special missions for the Indian Army when it sought intelligence on Pakistani armoured assets. The picture generated by the radar was developed on the ground in a specially equipped van. According to former IAF Wing Commander Alok Chauhan, “These aircraft can map a country the size of Pakistan in a single-digit number of missions….”

The aircraft could stand out in all kinds of weather and never needed cosseting in an air-conditioned hangar. The MiG-25 was extremely easy to maintain and service, demanding less specialised equipment and manpower than similar western aircraft.

Gordon adds: “Arguably the most impressive thing about the MiG-25 was that its extraordinary performance was obtained in a relatively conventional aircraft, one which was simple and cheap enough to be produced in very large numbers and to be exported. Interestingly, the only confirmed Iraqi air-to-air kill of the 1991 Gulf War was scored by a MiG-25, which downed a U.S. Navy F/A-18 Hornet, and MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft can still operate with impunity over many parts of the world.”

The MiG-25 holds 29 world records, among including the altitude record in an aircraft using jet engines. On August 21, 1977, Russian test pilot Alexander Fedotov climbed to an altitude of 123,523 ft above the Earth.

Flying into the sunset

With India acquiring high resolution remote sensing satellites with the capability to read even the licence plate of a parked army truck, there was no longer a need for reconnaissance aircraft to overfly enemy territory. The MiG-25R began to look like a Cold War weapon.

The other reason was the issue of spare parts from Russia. IAF officers report that the Russians had closed down the plants that made Foxbat parts. They had even got rid of the blueprints. (This isn’t as negligent as it sounds; the Americans destroyed the blueprints of their top secret SR-71 spy plane.) The IAF was, therefore, forced to rely on made in India parts, which carried potential risks in such a high-performance aircraft.

The magnificent Trisonics are gone but hopefully one day the IAF will release the stories of the daredevil missions conducted in these powerful MiGs and the brave men who flew them over Islamabad and Tibet.

(This article was originally published by Russia Beyond the Headlines.)

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What it Takes to Fight a Two-Front War

The idea of a two-front war against China and Pakistan has frightening implications. However, that should not prevent India from preparing for it.

The chances of India having to fight a two-front war are smaller than small. While it is common for large countries to gang up against relatively weaker ones (such as Western nations bombing Vietnam, Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq), attacking a country of India’s size and strength is akin to inviting annihilation.

First up, Pakistan is mortally afraid of taking on India. This is because the economic and military balance has greatly skewed in India’s favour since the previous wars. Just 10 carefully targeted nuclear bombs will result in Pakistan disappearing from the map. Meanwhile, India will dust itself off after the loss of a few cities and walk away. As far as China is concerned, it knows India’s Agni-V ballistic missiles can turn the country’s spectacular economic story into history. A joint China-Pakistan attack on India will be both fratricidal and suicidal.

Also, one must learn lessons from the past. In the 1965 War when Ayub Khan appealed to big brother China to bail out Pakistan, which was being hammered by the Indian Army, Chinese strongman Mao Tse-Tung, fearing the escalation of the war into a global conflict, replied: “If there is a nuclear war, it is Peking and not Rawalpindi that will be the target.” Again, in the 1971 War, despite desperate pleas by dictator Yahya Khan and Henry Kissinger of the US, the Chinese did not move even a few trucks around.

However, war planning must take into account the worst case scenario. One cannot rule out a two-front war if China starts crumbling and its leadership seeks a way out to distract the population. Although the majority Hans are strongly nationalistic and solidly back the communist government, things could change if social problems escalate. For instance, by 2030 a quarter of men in their 30s will never have married because of the shortage of women. Such seemingly mundane issues could snowball into large crises.

Wars can also be sparked by accident. For instance, a border clash between India and China could spiral into a larger conflict, sucking in Pakistan.

Because wars are unpredictable, it is natural and entirely advisable to take out insurance cover. As the American author Will Durant wrote after analysing the causes of India’s invasion by Islamic and European hordes, “A nation must forever wage peace but keep its powder dry.”

STRENGTHEN THE AIR FORCE

A succession of air chiefs has declared that the Indian Air Force (IAF) cannot fight a two-front war without a minimum of 42 squadrons. It can be safely assumed that – like four star generals in other countries – the IAF brass also loves expensive new toys. They are simply scaring the politicians into greenlighting multi-billion dollar aircraft purchases.

However, when war breaks out, it is the air force that is the first to take both defensive measures as well as offensive action. A strong air force that makes Indian airspace impregnable is therefore a must.

The Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is the second largest air force in the world with more than 2,800 planes, including 1,900 combat aircraft. Of these, 120 are long-range H-6 bombers of which India has no equivalent, and according to the IAF's combat doctrine there are no plans to have dedicated bombers in the future. China is also reportedly working on a stealth bomber codenamed H-18.

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is the largest in the Islamic world with 750 aircraft of which 450 perform combat roles. Most of these are Chinese junk, but the 100 F-16s constitute a potent threat. While the Pakistani F-16s belong to an earlier era, some of these have been upgraded with modification kits by Turkish Aerospace Industries. As Turkey licence produces the F-16, in a crunch situation it could supply more F-16s to the PAF.

One cannot rule out the possibility of Islamic countries lending their aircraft to Pakistan, as happened in the 1971 War when Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE and Turkey provided warplanes and Iran provided landing facilities to PAF aircraft.

The IAF currently has over 1700 aircraft of which 900 are combat aircraft, including the air dominance Su-30MKI. As India replaces older MiGs, the Su-30 fleet is likely to touch 300 aircraft – an impressive number for such an expensive and large aircraft.

The IAF also has nearly 90 upgraded MiG-29s, which are far superior to the F-16s, plus there are around 45 upgraded and highly capable Mirage 2000 fighter bombers. During the 1999 Kargil War, both the MiG-29 and Mirage-2000 had performed brilliantly. With the Russian jets providing top cover and keeping the PAF F-16s well away from the border, the Mirage-2000 was able to bomb Pakistan Army positions across the LoC with impunity.

However, with China and Pakistan having a combined total of 2350 combat aircraft versus the IAF’s 900 jets, there is a pressing need to restore some parity by inducting lighter and cheaper single engine aircraft. These include the homemade Tejas and the latest Viper version of the American F-16, provided they are made in India.

For a country that splurges on multi-billion loan write-offs, wasteful and shameful Commonwealth Games and numerous scams, a 45-squadron fleet should be loose change. Seemingly unimportant acts or omissions can have grave and unforeseen consequences. As the American statesman Benjamin Franklin famously wrote:

“For the want of a nail the shoe was lost,

For the want of a shoe the horse was lost,

For the want of a horse the rider was lost,

For the want of a rider the battle was lost,

For the want of a battle the kingdom was lost,

And all for the want of a horseshoe-nail.”

BUILD A MISSILE WALL

Since modern wars often begin with a missile or air attack aimed at suppression of enemy air defences and destruction of parked aircraft, the country should be protected by a ring of surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. Currently India has one of the most antiquated air defence systems in the world, and relies on the 1960s vintage Russian SAMs. Although they might work against Pakistan, there is an urgent need for more modern SAMs that will shoot down advanced Chinese jets.

The good news is that India has decided to build a ballistic missile defence (BMD) system that will also take out enemy aircraft and cruise missiles. The core of this system will be the S-400 Triumf – a long-range air defence weapon that can literally take the war into the enemy’s airspace. For instance, an S-400 based at Halwara air base can bring down an F-16 flying over Lahore in just 34 seconds, giving the Pakistani pilot no time to say his prayers.

This S-400 air defence system can not only block enemy aircraft from providing support to their army during a conventional war, it can provide basic protection against Pakistani or Chinese missiles in case of a nuclear war. The system is, therefore, a force multiplier that can dramatically influence the outcome of a war. Five units have been ordered from Russia but more are needed in view of India’s vast borders.

However, no single missile is a game changer on its own. Missile defence works best when it is layered – multiple systems covering all low, medium and high altitudes. Anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and air defence aircraft are also vital links of this network. India’s BMD system will also include a range of short and medium Indian and Israeli missiles.

Having even a rudimentary BMD system is better than having none at all because it creates doubt in the mind of the enemy whether his first strike will succeed. If the Pakistanis and Chinese cannot be certain that their pilots will get out alive from Indian airspace, or whether enough of their missiles will penetrate an Indian BMD system, it is more than half the battle won. As both Sun Tzu and Chanakya would agree, the best victory is that which is gained without fighting or the loss of men.

STRONGER AT SEA

For the Indian Navy to defend both coastlines successfully a fleet of 30 submarines should be the minimum, with perhaps a fleet of 50 (nuclear-powered attack, ballistic missile capable and diesel-powered attack subs) being an ideal number. Compared with India’s current fleet of 16 subs, this may seem like overkill. But compare India’s abysmal fleet strength with that of tiny and dirt poor North Korea, which has more than 70 submarines. (Now you know why American naval vessels maintain a safe distance from the Korean peninsula.)

Submarines being the true predators of the deep will allow India to wreak havoc on its adversaries during a war. Even a fleet of just 24 subs (the sanctioned strength) can target every task force in the Indian Ocean. During the 1999 Kargil War, it was a submarine – not an aircraft carrier – that was poised to deliver the first blow had India decided to escalate the conflict. Deployed off Karachi, INS Sindhurakshak had its torpedoes trained on the harbour installations. Had General Pevez Musharraf not despatched Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to the US on a mission of mercy, India would have made a bigger bonfire of the Pakistani city than last time round in 1971.

As well as subs, India needs to spend on other less glamorous but critical weapons platforms such as missile boats, frigates, stealth ships, minesweepers, land and ship attack missiles, torpedoes, shore-based radar, close-in warfare weapons, electronic warfare suites and maritime satellites.

PREPARE FOR ARMAGEDDON

In May 2017 India inked a deal with the US under the US Foreign Military Sales programme to buy equipment for use against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. The order includes 38,034 general purpose masks and 114,102 filters. This purchase offers a clue that India is preparing to fight in a biological/chemical/nuclear contaminated battlefield.

Considering that the Indian Army comprises 1.2 million men and women, with frontline troops forming at least a third of that force, a lot more containment equipment needs to be required. If an Indian armoured column advancing into Pakistan is attacked with tactical nuclear weapons, containment equipment will allow the thrust to continue until India such time when decides to escalate.

India was able to defeat Pakistan is four successive wars mainly because of superior troop morale. The military brass should ensure that soldiers are not condemned to suffer nuclear fallout or a chemical burst. Indian warriors are not worried about dying but no soldier likes to be treated like fodder.

INDIGENISE OR PERISH

A two-front war will involve rapid attrition. Lost hardware would need to be quickly replaced by the armaments factory for the armed forces to be able to fight a sustained war. Rapid indigenisation is therefore of the utmost importance.

In March 2012 army chief General V.K. Singh had dropped a bombshell that tanks were running out of ammunition, air defence was becoming obsolete and the infantry lacked critical weapons. The scariest part was the Indian Army had ammunition stocks only for a two-day war. Now compare this with the 1965 War when India had at least three weeks’ worth of ammunition – after fighting a 22 day war.

Five years later, India’s security continues to be at risk. The country’s war wastage reserves (WWR) include military material held in reserve in case of war. This includes bullets, rockets, missiles, weapons and fuel. According to the original norms, WWR should ideally last 40 days of intense fighting, allowing time for production to be ramped up and delivered to the military. In 1999 this was revised to 20 days of intense fighting.

However, according to a July 2017 report by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), the stock of as many as 61 types of ammunition – out of a total of 152 types of ammunition considered critical by the Indian Army to fight a war – is available for just 10 days. Until this is fixed, forget a two-front war, India’s ability to fight on a single front looks doubtful.

The armed forces need to be seriously weaned away from the easy import route. This is critical as weapons prices have kept in step with India’s growing requirements. The Rafale fighter costs approximately $200 million and the fifth and sixth generation fighters will be an order of magnitude costlier. This is simply unsustainable in the long run. Moreover, foreign sellers will jack up costs if India seeks weapons in the middle of a war (when bargaining isn't possible) or even deny weapons if there are international sanctions.

In order to seed a vibrant defence manufacturing base, India must allow majority foreign stake in defence companies. This way India can fast-forward the process of becoming a hub of cutting edge weapons research and get out of the vicious cycle of low to mid-end technology transfers. The spate of weapons production partnerships entered into by private Indian players with defence MNCs due to the Make in India initiative will get a huge fillip if defence production policies are further liberalised.

Quoting Chanakya, “A person whose wealth is stored in the house of another person will not be able to use his wealth when ne needs it.” This is true of weapons as well – India cannot fight a major war if it relies on imports.

INK MILITARY PACT WITH JAPAN

It is said about the Chinese that they hate the West, despise India and fear Japan. After seven decades of isolation and self-imposed military spending limits, Japan is slowly emerging out of the American security umbrella. The country has lifted the 1 per cent of GDP limit on defence and has embarked upon a massive weapons building programme. In order to counter China and the North Korean nuclear threat, there is a very real possibility that Tokyo could go nuclear instead of relying on American guarantees.

Unlike the Chinese, Japan has more positive views about India. This is not merely a case of an enemy’s enemy being a friend; Japan and India also share religious and cultural similarities which make it easier for both countries to enter into a strategic partnership. An India-Japan military pact will be beneficial to Tokyo as well because China will then have to watch its back against India if it threatens Japan. With the dragon already feeling the heat from the US pivot to Asia, its worst nightmare will come true if India applies pressure from the west.

With the disciplined Japanese military – which has a 1000 year old martial tradition – deployed off the East China Sea, and India’s 90,000-strong Mountain Strike Corps threatening Tibet, it will be the best insurance against an attack for both India and Japan.

MAKE WAR DOCTRINE TRANSPARENT

India should lay it out that no matter who is in power, the country’s political leadership will not hesitate to wipe out Pakistan if it joins a Chinese attack on India. Since Beijing will not stick its neck out to defend Islamabad, the Pakistani brass will only attack India if they are in a suicidal frame of mind. While there are indeed fanatic zealots in the Pakistani military establishment, for the most part the Pakistani military elites lead a cushy life, sponging off the poor masses. Insulated from the poverty and misery of the country, the generals in Rawalpindi have zero incentive to be suicidal.

Considering the neighbourhood we live in, India should constantly be in a state of war readiness. This is the price of progress. In the meantime, New Delhi should have a plan ready to do a second and third Bangladesh by supporting independence movements in Balochistan and Sindh. This will also allow Khyber Pakthunkwa to rejoin Afghanistan. A truncated Pakistan alone will ensure permanent peace on India’s western border.

(This article was first published in Geopolitics magazine.)

[rakeshkrishnansimha]

Flight of the Falcon: Will the F-16 Lead India’s Defence Industry to a New Era?

India could absorb a number of red hot technologies if the American F-16 is built locally. And that’s not counting the geopolitical spinoff of having American lawmakers rooting for New Delhi.

Lockheed-Martin’s announcement that it would shift the F-16 Falcon’s entire production chain to India and manufacture the jet fighter jointly with Tata Advanced Systems Limited has caused considerable excitement in the country. If the deal gets the government’s green light, it would be a significant event because never in modern armaments history has an entire aircraft ecosystem been wound up and transplanted in a different country.

The only down side – if you could call it that – of Lockheed’s offer is that the F-16 is a 1970s era aircraft, with its critics urging India to acquire the technology of a more modern jet. But they need to understand that the 40 year old American fighter is an order of magnitude more advanced than India’s latest Tejas light combat aircraft.

Goodbye to licence production

India’s state owned defence industry has for decades been addicted to licence production, which in plain language means using screwdriver technology. In a paper titled Transfer of Defence Technology - Exploring the Avenues for India, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) explains why licence production or manufacture is a technological dead end.

"The licence manufacture mode, currently being referred to as transfer of technology in the Indian Defence Procurement Procedure, essentially delivers the capability to manufacture or produce defence systems through the acquiring of necessary know-hows. However, for significantly upgrading the system or designing, developing and manufacturing new variants independently of the foreign technology seller firms, the know-whys are needed. These know-whys are never provided for established reasons and huge costs, leaving the recipient country considerably dependent on the seller firm for its futuristic needs."

In the last five decades India has licence produced the MiG-21, MiG-27, Sukhoi Su-30MKI, Jaguars, T-72 and T-90 tanks and BMP armoured personal carriers among others. And yet India’s state owned companies did not derive a single new home-grown version of these weapons platforms.

Falcon arrives

The F-16 could change that. It is a high-performance aircraft that becomes an even more potent weapon in the right hands. In a mock combat exercise held in the US last year, a Falcon outgunned and outmanoeuvred the latest F-35, thoroughly humiliating the stealth fighter. More significantly, the F-16 was deliberately handicapped with a full load of missiles, bombs and fuel while the F-35 was flown clean – that is minus its missiles – for optimum performance and speed. And yet the older fighter won.

In real life combat, the Israelis have used the Falcon to strike its enemies near its borders as well as destroy targets as distant as Tunisia and Iraq.

One must not forget that as many as 3200 F-16s are in operation with 25 countries worldwide. And with the ongoing troubles with the F-35 programme, the Falcon remains the backbone of the US Air Force.

The Block 70 that Lockheed has offered India is the latest version with extended range. With upgrades, the F-16 will be flying into the second half of this century. Some predict that it could be the world’s first 100-year-old fighter. With its airframe showing no signs of fatigue, it could fulfil that prediction. Clearly, this is an aircraft with a long shelf life.

The F-16 could usher in a new era of technological advancement in India. To illustrate, when India took the first steps towards economic liberalisation, it was the re-entry of Coca-Cola that make India kosher for foreign multinationals. The presence of Coke, the defining symbol of western capitalism, assured investors that India was ready to do business again.

Similarly, Prime Minister Narendra’s Modi’s Make in India initiative in defence will receive a turbocharge when the Falcon lands in India. First up, there will be an immediate impact on the Indian aerospace industry.

John Losinger and Abhay Paranjape of Lockheed’s Integrated Fighter Group explain how the transfer will pan out: “The first several aircraft will be delivered from the US production line. It starts off with getting the user (say, the Indian Air Force) to become familiar with the aircraft, figure out if there are any special systems that need to be going on to that aircraft…and simultaneously training the right set of people, do the tech transfer, tooling setup, they will need the right sort of buildings, runway facilities so there is a seamless transition from aircraft being delivered from the US to aircraft being delivered from India.”

The entire process could potentially create thousands of jobs. At the very lowest technical level the F-16 project will require numerous people trained through ITI or equivalent technical training institutions. The next step is the hiring of entry level engineers, designers, supply chain managers, software engineers, hardware engineers and supply chain integrators among others. “This is like bringing up a whole new industry,” explain Losinger and Paranjape.

How Turkey rode the Falcon

A highly successful example of how transfer of technology transformed a nation’s aerospace sector is the Lockheed-Turkish Air Industries (TAI) tie-up in the 1980s. According to the IDSA, this project resulted in the production of a total of 308 F-16 aircraft over a period of around 12 years.

In this landmark deal the state owned TAI had the major share with 49 per cent; Lockheed Martin had 42 per cent; General Electric (GE) had 7 per cent and the remaining was held by two other firms. A total investment of $137 million was made, with $70 million from Turkish partners and $67 million from the US partners, which was later supplemented by the latter with another $100 million. Lockheed Martin provided three experienced directors for five years and the general manager for 14 years.

“From the experience gained from building 80 per cent of the F-16 aircraft, TAI began branching out into other areas to include: parts of the transport aircraft CN-235 and A400M; modifications of Boeing 737s into an airborne early warning aircraft; and parts of helicopters Agusta Mangusta T-29 and Sikorsky T-70 Blackhawk. The TAI also developed a modification centre where they upgraded aircraft such as the C-130s, F-4s, T-38s and F-16s.”

Lockheed claims the Turkish company is now developing indigenously designed unmanned aerial vehicles, basic trainer aircraft and even a fifth generation fighter aircraft.

Turning a trickle into a torrent

With the country’s defence spending expected to swell to $620 billion by 2022, the government is keen to transform India – from its current position as the world’s largest importer of military equipment—into a manufacturing powerhouse.

Earlier this year the government presented a plan to allow strategic partnerships in submarines, armoured vehicles, single-engine fighter planes and helicopters, which were once no-go sectors for the private sector. A pool of six defence firms is likely to be formed under the model, allowing them to bid for big-ticket military projects. The firms are L&T, Tata, Mahindra Defence, Reliance Defence& Engineering, Bharat Forge and the Adani Group.

However, there is endless room for ventures in non-strategic projects, such as howitzers, field guns, short range missiles, small arms and ammunition. Foreign firms are waiting to grab of slice of the Indian market. Once the F-16 production line moving to India, it could lead to a flood of defence companies moving to India.

Level playing field

In the US, even the largest defence firms such as Boeing, Lockheed and Raytheon are given cash grants for conducting weapons R&D. Once a product is developed, the companies involved are given guaranteed orders. Indian defence firms, no matter how large, must also be given government grants for research. This might appear like a freebie but the advantage will be billions of dollars saved in imports.

India also needs to totally revamp its Ordnance Factory Boards which are producing not just shoddy but unusable weapons. They need to enter the 21st century especially in view of a former Indian Army general’s remarks that Pakistan exports more defence products than India.

Also, when private players create parallel manufacturing lines, the status of India's state owned defence enterprises will need to be redefined. Since you can’t have two sets of companies producing the same weapons, privatisation seems the most likely result. With the defence PSUs have strong unions, this could turn out be one of the most disruptive events in India's defence industry.

But no matter how the future pans out, the F-16 is set to be the catalyst that will transform the map of India’s moribund defence industry.

(This article was previously published by Geopolitics magazine.)

                                         SAAB TAKES A SWING

Lockheed’s decision to move the F-16 production line to India does not guarantee the American company will walk away with the deal. The Saab Gripen is a dogged rival that has tasted success in South Africa, Czech Republic and Hungary, and is in a strong position in Brazil.

Saab has offered to move the Gripen plant from Sweden to India. It has offered the IAF an aircraft that is cheap as chips but is no laggard either when it comes to performance technology.

As well as highly developed netcentric warfare capabilities, the Gripen has good short takeoff performance. Plus, Saab has designed it to have low maintenance requirements, which could interest the Indian Air Force, whose Achilles heel is poor maintenance.

However, what tilts the balance in the F-16’s favour is geopolitics. An order this big is rarely about price or performance – it is about quid pro quo or ‘you scratch my back, I scratch yours’. India will extract its pound of flesh and the US has more favours to dole out.

New Delhi could extract promises on the transfer of technology in other critical areas while also getting the US to align its diplomacy in line with India. Last week the US for the first time listed Pakistan among nations and regions providing "safe havens" to terrorists.

However, Saab could offset Sweden’s lightweight status by making an offer India cannot refuse. For instance, it could sell India the latest technology used in the Gripen E for use in the Tejas.

India has shortlisted the F-16 and the Gripen for its requirement of at least 126 single engine fighters. With the IAF set to retire over 250 MiG-21s and MiG-27s in the coming years, that requirement would swell easily. If India distributes the order equally between Lockheed and Saab, it will have two world class production lines.

Whichever way India swings, what’s certain is there will be considerable deliberation and give and take before this mega deal is inked.

[rakeshkrishnansimha]

Why the Indian Air Force Should Not Rush Into Stealth

India must buy greater numbers of cheaper, non-stealthy planes until such time Indian industry is able to master stealth technology.

If there’s one area in which China has acquired a massive lead over India it is in the development of stealth fighters. While India’s Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) venture with Russia is far from being combat ready, China claimed in March that its Chengdu J-20 had entered service with the Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). It tallies with an assessment by the US Defence Department that the J-20 could be inducted in 2018. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington DC-based security think tank, concurs the J-20 could enter service in a similar time frame.

China’s stealth programme is unique because it is the only country that has two concurrent programmes. Alongside the J-20, a stripped-down export version, the Shengyang J-31, is also in the final stage of development. Its first customer could well be Pakistan, which is Beijing’s test market.

A scenario in which the Chinese are armed with stealth fighters may look alarming in the backdrop of worsening India-China relations. However, the thing to note is that the initial batches of the J-20 and J-31 are still experimental and years away from being fully battle ready. At best they are at the initial operational capability (IOC) phase. (IOC is the state achieved when a capability is available in its minimum usefully available form.)

A peculiar aspect of the Chinese defence industry is its achievements tend to multiply in March because it coincides with the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress in Beijing. The meeting is often used by the Chinese defence industry as a platform for advertising its military and technological achievements before party bosses.

The available information on the two programmes is both the Chinese stealth fighter concepts remain works in progress. The reality is that only small numbers of the aircraft have been produced to date. These aircraft are therefore technology demonstrators and it could take years before the Chinese military leadership has the confidence to use them against rival air forces.

In this backdrop, there is no need for India to press the panic button although it is imperative that work on the indigenous stealth programme is speeded up. The country should not end up in a wasteful arms race but instead learn from the experiences of the US, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea in developing stealth aircraft as well as anti-stealth missiles and radars.

A short history of stealth

A quick recap of aerial stealth warfare will help illustrate the problems and pitfalls that await countries that deploy stealth technology.

In the 1980s the US built the F-117 Nighthawk that was supposed to be invisible to radar. It was such a closely guarded secret that the F-117 was only flown at night. First used in the 1991 Iraq War, it was an extremely trouble prone aircraft that also lacked the capability to dominate the air. It was quietly retired after a Serbian air defence team used brilliant tactics to identify, isolate and shoot down an F-117 raider over the former Yugoslavia. The weapon used was a Russian made S-125 missile manufactured in the 1960s. The US Air Force (USAF) has kept the first stealth jet’s combat abilities and records classified.

It was the Russians who first conceived the concept of stealth aircraft, but despite their huge achievements in weapons during the Cold War, they never ventured into stealth aircraft. Perhaps they knew stealth wasn’t an invisibility cloak – which the US military has led the world to believe.

In recent years, several American aerospace engineers such as Pierre Sprey have exposed stealth technology as a lie. They say no aircraft can ever be 100 percent stealthy because there is no such thing as one radar in war. “There are lots of radars,” Sprey said in an interview to Dutch television. “And you can’t be nose-on or dead-level to every radar in the theatre. There are always going to be radars that are going to be shining up (from below) or looking from above – they can all see you.”

The Russians went ahead and quietly built a range of VHF radars and surface to air missiles that can detect and bring down stealth fighters.

The Russian strategy of counter stealth measures seems to be winding up the US defence establishment. According to a former US Air Force pilot who flew the latest F-35 stealth jet, just because Russian VHF radars can detect the F-35 doesn't mean they can also target and bring it down. Anti-aircraft defences comprise several links – command, control, communication, ground radar, missiles and airborne radar – in a long “kill chain”. The F-35 will seek to snap one of these links, and thereby disrupt the detection ability.

Meanwhile, Russia and China are upping the ante and building a new generation of anti-aircraft missiles that can be fired from an extremely long range. These new radars can detect stealth aircraft in much better resolution as well. This will seek to nullify the biggest advantage of the American stealth fighters – the ability to detect enemy aircraft from extremely long ranges.

Limitations of stealth aircraft

That the situation in the stealth world wasn’t on cruise control was evident when it was revealed in 2014 that the US Navy planned to buy 22 additional EA-18G Growler electronic warfare (EW) aircraft for $2.14 billion.

The US Navy uses the Growler EW aircraft kitted out with advanced radar jamming equipment to protect its fleet of F/A-18 aircraft during missions. Now, the F-35 is fitted with its own EW capabilities and its supporters say a separate jamming aircraft is not needed because of this technology. But according to others in the US Navy and industry, the F-35's stealth and EW capabilities are simply not enough.

It is a tacit admission that the US Navy is not entirely comfortable with the F-35's capabilities in anti-access/area denial environments.

The purchase of more Growlers is seen as the US Navy's "escape hatch" from the unpopular F-35 programme, which has historically received a lukewarm reception from some sections of the service.

The Russian experience has been similar. After promising to buy hundreds of Sukhoi stealth fighters, recently named as the Su-57, and accepting hundreds of millions of developmental dollars from India, Russia has decided to scale back its plans. Instead of a largely stealthy fleet, the Russian Air Force will rely more on 4+ generation aircraft such as the Su-35 Super Flanker – also known as the stealth killer. Russia will build only a handful of Su-57s while continuing work on the aircraft.

Meanwhile, in China despite the manufacturers’ claims, the PLAAF last year acquired 24 advanced Super Flankers from Russia. This is a tacit admission that the Chinese military is not confident about the capabilities of its stealth jets. Despite the Chinese showing off their stealth jets, the doggedness with which they have pursued the Su-35 and begged and cajoled the Russians to sell them the Super Flanker points to serious shortcomings in their twin programmes. Since both the J-20 and J-31 are based on designs stolen from the US, the flaws in the Americans designs (such as lack of aerodynamic shape, poor manoeuvrability, short range and oxygen supply failures) may have penetrated into the Chinese jets as well.

Lessons for India

With the Su-57 experiencing developmental bottlenecks, there isn’t much India can do other than to push the Russians harder. If the project goes ahead, the IAF should insist on getting stealth aircraft that have protection from new generation anti-stealth missiles. If the Russians don't provide what the IAF wants, India should go in for a limited number of Su-57s and acquire the technology for use in its own fifth generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme.

With the benefit of hindsight, India should ensure the AMCA does not travel the same trajectory as current stealth programmes. Instead of packing everything into one aircraft (as the Americans did in the F-35), India should go for 'honest' aircraft with robust offensive and defensive capabilities, without too many bells and whistles.

While the AMCA’s stealth aspects will allow it to plunge straight into battle without worrying about enemy air defences, the Aeronautical Design Agency’s decision to pick a design layout similar to the F-22 severely underestimates the amount of equipment required to carry out true 5th-generation warfare, say Abhijit Iyer-Mitra and Pushan Das in a report prepared for the Observer Research Foundation.

According to the report, while stealth is just one aspect of a 5th-generation fighter, “the most critical aspects are in fact sensor fusion, man-machine interface and the integration of the aircraft with other land, sea and air forces, and as part of a broader fleet of aircraft comprising a totality of air power. An elaboration of these aspects has been notably absent from the design phases”.

If the AMCA becomes mired in the quicksand of compromise, it could turn out to be India’s F-35. The American jet’s stealth has been significantly compromised, prompting several commentators to reclassify the fighter from very low observable (VLO) to merely the low observable (LO) category.

Failure is not an option for India. With 3300 combat jets in various branches of its military, the US can fall back on older fourth generation aircraft to finish the job. Deep pockets (a defence budget of over $500 billion) and a large industrial base allow America to go back to the drawing board and undo its mistakes or produce a new fighter. Even when it flies inferior fighters, no country in the world will dare attack the US.

India with a $57 billion defence budget and less than 800 combat jets can’t afford to produce a dud FGFA. A wise general once said: “A mistake in strategy cannot be undone in the same war.” With the Chinese and Pakistanis increasingly envious of rising India, a war could be thrust upon us in the near future. India simply cannot let its guard down.

Options for the IAF

The IAF must continue to invest in 4+ generation aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-30MKI and Rafale as these will be the air dominance fighters that will kick in the door and allow secondary fighters such as the Mirage-2000, MiG-29s, MiG-21 and even the rookie Tejas to enter the battlefield. The US, Russia and China are all buying 4+ generation aircraft or upgrading existing ones to the 4++ generation standard. The American F-15 and the Russian MiG-31 are likely to keep flying well into the 2040s and beyond.

Stealth fighters are not only hard to build but it is a fact that air forces have oversold them to the public. In view of the growing pains being experienced by the industry, the fail safe option or Plan B is to buy greater numbers of cheaper, non-stealthy planes. As the Russians used to say in World War II, quantity is quality.

The huge expense of developing, buying and maintaining stealth jets means they will – at least in the next couple of decades – be used sparingly, perhaps at night and escorted by plenty of non-stealth aircraft. This scenario has completely upended predictions that stealth fighters would play a dominant role in air combat by the early part of the 21st century.

There is no need for India to rush into buying stealth aircraft when the world’s leading powers have chosen the sensible way of falling back on 4th generation jets.

(This article was first published in Geopolitics magazine.)

[rakeshkrishnansimha]

Can BrahMos Punch its Way to the Export Market?

By exporting the BrahMos missile to Vietnam, India will not only gain considerable geopolitical leverage, prestige and user data, it will also help shed New Delhi’s traditional reticence towards overseas military sales.

India’s myopic attitude towards weapons exports has led to peculiar outcomes. In 1978 the Indian Army was looking to dispose of 100 outdated Centurion tanks. These tanks had performed brilliantly in the 1965 war with Pakistan and could have been donated to a friendly African country. According to an American government report, they were sold as scrap to a foreign company which was an intermediary of the racist South African regime. To New Delhi’s deep embarrassment, the South African military, which was facing an international embargo, refurbished the tanks and used them against Black Africans.

In ‘India's Ocean: The Story of India's Bid for Regional Leadership’ David Brewster writes that in September 1986, Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe requested India to deploy a squadron of MiG-21 aircraft with Indian Air Force (IAF) pilots to provide protection against the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Fearing it would get sucked into the African quagmire, India baulked. The following year, India refused to sell MiG-21s to Zimbabwe for the same reason.

In the late 1980s Thailand requested India to supply Jaguar deep penetration strike aircraft that HAL was license producing for the Indian Air Force (IAF). Since HAL was going to shut the Jaguar facility after completing the final order for the IAF, the Thai deal would have kept its production line humming for years. However, the government shot down the proposal in the belief that Thailand might deploy the aircraft against Vietnam, a friendly country. However, the Vietnamese military was several orders of magnitude more powerful than the Thai defence forces and a couple of Jaguar squadrons would scarcely have tilted the balance in Bangkok’s favour.

The lack of a strategic culture, poor grasp of geopolitical realities and decision making paralysis in India’s political leadership ensured that the country never quite got to exporting weapons.

The government’s pussyfooting over the export of BrahMos missiles, therefore, brings on a sense of déjà vu. For several years India and Vietnam have been circling around a deal worth potentially hundreds of millions of dollars to provide supersonic cruise missiles to Hanoi. In August the Vietnamese media said India had delivered the system, but New Delhi poured cold water on the considerable excitement generated in India.

It is understandable why Vietnam is desperate seeking the BrahMos. The supersonic missile has been described as a “war winner” and “Brahmastra” by A. Sivathanu Pillai, the founder of BrahMos Aerospace. In tests the world’s fastest cruise missile has been known to cut warships in half. Its tremendous speed and accuracy give very little time to the enemy to take evasive action. Such destructive power and speed are unique in a non-strategic weapon. Armed with the missile, Vietnam will gain an asymmetric advantage against the much larger People’s Liberation Army Navy. It would leave Chinese warships and coastal assets highly vulnerable to a crippling missile strike.

Old habits die hard

India’s reasons for holding back the BrahMos could be three-fold. One, the Ministry of External Affairs has a long-standing policy of not upsetting China even if the dragon cares little about Indian sensibilities. Because Beijing is said to be ultra-sensitive about the introduction of modern weapons by its neighbours, the MEA, which remains a status quo seeker, is said to be vehemently opposed to the sale.

Leading strategist Bharat Karnad writes that in 1998 when he first suggested that India supply the BrahMos to Vietnam, the then Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath’s rather dismissive response in his meeting with the National Security Advisory Board was that this was “not practicable” thing to do. According to him, it was “a phrase that has ever since remained etched in my mind and reflects the MEA’s strategic myopia. In other words, China could arm Pakistan with nuclear missiles but for India to return the favour by equipping states on the Chinese periphery was not right. When Delhi fears even to do a strategic tit-for-tat, small wonder India has counted for so little for so long”.

Secondly, BrahMos Aerospace may not have the spare capacity for fulfilling export orders. With all three branches of the military placing large orders for the BrahMos, exports may be overdoing it. The company is also in the process of testing the lighter BrahMos NG version for the Indian Air Force and is building the next generation extended range BrahMos which could see the missile able to hit targets 1000 km away (compared with 300 km currently). However, this assumption can be ruled out because BrahMos Aerospace would not be lobbying for exports if it didn’t believe it couldn’t meet the orders.

Thirdly, does the fine print in the agreement between India and Russia impose restrictions on exports? If this is an issue, then India needs to get the pact amended in step with current requirements. The Russian side needs to be convinced that they also stand to make a lot of money. Russian bureaucracy can be highly resistant to change, with Soviet-era officials having a penchant for stonewalling vital decisions.

On the bright side, the fact that weapon exports are being discussed at all in India is a quantum leap for a country that for decades wouldn’t even contemplate the possibility of arming other countries. With a nationalist government in charge and the defence sector receiving a huge push from the Make in India policy, the situation is a lot different today.

Betting big on BrahMos

If the Vietnam deal goes through, it will make history as it would be India’s first export of a major offensive weapon. The BrahMos is a perfect fit in the backdrop of Make in India because it is the only world class weapon currently being produced in the country. It would contribute hugely to India’s image as a bold new entrant in the high-octane world of weapons.

The BrahMos can also be used as a bargaining tool against China. By supplying the missile to Vietnam – and other friendly countries in South East Asia – India can show Beijing that two can play the destabilising game. If China provides high-end weapons to Pakistan, then India can offer the BrahMos to Vietnam, a country with a very professional and powerful military that had killed up to 68,000 Chinese troops in their last major clash, in 1979.

The missile system could therefore play a useful role in keeping Chinese weapons from being sold to Islamabad, which will then start feeling the pinch as it is too broke to get Western arms and ammunition. By exporting this class of missiles as well as other modern weapons to Vietnam and other countries located in the proximity of India’s enemies (let’s admit Pakistan and China are enemies and not just rivals), India can send a clear signal that it can raise the heat on its enemies.

Geopolitical embrace

Foreign military sales are a force multiplier because they tie the seller and buyer in a long-term geopolitical embrace. This may eventually translate into further military sales. To illustrate, when India acquired the MiG-21 from Russia in 1965, nearly 100 per cent of its advanced weapons were of British or western origin. A decade later over 80 per cent of its weapons was from Russia.

Again, take India’s current Flanker diplomacy. The induction of advanced Su-27/30 Flanker aircraft in the air forces of Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam proved to be an unexpected windfall for India. As a maintenance hub for the Russian made Flanker series aircraft and a trainer of foreign fighter pilots, the country earns a substantial amount of money. But more importantly, it strengthens New Delhi’s ties with the region.

Considering that two of the air forces with which India has signed agreements to service Flankers belong to Muslim majority countries – which have in the past openly supported Pakistan in wars against India – that is no mean achievement.

With Vietnam the ties are much deeper. Both nations have a commonality of weapons platforms by virtue of their Russian origin. They can therefore share expertise and resources available with their respective armed forces in terms of handling and maintaining these weapons.

India has also repaired and upgraded over 100 MiG-21 fighter planes of the Vietnamese People's Air Force and supplied them with enhanced avionics and radar systems. The Indian Navy has been supplying critical spares to Hanoi for its Russian origin ships and missile boats.

India has already made a significant foray into the hardware segment by offering Vietnam a $100 million line of credit to buy patrol vessels built by India's L&T. Vietnam could also become the first foreign customer for the Akash surface-to-air missile.

User feedback

Exports are critical because they allow a weapon to be used in a variety of environments and situations. Let’s say India never exports the BrahMos. In such a case, we will know its effectiveness and impact only when or if India goes to war. On the other hand, by exporting it to, say, Vietnam, Brazil and Chile (all rumoured buyers) India will get feedback from three different sets of users with varied climatic conditions and war fighting philosophies. And if one of these countries fires the missile in anger, it would generate priceless data for the manufacturer as well as India’s armed forces.

BrahMos Aerospace has not only created a new benchmark in cruise missile development, it has adopted the incremental or ‘ladder’ approach where more advanced – and innovative – versions of the missile are constantly being designed, tested, produced for all branches of the armed forces. Through exports, the company will be able to acquire feedback from an entirely new – foreign – perspective. That’s a huge deal in the ultra-competitive world of modern weapons.

Breaking new ground

Despite having one of the world’s largest military forces, India does not count among the top 20 arms exporters. It wasn’t always like this. The country had a robust defence export sector during the World War II era when it was a major supplier to Britain. However, after independence the fixation with international peace and aversion for war made it impossible for India to build on its defence industrial base.

For instance, speaking on the defence budget in the Lok Sabha in 1957, Acharya Kriplani, said: “The mounting expenses on the army must be cut down. The followers of Gandhi and adherents of universal peace should not increase military expenditure.”

With the BrahMos, New Delhi can finally make a mark on the global arms bazaar. Considering that it is the only supersonic cruise missile in the world, there should be no dearth of buyers for it.

(This article was originally published in Geopolitics magazine.)

[rakeshkrishnansimha]

India’s new military doctrine: Shoot first, questions later

India has made a decisive break from its defensive and reactive mindset that in previous conflicts prevented the country’s armed forces from performing to their true potential. The second edition of the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF-2017) leaves no doubt that both the political leadership and the military brass are moving away from strategic timidity and embracing the concept of strategic offensive.

Released in April by Admiral Sunil Lamba, the senior among the current three services chiefs, JDIAF-2017 declares: “India has moved to a pro-active and pragmatic philosophy to counter various conflict situations.”

The language of the document is typical Indian bureaucratese – riddled with typos and punctuation errors, besides being ponderous and verbose. Despite these faults, there is a sense of exuberance – rare in an official document. Perhaps this is an indication that India’s commanders feel they have finally been given a free hand to deploy the full might of the country’s vast armed forces in a future war. India’s elite strike forces will no longer sit idle waiting for the opportune moment, which never came in the last wars.

The document says: "Conflict will be determined or prevented through a process of credible deterrence, coercive diplomacy and conclusively by punitive destruction, disruption and constraint in a nuclear environment across the Spectrum of Conflict.” Translation: India will henceforth adopt Patton-style kick-them-hard warfare.

India’s shifting doctrines

Having a military doctrine is critical for national security because it provides clear guidelines for the political and military leaderships for tackling national security challenges. It provides a set of ideas on how a country plans to wage war – and more importantly deter war. A written document also sends a message to other countries – including partners and adversaries – that the Indian military has a plan of action and will act on it when the occasion demands.

The absence of a proper war doctrine, especially during the Jawaharlal Nehru years, made India fall into the trap of waging limited wars, thereby ceding the advantage to its adversaries. The defensive nature of India’s leadership can be discerned from the manner in which India handled the 1962 China war. During three separate attacks, in September, October and November, India let the Chinese dictate the time, place and nature of the war as well as the final ceasefire. "While we were not party to these proposals, we did not do anything to disturb the ceasefire," the Ministry of Defence notes in its annual report.

In the 1965 war with Pakistan, New Delhi agreed to end the war at a time when it was hours away from delivering the knockout blow. In fact, at the peak of the war when Indian and Pakistani armour was clashing on the border, Army Chief Jayanto Nath Chaudhary ordered the local commander Harbaksh Singh to withdraw to a position east of Amritsar (implying that he cede Amritsar to the Pakistani Army). Singh refused and what followed was the Battle of Khem Karan which saw the utter rout of Pakistani armour – 75 tanks destroyed and 25 left abandoned, their wireless sets still crackling.

Again, in the 1971 war the political leadership let slip the opportunity to carve up West Pakistan after decisively defeating the Pakistanis in the east and neutralising Pakistan’s air force and navy in the west.

It was after the emphatic victory of 1971 that India’s strategic thinking shifted from defensive to deterrence. The change involved three phases. In 'India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia' Ali Ahmed explains that the first phase was the move from 'strategic defensive' of the 1970s to 'strategic offensive' of the 1980s. The second phase was of India again being on the strategic defensive till the turn of the century. In the third phase India has yet again moved to 'strategic offensive'.

Factors influencing change

Military doctrine reflects the state of the nation and cannot be divorced from it. For instance, the descent into the defensive mindset of the 1990s happened when India was beset with coalition politics. India was overrun by leftist and liberal leaders such as I.K. Gujral and Mulayam Singh Yadav who were sympathetic towards Pakistan. Gujral, in fact, made unilateral concessions to Pakistan and wound up highly prized intelligence assets in Sindh and Balochistan because of his view that “older brother” India must be magnanimous and generous towards Pakistan, the younger one.

However, this was construed as Hindu weakness, which emboldened the Pakistanis to prop up terrorist movements in Kashmir and Maoist infested areas.

The Kargil War of 1999 was also a result of the Pakistani cowboy generals’ perception of India as weak. If anything good came out of that conflict – and the attack on the Indian Parliament two years later – it was the consensus among India’s political and military leadership that Pakistan would no longer be granted concessions.

Another factor transforming the country’s strategic culture is India’s emergence as a powerful economy with an increasingly wealthy, assertive and aspiring middle class. New Delhi now sees itself as a key member of the global order. Pakistani military sociologist Ayesha Siddiqa writes in South Asia Journal: "Much of this change is linked with India's growing desire to establish itself as a global power. The upcoming and affluent middle class and the Indian diaspora have a relatively aggressive stance so far as national power is concerned, which adds to the military's relative influence."

The 2003 nuclear doctrine, in which India declared that it would launch "massive" retaliatory strike if Pakistan lobbed even a single battlefield nuke at India’s armed forces is evidence of the country’s hardening strategic posture.

Cold Start: Still running

JDIAF-2017 is likely to give more sleepless nights to the Rawalpindi generals who are obsessed with achieving parity with India. The document indicates that India’s famous Cold Start strategy – which aims to grab bite-size chunks (60-80 km deep) of enemy territory within the first three days of an Indian armoured thrust – may be on the back burner but not off the table.

The document says: “Therefore, undertaking ‘Integrated Theatre Battle’ with an operationally adaptable force, to ensure decisive victory in a network centric environment across the entire spectrum of conflict in varied geographical domains, will be the guiding philosophy for evolution of force application and war fighting strategies.” This is a clear sign that India is preparing for Cold Start or at least some form of this blitzkrieg strategy.

Two recent developments suggest Cold Start is not in cold storage. Last year the Indian Army placed an order for 1600 T-90 tanks – which will form the spearheads of an Indian armoured thrust. These tanks are capable of operations in a nuclear-biological-chemical environment. Secondly, in May this year India inked a deal with the US under the US Foreign Military Sales programme to buy equipment for use against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. This includes 38,034 general purpose masks and 114,102 filters.

Surgical strikes

The September 2016 surgical strikes on terrorist camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir caused considerable heartburn among Indian leftists, liberals and some political leaders, plus denial in Pakistan, but it had one unexpected result. The strikes nailed the lie peddled by these same groups – and backed by Pakistan and several western analysts – that India’s options for waging conventional war in the backdrop of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal were limited.

The scope of the joint doctrine includes India’s likely response to terror provocations. It says retaliation could be in the form of “surgical strikes”. In fact, the document says Special Forces units will be “tasked to develop area specialisation in their intended operational theatres”.

Worryingly for Pakistan, the logical conclusion of surgical strikes is that India will fight future battles inside Pakistan. For, India cannot afford to allow Islamabad’s low-cost high-intensity terror warfare against India to continue forever. The costs are simply too great as paramilitary and military forces are being tied up in internal security, impacting their morale and war fighting capacity.

Critical shortfalls

To be sure, the doctrine is not a magic wand that will make nagging problems go away with a wave. It will achieve its purpose only if India moves towards integrated military structures. Currently, there is considerable resistance to tri-services cooperation because the Indian Air Force fears that it will be swamped by the much larger Army. However, such cooperation is a matter of do or die. During the Kargil war while the army was engaged in bitter fighting on the peaks, the IAF chief went on a week’s tour of Europe because he was unaware of the extent of Pakistan’s ingress. (If it’s any comfort, Pakistan’s air chief was also clueless about what was happening in Kargil!)

Hopefully, India will now appoint a tri-service Chief of Defence Staff required to integrate the major commands. Similarly, the government must establish an aerospace command in the backdrop of China’s aggressive military space programme which has successfully tested anti-satellite weapons and is on the verge of a breakthrough in hypersonic glide weapons.

The doctrine comes at a time when the military is under-armed or equipped with ad-hoc purchases (such as the Rafale deal), which are placing roadblocks in India’s war fighting capacity. The doctrine would focus on optimising and allocating resources based on need. As George Washington said, “To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace.”

Endgame

Having a long-term plan to systematically build military capabilities in tune with geopolitical aspirations is one thing. But a military doctrine must have definite goals. For instance, can Pakistan (or even China) be allowed to remain permanent roadblocks in India’s quest for supremacy?

In an article titled ‘India’s War Doctrine - The Next Decade’, published in the Indian Defence Review, Col (retired) J.K. Achuthan explains the conundrum: “Imperial Rome ruled much of the Western world and the Mediterranean rim for centuries during ancient times, simply because it had a very clear war doctrine that did not tolerate the emergence of any other military power in its neighbourhood. We are having problems with Pakistan mainly for this reason, because from 1980s onwards we have allowed it to emerge unchecked as an inimical military power, which is seething with a paranoid revenge syndrome and aspiring to attain military parity with India.”

A public document cannot obviously mention the issue of neutralising our next door neighbours – even if they are diehard enemies. But the ambit of military doctrine should include such uncomfortable questions as well. Only then will future generations of Indians be truly safe. For, the ultimate aim of war is peace.

(This article was first published in Geopolitics magazine, July 2017.)