Translation of a January 3, 2019 Facebook post by SXTbit, responding to Tsai Ing-wen’s January 2 response to Xi Jinping’s address on cross-strait affairs.
I don’t think I’m the kind of person who’s capable of taking enough sides of the issue into account, but I still want to thank our president for having the courage to speak up to China about what we don’t want. No matter what, thank you.
It felt like when you were little and you were bullied by a classmate, and when you came home, what you heard from your parents wasn’t “Just don’t bother with him” – it was, at long last, “We’ll go tell him that what he did was wrong.”
Although Tsai Ing-wen doesn’t have children, I think her attitude is like a brave mother’s. If I were still a child, I think I would need that kind of mama.
Even though the classmate who was bullying me is from a wealthy and powerful family, and whether he would listen or not wasn’t something I could decide, I would only want to know that my mother could explain what’s right and wrong.
#ThankYouPresidentTsaiIngwen
Comment by Tsai Ing-wen: Don’t cry. Let’s work together. This is what I should be doing, and for Taiwan’s sake, I’ll keep at it. Thank you and everyone for your support.
Translation of a press release by the KMT’s Culture and Communications Committee January 3, 2019. This is President Tsai’s statement.
Regarding mainland China secretary-general Xi Jinping’s discourse on the 40th anniversary of the Message of Compatriots in Taiwan, and President Tsai’s response, the Chinese Nationalist Party’s statement is as follows:
1. In accordance with the stipulations of the Constitution of the Republic of China, the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country. Our party resolutely opposes Taiwan independence. This is our party’s consistent and firm position, and it will not waver.
2. In November 1992, SEF and ARATS, under the authorization of their respective governments, through negotiation and correspondence arrived at the “1992 Consensus” that “both sides of the strait adhere to the one-China principle, but agree to each make their own verbal statements on its meaning.” This demonstrates the character of cross-strait relations as seeking common ground while respecting differences, conforms with objective facts and the stipulations of both sides, and allows the two sides to temporarily put aside their disagreements. This is the meaning of the 1992 Consensus of “one China, respective interpretations” that Chairman Wu has repeatedly reaffirmed.
3. Secretary-General Xi Jinping’s proposed “one country, two systems Taiwan model” is not the meaning of the 1992 Consensus. At present the two sides of the strait are separately governed, and we are afraid “one country, two systems” would have difficulty gaining majority support from Taiwan public opinion. We look forward to the two sides of the strait engaging in systemic competition to advance the welfare of people on both sides of the strait via the system most beneficial to country and citizenry.
4. Since DPP governance began more than two years ago, the cross-strait relationship has fallen into stagnation and difficulty. The institutionalized SEF-ARATS negotiation, exchange, and services platform has ceased to function, making it impossible to effectively resolve numerous quality of life and economic issues shared by both sides of the strait.
5. Since 2005, our party has regularly held cross-strait exchanges and negotiations, solving several cross-strait problems through institutionalized arrangements.
6. Cross-strait exchange and development must peacefully move forward. The public looks forward to expansion and deepening of bilateral exchanges. Our party, legislative caucus, and local government leaders fervently anticipate the two sides working together for peaceful and stable development, creating a win-win situation.
Note: Cities and counties where one party or the other didn’t run a candidate during the period of measurement were excluded from this exercise. Data source: Central Election Commission.
Five legislators are leaving office following the local elections. It doesn’t look likely that any of their seats will flip, but the degree of partisan shift will be interesting.
District: Taichung 5
KMT legislator Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) elected Taichung mayor
2016 result: KMT +12
Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) (KMT) 51.51%
Liu Kuo-lung (劉國隆) (DPP) 39.96%
Chien Meng-hsuan (簡孟軒) (Faith and Hope League) 6.88%
Miao Feng-lung (苗豐隆) (Independent) 1.63%
District: Changhua 1
KMT legislator Wang Hui-mei (王惠美) elected Changhua County commissioner
2016 result: KMT +12
Wang Hui-mei (王惠美) (KMT) 56.19%
Chen Wen-pin (陳文彬) (DPP) 43.80%
District: Kinmen
KMT legislator Yang Chen-wu (楊鎮浯) elected Kinmen County commissioner
2016 result: KMT +19 (over New Party)
Yang Chen-wu (楊鎮浯) (KMT) 45.08%
Wu Cheng-tien (吳成典) (NP) 25.93%
Chen Tsang-chiang (陳滄江) (DPP) 23.07%
5 other candidates combined for 5.92%
District: Taipei 2
DPP Legislator Pasuya Yao (姚文智) resigned to show how serious he was about wanting to be Taipei mayor
2016 result: DPP +23 (over KMT-endorsed New Party candidate)
Pasuya Yao (姚文智) (DPP) 59.29%
Pan Huai-tsung (潘懷宗) (New Party) 36.42%
5 other candidates combined for 4.29%
KMT & DPP Vote Shares by Regional Executive and Council Race, 2009-2018
To better understand how much of this weekend’s result to attribute to national trends and how much to attribute to idiosyncratic local factors, I compared this year’s regional executive and council vote shares for the two major parties with the previous two elections: the DPP wave in 2014 that preceded Tsai’s victory in 2016, and the KMT win in 2009-2010 that preceded Ma’s re-election in 2012. On aggregate, the DPP fell back to its 2009-2010 performance, when it was distinctly the minority party: better in a few places with great candidates, but even worse in those with poor candidates. The KMT for its part made a recovery. The DPP suffered broadly and deeply in this election, suggesting national discontent, be it over the economy or something else, was a layer on top of voters’ evaluations of individual candidates. And if these results really were simply confined to local issues and candidate quality, the breadth of the public rejection of DPP candidates would itself be cause for alarm.
A typical race was for Taitung magistrate. The DPP ran the same candidate as always, a sitting legislator who is popular and whose opponent was someone he’d defeated before. He got 8.5% less of the vote than in 2014 and 10% less than in 2010. In Nantou, the DPP got 49% of the executive vote four years ago and 33% this year: Its candidates were different, but were they that different? Among the 44 races in the sample, the DPP only improved on its 2014 performance by 1 percent or more in 9 of them: Taoyuan Executive, Keelung Executive, Hsinchu City Executive, Nantou Council, Penghu Council, Hsinchu City Council, and three races where it didn’t run a candidate the last time around and was improving on zero (the Taipei, Hsinchu County, and Hualien executive races). This isn’t what I would expect from a new ruling party that voters know now controls resource allocation.
Below you will see the vote shares for the KMT, DPP, and third party/independent candidates in the executive and council races of Taiwan’s regions (cities and counties). The “Big Six” are Taipei, New Taipei, Taoyuan, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, which together account for about two-thirds of the population. (The rise of Other’s share in 2014 and 2018 is attributable to Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), who received 5-7% of the overall executive votes by himself.) In the 2009-2010 cycle, the races for Taipei, New Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung were in 2010, and everything else was in 2009.
Taiwan’s economy hasn’t yet broken out of long-term trends under Tsai
As I have a lot more family responsibilities these days (and I’m very thankful there is so much I can do for my wonderful family), I’m unable to follow Taiwanese politics as closely as I did before, let alone write or translate on it regularly. Fortunately, I do have a window of time today, the day of the latest “blue wave.” Rather than show you electoral maps or results, I’d like to show you some tables from Taiwan’s national statistics website and then explain why I think they help explain today’s results.
GDP Growth
Monthly Regular Earnings
Unemployment
Industrial Production Growth
Population
A common critique of the Ma administration in its miserable final years was that making a living was getting harder and harder because the promises of wealth from greater economic openness to China hadn’t delivered for the average citizen. The persuasiveness of this argument was predicated on the perception that the economy was not good, which may be hard to understand if you see Taiwan as a developed country that’s a great place to live, but is easy to understand if you remember how good its growth used to be. (Population reflects the low birth rate, which I believe based on personal experience is largely influenced by young people’s perception they can’t afford to have more children.)
Note also how strong all the economic numbers were before 2000. It’s not fair to attribute the way the trend lines bent downwards afterward to the KMT losing political dominance (that was the year of a world recession; Taiwan was already approaching the limits of its growth model; capital was starting to flow outward to China), but I think a lot of older voters do do this, giving the KMT a built-in advantage on this issue.
Under President Tsai, the GDP growth rate has improved from the late Ma period but hasn’t yet broken out of its long-term downward trajectory. In terms of the other indicators, things haven’t gotten demonstrably better under Tsai. This comes as no surprise to me: Taiwan’s challenges are persistent and structural, so even if Tsai’s reforms are in the right direction, they will take years to pay off. But I’m not sure how many citizens feel like they can afford to wait that long, and I doubt the administration has persuaded people things are moving in the right direction. Arguably the biggest policy achievement these past two years, pension reform, was crucial for long-term solvency but caused short-term pain that may have affected today’s results. Labor reform turned into a quagmire. The U.S.-China trade war is a downside risk for Taiwanese firms with Chinese operations. Talk of a free-trade agreement with the U.S. is promising, but Taiwan’s pork industry and currency management are likely obstacles, not to mention Beijing.
I believe that as long as voters are unhappy with the performance of the economy, Taiwanese politics will remain unstable, with voters lurching from one candidate to another looking for a solution. However misguided Han Kuo-yu’s economic policy proposals are, he did astutely focus his campaign on the promise of revitalization. Cheng Wen-tsan in historically blue Taoyuan is thriving, and survived this wave, thanks in large part to the perception he’s getting things done to make his city a better place. DPP headquarters should call him and study what he’s doing. The party needs greater achievements and greater salesmanship.
Update: A very knowledgeable friend of mine comments, "It's not the economy, it's local governance." In other words, DPP administrators who didn't do their jobs well were punished. I think voters would have been more forgiving and the damage less comprehensive if times were better, but his is an excellent point as well as the simplest explanation, so I wanted to acknowledge it here as well as qualify that my piece is meant to add context to other reporting and analysis rather than stand as a monocausal explanation of such a complex event.
Ting accuses DPP of only pretending to support Yao, while truly supporting Ko
Translation of an August 11 China Times report.
The evening of August 11, KMT Taipei mayoral candidate Ting Shou-chung (丁守中) raised the question of whether the DPP has essentially pretended to nominate its own candidate while actually stepping aside for Ko Wen-je (柯文哲).
When first asked by a reporter for his view about Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) meeting with Ko [S.tw: which apparently went pretty well for Ko’s hopes to recover deep-green voters], Ting remarked that Ko had on the one hand said both sides of the Taiwan Strait were as close as family (兩岸一家親), but on the other hand had embraced in supplication the “The Father of Taiwan Independence, Lee Teng-hui”, and this was confusing people. Moreover, Lee’s full support of Ko was evidence Ko is “ink-deep green”, Ting remarked.
Ting went on to accuse the DPP of making a false nomination and a true auxiliary selection. According to Ting, if the DPP had directly nominated Ko, then Ko would have taken on the burden of the DPP’s failures of governance, so the party chose a different strategy, nominating the weakest candidate possible: Otherwise, how could the DPP’s candidate for Taipei City be so weak as to have only 5% support? This demonstrates the DPP hasn’t actually mobilized, and is only pretending to support its own mayoral campaign while actually stepping aside for Ko Wen-je, Ting concluded.
Another reporter asked Ting what he thought about some netizens’ remarks that as far as the Taipei City election is concerned, supporting an idiot is better than supporting a madman. Ting replied that he is no idiot, as his achievements in the Legislature are clear for all to see—he managed to legislate far-sightedly while quickly responding to public opinion—but he did if anything “work like an idiot” in that he single-mindedly focused on renewing Taipei City and making its residents’ lives better.
According to a recent TVBS poll, independent incumbent Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) is leading the Taipei mayoral race with 40%, while DPP candidate Pasuya Yao (姚文智) is a distant third with 11% and has net favorability of minus 32. My own impression from casually following the news is also that Yao does not have traction. Assuming current trends continue, Ko's commanding lead over Yao will likely encourage more greens to abandon Yao to vote for Ko, and push down-ballot green candidates to ally or at least maintain friendly relations with Ko with an eye towards both this election and Ko's next term.
Provided that the DPP's minimum objective for Yao's candidacy is to support down-ballot candidates worried that party voters disillusioned with Ko would otherwise stay home, a Ko win is still an acceptable result for the party: the other candidates could still absorb both Ko and Yao votes. Yao, however, has publicly claimed that this election is a matter of political life and death for him: He vowed in April to "leave politics forever" if he finished third, and upped the ante today by stating he would leave politics if he lost at all. So what's in his own interest is to go down fighting and prevent the green vote from consolidating around Ko. And as the party's nominee for the capital city, he does have a legitimate claim to the party's support.
This week, this conflict between the interests of the party and its candidate has broken out into the open and raised the possibility that DPP down-ballot candidates and political appointees will be forced to make a choice between Ko voters and Yao voters.
On a television program a couple days ago, Yao's campaign spokesman Hung Li-chi (洪立齊) called for DPP members whose loyalty to Yao over independent incumbent Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) is unclear--including popular DPP city councilor Kao Chia-yu (高嘉瑜)--to either leave the party or be expelled from it. Yao has given the impression this statement was unplanned but has stood by it nevertheless, saying his spokesman represents the campaign. Meanwhile, the DPP has withdrawn its endorsement of a neighborhood warden who has endorsed Ko, leading the warden to tearfully ask if it is wrong to support someone who gets things done.
After hearing Hung's remarks, Kao said she was confident Yao would "be a hero and save the beauty"; when Yao instead affirmed Hung, Kao wrote that she would reflect on how to support Yao, but also challenged him to resign from the legislature for the sake of his campaign. Apple Daily (which has a good relationship with Kao) launched a Facebook Poll asking, should Kao Chia-yu leave the DPP, or should Pasuya Yao resign from the legislature? As of 7 pm Taiwan time on August 9, the readership overwhelmingly stood with Kao:
Kao should leave the party: 8%
Yao should resign: 92%
DPP headquarters appears to be triangulating. Deputy secretary-general Hsu Chia-ching (徐佳青) announced a hard line, stating the party will expel any DPP member who stumps for Ko after Aug. 31. However, secretary-general Hung Yao-fu (洪耀福) has opened a significant loophole by clarifying that while campaigning for Ko is a party discipline violation, it would be "very difficult" to classify Ko campaigning for or endorsing a DPP candidate as a party discipline violation. If this line holds we can expect to see Ko on the candidates' posters and stages but not vice versa, which suits Ko's preference for a minimalist campaign anyway. Hung has also informally reprimanded the Yao campaign, saying it should be uniting supporters instead of manufacturing conflict.
Down-ballot candidates aren't the only DPPers under pressure. DPP members within the Taipei City Government include Taipei Deputy Mayor Chen Chin-jun (陳景峻)--an Executive Yuan secretary-general under Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁)--and Department of Civil Affairs Commissioner Lan Shih-tsung (藍世聰), both of whom have publicly endorsed Ko and look ready to stand by him. Chen Chin-jun has pointed out that Hau Lung-bin (好龍斌) served as environmental minister under a DPP administration and raised concerns that forbidding DPPers from working for Ko would set a double standard.
A third divide this controversy could exacerbate is between the Hsieh and Su factions. Pasuya Yao is a member of the Hsieh faction, and New Taipei's mayoral candidate is Hsieh's old rival Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌). After the Yao-Kao dispute flared, a Hsieh faction member complained to UDN on background that the DPP is fully supporting Su but has "released Yao into the wilderness" (放生). Sour grapes aside, the accusation the DPP's support for Yao has been less than strong, and to some extent cynical, is a reasonable one.
I don’t think Yao’s campaign can be saved. He’s represented a safe green district for a decade, which isn’t great preparation for the intensity of a mayoral race like this. He has fessed up to avoiding publicizing his campaign events, complaining the media asks him "political questions that take the focus off of policy". If the media did focus on his policies like he wanted, they’d find some lemons.
By vowing to retire unless he wins, however, Yao has burned his ships behind himself. And repairing the DPP and its partisans’ relationship with Ko likely isn’t something that can happen in such a short time frame anyway. It’s a real dilemma. The most urgent task appears to be simply stabilizing the city party chapter’s campaign and trying to prevent this media cycle from perpetuating into the fall.
TISR has returned to posting, albeit intermittently. Both horse-race and city government questions were asked in these two polls.
April 19-21 Poll:
1. Whom do you support in the Taichung mayoral election?
Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) (DPP): 31.9%
Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) (KMT): 23.7%
Won't Vote / Blank Ballot: 8.6%
Undecided: 35.7%
TISR Notes: Lin's support was relatively higher among males, residents of the old Taichung County, voters ages 60-69, votes with secondary or university education, and pan-greens. Lu's support was relatively greater among residents of the old Taichung City, voters age 40-49, voters with vocational education, and pan-blues.
2. Whom do you believe will win the Taichung mayoral election?
Lin: 40.6%
Lu: 20.1%
Undecided: 39.4%
TISR Notes: 82.3% of Lin's supporters think he will win. 55.6% of Lu's supporters think she will win.
3. The remediation of Taichung's Liuchuan and Luchuan canals has been a major project of the Taichung City Government. Since remediation, the waterfronts have become a leisure area for citizens. Have you visited the Luchuan or Liuchuan canal since the remediation project was completed?
Yes: 42.8%
No: 55.8%
Unclear: 1.4%
TISR Notes: Residents of the old Taicung City, residents age 20-29, and those with vocational education or above are more likely to have gone.
4. Are you satisfied with public safety in Taichung City?
Yes: 54.8%
No: 26.3%
Undecided: 18.9%
TISR Notes: Men, respondents age 20-29, those with at least secondary education, and pan-green supporters are more likely to be satisfied.
5. The green line of the Taichung MRT is scheduled to begin test runs by the end of this year and launch in 2020. Are you satisfied with the MRT's progress?
Yes: 39.4%
No: 33.4%
Undecided: 27.2%
TISR Notes: Men, respondents age 20-29, those with secondary or vocational education, and pan-greens are more likely to be satisfied.
6. Are you satisfied with the city government's planning and preparation for the flower exposition?
Yes: 46.6%
No: 19.2%
Undecided: 34.3%
TISR Notes: Residents of the old Taichung County, those with at least a college education, and pan-greens are more likely to be satisfied.
1. Are you satisfied with Mayor Lin Chia-lung's (林佳龍) performance?
Yes: 51.7%
No: 24.3%
Undecided: 24.0%
TISR Notes: Residents of the old Taichung County, those age 60 or over, those with only primary education, and pan-greens were more likely to be satisfied.
2. Do you believe Taichung City has made progress during Mayor Lin's three years in office?
TISR Notes: The only demographic among which "progress" wasn't the plurality response was pan-blue supporters. Belief in progress was particularly strong among men, residents of the old Taichung County, respondents age 60-69, and pan-greens. Among pan-blues, 24.8% thought the city had made progress; 30.9% thought it hadn't changed much; and 38.1% thought the city had regressed.
3. Are you proud to be a citizen of Taichung?
Yes: 72.3%
No: 11.6%
Undecided: 16.1%
TISR Notes: All demographics were proud to be Taichungers. Respondents age 20-29 and pan-greens were especially proud. 66.8% of pan-blues were proud.
4. Did you know Taichung has surpassed Kaohsiung to become Taiwan's second-largest city?
Yes: 58.4%
No: 41.6%
TISR Notes: Men, residents of the old Taichung City, respondents age 40-69, and those with at least vocational education were more likely to know this.
5. Which party has the most responsibility for Taichung's air pollution?
Central Government: 30.5%
City Government: 20.0%
Taipower: 16.7%
Taichung Citizens: 10.8%
Other: 1.9%
Undecided: 20.0%
TISR Notes: Residents of the Qingshui/Wuqi/Shalu area assigned the greatest responsibility to the city. Their results were: City Government 30.9%, Central Government 21.1%, Taipower 21.7%, Taichung Citizens 2.2%.
6. Are you satisfied with the remediation of the Luchuan and Liuchuan canals?
Yes: 66.3%
No: 8.6%
Undecided: 25.1%
TISR Notes: The plurality of respondents from all demographics were satisfied. The most satisfied were residents of the old Taichung City, respondents age 20-39, those with at least vocational education, and pan-greens. 60.2% of pan-blues were satisfied.
Recent TVBS mayoral election polls: headline and other #s
Sources: Summary of six majors; Taipei (Jul. 11-13); New Taipei (Jul. 13-17); Taoyuan (Jul. 6-11); Taichung (Jul. 18-20); Tainan (Jul. 4-6); Kaohsiung (June 29 - July 4); Hsinchu County (Jun. 26-29)
Comments
-Framing "coal power or nuclear power?" as a binary question puts the national government in a tough spot.
-According to this poll, the KMT went with its less popular option in Hsinchu County.
-Lin is the incumbent in the greatest danger, but this Taichung poll was conducted before China's intervention to strip Taichung of the right to host the East Asian Youth Games, which may have rallied support to Lin.
-After all that’s happened, Ko Wen-je's net favorability is still positive. Pasuya Yao, meanwhile, is toast.
-Cheng Wen-tsan fever continues.
-Hou You-yi has broad support and is perceived to be a clean politician.
-The KMT is disintegrating in Tainan.
HEADLINE FIGURES
Taipei
Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) (Independent): 40%
Ting Shou-chung (丁守中) (KMT): 30%
Pasuya Yao (姚文智) (DPP): 11%
Undecided: 18%
New Taipei
Hou You-yi (侯友宜) (KMT): 48%
Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) (DPP): 29%
Undecided: 23%
Hsinchu County
Hsu Hsin-ying (徐欣瑩) (MKT): 31%
Yang Wen-ko (楊文科) (KMT): 27%
Chang Chao-feng (鄭朝方) (DPP): 9%
Undecided: 32%
More questions under the fold:
TAIPEI (Continued)
Favorability:
Ko (Independent): 43% favorable, 34% unfavorable, 23% no opinion
Ting (KMT): 36% favorable, 24% unfavorable, 40% no opinion
Yao (DPP): 15% favorable, 47% unfavorable, 38% no opinion
Satisfaction with Incumbent Administration (Ko's):
Satisfied: 44%
Unsatisfied: 40%
No Opinion: 16%
Regarding Typhoon Maria, New Taipei Mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫) yesterday announced a day off today, while Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je and Keelung Mayor Lin Yu-chang (林右昌) didn't. Do you believe that Mayor Ko's decision was appropriate?
Yes: 66%
No: 19%
No Opinion: 15%
NEW TAIPEI (Continued)
Favorability:
Hou (KMT): 46% favorable, 18% unfavorable, 35% no opinion
Su (DPP): 36% favorable, 31% unfavorable, 33% no opinion
Regardless of whom you will vote for, overall, do you believe (candidate) is a person of integrity (清廉)?
Hou: 45% yes (12% strongly, 33% somewhat), 12% no (10% somewhat, 2% strongly), 43% no opinion
Su: 45% yes (9% strongly, 36% somewhat), 13% no (9% somewhat, 4% strongly), 41% no opinion
The government is going to rebuild a coal power plant in Shen'ao, Ruifang. Do you approve of this?
Yes: 22%
No: 53%
No Opinion: 25%
Some have recommended restarting the fourth nuclear power plant as an alternative to rebuilding the coal power plant at Shen'ao. Would you prefer rebuilding the Shen'ao coal power plant or launching the fourth nuclear power plant?
Build the coal power plant: 24%
Launch the nuclear power plant: 49%
No opinion: 27%
Do you believe that compared with three years ago, Taichung's air pollution is now more severe, less severe, or about the same?
Less Severe: 6% (2% very, 4% somewhat)
More Severe: 51% (14% somewhat, 37% very)
About the Same: 34%
Don't Know: 8%
Hypothetical race with an extra independent candidate and without a KMT candidate:
Huang (DPP): 43%
Su (Independent): 10%
Lin (Independent): 8%
Chen Tzu-ching (陳子敬): 7%
Hsu (Independent): 4%
Undecided: 28%
Hypothetical race with the extra independent and the KMT candidate included:
Huang (DPP): 41%
Kao (KMT): 15%
Su (Independent): 8%
Lin (Independent): 7%
Chen (Independent): 4%
Hsu (Independent)： 3%
Undecided: 20%
Hypothetical election where KMT nominee replaced by KMT primary candidate who was passed over:
Lin Wei-chou (林為洲) (KMT): 37% (+10)
Hsu (MKT): 29% (-2)
Cheng (DPP): 8% (-1)
Hypothetical election where Lin joined the race as an independent:
Hsu (MKT): 27%
Lin (Independent): 24%
Yang (KMT): 20%
Cheng (DPP): 8%
Undecided: 21%
As I start this post, the legislature has just passed the third reading of the civil servants pension bill. It now moves onto the bill for teachers, and the legislature has yet to take up the bill …
Wu Den-yi was elected KMT chair about a month ago. At the time, one of the popular theories about his win was that it represented a victory of the Taiwan-oriented local factions over the orthodox C…
Nathan Batto: “I think the increase in new KMT voters is related to party morale, not to the KMT party chair election...I think the evidence suggests that Wu Den-yi was elected by a fairly broad base of support within the KMT rather than by any specific group such as local factions or Taiwan nationalists. Admittedly, there is a limit to what we can see with crude data like this, so maybe it is best to state my conclusion in the negative. I don’t see any clear evidence for the local faction mobilization thesis.”
Poll conducted Apr. 6-11, 2017 with 924 respondents and plus-minus 3.2 points (link). Of note, all respondents are employed. A cross-section of responses to questions 1 and 3 would've been helpful. Although the strongest protests against the bill during the legislation period were labor groups and opposition parties saying it didn't go far enough in guaranteeing time off, the pollsters instead seem focused on consequences of people working less, such as lower incomes and higher prices. Updated to add questions 12-15.
1. Three months have passed since the "one fixed and one flexible day off" system (S.tw: henceforth abbreviated as 1F/1F) was implemented at the beginning of the year. Overall, are you satisfied with 1F/1F ?
Yes: 17% (strongly 3%, somewhat 14%)
No: 44% (somewhat 22%, strongly 22%)
No Opinion: 39%
By Party ID:
DPP (20% of sample): Yes 29%, No 30%, No Opinion 41%
KMT (17% of sample): Yes 10%, No 61%, No Opinion 30%
NPP (6% of sample): Yes 51%, No 23%, No Opinion 26%
Neutral (36% of sample): Yes 13%, No 42%, No Opinion 45%
Other (22% of sample): Yes 9%, No 50%, No Opinion 41%
2. Overall, do you believe 1F/1F helps protect workers' rights and interests?
Yes 36%, No 44%, Don't Know 20%
(Comparison: Feb. 22, 2017 poll with 966 respondents found Yes 37%, No 46%, Don't Know 18%)
3. Overall, do you understand 1F/1F?
Yes: 52% (strongly 9%, somewhat 43%)
No: 42% (somewhat 31%, strongly 11%)
Not Sure: 6%
4. Has 1F/1F had a good effect, bad effect, or no effect on you personally?
Good 8%, Bad 21%, No Effect 69%, Don't Know 2%
(Feb. 22 poll: Good 7%, Bad 25%, No Effect 65%, Don't Know 3%)
5. Since 1F/1F was implemented, have your vacation days become greater or fewer, or have they been unchanged?
Greater: 25%
Fewer: 71%
Unchanged: 3%
Don't Know: 3%
(Feb. 22 poll: Greater 25%, Fewer 68%, No Effect 6%, Don't Know 2%)
6. Following 1F/1F's implementation, have your overtime hours become greater or fewer, or have they been unchanged?
Greater: 1%
Unchanged: 76%
Fewer: 21%
Don't Know: 2%
(Feb. 22 poll: Greater 7%, Unchanged 65%, Fewer 25%, Don't Know 3%)
7. Since 1F/1F's implementation, has your monthly salary become bigger or smaller, or has it been unchanged?
Bigger: 5%
Unchanged: 69%
Smaller: 23%
Don't Know: 3%
(Feb. 22 poll: Bigger 4%, Unchanged 70%, Smaller 23%, Don't Know 3%)
8. Overall, are you worried that following 1F/1F's implementation, your income will decrease?
Yes: 38% (strongly 18%, somewhat 20%)
No: 59% (somewhat 29%, strongly 30%)
No Opinion: 4%
9. Some people believe that 1F/1F's implementation caused some problems. Which of these do you believe are problems the bill caused?
Lower Income: 35%
Vacation Days are Inflexible: 13%
Higher Company Personnel Costs: 8%
Company Personnel Dispatch Difficulties: 7%
Higher Goods Prices: 7%
Insufficient Complementary Measures: 5%
Can't Complete Work because of Overtime Restrictions: 4%
Inconvenience of Shopping or Eating Out on Vacation Days: 2%
Other: 9%
Don't Know: 36%
10. Following 1F/1F's implementation, employer-provided annual vacation days that are not taken in the year they are distributed have to be converted to monetary compensation and cannot be saved for use in a future year. Some people have recommended instead allowing vacation days to be saved for future years. Do you support such a change?
Yes: 57% (strongly 22%, somewhat 35%)
No: 32% (somewhat 18%, strongly 14%)
No Opinion: 12%
11. Following 1F/1F's implementation, any work of 4 hours or fewer on a scheduled off-day is calculated as 4 hours of work. Some people believe the actual number of work hours should be recorded instead. Should the actual number of hours worked be recorded instead?
Yes: 74%
No: 14%
No Opinion: 12%
12. How many days per week do you work on average?
Three: 2%
Four: 4%
Five: 72%
Six: 13%
Seven: 6%
Don't Know: 2%
(Sample Average: 5.2 Days)
13. How many hours do you work on the average workday?
Seven or Less: 10%
Eight: 58%
Nine: 12%
Ten: 11%
Eleven or More: 6%
Don't Know: 3%
(Sample Average: 8.4)
14. Do you believe the recent rise of goods prices has been severe?
Yes: 74% (very 45%, somewhat 29%)
No: 15% (not very 13%, not at all 2%)
No Opinion: 11%
15. Some people say 1F/1F has caused goods prices to rise. Do you agree?
Yes: 56% (strongly 28%, somewhat 28%)
No: 33% (somewhat 22%, strongly 11%)
No Opinion: 12%
2. Premier Lin Chuan (林全) job approval: 23% approve (3% strongly, 20% somewhat), 44% disapprove (26% somewhat, 18% strongly), and 33% no opinion
3. Are you confident in the government's ability to manage pension reform?
Yes: 29% (strongly 10%, somewhat 19%)
No: 46% (somewhat 23%, strongly 23%)
No Opinion: 26%
4. Do you support the government advancing labor and military/civil servant/teacher pension reform?
Yes: 61% (strongly 27%, somewhat 34%)
No: 18% (somewhat 10%, strongly 8%)
No Opinion: 21%
5. Are you confident the government will complete pension reform?
Yes: 32% (strongly 11%, somewhat 21%)
No: 52% (somewhat 29%, strongly 23%)
No Opinion: 17%
6. Under the Examination Yuan's proposal, civil servants and teachers would receive a monthly pension of at least NT$32,160 (S.tw: ~US$1,060). Do you believe that number is too high, too low, or just right?
Too High: 22%
Too Low: 13%
Just Right: 47%
Don't Know: 19%
7. Some people say that the pension systems for civil servants, teachers, and soldiers must be swiftly reformed, otherwise they will go bankrupt. Do you agree?
Yes: 61% (strongly 32%, somewhat 29%)
No: 25% (somewhat 15%, strongly 10%)
No Opinion: 13%
8. (Abridged) Some people say that pension reform should not reduce the pensions of people who have already retired; others say it should. What do you think?
Should Include Current Pensions: 53%
Shouldn't: 30%
No Opinion: 16%
9. Overall, if the pension system is reformed in the direction of paying more in premiums to receive less in benefits starting from a later retirement age, could you accept that?
Yes: 41%
No: 44%
No Opinion: 15%
New Taipei poll conducted May 15-18, 2017 with 970 respondents, plus-minus 3.1 points (link). Taipei poll conducted April 28 to May 4, 2017 with 902 respondents, plus-minus 3.3 points (link). The two big takeaways for me are that the DPP can’t muscle Ko out of the race next year, and Hou has an advantage as New Taipei’s status quo candidate.
Note: Party ID split of Taipei poll is 28% KMT, 19% DPP, 8% NPP, 25% neutral, 19% other. No party ID split provided for New Taipei poll.
Approval of New Taipei Mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫): 50% approve (9% strongly, 41% somewhat) and 26% disapprove (21% somewhat, 7% strongly), with 23% no opinion.
Approval of Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲): 43% approve (8% strongly, 35% somewhat) and 46% disapprove (29% somewhat, 17% strongly), with 11% no opinion.
Hypothetical New Taipei Matchups, blue on left and green on right:
Hou You-yi (侯友宜) 47, William Lai (賴清德) 42
Hou You-yi 57, Yu Shyi-kun (游錫堃) 32
Hou You-yi 67, Luo Chih-cheng (羅致政) 20
Hou You-yi 68, Wu Ping-jui (吳秉叡) 19
Hou You-yi 72, Gao Jyh-peng (高志鵬) 15
Chou Hsi-wei (周錫瑋) 38, William Lai 53
Chou Hsi-wei 45, Yu Shyi-kun 44
Chou Hsi-wei 53, Luo Chih-cheng 32
Chou Hsi-wei 55, Wu Ping-jui 29
Chou Hsi-wei 57, Gao Jyh-peng 28
Hypothetical Two-Way Taipei Matchups, Ko on left and blue on right:
Ko Wen-je 44, Eric Chu 45
Ko Wen-je 56, Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁) 27
Ko Wen-je 46, Ting Shou-chung (丁守中) 41
Hypothetical Three-Way Taipei Matchups, Ko vs. blue vs. DPP’s Pasuya Yao (姚文智):
Ko 37, Chu 42, Yao 11
Ko 50, Fu 26, Yao 11
Ko 40, Ting 39, Yao 9
Hypothetical Three-Way "All-Star" Taipei Matchup, Ko vs. Chu vs. Lai:
Chu 38, Ko 27, Lai 26
PRC: Lee Ming-che arrested for subversion of state power
Translation of a May 27, 2017 report by the Liberty Times (link).
China last night announced that Lee Ming-che (李明哲), whom it has detained for over two months, has been arrested by state authorities for “subversion of state power” (顛覆國家政權罪). Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice early this morning stated in a press release that it sent separate messages to China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate and Ministry of Public Security last night demanding that in the spirit of the Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement, they report to Taiwan about Lee Ming-che’s circumstances.
The MOJ indicated that Lee has not been in contact with his family for over two months, and his relatives are extremely worried about his safety. The MOJ called on China to allow family visits in the spirit of humanitarianism and to release Lee after their investigation is complete. It also expressed hope that during the investigation, China will guarantee Lee’s physical health, personal safety, and legal rights, especially the right to choose his own legal defender(s).
UDN report excerpt (link): …Since China’s announcement, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council has published 4 press releases, and the Straits Exchange Foundation as requested assistance and information from the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits 6 times. They have received no response.
