#beyng

[sohochari]

Duel with language and the way Slavoj Žižek encoded Heidegger (Third Segment) ⇒ Kirno Sohochari

Duel with language and the way Slavoj Žižek encoded Heidegger (Third Segment) ⇒ Kirno Sohochari

Slavoj Žižek’s critics heard plausible to the readers who think Heidegger was whimsical to understand the real nature of “being” in a truthful ground. His critical approach on dwells with language (what we’ve discussed in previous two segments of the article; See Segment-1 & Segment-2) become convincing for such readers who think Heidegger grounded his “being” in the wrong way; they may think so,…

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[modestproposals]

My work in philosophy this semester has been focused mainly on the problem facing those who want to examine existential language in empirical terms. This problem can be said to be most intense through the expositions of religion that religious naturalists bring to the table as opposed to guys like Karl Barth or Rudolf Bultmann. This problem also comes to presence in neo-pragmatic expositions of meaning and norms: whereby meaning is instituted by social norms. These guys (Jeffrey Stout, Robert Brandom, Donal Davidson, etc.) use Wittgenstein's work, except they systematize one of his key ideas: that meaning is a function of use. My suspicion (and, presently, conviction) is that Wittgenstein understood that if his ideas were systematized, then such schematism would lead to a behaviorism--see B. F. Skinner, D. Z. Phillips, Peter Winch, Robert Brandom (i.e., the problem of fideism is the problem of behaviorism).

It seems to me that one of the ways out of behaviorism or logical empiricism is to start with phenomena (e.g., phenomenology). 

Such things boil down to starting points: if one starts with language, then language is going to be that which determines the real and unreal (reference any neopragmatist). On the other hand, if one starts with phenomena, then one has a foundationalist philosophy (reference any reformed epistemologist). 

A third option seems to be along the way: Heidegger's later philosophy. Heidegger doesn't begin with either phenomena or language. Heidegger begins with beyng (or Being, depending on which translation you are reading). And Heidegger's questioning of beyng seems to be a second and last beginning for western philosophy: it escapes all scientism, rationalism, empiricism, and contextualism.

[modestproposals]

If a thoughtful question is not so simple and so salient that it determines the will and style of thinking for hundreds of years by assigning them the highest matter to be thought, then it is best that that question remain unasked. For if it is merely parroted, the question only adds wares to the nonstop bazaar offering a bewildering array of changing 'problems' and 'reproaches' that concern nothing and no one.

Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 18.