Voyage of Discovery: Hegel and his philosophical work [Part II] “One cannot speak of an injustice of nature in the unequal distribution of possessions and resources, for nature is not free and is therefore neither just nor unjust.”
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831) published „Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse“ in 1821. In the preface he describes the idea of justice, the term of right and it's realization. The concepts of free will and freedom are interlinked to underline the theory, that the free will can only realize itself in a (reasonable) legal system. Hegel defines “right” [Recht] as the existence of the free will in the world (PR §29). So a philosophy of right is necessarily a philosophy of freedom that seeks to comprehend freedom actualized in how we relate to each other and construct social and political institutions.
“Once the state has been founded, there can no longer be any heroes. They come on the scene only in uncivilized conditions.”
During the last few years I have repeatedly come across Hegel and his dialectics. In the philosophy class we dealt with his dialectics in order to better comprehend Marx's understanding of history and historical materialism. To quote Lenin: "It is impossible completely to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic." However, their approaches differ in certain respects, especially in their differing versions of the relation between consciousness and life. While Hegel formulates, that consciousness determines life, Marx, on the contrary, states "(...) life determines consciousness". So this is not only a central question of cognitive ability from an ontological point of view, but to truly understand the hierarchical opposition or relation of consciousness to the human being, vice versa. When I was devouring Schopenhauer three years ago, I often thought of Hegel, who was giving his lectures at the same time, which were attended far more frequently. When I was dealing with the biography of the poet Hölderlin, I found out that Hegel, Schelling and Hölderlin shared a room in the Tübinger Stift. Imaging how these three high spirits inspired and strengthened each other. During my studies I encountered Hegel again in the philosophy of law and in criminal law. The spark jumped with the statement, that the criminal must be be honoured as a reasonable man, because
„Denn in seiner [des Verbrechers] als eines Vernünftigen Handlung liegt, daß sie etwas Allgemeines, daß durch sie ein Gesetz aufgestellt ist, das er in ihr für sich anerkannt hat, unter welches er also als unter sein Recht subsumiert werden darf." In brief: The "reasonable" criminal is breaking a rule, but at the same time, he is forming a new, possible right.
„Daß die Strafe darin als sein eigenes Recht enthaltend angesehen wird, darin wird der Verbrecher als Vernünftiges geehrt. – Diese Ehre wird ihm nicht zuteil, wenn aus seiner Tat selbst nicht der Begriff und der Maßstab seiner Strafe genommen wird; – ebensowenig auch, wenn er nur als schädliches Tier betrachtet wird, das unschädlich zu machen sei, oder in den Zwecken der Abschreckung und Besserung.“ Speaking of crime as an "evil" and punishment as a form of compensating "evil" falls too short and tempts to focus too much on the intention of the criminal and thus leads to "recharge" the punishment morally and psychologically, which has no fruitful function. Again for better understanding:
It is not the criminal who can question the law, but only Society that recognizes infringement as a new right. It therefore requires one clarification that the (new) law set by the criminal does not apply if it should not be recognised. Penal Theories are deffining penalty purposes, aspects of justice (cf. ius talionis "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth") and are also considering the soundness of mind and how crimes can be prevented. Hegel was a representative of Absolute Penal Theories like Kant, both advocated death penalty [!] and the central aspect "restoring justice", could not explain, why penalty is needed. Also the Absolute Penal Theory is forbidding considerations of utility and meaning of the punishment (e.g. therapeutic offers), explaining this view with incompatible with the "dignity and freedom of men". Continues in the second part.