Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. On January 2, 2025, the Department’s National Security Division issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). The NPRM provides the public an opportunity to submit comments on proposed revisions to the regulations governing FARA. The comment period for the NPRM will close on March 3, 2025.
Short answer: Trump wants to gut FARA as well, so everybody can bribe everybody --- legally.
The Justice Department's campaign to enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has made lawyers and accountants rich. Now a new group of lawyers are joining the party.
Plaintiff Lawyers Join The Bribery Racket
The Justice Department’s unprecedented campaign to enforce a once-backwater statute called the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or FCPA, has made corporate lawyers and accountants rich as big companies pay big law and accounting firms to investigate and defend potential violations. Plaintiff lawyers have noticed the enormous fees, which are often reaching into the hundreds of millions of dollars, enhanced FCPA enforcement is generating and are moving to extract their own cut.
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The unintended consequences of the Justice Department’s FCPA policy simply continue to mount. The intense criminalization by U.S. government lawyers of behavior that should never be condoned, but is globally systematic, has produced many outcomes. Meet one of them: Hamilton Lindley, a professional securities class-action lawyer. In the last few months he has followed corporate disclosures of FCPA investigations by suing the boards of directors of Weatherford International, Parker Drilling, Avon Products and Pride International. Lindley is now spending a quarter of his time on the FCPA and is quite honest in saying he is just following the lead of the Department of Justice and the Securities & Exchange Commission.
“I think the fact that these companies have been committing graft overseas frankly is an interesting topic for juries to hear,” Lindley told me. “It’s the new enforcement regime of the DOJ and SEC so private practice lawyers are interested in what government lawyers are doing.”
In the lawsuit Lindley filed against Weatherford and its board, for example, Lindley has figured out by taking a few minutes to read an SEC filing that the “Weatherford Board has incurred an astonishing $108 million in costs and expenses in connection with FCPA-related investigations,” which doesn’t include the “pecuniary penalty that Weatherford is likely to have to pay to resolve the DOJ and SEC investigations.” So the general idea is for Lindley and his firm, Goldfarb Branham, to also make some money off of Weatherford’s conduct.
As I wrote a few months ago, all this stems from Weatherford’s voluntary disclosure in 2007 that it might have a small bribery problem in Europe. It hired law firm Fulbright & Jaworksi to conduct an investigation, which became long and expensive— and uncovered additional potential bribery all the way in West Africa. One Fulbright lawyer, William Jacobson, who happened to have been assistant chief of the Department of Justice’s office responsible for FCPA enforcement when Weatherford made its initial disclosure, became a general counsel at Weatherford, though the company says he has been walled-off from the investigation.
Now the plaintiff lawyers are trying to join the fun. So far the results have been mixed as plaintiff lawyers try to get around the fact that the FCPA does not really provide directly for civil actions. Shareholder actions based on securities fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty by boards of directors seem to be popular. According to Miller Chevalier, plaintiff firms have extracted FCPA-related settlements in civil litigation from companies like Faro Technologies, which paid $6.9 million; Nature’s Sunshine, which paid $6 million, Immucor, $2.5 million; and Syncor, $15.5 million.
How much do the plaintiff lawyers wind up with? In the Syncor case plaintiff firms Dietrich & Arleo, Kendall Law Group, and Coughlin Stoia got 25% of the settlement, or $3.87 million, a court filing shows. How disproportionate can the civil litigation get? In the Faro Technologies case, in which the company self-reported the violations, plaintiff lawyers settled for $6.9 million, even though Justice and the SEC got just $2.9 million, court documents show. How much more baffling can copycat FCPA civil litigation be for the board of directors of a company? Pretty baffling when you consider the Justice Department-mandated compliance monitor making millions of dollars following a Justice Department FCPA settlement doesn’t appear to be working under attorney-client privilege. The monitor might have to turn all the secrets he is being paid to uncover by the company that has been forced to hire him right over to a plaintiff’s attorney who is suing the same company.
There is still no evidence that the Justice Department’s aggressive FCPA effort—the many FCPA actions it has brought in the last few years coupled with 150 open FCPA investigations—is having any impact reducing bribery. There is some anecdotal evidence, however, that it is disadvantaging U.S. corporations in the global marketplace. FCPA cheerleaders were pretty convinced recently the U.S. wouldn’t be virtually alone in the world in enforcing anti-bribery laws, encouraged by the U.K.’s adoption of an actual anti-bribery law. But like most OECD countries, the U.K. has now revealed it has little intention of actually enforcing the law anytime soon. There is also now an indication that an individual or company can be exempt for political reasons from the serious consequences now associated with FCPA enforcement.
What is clear is that the cost of enhanced FCPA enforcement on U.S. corporations keeps going up. And that more lawyers are finding ways to get rich off of it.
“It’s just so unfair that American companies aren’t allowed to pay bribes to get business overseas,” Trump said, according to a passage published by the Post. “We’re going to change that.”
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits individuals and businesses in the U.S. from paying money or offering gifts to foreign officials as a way to win business overseas.
So naturally Trump hates it.
“It’s just so unfair that American companies aren’t allowed to pay bribes to get business overseas. We’re going to change that.”
Pausing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement to Further American Economic and National Security
Issued February 10, 2025.
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. Purpose and Policy. Since its enactment in 1977, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 et seq.) (FCPA) has been systematically, and to a steadily increasing degree, stretched beyond proper bounds and abused in a manner that harms the interests of the United States. Current FCPA enforcement impedes the United States' foreign policy objectives and therefore implicates the President's Article II authority over foreign affairs.
The President's foreign policy authority is inextricably linked with the global economic competitiveness of American companies. American national security depends in substantial part on the United States and its companies gaining strategic business advantages whether in critical minerals, deep-water ports, or other key infrastructure or assets.
But overexpensive and unpredictable FCPA enforcement against American citizens and businesses -- by our own Government -- for routine business practices in other nations not only wastes limited prosecutorial resources that could be dedicated to preserving American freedoms, but actively harms American economic competitiveness and, therefore, national security.
It is therefore the policy of my Administration to preserve the Presidential authority to conduct foreign affairs and advance American economic and national security by eliminating excessive barriers to American commerce abroad.
Sec. 2. Policy of Enforcement Discretion. (a) For a period of 180 days following the date of this order, the Attorney General shall review guidelines and policies governing investigations and enforcement actions under the FCPA. During the review period, the Attorney General shall:
(i) cease initiation of any new FCPA investigations or enforcement actions, unless the Attorney General determines that an individual exception should be made;
(ii) review in detail all existing FCPA investigations or enforcement actions and take appropriate action with respect to such matters to restore proper bounds on FCPA enforcement and preserve Presidential foreign policy prerogatives; and
(iii) issue updated guidelines or policies, as appropriate, to adequately promote the President's Article II authority to conduct foreign affairs and prioritize American interests. American economic competitiveness with respect to other nations, and the efficient use of Federal law enforcement resources.
(b) The Attorney General may extend such review period for an additional 180 days as the Attorney General determines appropriate.
(c) FCPA investigations and enforcement actions initiated or continued after the revised guidelines or policies are issued under subsection (a) of this section:
(i) shall be governed by such guidelines or policies; and
(ii) must be specifically authorized by the Attorney General.
(d) After the revised guidelines or policies are issued under subsection (a) of this section, the Attorney General shall determine whether additional actions, including remedial measures with respect to inappropriate past FCPA investigations and enforcement actions, are warranted and shall take any such appropriate actions or, if Presidential action is required, recommend such actions to the President.
Sec. 3. Severability. If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 4. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Failure To Understand FCPA and ITAR Has Consequences For Any US Government Export Contractor
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) must be thoroughly understood by any size U.S. government contractor doing business under foreign export and trade controls regulations. The consequences of non-compliance can be brutal.
For small business guidance on export management and regulation see:…
Some Statistics
The table and graph below detail the number of FCPA enforcement actions initiated by DOJ and the SEC, the statute’s dual enforcers, during each of the past ten years.
Aggressive Internal Controls Enforcement
It has been hiding in plain sight all along. The FCPA requirement that “reporting companies to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to…
Dynamic Contracts Consultants provides FCPA (Federal Corrupt Practices Act) services for the payment of bribes to foreign officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business. Get in Touch with Us!