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WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, May 27, 1856. SIR: I have received your letter of the 21st instant. The delay for which you make a hypocritical apology has strengthened you to resume the labor of vituperation; but, having early in this correspondence stamped you with falsehood, and whenever you presented a tangible point convicted you, by conclusive proof, I have ceased to regard your abuse; and as you present nothing in this letter which requires remark, I am gratified to be relieved from the necessity of further exposing your malignity and depravity. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War

-- Final letter from Secretary of War (and future Confederate President) Jefferson Davis to General Winfield Scott, Commanding General of the U.S. Army, in a vicious, petty, disrespectful back-and-forth correspondence full of insults and accusations as they openly feuded throughout the Administration of President Franklin Pierce.

I'm trying to find the best way to break down this entire correspondence between Davis and Scott because it's incredibly entertaining as the two (insufferable) men spent the better part of two years of President Pierce's term trading a voluminous amount of hate mail that got extraordinarily personal and probably would have led to a duel had General Scott been younger and healthier. And, of course, one of the best parts of the feud is that, since this was the 19th Century, they write these pages and pages full of thousands of words of nasty attacks on one another and then dutifully sign each letter with "Very respectfully..."

General Charles Scott

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what was the whole involvement of lafayette during the battle of monmouth

thank you :)

Hello Anon,

thank you for your question. La Fayette’s involment in the Battle of Monmouth is quite an interesting one. It actually started before the Battle of Monmouth. On May 20, 1778 our dear Marquis was engaged in the Battle of Barren Hill. I will keep the account brief because the Battle of Barren Hill is not what you wanted to know - but it sets the stage for Monmouth.

La Fayette was given the command over 2.200 troops. They left the American encampment at Valley Forge on May 18, 1778. Washington gave La Fayette very clear instructions regarding his mission. He wrote the day La Fayette departed:

The detachment under your command with which you will immediately march towards the enemy’s lines is designed to answer the following purposes—to be a security to this camp and a cover to the country between the Delaware and Schuylkil—to interrupt the communication with Philadelphia—obstruct the incursions of the enemies parties, and obtain intelligence of their motions and designs. This last is a matter of very interesting moment, and ought to claim your particular attention. You will endeavour to procure trusty and intelligent spies, who will advise you faithfully of whatever may be passing in the city; and you will without delay communicate to me every piece of material information you obtain. (…) You will remember that your detachment is a very valuable one, and that any accident happening to it would be a severe blow to this army. You will therefore use every possible precaution for its security, and to guard against a surprise. No attempt should be made nor any thing risked without the greatest prospect of success, and with every reasonable advantage on your side. I shall not point out any precise position to you; but shall leave it to your discretion to take such posts occasionally as shall appear to you best adapted to the purposes of your detachment. In general I would observe that a stationary post is unadviseable, as it gives the enemy an opportunity of knowing your situation and concerting successfully against you.

Although Washington wrote La Fayette that “a stationary post is unadviseable”, La Fayette took up camp on Barren Hill (today Lafayette Hill). The British troops managed to encircle the American troops and trapped them against the Schuylkill River. La Fayette however knew of some roads that would allow him to bypass the British forces while simultaneously distracting them. The whole mission bordered on a disaster, although the American troops were able to fulfil some of their goals and suffered only three casualties.

After Barren Hill, the Americans undertook numerous efforts to slow the British troops under General Clinton down, to harass them and to interrupt their supply lines. Washington held several councils to discuss a long-term strategy. La Fayette attended these councils as well - just like Major-General Charles Lee did. Lee would be a major player during the Battle of Monmouth.

The Council of War from June 24, 1778 resulted in a plea for caution by most of the officers. Many of the attending officers thought that a victory in battle would be most unlikely and that a defeat would be devastating for the army. Washington did not agree but could only argue for a compromise. 1.500 troops would be send under the command of General Scott to reinforce the vanguard and to support the Generals Maxwell and Dickinson in their effort of slowing Clinton down. While many of the officers in attendance were in favour of this strategy, many were not. Most outspoken amongst them were the Generals La Fayette, Wayne and Greene. La Fayette had signed the compromise (due to peer-pressure as he later claimed) but Wayne (and Greene as well for all that I know) had outright refused to do so. They all communicated with Washington that, although a major battle should still be avoided, a larger body of supporting troops should be send to interfere with the British. They wanted to dispatch between 2.500 and 3.000 troops directly and keep the rest of the army within a short distance to strike if necessary. La Fayette wrote in his Memoirs:

“In a council held on this subject, Lee very eloquently endeavoured to prove that it was necessary to erect a bridge of gold for the enemy; that while on the very point of forming an alliance with them , every thing ought not to be placed at hazard; that the English army had never been so excellent and so well disciplined; he declared himself to be for White Plains: his speech influenced the opinion of Lord Stirling and of the brigadiers - general. M. de Lafayette, placed on the other side, spoke late, and asserted that it would be disgraceful for the chiefs, and humiliating for the troops, to allow the enemy to traverse the Jerseys tranquilly; that, without running any improper risk, the rear guard might be attacked; that it was necessary to follow the English, manœuvre with prudence, take advantage of a temporary separation, and, in short, seize the most favourable opportunities and situations. This advice was approved by many of the council, and above all by M. du Portail, chief of the engineers, and a very distinguished officer. The majority were, however, in favour of Lee; but M. de Lafayette spoke again to the general on this subject in the evening, and was seconded by Hamilton, and by Greene, who had been lately named quarter - master in place of Mifflin. Several of the general officers changed their opinion (...).”

Washington, who was keen on taking a more offensive stance, send additional 1.000 troops on June 25, 1778. La Fayette wrote in his Memoirs:

“(...) and the troops having already begun their march, they were halted, in order to form a detachment. When united, there were 3,000 continentalists and 1,200 militia; the command fell to the share of Lee, but , by the express desire of the general, M. de Lafayette succeeded in obtaining it. Everything was going on extremely well, when Lee changed his mind, and chose to command the troops himself; having again yielded this point, he rechanged once more, and as the general wished him to adhere to his first decision (...).”

We see from this excerpt that Lee could not really make up his mind concerning the command. What happened? Washington offered Lee, his second in command after all, the command over the vanguard. Lee refused, basically saying that such a command was beneath him. Washington next offered La Fayette the command - the Marquis happily agreed. La Fayette moved his troops fast - too fast. Although he managed to come within three miles of the British troops, he moved too fast, outrun his supplies and his men were exhausted and vulnerable. Washington wrote La Fayette on June 26, 1778 that:

“In order that the Troops may be supplied, I wish you would always send up, an Active Officer in time to the Commissary, who might never leave him till he obtained the necessary supplies. This will be attended with more certain relief than by writing by common expresses. Though giving the Enemy a stroke is a very desireable event, yet I would not wish you to be too precipitate in the measure or to distress your men by an over hasty march. The Weather is extremely warm and by a too great exertion in pushing the Troops many of em will fall sick and be rendered entirely unfit for service. I (...) I must repeat again my wish that you do not push on with too much rapidity. You may be, in case of Action, at too great a distance to receive succour and exposed from thence to great Hazard. The Troops here are suffering for want of provision, as well as those with you, and are under the necessity of halting, till they are refreshed. (...) Your provision is on the Road.”

La Fayette moved to Englishtown where he was supposed to meet up with Lee and his troops. Lee in the meantime had come to the realisation that La Fayette’s command actually was not that bad and he now wanted to be in command. He requested Washington to put him in command and Washington agreed. At Englishtown Lee’s vanguard now consisted of round about 4.500 troops.

La Fayette described it as follows in his Memoirs:

“(...) M. de Lafayette was delayed by want of provisions; and it was not until the 26th, at a quarter to twelve at night, that he could ask for Lee, who was sent with a detachment of one thou sand men to Englishtown, on the left side of the enemy. The first corps had advanced upon their right; and M. de Lafayette, by Lee's especial order, joined him at midday, within reach of the enemy, from whom he fortunately succeeded in concealing this movement.”

Washington was with the main army close behind them. Lees behaviour in the coming days was not what it could be. He held his own Councils of War where Washington was not in attendance and gave order were he probably was not in a position to give orders.

The Battle of Monmouth was fought on June 28, 1778. Compared with his, in my opinion really exciting part, in the days and weeks leading up to the battle, La Fayette’s role in the battle itself was relatively unassuming. He followed Lee into battle while commanding a portion of the vanguard. Lee, who had halted is advance prior, continue to advance as soon as La Fayette arrived. The Marquis helped to secure the right flank of the American troops. Later on in the battle, his troops started to retreat after being unable to put down a British artillery unite. The retreat of his troops was probably one of the reasons why Lee later decided to retreat with the entirety of his venguard.

Washington arrived some time after and was not at all amused by Lee’s conducts. Not at all. In fact, Lee’s behaviour was one of the few times that made Washington loose his temper in public. He took over command from Lee and organized the Battle anew. Washington is still today praised for his excellent behaviour that day. La Fayette wrote in his memoirs how impressed he was by Washington and some of the other officers.

“During this affair, which ended so well, although begun so ill, General Washington appeared to arrest fortune by one glance, and his presence of mind, valour, and decision of character, were never displayed to greater advantage than at that moment .* Wayne distinguished himself; Greene and the brave Stirling led forward the first line in the ablest manner.”

The Marquis ends his account of the Battle of Monmouth with this sweet little remark about how he and Washington spend the night.

“The general and he passed the night lying on the same mantle, talking over the conduct of Lee (...).”

Washington and La Fayette both fell asleep on Washington’s coat under a tree, both being exhausted by the events of the day. Allegedly General Greene found them asleep together but could not bring it over him to wake them - the scene was just too touching.

I hope that answers your question thus far. I hope you have/had a wonderful day!