It is not necessary to believe that the ontology proposed in this book is capital-T true to think that it might be a useful heuristic for doing social science. Indeed, the advocates of some of my key dialectical resources – quantum decision theory, game theory, and semantics – themselves generally take an agnostic position on questions of ontology. That makes sense intellectually, since we do not have to agree on the nature of reality to see if a quantum approach can predict experimental results. And it makes sense strategically, since their work is more likely to be accepted by others if it is not freighted with controversial ontological baggage. My effort to show that a quantum approach sheds new light on debates in social theory can be read in teh same, pragmatist spirit. Of course, insofar as these various efforts succeed they will not leave social science where it was before. In particular, they raise the question 'if quantum theorizing about X works so well, then why are you still engaged in classical theorizing?' Even as a heuristic, in other words, a successful quantum social science implicitly calls upon those in the mainstream to justify something they have always taken for granted. One of the first places where this call may become salient is in graduate methods training, which, if my own experience is any guide, is a touchy subject. But beyond foreshadowing a potential conflict in this area, a non-realist or 'as-if' reading of quantum social science has the virtue of not forcing those who are interested in exploring these ideas empirically to change their entire worldview first.
