Last week was a busy one in the secular West’s confrontation with its Christian heritage. In Amsterdam, the Free University summoned Piet de Vries, a theologian who criticised “cheating, divorces…
What was encouraging, however, was how much the petitioners floundered when they had to explain their opinions. Should Finnis be sacked because he was a bad person, because employing him associated the university with his views, because he would offend students, or because students who stayed away from his seminars would be missing out? The case against Finnis seemed to bounce from one reason to another. In a separate interview on Today, a student first announced “It’s not about ‘he’s homophobic so let’s ban him’,” then said that Finnis was not “able to fulfil the criteria of his job” because of how he would make students feel.
Simply by remaining calm and sticking to his principles, Finnis had made his opponents sound incoherent. The campaign against Christian morality may be increasingly powerful, but it also looks ever more confused.
First, the petition signatories view academic research, including scholarship published in top-tier journals and the upper echelon of university presses, as harassment. Second, the petition makes clear that the student signatories view natural law and the precepts of the Catholic church and traditional Christian churches as adopting homophobic, transphobic, and “extremely discriminatory views.” Third, the petition’s reference to awaiting a “person-to-person instance of harassment or victimisation,” exposes the students’ view that a classroom lecture that includes Finnis’ scholarship would be verboten.
Justin Weinberg, a philosophy professor at the University of South Carolina, suggested the petition raised “an interesting question about whether students should have to fulfill their curricular requirements by taking courses from a professor who is on record stating that an important part of their identity is ‘evil.’”
To be clear, what Finnis called “evil” was “homosexual conduct”—not the homosexual or the homosexual’s orientation. And his position is consistent with Catholic teaching, which is based on tradition and “Sacred Scripture, which presents homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity.”
Although Weinberg refused to take a position on the merits of the petition, the analogies he proffered foreshadow a bleak future for Catholics and traditional Christians in “higher” education.
“We could ask,” Weinberg wrote, whether “a Jewish student [should] have to take a course from a professor who has publicly argued that the Nazis were right in believing that there should be no Jews? Or, should an African-American have to take a course from a professor who has publicly argued that it would be advisable for the U.S. to return to legalized slavery?”
The mere equating of natural law jurisprudence to Nazism and slavery suggests the future is already here, and it is bleak indeed.
In this moment, it is shown that the relationship between Yuuri and Victor are in the process of developing, from competitors to student and coach, and eventually, to lovers, this scene in episode four of the animation shows that reflected in Kennedy opinion of Obergefell that even in same-sex relationships, there are attributes that are not simply for procreation, but of higher values that no other type of relation can satisfy. Additionally, the focus of their love around their passion of skating takes away their identity of being seen as two men together, but as two professional skaters falling in love through the series. As an interesting note, throughout the series the gender neutral term of significant other is used, 恋人(koibito) rather than a sexed term for a lover. I think this is significant in the discourse of this series, as the writer Mitsurou Kubo wants the viewers to first and foremost consider them as professional skaters, people, before labeling their identity. This humanizing aspect reflects changes in societal values towards same-sex relationships, rather than just terms of sodomy and mental illness. If viewed via the lens of Bowers v. Hardwick, there would be the view that this scene would be the promotion of homosexuality, which is linked to sodomy, and would be considered illegal. Through the lens of consequentialism, one would find that this relationship by virtue is wrong, and should not be supported. However, due to shifts within the court, as well as shifts in societal views, we can see how we can see their relationships as a relationship between two people, rather a homosexual relationship. I thnk that this animation does an excellent job in the normalization of non-heterosexual relationships, by showing that the parties involved are first and foremost people, not the identities they are defined by.
I'm going into a seminar very unprepared and I am going to place the blame squarely at John Finnis' feat, because writing about his stupid theory has genuinely melted my brain. It's pouring out of my ears as we speak. Brain juice everywhere.
John Finnis is a legal philosopher (Jurisprudence) who developed the theory of Classical Natural Law, by Aristotle and Aquinas, in order to address certain issues. These issues are: physicalism (as suggested by Vardy, having to be a ‘prisoner to biology’), secularity, the naturalistic fallacy and the issue of the theory becoming too naturalistic. This was discussed in his book ‘Natural Law and Natural Rights’.
Finnis begins by moving away from the boundaries of biology, however keeps it in the realms of natural law in addressing the natural common human ‘nature’ which extends beyond biology: rather individual interests and culture is included in our nature. Finnis suggests that we don’t have an ultimate purpose or telos as Aristotle does, however there are some ‘self-evident goods’ which motivates humans. There is no duty to reach these, however it is simply reasonable to aim for them.
Similar to Aquinas and Aristotle, reason is a reliable basis and part of human nature and thus should be used in our moral decision making. These seven goods and reasons do not require God, and if humans have no objective telos then it implies that God plays little role in his Natural Law, since nobody has a duty to God either. Since we don’t have a duty, we don’t have to (or ought to) do anything, thus Finnis’ New Natural Law does not face the issue of the naturalistic fallacy. We seek out the goods for themselves, not out of duty. It is each person themselves who should use their reason to come up with their own unique life project which will result in flourishing, which will involve achieving some of the seven goods, and follow this. This also avoids legalism as you cannot prescribe universals if everyone’s life plan is different and unique.
The seven fundamental basic goods should cover every human desire. They are all equal and to directly reject any is always wrong, for example murder is always wrong since it prevents the first of the seven goods, life. Since they aren’t a duty, they can be rejected, but that would be unreasonable and prevent one flourishing. Anything else that seems good is that which allows you to reach these goods, such as freedom.
Life (similar to Aquinas’ primary precept of self-preservation) is the respect for humans, and includes our desire for good health and procreation.
Knowledge is simply theoretical ideas that are good in themselves, or reaches some objective such as calculating a cost, both of which helps one move towards flourishing. Finnis also makes it clear that “‘knowledge’ unlike ‘belief’, is an achievement-word” thus indicating the process of acquiring knowledge is good.
Aesthetic experiences are the literal sensory experiences we receive that are enjoyable and good in themselves.
Play describes physical experiences we partake in for they are good in themselves: this includes cultural traditions, social, individual, intellectual, physical and all different types of activity.
Sociability is our freedom to interact with people on any level, from simply a common relation to all humans to friendship.
Practical reasonableness is the good of being able to achieve the other goods, and was developed more by Finnis.
The final good for Finnis is ultimate reality: reaching our own truth and understanding of the world, and which could be a religion.
Finnis’ sixth good--practical reasonableness--is slightly different to the other goods as it is not an experience or concept, it's a skill, a virtue. It is one similarity to the classical Natural Law, for it is phronesis, suggested by Aristotle, and is the ability to balance the achievement of the other six goods relative to their personal life plans. It is an awareness of the basic goods, and the ability to apply this to real life scenarios, differing from the good of ‘knowledge’ which is based around an objective which is not related to goods directly: “practical philosophy is a discipline and critical reflection on the goods that can be realised in human actions”. To develop how this should be used, Finnis suggests nine principles of practical reasonableness.
First, one needs to plan their life as a whole.
Second, actions chosen should be efficient in terms of resources to provide for such a choice.
Third, people need to be motivated and committed.
Fourth, one should not become obsessed with that kind of good.
Fifth: what is prioritised should have a good and justified backing, and this is common for “any commitment to a coherent plan of life is going to involve some degree of concentration on one or some of the basic forms of good”.
Sixth, one must act on their own conscience and ability, not on another’s authority.
The next three are not based on oneself but rather the community, which introduces his idea of the common good.
The seventh is to be concerned for others at all times
The eighth is to think of the common good of the community as a whole, and if one’s action can help the community
The final principle is to not commit acts which harms or goes against the basic rules even if it benefits another good.
Finnis’ concept of the common good is based on how we’re social beings who are most productive when working/cooperating with others. This means that all the goods are able to work together. The common good is organising social living in communities to effectively allow people to participate in the basic goods for themselves. However all this requires coordination and management: a source of authority to balance individual freedom and the common good. And the best, most effective authority for this is the law. Some laws directly protect the common good (e.g no murder) while others help create a stable society, so people feel to seek the common goods. A legal system is just if it supports the goods in accordance with practical reason, and in return it is reasonable to accept a just legal system. If one accepts a legal system, you’re legally and morally obliged to obey every law or accept every punishment.
Based on all this, people have high freedom to choose between several actions, none of which are wrong unless they literally clash with the goods, such as murder or perhaps enforcing censorship over someone. Every other choice which leads to a good is preferable, from doing art, to meeting up with friends, to revising for exams. Based on the nine principles the decision could be swayed by which would be best to do based on the amount of time one has, or based on their life project. However, since this project is an overarching theme across a life, it doesn’t have to define every detail, and you can seek what doesn’t contribute to one’s project if it is good. As all seven are equal and good, to choose any non-harmful action is morally good, thus not logically contrary, and it is simply up to human free will which route to follow: “Each is fundamental. None is more fundamental than any of the others, for each can be reasonably focused on”.
Overall it can be seen that Finnis addressed and revisited the Natural Law formed by Aristotle and Aquinas. I changed an overall human purpose (Eudaimonia or Beatitudo) to a personal choice of life plan that should be strived for through the use of practical reasonableness to achieve the goods that motivate us, is desired by all humans in our common human nature, and lies at the end of the plan. We have no duty to do so, so there is no issue regarding the naturalistic fallacy, though it is only reasonable to achieve these goods, and morally wrong to harm the goods. This does not extend simply to us: another part of our human nature is to live in co-ordinated groups, and so we have a common good that must be preserved. Finnis believes this can be done through obeying the law, which provides everyone with a society in which we can strive to access the seven goods we desire, and eventually--via practical reasoning--achieve our life plan.
This is a brief statement of a rather important problem in political philosophy; how do you justify the position/utilization/transformation of limited resources (which is certainly necessary for life) without allowing for apparently unjust distributions of these resources (for example, one person accumulating all the goods in a given society).
If you say anyone can acquire any unowned thing they want, you run into substantial problems delineating what exactly establishes such a unilateral act of acquisition. If you make the criteria too stringent, it will seem likely that no one in fact has justly acquired property (for example, asking all effected people for their permission), criteria that are too particular (for example, engaging in certain types of economic activity) seem likely to be biased in the favor of particular kinds of choices about what to do with land, but we generally grant that ownership of a thing (in particular on the unilateral model) has very little to do with what one does with a thing.
But if you make the criteria too loose, it is very likely that very basic actions permit full ownership of indefinite amounts of property; opening one up to substantial intuitive problems. It is surely absurd that the mere declaration of intent, or some other trivial action is enough to establish ownership over a property; especially if that property contains difficult or impossible to acquire resources.
My preferred solution is that private acquisition of property is permissible; even on a fairly grand scale; but you also acquire enforceable obligations to use that property for the benefit of others; not merely for the satisfaction of one's own tastes. You are permitted to pursue genuine goods with your property as long as that pursuit helps others pursue their goods. If you fail to do this, the people around you are permitted to engage in compel you to act in this manner.
However, you still have some freedom in what you do with your property; since there are multiple kinds of basic goods that can be pursued; and which good you pursue is completely up to the owner. But, this list of goods is not indefinite, on the system I'm proposing one must demonstrate that the use of the property is in accord with some reasonably well-defined (though broad) basic good of human life, both for one's self and for others.
Now, the communists in the audience may be questioning why we should permit property ownership at all. The reason I believe property ownership is necessary can be found in Aristotle's account of these matters; the Goods that truly matter must be pursued by individuals, and individuals require resources in order to pursue whatever good they are best suited for. Moreover, the acquisition of any good requires virtue, and the virtues are related to the proper handling of one's personal life, which requires a level of dominion and autonomy from the rest of the system. In short, individual realization requires some system of private property; though not the absolute-dominion model required by Libertarian thought.
I will happy to develop these thoughts more for interested parties (if there are any), as I'm aware in their current form they are quite fragmentary. It goes without saying that the current model of American private property is not based upon these principles, with property-holders usually thinking they can rightfully do whatever they want with their possessions, and the government treating direct harm as the only enforceable offense a property owner can commit. On my model both of these mindsets are completely false.
*I wish to give credit to John Finnis, whose theories on property ownership substantially are presented here.
