Ukrainian cities before and after the arrival of the russians.
#hotd#daeron targaryen#aemond targaryen#daemon targaryen#helaena targaryen



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Ukrainian cities before and after the arrival of the russians.
Cinema in Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine. 1970s.
⚡Серебрянський ліс вкривається павутиною з оптоволокна.
На жаль, такі реалії і військова необхідність. Скільки десятків років Україна потім прибиратиме все це — ніхто наразі не може передбачити.
📹: Сталеві леви omrb_63
Aftermath of the “Russian world”.
The Ukrainian cities of Mariupol, Bakhmut, Sievierodonetsk, Lysychansk, Vuhledar, Lyman, Vovchansk, Volnovakha, Marinka, Kreminna... Toretsk has now joined this far from complete list of cities turned into ruins after the start of t🇷🇺 invasion
Khata in Kreminna, Luhansk Region, early XXth century
The Byzantine-style 17th century Trinity Church that can be seen in the background was demolished in the 1930s, and the bricks were used to build a school.
Some commentators say the Ukraine conflict is at a stalemate, but what we are seeing is the usual ebb and flow of a long war.
At the beginning of 1915, the war on the Western Front had reached a stalemate. There were technical, strategic and doctrinal reasons for this. The machine gun changed tactics and killed soldiers by the hundreds, as did more accurate and concentrated artillery. Poor communications hampered the co-ordination of the different elements of the massive armies. A lack of protected mobility meant that even when a breach was made in enemy lines, the enemy could more quickly fill the gap than the attacker could exploit it.
Recently, this has become the analogy of choice for some writing about the war in Ukraine. Articles in publications from in the United States, Britain and beyond have all touted theories of the current “stalemate in Ukraine”. It makes for good headlines, but there is one problem: it just isn’t true.
The Collins dictionary defines stalemate as a “deadlock, draw, impasse … a situation in which neither side in an argument or contest can win or in which no progress is possible”. War is a complex tableau of military, diplomatic, technological, economic and societal endeavours. Therefore, a stalemate in war implies a situation of geographic, economic, military and intellectual stasis. This is not the case in Ukraine. Both sides in the conflict, and their supporters, have an enormous range of tactical and strategic options available to them in 2023.
What we are seeing instead is the normal ebb and flow of a long war being fought by well-resourced countries with external sources of support. After the initial burst of activity where each side seeks large, hard blows against the adversary to hopefully compel them to concede quickly, most wars settle into a cycle of pulses and pauses.
The most recent pulse, with the Ukrainian offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson, saw huge amounts of territory returned to Ukraine through the courage and innovation of its military forces, and the military, intelligence and technical support of the West. These offensives provided a boost to the morale of the Ukrainian people. They also reinforced that the Ukrainians are quite capable of defeating the Russians.
Importantly, the offensives also resulted in a lower tempo of operations. Humans, even well motivated ones, need a break from operations to reflect, reinforce and relax before the fighting begins again. This is the low ebb of the cycle of war that we are seeing right now.
It is a very long way from a stalemate. There is a huge amount of activity being conducted even in this low tempo phase. Most of it remains invisible to the layman because it is not as exciting to report or because it is hidden by operational security and the normal fog of war.
The Battle of Bakhmut is draining away Russian and Ukrainian lives. Over the past several months, the Russian Army and the mercenary Wagner Group have competed to hurl tens of thousands of Russian soldiers against Ukrainian defensive lines which have been developed and improved since 2014. The town of Bakhmut has no strategic importance beyond its propaganda value for a Russian Army that has had no battlefield victories since the early days of this war. Yet, the fighting there is as bitter as any in this war and is resulting in mass casualties that few armies can sustain.
To the north, the Ukrainian Army presses on with its methodical advance towards the Kreminna-Svatove-Starobilsk triangle. Unlike the battle to the south, this offensive will have important strategic outcomes if the Ukrainians succeed. Within these towns are key transport and logistic support hubs for the Russian Army in Luhansk Oblast. If Ukraine secures this critical triangle of cities, the Russian position in Luhansk is probably untenable, and its forces in Donetsk will be forced into a dilemma about how to orientate their troops.
There is much more occurring that we don’t see directly. Tactical reconnaissance on the ground, in cyberspace and in the air is occurring across the entire front, seeking weaknesses to exploit in the offensives to come. Training and equipping of new troops and formations is occurring – quickly - for these future offensives. Once trained, these formations are being deployed behind the lines and being readied to join the more experienced forces who are defending, scouting and preparing to advance. And changes in command are being made in preparation for attacks in the northern spring, such as the appointment of the Russian general Valery Gerasimov last week.
The strategic fight also rages unabated. Russian missile and drone attacks continue to cause the death of civilians and impact on power supplies, as they did again over the past weekend. The Russians probably have sufficient drones and precision missiles and rockets for several large-scale attacks on Ukraine each month. At the same time, both Ukraine and Russia continue to be energetic in the conduct of information operations in their own nations and beyond, seeking to retain the support of their partners and allies.
So, while we may not be witnessing the rapid advances of late 2022, there is still much activity going on in Ukraine. More importantly, both sides retain the military, economic and intellectual potential to innovate and act in creative ways to win battles and drain the resources of their adversary.
By no means are the main belligerents or their supporters yet in a position where “neither side in an argument or contest can win or in which no progress is possible”.
We may be in a lower tempo phase in this war, but this is a long way from a stalemate.
Daily Wrap Up April 25, 2022
Under the cut: Sweden and Finland will submit their NATO applications simultaneously and Russia Does Not Like This; No evacuation corridors out of Mariupol (Russia offered but Ukraine doesn’t trust them to not fire on the corridors); US nominates Briget Brink as ambassador to Ukraine; Heavy fighting continues in Luhansk and Donetsk; UK sending medical supplies, ambulances, and fire trucks to Ukraine; Explosions in Russian-occupied City Hall of Kremmina with no survivors; Evidence of rape is being collected from the bodies of women for the investigation into war crimes by the ICC (mind the content warnings).
Kremennaya, Luhansk region. 2015. photo by Alexander Kuchinskiy