#lisbon summit

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O Vice-Primeiro-Ministro, Paulo Portas, durante a conferência "The Lisbon Summit-The Outlook for economic growth and reform" promovida pelo semanário The Economist, no Hotel Miragem em Cascais.

Alberto Frias/Expresso

[afmonochrome]

O Vice-Primeiro-Ministro, Paulo Portas, durante a conferência "The Lisbon Summit-The Outlook for economic growth and reform" promovida pelo semanário The Economist, no Hotel Miragem em Cascais.

Alberto Frias/Expresso

[natosource]

State Department: Missile threat to Europe 'is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively'

From Frank A. Rose, the Department of State:  Missile defense plays an important role in the broader U.S. international security strategy, supporting both deterrence and diplomacy. Missile defense assures our allies and partners that the United States has the will and the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a limited ballistic missile attack against the U.S. homeland, our forward deployed troops, allies, and partners. Missile defense also may help constrain regional actors from trying to inhibit or disrupt the U.S. ability to come to the defense or assistance of its allies and partners. . . .

In order to augment the defense of the United States and provide more comprehensive and more rapid BMD protection to our European Allies and U.S. deployed forces, in 2009 President Obama outlined a four-phase implementation plan for European defense. Through the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), the United States will deploy increasingly capable BMD assets to defend European population and territory against a ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area that is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively. At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon Allies welcomed the EPAA as the U.S. contribution to the NATO missile defense capability.

Our NATO Allies also have systems that they can contribute to the collective defense. Some of our Allies, for example, have Aegis ships with advanced sensor capabilities that could provide valuable contributions even without SM-3 interceptors. Our Allies also possess other land- and sea-based sensors that could be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems, such as PATRIOT, that can be integrated and used to provide point defense.

EPAA Phase 1 gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean. The deployment of an AN/TPY-2 missile defense radar in Turkey was the other key part of EPAA Phase 1.

For Phase 2 of the EPAA, we have an agreement with Romania to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 interceptor site beginning in the 2015 timeframe. This site would provide protection against medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

We also have an agreement with Poland to place a similar U.S. SM-3 interceptor site there in the 2018 timeframe for Phase 3 of the EPAA.

Finally, with respect to Phase 4, the Department of Defense has begun concept development of a more advanced interceptor for deployment in the 2020 timeframe that will enhance our ability to counter medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and potential future ICBM threats to the United States from the Middle East. . . .

Russia has raised the issue of a legal guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria” that could, in effect, create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems. We certainly cannot accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of purposes around the world, not just for missile defense. We also will NOT accept limitations on the capabilities, and numbers of our missile defense systems. We would be willing to agree to a political framework including a statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. In fact, this is what we have been saying all along: any statement will be politically binding and it would publicly proclaim our intent to cooperate and chart the direction for cooperation, not limitations. Our cooperation with Russia will not come at the expense of our plans to defend against regional ballistic missile threats or for the defense of the U.S. homeland.

Remarks by Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, to the Middle East Missile & Air Defense Symposium in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.  (photo: International Institute For Strategic Studies)

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NATO: 'We need to hand over the last provinces and districts to lead Afghan responsibility at a certain time in 2013'

From Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO:  Let me stress, we will stick to the Lisbon Road Map and complete transition by the end of 2014. That road map is actually based on a timeline outlined by President Karzai himself before the Lisbon Summit. He presented the goal to see the Afghan Security Forces take full responsibility for the security by the end of 2014. And we stick to that.

However, in order to actually complete transition by the end of 2014, we need to hand over the last provinces and districts to lead Afghan responsibility at a certain time in 2013. Because based on experience it takes between 12 and 18 months to actually fully implement a transition.

So if the whole of the transition is to be completed by the end of 2014 we'll have to hand over the last provinces to lead Afghan responsibility by mid-2013, or at the latest in the second half of 2013. That's why the year 2013 has suddenly been mentioned. It's not about accelerating the transition process, but it's actually in order to stick to the Lisbon Road Map that we have to take 2013 into account.

And from the time when we have handed over all provinces to lead Afghan responsibility, we will, of course, gradually change the role of our forces from combat to support, but we will continue our combat operations and be prepared to conduct combat operations until the end of 2014. That is throughout the whole transition period.

I hope this explanation clarifies the confusion that sometimes has been created about the year 2013, 2014. This discussion does not change the overall road map as it was outlined in Lisbon. We stick to the Lisbon Road Map. 

Excerpt from press briefing by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.  (photo: NATO)

[natosource]

Putin’s Return and NATO-Russia Relations: Back to the Future

From Jakub Kulhanek, the New Atlanticist:  The NATO-Russia rapprochement reached its apex at the time of the NATO Lisbon Summit when both sides declared their readiness to build a joint missile defense in Europe. Although hailed as a major game changer, the joint missile defense has been fraught with the overblown expectations on both sides. There was little denying of the fact that both NATO and Russia could not agree on the practical side of such cooperation.

The post-Lisbon rapprochement was in large measure possible thanks to the decision by Obama administration to scrap the US initial plans to deploy missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland. Yet, fast forward to the present time, the Russian leadership in general and Putin in particular begin to voice their discontent over NATO plans to deploy more sophisticated missile defense systems in Poland and Romania. Similarly, Russia maintains that any missile defense shield in Europe should be built as a joint venture between NATO and Russia, whereas the Alliance insists on having two separate systems that would exchange information.

Given the irreconcilable differences, practically no common ground exists between the two sides. Even the most optimistic proponents of cooperation admit that there will be no agreement on European missile defense by the time of the NATO Summit in Chicago in May. . . .

Putin should not be seen as necessarily anti-Western. After all, during his first term in office he oversaw a major realignment in Russia’s relations with the US and NATO, while pursuing close ties with several European countries.

More worrying is that Putin is said to have grown more wary of the West as he believes the West didn’t live up to its part of the deal in return for Russia’s assistance in the war against terrorism and more recently in Afghanistan. With respect to missile defense, Putin buys into a widely held assumption by Russian hardliners that NATO wants to gain a strategic leverage over Moscow. Given his distrust of the West and tendency to play hardball politics, Putin may prove less predictable and more prone to erratic outbursts. Although Russia, restrained by its limited foreign policy capabilities, will be unable to cause major problems for NATO, it might find a way to make life difficult for the Alliance. A less cooperative or openly antagonistic Russia might throw occasional diplomatic tantrums and perform customary sabre rattling in the form of threatening military deployments on its borders with NATO. Consequently, the Alliance risks being drawn into protracted diplomatic tussles with Moscow, which will sap into its political resolve and vital resources needed elsewhere.

Jakub Kulhanek is head of the East European Program at the Association for International Affairs in the Czech Republic. He has published extensively on post-Soviet affairs, among other things, in the Harvard International Review, Problems of Post-Communism, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) journal, the Moscow Times and on the US Atlantic Council, EU observer and Foreign Policy Magazine websites.  (Photo credit: Getty)

[natosource]

NATO Chief: "From mid-2013 there will be a gradual change of the role of our forces in Afghanistan"

From Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO:  First, let me stress that we stick to the road map that was outlined at the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010, according to which we will gradually hand over lead responsibility to the Afghans; a process that has been started and hopefully will be completed by the end of 2014.

There is nothing new in the fact that from mid-2013 there will be a gradual change of the role of our forces in Afghanistan. The fact is that by mid-2013 we will start the final transition of provinces and districts to lead Afghan responsibility. So from that time on the whole of Afghanistan will have Afghan Security Forces in the lead of security. And from that time on we can gradually change the role of our forces from combat to support.

The pace and the scope of that transformation of our forces will, of course, very much depend on the security situation on the ground. The better the security the stronger the Afghan Security Forces the more rapidly we can transform the role of our forces.

So all that will take place within the road map we outlined in Lisbon in 2010. 

Exerpt from joint press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and President of Romania Traian Băsescu.  (photo: NATO)

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Secretary Clinton Meets With German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on April 14, 2011. Before their meeting, Secretary Clinton said: "It is wonderful to be back in Berlin and to have this opportunity to meet with the Chancellor to discuss a number of issues that are of great importance to both of us. I appreciate that NATO is meeting here in Berlin because Germany is such an essential partner in NATO and the work that was done at the Lisbon Summit to chart the way forward for NATO is going to provide the strategic direction that we are seeking to implement. "We work together in Afghanistan. We are committed to following through to achieve the mutual objective of working toward a world without nuclear weapons. We are also sharing the same goal which is… more »