Mind-like
I'm starting to think more in terms of just cognition/experiencing and less in terms of minds, because:
Cognition/experiencing is more fundamental than minds. Mind interferometry starts not with other things having minds, but with other things having cognition/experiencing. Minds are only then inferred to exist in, or are used to model and predict, things which seem to persistently have some sort of cognition/experiencing that matters.
It does not take much to justify the idea that all cognition is potentially experiencing. At first the only cognition we know of is just our experience stream. The first reason we have to suspect minds in other things is when we realize their behavior is consistent with how we would act if we were experiencing their situation.
It is a lot harder to rigorously justify or even define any notion of minds. What mind interferometry evidence must a thing exhibit? What cognition/experiences must it have? How long? How often? How consistently? How coherently? In what combinations? At what speeds and time scales?
It is hard to draw the boundaries of minds. Mind interferometry tells us that cognition/experiencing happened seemingly within the thing. But where exactly is the mind? Is it even just one mind? Is it part of a bigger mind? If cutting off a part causes a reduction or change of cognition/experiencing, is some of the mind in that part?
Putting cognition/experiencing first kinda reveals that the whole idea of minds was a distraction anyway. Philosophically, legally, psychologically, and especially ethically. "Mind" is a heuristic, a summary, a pattern that things match more or less. To the extent that anything is best explained by having cognition/experiencing, it is mind-like.
It does not matter if something is a "mind". What matters in any given situation or question is if mind interferometry suggests something has or can have any relevant cognition/experiences.