Can refugee scholars hold the line? Why the theoretical line that separates forced migrants from other persons on the move may not be sustainable
The following piece was written by T. Alexander Aleinikoff, University Professor and Director of the Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility at The New School. This text was prepared for delivery at the conference on “Borders, Territory And Rights: Changing Legal Cartographies Of Migration And Mobility,” held on 17-18 June 2021.
My title doesn’t refer to whether refugee scholars should help others fend off attacks from governments and populist parties that are intent on destroying the international protection regimes we study. Most of us are already so engaged.
Rather, I am asking a conceptual question about the nature of refugee scholarship: does the line that separates forced migrants from other persons on the move continue to be theoretically sustainable?
Most (but not all) refugee scholars argue for such a distinction, both on conceptual and practical grounds.
[...]
But in more recent years, it has become gradually more difficult to distinguish migrants from refugees – and this for various reasons.
First, the definition of refugee has expanded dramatically. Today virtually anyone fleeing conflict in their home state will be categorized as a refugee (e.g., more than 5 million Syrians), whether or not they can show a threat of individualized or group-based persecution. Furthermore, through very effective lawyering, refugee advocates have significantly enlarged the “social group” category to include, for example, LGBTQ claims, gender-based claims, and claims based on gang violence. It is also now established law that the threat of persecution can come from private actors, not just the state. And with the rise of the idea of “climate refugees,” the threatened harm will come from a non-human source.
We are getting closer to an understanding of refugee as anyone whose “survival” is at stake. At some point, it becomes difficult to argue for protection for these groups, and not for persons leaving an economy in ruins, extreme poverty or general conditions of civil disorder. (I was once taken with the aphorism that migrants seek to improve their lives while refugees seek to rebuild their lives. I am less certain today that this distinction holds.)
Second, both refugee and migration scholars now recognize that individual reasons for movement are remarkably complex—involving, to name a few, personal characteristics and risk appetite (ie, when a person decides to leave a dangerous or economically distressed situation for uncertainty elsewhere), the location of family, economic opportunities at home and abroad, environmental events and climate change, prospects for the future, the strength of local ties.
The post-war refugee regime has been based on the idea that we can identify the reason a person has decided to flee; but we now see this as a fool’s errand.
Why did millions of Syrians leave while millions of Syrians remained? Why do tens of thousands of Central Americans travel to the US but a larger number stay home? For each person, there will be a calculation based on a wide range of factors. [Read more here.]
