#team portrait

[electronicsquid]

Dartmouth football team with a game ball from their victory over Brown (Dartmouth 22 - Brown 0)

(H.H.H. Langill? 1901)

[lackadaisycats]

This art, holy dang. The entire Lackadaisy flm crew, as depicted by art-marvel Shmoopy and gifted to the team by our dear Newt.  Thank you both!!  ❤ ❤ ❤ Each time I zoom in, I get stuck in a googly-eyed trance trying to absorb it all.  I’m gonna have to come up with an index of everyone included. Meanwhile, though...

Check the full res version here!

[chubachus]

Portrait of members of a cricket team attributed to Mathew Brady, c. 1860′s.

Source: Library of Congress.

[eyewitnessnation]

James Paxton attends ladygunn mag celebratory dinner |  February 7

(via philkasiwitness | twitter)

[eyewitnessnation]

teamportrait on Instagram 

[eyewitnessnation]

thisisjamespaxton : @ashtondsanders sets the standard for what it means to be an all around good ass dude. Great kickin' tonight brother, all love! 💥🤘🏼💥 crush it in Chicago! #linkedup #teamportrait

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Leverkusen’s positional play approach

IB, 26.05.2019

In the last games of the season, Leverkusen used an interesting approach in their positional play, creating a 3-2-2-3 (midfield-box) staggering from the initial 4-2-3-1 shape, which basically changed the whole dynamics of their positional play.

From 4-2-3-1 to a 3-2-2-3

In order to keep the original rules of spacing & staggering (Juego de Posicion) and to create an optimal dynamics in between the lines -offer depth in both halfspaces-, a switch from the 4-2-3-1 was necessary. There are definitely a lot of different ways to change the structure -move into 2-3-2-3, 2-3-3-2, 3-1-3-3 etc.-, but based on Bosz’s initial approach both at Ajax & Dortmund -both in a 4-1-4-1/2-3-2-3- it was inevitable that he is going to imply a system according to the JdP principles -max 2 players in the same vertical channel-, whilst still being flexible.

The last point is particularly present at Bosz’s philosophy, as his system allows more movements inside the structure as opposed to Guardiola’s system, which is much more rigid in that regard.

Midfield-box

Also, when creating a specific shape it’s important to consider the possible manipulative effects it has on the defensive structure. For instance, pushing up a full-back might result the oppositional winger’s opponent/man-oriented defensive behavior, which creates a different dynamics -also requires different patterns, movements to penetrate/exploit- opposed to a more shifting-oriented defensive system, where a high full-back would usually be closed down by a full-back, again resulting in a different wide dynamics.

In this sense creating the midfield-box at the centre -2-2 staggering inside- also have a different effect, especially on the oppositional 2nd line: from this perspective it can be interesting to differentiate between the specific strategies of how and where! to manipulate the oppositional structure with a higher emphasis -e.g. overloading the centre will most likely manipulate the defending of the 2nd line, whilst overloading the last line will again create a different effect, now on the last line’s movements.

Although in order to create an optimal dynamics some rules must be applied.

The central-midfielders have to position themselves in front of the oppositional 2nd line, whilst the attacking-midfielders are positioned higher, behind the 2nd line, in between the lines. Also, the central-midfielders should be positioned more to the centre -adapting to the opponent: inner side/shoulder of the oppositional central-midfielder-, whilst the attacking-midfielders have to be wider generally -outer side/shoulder of the oppositional central-midfielder-, occupying the space between the CM-W channel.

These rules help the central players to avoid blocking each other, offering more passing options, whilst maintaining the central channel towards the central-forward open.

Knowing the Bosz system, more flexibility is allowed, but only within these principles. As said before, occupying the central areas with 4 players manipulates the 2nd line, since it divides the attention of the central-midfielders -causing decisional-crisis with doubling them-, therefore it will naturally result more penetrative actions from the 3 central zones -also important to consider strategically.

Spacing & staggering in the midfield box -› red zones showing the players’ dominantly occupied spaces.

With having 3 at the back, the circulation dynamics changes as well.

The ability to constantly move the ball is essential to have an effective JdP, but the focus of this might vary. To keep the original comparison, whilst Guardiola’s Manchester City in the 4-1-4-1/2-3-2-3 -keeping the back 4- focuses to circulate the ball more horizontally in the, then use verticality (horizontal to move/stretch the opponent -› prepare/create the verticality) to penetrate, the 3-2-2-3 focuses more on verticality, since the back 3’s can’t stretch/move the oppositional shape that much horizontally, as it’s important to maintain optimal distances -to avoid being too wide to disrupt connections-, but enough to invite the press/pull out players from the oppositional 2nd line, to open up the verticality.

With a slight change though, it’s possible to create hybrid-ish system, with the midfielders dropping deep & back 3 to move out wide, forming a 1-4-2-3 structure.

Idea to create a 1-4-2-3 staggering with slight changes at the back -CMs to drop deeper into the halfspaces, wide players of the back 3 to move out wide. Also used earlier by Tuchel at Dortmund (vs. Koln, 2016.05.14.)

Depending on the defensive system different dynamics occur in terms of progressing the ball into advanced areas. For instance, against a 4-4-2 block there is a higher probability to exploit the outside-to-inside dynamics, whilst against a 5-4-1 block the inside-to-outside pattern will be more frequent.

Outside-to-inside dynamics: direct pass out to either wide player from the back, and due to the midfield 2-2 staggering a free-man will be created at the centre. Since the attacking-midfielders’ higher & wider positioning in the halfspaces will attract the cover from the oppositional central-midfielders (basically pinning them) on the near-side, the moment when they push higher up to attack the space behind the full-back (pulling the opp. midfielders), the centre will be opened up towards the central-midfielder, who can now operate in an open space (dribble forwards, look for switches etc.). This also exploits a simple defensive principle: when the ball goes out wide, the 2nd line usually drops deeper to offer cover, which will generally open space to the centre (midfield-box increases the distances in between the lines, to highlight this general weakness).

Inside-to-outside dynamics: against a 5-defender system, the direct pass out wide is less accessible, therefore the inside penetration to move the ball out wide occurs in a higher emphasis. By creating the central-overload, it causes orientation issues for the 1st & 2nd line, which opens the access towards the centre, from where an outside pass can be player (central penetration will tighten the last line – open wide spaces).

Referring to the earlier mentioned manipulative effects, in this system it’s key to avoid opponent-oriented defensive behaviors, in order to create a more optimal positional situation for the inside winger/Havertz in between the lines.

Since if he is being followed closely by the full-back, he won’t have the space/opportunity to turn directly from the pass into an open space, to exploit his ability to accelerate on the ball & use diagonality. Although as the system allows more flexibility, Brandt-Havertz are free to move horizontally to the centre as a principle, to solve the issue of being marked tightly from the back.

To assure the open spaces it’s important to maintain the aforementioned principles of staggering, therefore Havertz usually positions himself closer to the 2nd line -between the lines- to manipulate their defensive behavior, plus the right-back pushes higher up -higher than Havertz- to pin the oppositional full-back & create the space for Havertz.

Here it’s also important to mention the role of player profiles: in order to successfully implement the midfield-box -in the same way Leverkusen does- we need:

full-back -› comfortable at advanced positions, ability to make runs behind the last line & crossing, extra: 1v1 ability to dribble past the opponent ~ Weiser

winger/attacking midfielder -› dynamism on the ball & turn into spaces in behind using the 1st touch, high press retention, accurate lay-offs, make diagonal runs behind the last line, dribbling diagonally inside, flexibility to operate deeper ~ Brandt & Havertz

central-midfielder -› can play deeper in front of the centre-backs to control the circulation/tempo, press retention to handle pressure from behind (blind-side alertness), flexibility to operate 1 line higher & making runs in depth ~ Aranguiz

Principles

Due to being more fluent the system allows the midfield-box to make specific movement, breaking the 2-2 staggering to offer more dynamism -as opposed to the more rigid zonal attack principle-, often changing into a 1-3 or 3-1 staggering, or simply creating an asymmetric version of the 2-2. Although the basic principle is to always occupy the ballnear halfspace (priority, if not possibly – occupy the centre) in depth, therefore even though the attacking midfielders are moving outwards -as Brandt often did against Schalke’s 5-3-2 to stretch the 2nd line- a central-midfielder will push higher up to occupy that zone -creating a 1-3 staggering. Same happens when Brandt and Havertz are dribbling inside diagonally from deeper positions -in front of the oppositional 2nd line. As the depth must be assured a central-midfielder will push higher up in the halfspace or the centre to offer an option in between the lines, a dynamic rotation of the midfield-box. Using the concept of diagonality a specific rule/principle can also be stated: “use ballfar central-midfielder for ballnear diagonality, use ballnear central-midfielder for ballfar diagonality.”

IB, 26.05.2019 -- ‘Leverkusen’s positional play approach

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Liverpool’s pressing system

IB, 09.05.2019

The basis and main principle of Liverpool’s 4-3-3 pressing system is to keep the ball at the central zones, therefore preventing the be moved by horizontal circulation, which usually -if done well- stretches the defensive structure both in the vertical and horizontal axis.

To achieve that their system is both passing-lane and option-oriented: 1st line is closing passing lanes to prevent passes out wide towards the full-backs/wingers, whilst 2nd line is much rather option-oriented therefore their principle is to position themselves to have access to 2 players (defensive shifting’s decision making based on oppositional system, distances, ball’s speed).

Meanwhile the last line, mostly the fullbacks also have the option-orientation: if the 2nd line can’t create optimal access to the oppositional full-backs, then they push higher up, leaving a numerical equality at the back. Ideally the last line stays in position to offer better access at the central zones for the long balls.

Basic pressing system against Barcelona at the first leg: 1st line’s passing-lane orientation, 2nd line’s shifting movements and option-orientation, Robertson & Gomez pushing up higher to close Alba-Roberto wide if needed.

Even if the opponents can find valuable central options or the wide areas, they have both shifting solutions/traps to prevent these, especially at the flanks.

Forcing the build-up into the trap, model from the 1st leg: LCB is closed down by RW/Salah & covering the outward pass, this opens up the vertical lane towards the CM,  who can then pass out wide to the LB. If the RB/Gomez can’t step out from the last line, then the 2nd line will shift horizontally to close the wide zone.

Shifting dynamics

Wingers are closing the outside angle, whilst the CF always tries to close the ballnear CM/or the lone DM, depending on the oppositional system. This dropping movement allows the ballnear CM/Milner on the illustration to shift a bit wider and control the passing lane vertically in depth, preventing him being too focused on the opposition.

Since he is wider, he has a better access to the wide zones, if he has to shift out wide to close the oppositional FB. As the 2nd line is mostly staggered in a flat line, the DM has the flexibility to shift even to higher positions. Against a lone DM, usually there is no need to do that, since the CF/Firmino does an excellent job to constantly close that option with his cover shadow, allowing the 2nd line to be focused on closing down the depth behind.

Against 2 CMs deeper (here vs. a 3-2 structure) the pattern is that the DM/Fabinho pushes up to close the ballnear CM, preventing him to turn after receiving. As the ball goes out wide the DM has time to readjust his positioning deeper.

Pressing Barca’s build-up, 1st leg: if the CBs receive the ball, the wingers/Salah & Mané moves to press them whilst covering the pass to the FBs. If the deep DM-LCM receives, easier pressure  frontwise + also better angle to press -closing the vertical options -the GK in case of a backwards pass. If the FBs/Alba-Roberto receives directly, then the CMs/Keita & Milner pushes out wide to press – they are already positioned a bit wider to reduce the distance.

Barca had some issues with building from depth, without effectively stretching the 2nd line, even though Pool’s basic setup opened bigger central spaces, which could have been exploited better. In that way pulling Rakitic deeper was a clever solution, since it pulled out Fabinho, opening up more space in behind at the centre. Pulling out 4 players can be an effective way to open valuable spaces for teams, who can build from long balls after goal kicks better & then collecting 2nd balls.

This also allowed for Pool’s last line to stay in position, so even though Barca regained possession after long balls, the back 4 was in position to close any possible runs in behind, slowing down the possession.

A key player would have been Vidal though, who with a more central positioning could have manipulated the LCM/Keita then Milner, pulling him inwards to open up more space for the RB to receive. Since this option has been exploited only once, Barca basically struggled against the high-press. Although Pool had a solution for this as well.

Solution: shifting last line -› in this scene Roberto receives directly from ter Stegen, Mané drops deeper to close to force a backwards pass, which allows Robertson to push higher up. Optimally Pool prevents to do this shifting, since it leaves a 3v3 at the back, but without the optimal central connections and the width from Messi-Coutinho they couldn’t exploit that (e.g. direct passes, stretching the line wider), therefore van Dijk-Gomez could easily use their physical advantage after the generated long balls.

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