If veganism is a moral imperative, then it is problematic to support measures that fall short of veganism in any area of animal use. But that is exactly what many animal advocates promote, particularly when it comes to eating animals, which is our numerically most significant use of animals. For example, many animal advocates promote the idea that, instead of promoting veganism as a moral baseline, we should encourage a reduction in the consumption of animal foods and that we should praise any such reduction as normatively good. Many prominent animal advocates, including Peter Singer, support some version of what is called “reducetarianism,” which, in essence, maintains that we should reduce our intake of animal products but that we are not morally obligated to become a vegan. The best-known reducetarian campaign is probably “meat-free Monday.” Many animal charities that ostensibly promote veganism claim that, although veganism is a good thing, reducing the intake of animal foods is itself good and should be promoted as a morally good thing, and that it is not necessary, or is even “fanatical,” as Singer maintains, to promote veganism as a moral imperative.
Reducetarian measures by definition do not promote veganism as a moral baseline and necessarily accept the status of animals as things. Consider the matter in a human context. Take any fundamental rights violation—from human slavery to torture to genocide. Would we—in any of these situations—take a position similar to the reducetarian position? Would we say: “Stopping torture would be terrific but it’s not necessary, and it’s also good to promote any reduction in torture, so we ought to praise a dictator who forbids torture on Sundays and not be fanatical by promoting the complete cessation of torture”? Would we say: “We oppose slavery but it’s not necessary to abolish slavery. Any reduction in the suffering of slaves should be promoted as a morally good thing and a slave owner who beats his slaves nine times a week rather than ten times a week should be praised. It’s fanatical to insist on the abolition of slavery”?
It is, of course, “better” that the dictator or the slave owner impose less harm than more. But that does not mean that the imposition of less harm is something that should be praised and promoted. That is precisely what those who promote any version of reducetarianism invariably do. Gimmicks like “meat-free Monday” suggest that eating animal foods other than meat on Monday is something that is normatively good and praiseworthy and whatever one eats on the other six days is not an urgent matter of moral concern. Those concerned about racism would not promote “racist-joke-free Monday” because that would be to suggest that racist conduct other than jokes is less problematic and that racism on the other six days of the week is not a matter of profound moral concern. Reducetarianism of any sort trivializes the serious moral issue at stake.
Related to this notion of reducetarianism is the concept of the “flexible” vegan—the person who is vegan some of the time and not vegan some of the time. So a “flexible” vegan may be someone who eats entirely plant-based meals some, but not all, of the time. Singer claims that he is a “flexible vegan” who will eat animal products while traveling or at someone else’s house. As I mentioned in the introduction, the class of “flexible vegans” includes all nonvegans. No one eats or wears animals 100 percent of the time. Sometimes, probably quite often, they do not eat animal products. As a moral matter, being a “flexible” vegan is similar to being “flexible” with respect to the violations of fundamental human rights. Fewer violations are better than more; but none can be justified, and we should never promote any level of fundamental rights violations as morally acceptable or as indicative of some sort of moral progress.
If someone cares about the issue of animal use and agrees that veganism is a moral imperative but is not willing to become vegan, or to become vegan immediately, then they are free to choose whatever steps short of being vegan they want to take. But it is problematic to promote as a moral position that anything short of veganism can discharge our moral obligations to animals if we believe that they are not things and that they matter morally.
—Why Veganism Matters by Gary L. Francione
