Passwords have certainly had a bad rap lately. Security experts have been raising alarms about the "password problem" for years now, and some high-profile security breaches over the past few years really punctuate their message. When they complain about the "problem with passwords", they point out a laundry list of concerns such as password strengths, social engineering, and lax information protection practices, to name a few. But let's not understate the value of the password! It's certainly an admirable technology that served the Internet well during its formative years. Passwords are very compelling because they're intuitive and cheap. Users are responsible for protecting their passwords, so creating and remembering passwords does incur some overhead. Still, when you look at a password system in isolation, you can see that the security it provides is surely worth the minor inconveniences. To understand the problem with passwords, just take a peek at the password "best practices" advice. Today's best practices ask users to create a separate password for each account. The passwords should be at least 8 characters with a random mixture of case, numbers, and symbols (the allowed symbols vary from service to service). The password should not be memorable/predictable, such as a birthday, name, or dictionary term. Furthermore, you should change your password periodically, and never recycle, re-use, or share passwords with others. You also have to be careful when you use passwords as well. Don't enter them into unknown forms. Customer service should never ask for your password, so don't send them even on request. Be wary of sending passwords over public networks. Keep your machine secure to avoid key loggers. Don't let others see you type your password. Avoid entering passwords on public or shared computers. Also, never write down passwords; a secure password should only ever reside in your memory. These "best practices" are just off the top of my head, but they represent the most common advice. Taken in isolation, they seem reasonable, and definitely ensure secure password usage. Unfortunately, today's Internet is unbelievably diverse, and users now have to manage numerous passwords, revealing the password's ultimate weakness: scalability. Nobody follows the "best practices" because they're simply impractical in today's computing environment. No matter what you tell them, people are going to just do what's convenient: use a few simple passwords among a multitude of different accounts. Most of the accounts aren't of very high value to them anyway. And some of the "best practices" such as password complexity and periodic changes do more harm than good. Besides, most people don't take security seriously, and think that identity fraud won't happen to them. Those of you who HAVE been hacked know what I'm talking about: these are the people who constantly poke fun at you with comments like, "You're being paranoid! You're overreacting! Why are you going through all that fuss? I'm not concerned, there are better targets for fraud than me." And so on. But part of the cavalier attitude comes from the industry itself, which wants to assure people that the net is safe, or else Internet commerce would die. So when a major account database like Epsilon or Blizzard gets hacked, they try to assure you by downplaying the fallout. But guess what: you can recover a password with the stolen personal information, which, if you think about it, is arguably MORE important than any single account password! Internet services recognize the password security dilemma, yet instead of trying to simplify their systems, they stack more complexity on an already complex problem. They demand stronger passwords, and now multiple passwords and "secret questions" and secret images and phrases. Some sites now even impose username restrictions. These initiatives only make life harder for the user, and pretty much guarantees a lost-password flow (or lost-username flow for those stringent username requirements) every time an occasional user tries to log in. A whole new software category of password keepers has popped up to address the challenges, but these solutions only sweep the problem under the rug. The underlying problem (the password burden), still remains. Each service still has to maintain and protect them. And in the end, the passwords can still be ex-filtrated through sharing or socially engineering. Unless, of course, you still follow the impossible password best practices! As many security experts in the past have explained, adding complexity only makes legitimate use harder, but doesn't necessarily guarantee any gains in security. In other words, you will definitely have a harder time securing yourself, but an attacker may not have any more difficulty compromising your account. After all, a system is only as secure as its weakest link, and it doesn't matter if you have a solid oak office door with an electromagnetic lock if someone can just go over the drop ceiling (or cut the power). Furthermore, security favors simplicity. A system that relies on many complicated modules is weaker because it exposes a larger "surface" vulnerable to attack (to put it one way), giving an attacker more options. Today's online services are also very long interdependent chains, so their fates are often tied together. Each one is a vital link to a user's overall security as much as the user's own password discipline. Unfortunately, each organization has its own security practices. Poor security practices combined with weak password discipline results in easy pickings for a determined hacker. Gizmodo's Matt Honan discovered this unfortunate reality himself in the summer of 2012 when a hacker exploited weak information disclosure practices in Apple and Amazon to gain access and subsequently take over all of his other accounts from the initially compromised account. I know my post may be TL;DR for many, so bottom line: the "problem with passwords" isn't that passwords are a bad technology. The problem is actually password overuse combined with the industry's unrealistic assumptions and expectations about password best practices. Why must users suffer under the yoke of these so-called "best practices" for so many passwords? Why are individual services constantly re-inventing the wheel with their own password implementations, account databases, password/account reset/retrieval systems, and support staff to handle passwords? Even more confounding, why are casual sites like message boards, games, or your neighbor's gardening blog adding to the burden with their own password account systems? We wonder the same thing, which is one reason why we came up with CryoKey in the first place: as an attempt to create a simple, common identification model that seeks to reduce the password burden, not replace passwords altogether. We believe that keeping a few high-strength passwords for critical accounts and deriving password-free identities from these accounts creates a solution the strengths of both passwords and digital certificates.