Civilian USG agencies are integral to stability and reconstruction operations (SRO), but if they are to hold leadership roles during SROs requires agency leaders to recruit the right personnel and train them in interagency operations. The idea is intuitive, but recent news about the work culture of civilian agencies operating in Afghanistan suggests otherwise. USG officials who remember National Security Presidential Directorate-24 (NSPD-24) know that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has already once sidelined civilian agencies, albeit out of ignorance and arrogance. It is therefore in the US military’s interest to further cooperation between USG agencies by helping participating interagency partners train actively and participate dynamically.
In an excerpt from Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistanon Foreign Policy, Washington Post correspondent Rajiv Chandrasekaranasks why American sent its “C team” to Afghanistan. According to the excerpt, most of the members of Ambassador Holbrooke’s civilian surge did not necessarily represent America’s best and brightest who wanted to help the Afghans. Instead, DOS and USAID employees could be grouped into three camps: “those who had come to Afghanistan because they wanted to make a lot of money -- with hazard pay and bonuses, some staffers earned as much as $300,000 a year; those who were getting their tickets punched for a promotion or a posting to a comfortable embassy in Western Europe; and those who were seeking to escape a divorce, a foreclosed home, or some other personal calamity.” If accurate, Chandrasekaran indicates that the perverse incentives for deploying to Afghanistan with a civilian agency meant that the civilian component of interagency operations was unprepared technically, psychologically, and emotionally for the challenges of Afghanistan. Further undermining interagency operations were stringent security restrictions, a lack of desire to conduct operations outside the Embassy compound, and bosses that had little knowledge or will to execute interagency operations with the US military.
These criticisms are not to detract from the heroism and dedication that DOS and USAID have shown, but rather to underscore that it is in the US military’s interest to ensure that civilian USG partners are not perceived as incompetent interagency partners. If OSD and/or military officials believe that SROs are more effective by circumventing civilian partners, a repeat of NSPD-24 will happen and interagency operations could be severely set back.
Issued by OSD prior to the invasion of Iraq, NSPD-24 gave the DOD exclusive responsibility for post-war control of Iraq and consequently established the ineffective Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the directive “supplanted the ongoing interagency process.” According to officers who were part of the planning for the Iraq invasion, when NSPD-24 was announced during the middle of an interagency meeting on humanitarian aid, every representative walked out of the meeting. Described as a “palace coup,” NSPD-24 poisoned the relationship between the military and civilian agencies: civilian officials blamed the military (even though OSD issued the directive) for subverting their traditional responsibilities and expertise. With less than sixty days before hostilities commenced, NSPD-24 established ORHA and thrust unprecedented post-war reconstruction responsibilities onto a military unprepared for the task. Ultimately, NSPD-36 replaced NSPD-24 following the difficulties and failures caused by tasking the US military with SROs and transferred leadership the Department of State.
While SROs might not have been the US military’s forte, for the last ten years it has attempted to develop the capacity to engage in SROs. OIF and OEF precipitated this development for two reasons. First, the DoD sought to eliminate the economic incentive for participating in the insurgency and now stabilization and reconstruction capabilities are considered integral to stability and counterinsurgency operations. Second, as previously explained, civilian leaders (such as those of OSD) directed the military to take leadership of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. Although civilian agencies now lead all current and future SROs, their perceived and actual lack of capacity and human capital (as Rajiv Chandrasekaran highlights) for reconstruction operations is the third driver for expanding the military’s involvement in SROs. Military-centric provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan embody this rationale: in non-permissive environments the military is the only provider of development and aid because civilians will not conduct humanitarian and development operations in these areas. The deeper consequence is that the military develops institutions that parallel those of civilians (both governmental and non-governmental) and further undermine the legitimacy of civilian actors during SROs.
The inconsistency of civilian USG personnel in Afghanistan could encourage policy makers to revisit NSPD-24 for future SROs. Military leaders recognize that soldiers are not the best actors for conducting SROs and should therefore play a role in supporting (if not forcing) their civilian counterparts to improve the capabilities of their personnel. First, the military should provide funding for active USG personnel from all agencies to train with them during pre-deployment exercises. This enables civilian and military personnel to develop relationships that they can leverage in theater. Further, it improves soldiers’ and civilians’ understanding of their respective professional cultures so that it does not impede interagency cooperation. Second, in theater the military should continue to provide security elements for USG personnel that are willing to conduct operations outside of the wire. While it would be preferable to see more civilians integrate with units during operations, enabling civilians to conduct necessary reconstruction and stabilization activities ensures that USG employees are well utilized and take leadership during SROs. The military may not be the solution for SROs, but it will be a part of the solution for improving the capacity and leadership of USG personnel for future SROs.