(P)aragraph

Independent current affairs magazine based in Singapore. Youth is truth.

[southeastasianists]

Code REDD+ in Cambodia

Rural poor are being abandoned by the climate change scheme, argues Tim Frewer.

Neoliberal logic on climate change and deforestation is severely hurting Cambodia’s rural poor.

“What is REDD+?” asks a donor-funded state television commercial in Cambodia.

“It’s about saving the forests, while getting people out of poverty, while stopping climate change, as part of the global effort to combat rising carbon dioxide emissions,” replies one of the actors in the advert.

On national radio, a dedicated weekly half-hour program explains the benefits of the national REDD+ program in similar terms: reducing deforestation, improving livelihoods and, of course, avoiding carbon emissions.

In Phnom Penh, NGOs and government departments are busy preparing documents and posters explaining REDD+ and its supposed benefits. Shiny green posters line the halls of the Forestry Administration and Ministry of Environment, adorned with arrows, flow charts, pictures of smiling farmers, all proclaiming the benefits of the program.

Dozens of workshops and meetings are held in the capital in exclusive hotels featuring endless presentations on carbon forestry, social benefits, mechanisms to ensure ‘full and effective participation’ and safeguards. But none of these things tell us anything about the controversial idea that is REDD+.

And here’s the rub; REDD+ is primarily an idea – something that exists in the virtual – a supposed silver bullet to two problems.

The first is the loss of biodiversity from forested places, primarily in the tropics which have been labelled ‘critical ecosystems’ (an obvious throwback to the old Cold War obsession with protecting ‘critical infrastructure’).

The second is rising carbon emissions from forest clearance, which at first was thought to account for as much as 20 per cent of all greenhouse gas emissions, but has now been scaled back down to a more humble 10 per cent.

The lofty aspiration behind REDD+ is that wealthy companies or states in Annex One countries (net carbon emitters) could, via a trade in carbon credits, pay for those in forested, developing countries, to protect standing forests (or at least slow down the rate of deforestation); hence the name Reduction in Emissions form Deforestation and Degradation.

At some stage someone thought it fitting to tag on the “+” which would come to represent all those other things that have come to the attention of the international development industry in recent years (like conservation, gender, indigenous people, livelihoods and so on).

In a sense, REDD+ as a policy solution is nothing less than the triumph of neoliberal thought within the field of international climate politics. After a decade of the US’s aggressive promotion of ‘carbon markets’ in international climate conferences, the rest of the world, and especially the Global South, has been forced, bribed and coerced into playing the carbon market game.

The allure of millions of dollars of start-up funds provided by the World Bank and others, and the supposed future bonanza of carbon credits, have often been great for smaller countries (especially aid dependent ones like Cambodia).

The result is that, rather than demanding climate justice or what is owed to the poor who are the lowest carbon emitters and most likely to be affected by a changed climate (for example climate debt), countries like Cambodia are instead accepting a pittance of what they are owed for a scheme that has no evidence of actually working, and which is orientated more towards protecting Annex One country investors than the poor in forested countries.

If anything, the history of pollution markets over the last 30 years has shown them to be a largely ineffective policy mechanism.

And there is good reason to question the central tenets of REDD+, which place an enormous amount of faith in the creation of these new carbon markets as the ‘only option’ whether they are ‘voluntary’ or an example of ‘compliance’. Meanwhile these markets have very little grounding in the daily struggles of the poor who will be adversely affected by climate change.

Yet, the REDD+ program with all its talk of ‘full and effective participation’, ‘community rights’ and ‘safeguards for indigenous people’ has slowly rolled forward, absorbing all criticism into its ever expanding network of experts.

Keep reading

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“The issue of labor migration is critical to the economic security of the Asia-Pacific region. Origin countries rely on money sent home (remittances) to support domestic spending,” said APCSS workshop lead Dr. Lori Forman, “while destination countries rely on imported labor to fill manpower gaps.” Forman cited nearly 30 percent of Nepal’s gross domestic product is derived from remittances. Several Pacific Islands exceed 20 percent, while Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Philippines officially post levels around 10 percent. Demographic trends in the region – such as the aging of populations in Northeast Asia – will increase demand for labor to be supplied from other parts of the world. Workshop participants contemplated how their countries would be impacted if migration ended and migrants had to return to their origin country. The second- and third-order effects would quickly result in a region marked by increased instability and decreased human and national security. Participants noted that security challenges associated with migration go beyond economics. Improper treatment of workers can strain official bilateral relations between origin and destination countries, increasing tensions in the region. Migrant workers also impact resource requirements and introduce new cultures and behavioral norms in their non-native countries. When most of these workers are lower-skilled laborers, working in low-wage jobs with little protection, these factors can result in conflict with host-nation residents, exploitation, or human trafficking. “Too often,” said Forman, “migrant laborers fall through jurisdictional cracks. While international conventions, regional protocols and bilateral agreements exist, adding a security perspective to the discussion can contribute to safe and productive migration.”

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MACC: RM2.6b a donation, not 1MDB funds

The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) has found that the RM2.6 billion purportedly deposited into Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak's personal banks accounts came from donation. "The investigation report related to the RM2.6 billion has been referred to the attorney-general. "Investigations have found the RM2.6 billion which was allegedly deposited into the prime minister's accounts is the contribution of donors and not from 1MDB funds," said the commission in a statement. MACC's statement comes amidst hints by BN leaders in recent days that the RM2.6 billion might have been donations.

BN strategic communications director Abdul Rahman Dahlan had said that Najib, as Umno president, is allowed by the Umno constitution to act as atrustee for the party. Following this, Umno supreme council member Azalina Othman said there was nothing wrong with political parties receiving foreign funding. Najib himself spoke about political funding as well, pledging to disclose Umno's source of funding if DAP did the same. Three companies in the clear?

Earlier today, PKR secretary-general Rafizi Ramli predicted that Putrajaya might claim that the RM2.6 billion was funded by well-heeled Middle Eastern figures. Questions about Najib's bank accounts arose from the Wall Street Journal report on July 3. Quoting Malaysian investigators, WSJ said that RM2.6 billion was traced to Najib's private accounts which have since been closed.

The report claimed that US$681 million was transferred into Najib's bank accounts in two tranches in March 2013, two months before the general election. The money originated from a Tanore Finance, incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. The WSJ said another three tranches involving RM42 million were transferred from SRC International into Najib's accounts. SRC International is owned by the Finance Ministry, which Najib heads.

Source: MalaysiaKini http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/307196

In the meantime, there is a sudden Cabinet shakeup which saw to the axing of former Deputy Prime Minister Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yasin and former Attorney-General Abdul Gani Patail - both of whom have been critical of 1MDB. there have also been several arrests made, including that of the deputy public prosecutor looking into the 1MDB embezzlement saga. 

What are your thoughts?

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Our premiere edition is finally up and running!

As all first editions go, this is quite a modest venture by us.

But please, do have a read. We would love to hear from you!

(P)aragraph Journal Issue No. 1

Contents:

I. The Potential Influence of Foreign Powers on Myanmar

II. The Necessary Word Game

III. Sharing the Cost of “Being Humane”

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The inundation of migrants from war- torn Syria and impoverished sub-Saharan Africans to Europe is arguably the most pressing issue at hand for the European Union (EU). Amidst the chaos, the EU has faced international and domestic censure for “not giving a damn” about the lives of the migrants. A quick appraisal of the quagmire that the EU is stuck in reveals the source of the EU members’ reservations in pulling their weight to resolve this crisis. Primarily, notwithstanding the rectitude and rhetoric of being compassionate and human equality, “being humane” does come at a price. The rescue of the migrants from the Mediterranean Sea is not simply a one–off operation. It also implicates the long-term economical cost that comes with resettling and relocating the migrants. More importantly, the political, social and cultural costs for Europe to absorb and integrate these migrants will be exorbitant given the rate and volume of the migratory flow. Tensions between the host population and immigrants could easily escalate especially with Europe’s current economic woes and the vastly different backgrounds of the new arrivals. Such intolerance for immigration could then further fuel the support for far-right political parties, ousting the incumbent liberals and potentially reshaping the political milieu of Europe. In lieu of this “cost”, it is no wonder that the EU governments are apprehensive about devoting effort into this humanitarian mission.

In the face of internal economic woes, the added burden for humanitarian aid could place a strain on EU infrastructure. The sum of money devoted to rescues of the migrants is set to increase with the EU prepared to fund an extra €50 million in 2015/2016 for the rescue mission and to triple the budget for the Frontex joint-operations Triton and Poseidon to better manage the influx from across the Mediterranean Sea. These are on top of naval operations funding targeted at sinking vessels that transport the migrants to Europe. The costs of these measures will only continue to snowball as there has yet to be an effective solution to stop the flow of migrants right at its roots in Libya. Efforts to engage Libya for a joint solution are nugatory with Libya’s internal chaos, with two rival governments fighting for control of the country. But what makes this economic cost all the more problematic is that the economic burden is felt unevenly across EU.  The burden of this “cost” is felt more strongly in the South where the economy is in decline, but where the frontier of this migrant crisis lies. The rate and volume of exodus are overwhelming the reception centres in Italy where approximately 76,000 people are accommodated. Furthermore, even if they are rescued, these new arrivals would have difficulty finding a long term job in Italy or Southern Europe where the economy has taken a downturn in the recent years. They would only add to the saturation of labour in a workforce that has decreasing vacancies. The migrants are aware of the situation and have aimed to reach the richer areas of Western and Northern Europe. Again, disputes emerge over how many of these migrants should be allowed in, as too many of these migrants would be deemed an “over-foreignization” in the work force. It might be perceived as increased competition for jobs even in these richer countries. Undeniably, the economic cost of rescuing, resettling and relocating these migrants is hefty.

Taking this economic cost into consideration, the EU has proposed in May that “Excoriate Countries would receive €6,000 for every person relocated on their territory” in a bid to ameliorate the situation at the frontier. More importantly, the proposed plan involves a fairer distribution of the migrants across the EU members. The distribution criteria will consider “GDP, size of population, unemployment rate and past numbers of asylum seekers and of resettled refugees, and will take account of the efforts already made on a voluntary basis by Member States.” Since there is no incisive way to eradicate this problem, the next best solution is to manage and cushion the impact of this issue. The proposal is exactly in accordance to this line of thinking. By distributing the migrants evenly, it will mitigate, however slightly, the impact of this inundation of migrants and decentralize the pressure faced by the South.

Yet, EU members remain reluctant to exercise solidarity and continue to argue over this proposed quota plan. This suggests that monetary cost aside, the EU members also hold strong trepidations on the non-monetary aspects of “being humane”.  Firstly, the quota plan begets the question of responsibility sharing as an aspect of EU solidarity. In the proposal, it was stipulated that “If necessary [the quota plan] will be followed up with a proposal for a binding and mandatory legislative approach beyond 2016”. This means that all member states would be obliged to take in the migrants regardless of their hand in “creating” the migrant problem in the first place. This will set the precedence for sharing of burden to alleviate problems caused by other member states—a dangerous slippery slope that the EU should avoid. At least to the eastern member states, inclusive of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia that have opposed the quota system, it is unfair to impose upon other member states the burden of other member states’ problem, even if it is for the greater good of the region.  According to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban who has inveighed against the proposal, “It is a mad idea for someone to let refugees into their own country instead of defending their borders and then to say I will redistribute them among you … This is an unfair and indecent proposal. We therefore cannot support it.” Indeed, no rational country would be willing to bear the consequence of other countries’ problem. National interest will always precede the regional interests, especially if it is not self-beneficial.

Secondly, “being humane” to the new migrants can create and aggravate social issues in an increasingly intolerant Europe. The most permanent aspect of absorbing these migrants would be the change in demography in Europe. This change in demography entails the change in the social and political composition of Europe in the next generations to come. The global milieu is such that sentiments of Islamophobia are heightened and there is an increased perception of “over-foreignization” in Europe. The increased intolerance for immigration is reflected in the support for conservative far-right political parties and increasingly rightist moves by liberals to garner support from the population. Earlier this year, Denmark rolled out measures which will make it harder for people to claim asylum, meaning that more refugees are granted only short-term permits and it would be harder for their families to join them in Denmark. In the Danish general election on 18 June, the incumbent liberals were ousted and the opposition, a coalition consisting of the Danish People’s Party (set to be the second-large party in parliament), a party that has spoken out in favour of regular border controls to prevent illegal immigration, was voted in. In France, in the wake of the Paris attacks in January, National Front leader, Marine Le Pen had demanded that France regain control over its borders by stopping immigration.  The anti-Islam PEGIDA movement has already taken root in Germany and had spread across Europe. These movements are all symptomatic of increased intolerance towards immigration. In light of this situation, it is evident that the host population for these migrants (majority Muslims) is not in the position to absorb them at this moment. It is also in this context that migrant crisis became a convenient tool for the conservatives and far-rights to further their political agenda. Harping on increased immigrations and its alleged dilution of western culture and security, the cry for anti-immigration had fell on receptive ears in Europe. It does not help that the accumulation of the migrants is conspicuous. The build- up of migrants in major train stations in Italy due to the temporary suspension of the Schengen open borders accord during the G7 submit is most poignant image of the over-influx of migrants in Europe. Sheer visibility of the migrants to the common people on the ground is proof for anyone who buys into rightist rhetoric that their countries are “over-foreignized”. The clash between the Italians and France over the closing of the border to migrants and the fact that Hungary is building up a physical fence to keep out migrants clearly show the reluctance of the EU member states to receive these refugees in their own country. The social and political toll that the migrants will take on the country is recognized by the EU member states and is particularly reflected in the to-and-fro-game of pushing the refugees to each other.

Peter Sutherland, the special representative of the UN secretary general on migration has stated that “The fundamental issue here is saving people who are drowning in the Mediterranean… this is not about getting into battles about quotas when we are facing a humanitarian crisis”. Indeed, ideally, the economic, social and political price tags that come with humanitarian aid should be obviated. Unfortunately, the reality is that politics and money have taken precedence over compassion for a fellow human being. In the debates over what to do with the migrants, the states and many observers have dehumanized the people. The migrants are treated as problems to be solved, objects to be distributed, burdens that are not wanted, but rarely as fellow human beings to be saved. That countries will remain obdurate in their stance and refuse to exercise any form of solidarity to “cost-sharing” that will harm their respective national interests is not unexpected but nevertheless disheartening. “Being humane” is expensive and it seems that the EU is simply averse to bearing this cost.

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“The very first step is to recognize and name them: Rohingyas.”

That appeared to be the strongest message sent out at last week’s (May 29) special session on the Rohingya crisis. Titled The Tragedy of the Rohingyas: A Conversation with Dr Farish Noor, the two-hour session began with a brief historical background on how the Rohingyas’ position in Myanmar and in the Andaman Seas have been misunderstood, and how the dynamics of Burman nationalism since the 1950s contributed to present-day right-wing ethno-fascist sentiments. This was followed by questions from the audience, making this a genuine speaker-audience conversation rather than one mitigated by a sit-in moderator.

Across all his responses, Dr Farish emphasised his discomfort with one key issue: how the crisis, and in turn the Rohingyas, have been framed in both international and regional media. Unfortunately, most members of the audience who posed questions failed to pick up and pursue the point further. At the end of two hours, Dr Farish rounded off the session by reasserting how inappropriately the term “homeless” has been attached to the Rohingyas. He also cautioned against casting the crisis in terms of religious conflict.

The manner in which a crisis is defined goes beyond how the media interprets and presents it. On one hand, there ought to be a restoration of the dignity of the Rohingyas in the media as peoples whose home have for generations been within the shores of Myanmar, specifically in the state of Arakan, as well as in the region called Southeast Asia. On the other hand, it is equally crucial to pay attention to how the crisis and the peoples caught in it are being defined by states currently working to produce a regional response.

On the humanitarian level thus far, there has been little disagreement that immediate aid and medical relief should be rendered to the peoples stranded at sea. However, if Southeast Asian states are to move forward beyond such surgical measures, they can no longer avoid confronting the complications and limitations fraught within regional policy formulations. The nature of intra-ASEAN negotiations for crisis management has, for better or for worse, been traditionally a work of “consensus.” Regional policies tend to only be formulated and subsequently implemented when parties involved can agree to a set definition of how a crisis should be viewed. Hence, the tossing around of terms is hardly a banal act.

As of end May 2015, the formal designation for the Rohingyas aboard the boats in the Andaman Sea and Malacca Straits is that of “irregular migrants”. The term carries several implications. Firstly, it works to accommodate the confusion of nationalities of those found on board the boats, with some being the stateless Rohingyas and the Bangladeshi economic migrants. UNHCR officials working on the makeshift refugee camps in Aceh, for instance, have acknowledged the presence of these two nationalities. Moreover, the Burmese government have remained consistent in publicly refusing to acknowledge the Rohingyas by their nationality but instead as foreign Bengalis. “Irregular migrants” becomes a neutral term not exclusive to any nationality, but convey a notion of peoples deciding to take to the boats due to unnatural circumstances. In other words, circumstances propelling the crisis which might be clear to some members of ASEAN, but could not be couched explicitly to avoid antagonizing one another or be seen as meddling in their neighbour’s sovereignty.

Secondly, the term “irregular migrant” is also broad and ambiguous enough to be acceptable by all states involved to proceed with discussions on crisis management. It allows states to avoid the moral responsibility of addressing a systematic persecution programme initiated by a neighbour towards its minorities which produce the streams of “refugees” now flooding the seas. It also avoids demonising those already on the boats as an unwanted community, a charge states may be faced with should they label the Rohingyas simply as “illegal immigrants”.

Thirdly, it allows belated compassion to be expressed, especially with the unravelling of a longstanding human trafficking ring in the region. The “irregular” or unnatural circumstances are now revealed to be the victimization of the peoples as commodities in the new age slave trade. Recently uncovered evidences including mass graves at Wang Kelian in Perlis point to the validity of such cases. However, without denying the seriousness of these claims, such conflation between the region’s human trafficking syndicates and the fate of those peoples at sea anticipates a worrying potential to oversimplify the roots of the crisis in popular understanding.

To be fair, non-state actors have sought to repeal such narrow explanations of the crisis across varying platforms. In an article for the Jakarta Post, Avyantha Azis cautioned that the Rohingya issue is a political crisis of which states are attempting to manage as a humanitarian crisis. In doing so, ASEAN governments are skirting that the issue at heart is Myanmar’s persecution of the ethnic Rohingyas within their borders. To add on to Avyantha’s views, the solutions proposed by states then amount to the extension of relief aid, demonstrating a good deed done by governments with hearts – and maybe score yet another point in a moral one-upmanship game with the Burmese government in the eyes of the international community.

In another example, Marina Mahathir at the Global Moderates Movement-PROHAM roundtable session “The ASEAN Humanitarian Crisis in the Seas of Southeast Asia: What Are the Durable Solutions?” mooted a suggestion to marshal an international campaign against Myanmar’s persecution of minority groups. She suggested this be done in the same fashion as South African anti-apartheid movements in the 1970s-90s.

Such suggestions, however, are not new. At a conference in Harvard late last year, Nobel laureate and prolific social thinker Amartya Sen has thrown his weight behind getting the Rohingya crisis to be recognized internationally as “slow genocide”, in as much as they are being denied citizenship, healthcare and nutritional opportunities. Other academics at the conference have also echoed similar sentiments.

It would be an unimaginably far stretch to demand that ASEAN states begin to borrow the vocabulary from these non-state actors and confront Myanmar with them, if only because in its history, ASEAN has never openly vilified any of its member-states for unsavoury charges. With 2015 being the year in which the ASEAN Community is to materialize, for the organization to suddenly turn on Myanmar would bode little benefit for the image of the association as a united front on the international level.

Yet, stop-gap measures through relief efforts cannot be looked upon as a concrete solution in itself. The exodus of Rohingyas would continue as long as the situation in Arakan shows no hope for improvement. Moreover, Malaysia and Indonesia have imposed a one-year limit in their sheltering efforts for the Rohingyas, and have appealed to UNHCR and the international community for assistance to resolve the crisis.

The challenge for ASEAN is to pinpoint a balance on which to negotiate with the Burmese government to (at the very least) amend its 1982 citizenship law which has removed the Rohingyas from being recognized as one of the ethnic groups in Myanmar, but still able to present itself as the leading player in Southeast Asia on issues directly concerning the region. Too often ASEAN has been ridiculed as preferring a status quo of inefficient tameness in order to preserve its nominal unity. In the face of mounting tensions between China and the United States in the South China Sea, it becomes even more imperative that ASEAN in 2015 send a clear signal that the contest for influence and jurisdiction over the waters cannot exclude the voices of the states directly living along its coastline.

Should ASEAN be able to tide through the implosion of the Rohingya crisis in a convincing manner as a region, then perhaps we could grant the region a thin slice of optimism in dealing with China over the squabble over the South China Sea, especially with the newly announced China-ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Special Meeting to be held in October in Beijing this year. Even if ASEAN is unable to resolve the crisis or bring Myanmar to acknowledge and take responsibility for her practices of persecution, at the very least ASEAN must demonstrate a desire and potential to manage it. Otherwise the ASEAN Community project – and perhaps even ASEAN itself – will once again be deemed the white elephant of the region.

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In light of the recent migrant crisis in Southeast Asia, the Rohingya people in Myanmar are once again in the international spotlight. Much has been said about the need to resolve this issue that lies at the core of the migrant crisis. Despite so, Myanmar has criticized any attempt to portray the crisis as resulting from the Rohingya issue. This refusal to accept blame reveals quite evidently that the Myanmar government has no intention to change its policies toward the Rohingya minority in the near future, if ever. Could foreign powers – namely the United States and China – possibly effect a change in Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya?

Myanmar’s relationship with the United States has always been marked by tension. The United States has constantly used economic sanctions as an expression of disapproval against Myanmar regarding issues involving human rights and the enforcement of democracy in the country. Though such sanctions have been eased since 2012, the right to enforce these sanctions has been renewed annually. This is reflective of the United States’ pivot to the Asia-Pacific under the Obama administration, seeking ‘pragmatic engagement’ with Myanmar by complementing sanctions with increased dialogue. So will the United States potentially be able to push Myanmar to review the unfair treatment of the Rohingya minority?  This seems quite unlikely.

Arguably, the United States has little sway over Myanmar’s policy-making which is shaped more by internal politics and developments rather than international circumstances. The strict enforcement of sanctions against Myanmar by previous United States presidential administrations failed to achieve much in the advancement of human rights in Myanmar. For one, the call for the release of democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest and compliance with the results of the 1990 elections never came to fruition. The eventual release of Aung San Suu Kyi was decided upon by the military junta as they saw fit to do so, not a moment earlier or later than when it was felt to suit their interests. Detractors of President Obama’s ‘pragmatic engagement’ policy therefore argue that the easing of sanctions has made it even less likely for the United States’ to be able to advance human rights causes in Myanmar.

Furthermore, the United States is mindful of its strategic interests in the region vis-à-vis China which is growing in strength and influence on the international stage. China has long shared a close relationship with Myanmar that has endured regardless of Myanmar’s isolation in the international community. By taking a hard stance on the Rohingya issue, the United States risks pushing Myanmar even closer to China at a time when Myanmar is gradually presenting itself as a market with great economic potential. It is therefore unlikely that the United States will take significant action to push Myanmar towards changing its treatment of the Rohingya people at risk of its own interests. Even if it were to happen, the impetus for change remains in the military junta’s willingness to change rather the influence, if any, of the United States’ economic sanctions.

Will China use its close ties with Myanmar to effect change in the Southeast Asian country’s treatment of minority peoples then? Perhaps in the case of ethnic minorities living along the common border between China and Myanmar such as in the Kokang region, where conflict between the military junta and ethnic minorities have culminated in armed conflict and an influx of refugees into China. Yet considering the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence which form the basis of China’s interactions with other states, of which non-interference in internal affairs is a key point, China will not intervene in Myanmar’s policy-making unless it threatens China’s interests and/or security. China is wary of possibly alienating Myanmar in the face of warming ties between Myanmar and the United States, especially given what it views as the United States’ attempt to contain China in the region. It is therefore unlikely that China will step up to play a significant role with regards to the Rohingya issue, whether to speak for or against the Rohingyas.

It appears then that despite much criticism of ASEAN’s model of international relations based on consensus and non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states, ASEAN has the best chance of engaging Myanmar in constructive dialogue regarding the Rohingya issue. As Myanmar balances its relationship with the United States and China, it is able to play off Sino-US tension and rivalry to avoid over-reliance on either superpower. This allows Myanmar more autonomy in shaping its government policies without having to fall in line behind either superpower. Ultimately, change in Myanmar’s treatment of ethnic minorities such as the Rohingya remains dependent on the considerations of Myanmar’s government. However as compared to other types of foreign intervention, Myanmar is more comfortable engaging in dialogue with ASEAN given that it is assured of not being forced into any decisions that go against its self-interests. Therefore while ASEAN is incapable of enforcing change in Myanmar’s treatment of ethnic minorities, it remains the most likely platform on which Myanmar is willing to engage in dialogue and to enact change.

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we have been keeping the face of the blog mysterious for no reason.

so here you go.

Tumblr, meet (P)aragraph.

(P)aragraph, meet Tumblr.

[BTW our articles are also underway - they are sitting at the Editor’s desk for now and will soon see the light of day!]

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Thailand's death camps may be the most horrifying places in Southeast Asia

The horrors of the transatlantic slave trade are not resigned to history

By now, the ruthless nature of Rohingya trafficking syndicates is known to all — including Rohingya living on their native lands in Myanmar.

But their attempts to escape via the Bay of Bengal will likely continue. All of the Rohingya interviewed by GlobalPost were aware that the sea journey might kill them. Their decision to accept this risk is a testament to their bleak lives in Myanmar.

"We already live so close to death back home," Salima says. "We're mistreated by police. We're unable to feed ourselves. Women get, you know, dishonored. We think, ‘Well, I might as well risk dying at sea.'"

[uncle-iroh]

You have to understand, no one puts their children in a boat unless the water is safer than the land.

Warsan Shire (via uncle-iroh)

or as Farish A. Noor mentioned in a talk on the Rohingyas recently, 

“It takes a lot to compel people to leave the lands they call their home.”

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Mark Godfrey, TJ Demos, Eyal Weizman and Ayesha Hameed on Migration, Tate Etc issue 19 Summer 2010

While we are still preparing to present to you (P)aragraph’s first edition on migration, we came across this old piece from the Tate. As early as 2010, artists have been exploring the political questions of migration in their works. 

Here is an excerpt:

Mark Godfrey I find it interesting that so many other artists who look at crossings between Europe and Africa, and who are based in places such as Brussels, Berlin, Paris or London, tend not to pay attention to the life of migrants all around them in their home cities, but instead head for the locations of crossings, as if migrants’ struggles take place only at these sites. In so doing, they treat the border as if it is still a single place, or a line that exists on a map.

Ayesha Hameed I agree. This is the afterlife of migration, and your point calls attention to what extent that part of the journey is rendered visible or invisible. Once migrants reach their destination the discourse in art turns more towards identity politics and culturally specific shows, so that the conversation focuses more on static sites of multiculturality, as opposed to these fluid or mobile zones of crisis which render a certain point of their journey visible. When you talk about borders as a regime of visibility in this afterlife, those that migrants encounter are not necessarily visible. The borders themselves as they operate in the city become more complicated as they are more visible to those that can’t cross them, or they’ve become operationalised around these clusters of multicultural zones, and in the art world, in the organisation of shows that focus on national origin or ethnic identity.

Meanwhile, let us know what are your thoughts on migration, especially in light of what is happening across the Mediterranean and in Southeast Asia! Are the terms ‘refugee’ or ‘migrants’ appropriate? How else should we understand these crises? Have the non-political spheres i.e. art, literature, civil movements done enough?

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On 8 June 2015, Singapore declared a National Remembrance Day in memoriam of the Tanjong Katong Primary School students, teachers and adventure guide who lost their lives at Mt Kinabalu in Sabah. All events at the 28th Southeast Asian (SEA) Games began with a minute of silence to pay respects to the victims of the Sabah earthquake.

Our thoughts and prayers are with the families and loved ones of those lost in the Sabah quake.

Our thoughts, prayers and gratitude also for the mountain guides, who are laying and have laid their lives down to assist in the rescue efforts.

With much love, the (P)aragraph team

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we say hello, too. and welcome!

the first edition of (P)aragraph will be up and running soon. we cannot wait to show it off to all of you.