model_dump
[The intended recipient of this post was accidentally tagged early, as such this version of the post shall not be revised.]
(~11,800 words, 53 minutes)
Summary: A dense summary of the mechanical logic behind immigration restriction as the core pillar of the contemporary U.S. right-wing coalition.
As an overview, this document will mostly be a rerun for long-term readers of mitigatedchaos. It is not intended as introductory material for new audiences. New readers should instead read Now, Melt, which covers more foundational considerations and background knowledge.
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[ @themarospeaker wrote: ]
I value brevity, but I don't mind lengthy responses - as long as that length isn't intelligence-signalling drivel, but actual substance. Your response before proved you can do more than just fucking signal, so keep it up and we can have an actual conversation, alright?
This document is a heavyweight at over 11,000 words (including quotations). It aims to describe, in a relatively thorough manner, the points of my disagreement and the general reasoning behind them. Based on the prior 15,000-word Tumblr reply thread back-and-forth, I have tried to tune the density, but there may still be some over-explaining. I'll leave it up to you to determine if it's "intelligence-signalling."
My central point of disagreement is not on whether programs like "blinded resume hiring" are desirable, but whether the contemporary U.S. left-of-center is still capable of sticking to nuanced policy like that. My theory is that they stopped being able to sometime around 2012-2013, due to a combination of a bad ideological belief, and the political economy of rapid demographic change, which I believe favors a short-termist extractive approach over a long-termist productive one, along with other contributing factors. Therefore, in my opinion, immigration restriction is currently the strongest lever to correct this situation.
If nuanced 'left-wing' ideas are reliably 'recuperated' (i.e. bastardized) by 'liberals,' then effective policy implementation requires figuring out why that keeps happening. What's the most complex policy that a government or political system can support? What happens if that falls, and how can we raise it?
This document focuses on the unfavorable political economy of rapid demographic change, but that is not the sole reason that this happened, and immigration restriction, while high-leverage, does not create high-quality policy in itself. After immigration is restricted, there will be many years of work to do on institution quality, deep literacy, the effects of AI, and so on.
While I expect you to strongly disagree with my assessment, this document should give you:
A general understanding of where the contemporary U.S. right is coming from.
The central axis of organization of the contemporary U.S. right.
What sort of evidence or mechanism descriptions would be necessary to convince members of the contemporary U.S. right and split their current coalition (on core issues).
This includes, implicitly, which paths remain, following the decline in institutional trust, to connect members of the contemporary U.S. right to information.
The second Trump administration is banked, effectively, on two unresolved questions. The first is whether sufficiently effective interventions exist, and are known. The second is whether Democrats can be normal. A firm, positive answer on either of them (on the level of "China has industrialized," or "Singapore is wealthy") would allow for de-escalation.
Index
This document is divided into multiple parts, based on the replies from the final reply chain. Due to length, sections are numbered for ease of reference. This table is provided for ease of navigation only. Readers should start with Part 1.a.
[1]-[3] - A graph-based representation of the polity and of political structures.
[4]-[5] - Problems with the contemporary U.S. Democrats and associated institutions.
[6]-[10] - Risks with the political economy of combining mass unfiltered immigration with a lack of fast, highly-effective interventions. Core contemporary right-wing thinking in the U.S. on this issue. Potential 'natural exits,' and why they look either too improbable to risk betting on, or too undesirable.
[11] - Standard explanation of America's role in the global system (potential stakes from disruption).
[12]-[13] - Why it's better to look at recent causes for the Trump II admin.
[14]-[17] - DE&I composition, extent, balance of power.
[18] - Objection to presumed level of elite unity and competence; alternative theory of elite dynamics.
[19]-[22] - Objections regarding coalition quality. Also, no reason to believe that "more Reconstruction" solves the problem, rather than getting us to the current impasse sooner (might be of benefit historically, but doesn't solve our problems now).
[23]-[28] - Discussion of the two-sided nature of environmental and non-environmental factors.
[29]-[30] - The importance of trade-offs, including moral trade-offs, in considering declining marginal gains.
[31]-[32] - The nature of technically-intensive interventions.
[33]-[35] - General views on evolution; brief criticism of Nick Land.
[36]-[37] - Moral considerations regarding future technically-intensive interventions.
[38]-[40] - What's the appropriate null hypothesis, really?
[41]-[46] - Further moral considerations regarding potential future technically-intensive interventions.
[47]-[49] - The breakdown of nuanced 'left-wing' ideas suggests would-be implementers that prioritize group reputation protection and ignore nth-order consequences.
[50] - Internal conditions have higher leverage than external ones in terms of wealth as both cause and effect.
[51]-[52] - Problems with, and limitations to, elite quality.
[53]-[57] - Pandemic learning loss and limits to education.
[58]-[69] - U.S. Democrats doing a "bait-and-switch," advertising high-quality gap-closing attempts, and replacing them with Ibram X. Kendi.
[70]-[72] - Public institutions need to guard their reputation to prevent good work's reputation from being spent by dumb activists.
[73]-[75] - Good program variants did not require the 2014 identitarian turn.
[76]-[80] - The bad elements of the coalition are degrading institutions, which makes implementing good policy more, rather than less, difficult. This limits feasible policy complexity.
Part 1.a
The first reply.
I forget Americans always think in individual patterns; you've slightly graduated to thinking internal national politics mirror international relations, so I get that you're attempting to try to relate your alarmist idea of what ethnic relations are like in the USA (Low grade compared to ethnic conflicts in my neck of the woods). At least this is more coherent than what you've been saying earlier. Much better - you CAN talk about things without layers of obscurantism over top of it, but I'll get to why this doesn't apply to US foreign policy and interventionism in a bit.
TMS: "thinking internal national politics mirror international relations"
[1] Model the polity as a graph, where each person is a node, and then they are connected by directed weighted edges, representing things like power relationships, communication channels, or personal loyalties. Then give each node a vector, representing ideology or interests, from which the similarity of their alignment can be determined.
A formation produces a force on the environment and on people through synchronized action. The level of synchronization determines how coherent that force is. The synchronized actions of a motor company produce a car. The synchronized actions of a police force produce an expectation that theft is risky or costly.
Society is thus composed of overlapping power networks. A formal external agreement, for example, creates internal leverage for actors within an organization to use against other actors internal to that organization. It can succeed or fail. This holds from countries, through corporations, all the way down to the sub-actor impulses of human psychology at the individual level.
[2] Some formations are more coherent than others. The different formations have different structures. Information processing and decision-making limits inherently push large formations towards hierarchy (see the Mythical Man-Month). (We can think of the number of layers of management of an organization as being roughly based on its typical ratio of supervisors to employees.) This creates positions of greater, and more abstract, leverage.
People who occupy positions of high leverage in the power graph are "elites."
[3] The general problem of the Democrats in the early 21st century is that they are a distributed political machine. Obviously there will be arguments about how much a "political machine" is a difference in degree, but e.g. in California, that high-speed-rail project is probably like 90% graft.
Previously, probably due to slower communications, political machines (in America) would be isolated to an urban area, and probably both due to geographic limits and due to communication limits, they would be ruled by a "party boss."
A party boss is a man who has the authority to say "no." Since graft is not investment (at the polity layer), it doesn't pay for itself, so the amount of graft has to be limited, or it will start cutting into investment and depleting capital stocks. It will make the polity less competitive internationally and make non-graft-taking citizens less wealthy before then.
The problem with the contemporary Democrats is that (a) they lack a party boss to enforce both efficiency to keep the conversion ratio of payments into public (non-excludable & non-rivalrous) and club (excludable & non-rivalrous) goods high, and (b) due to the information collection and processing problems and incentive problems with centralized planning (and all law is centralized planning, even if it has net gains in some parts of the range, same as for firms), as the "more government spending party," Democrats have mostly tapped out their potential gains from more spending, and would need to instead switch to higher cultivation (higher per-node performance allowing each node to handle more of a production problem) in order to remain a source of net gains.
... You are also reading far too much conflict in between the two parties - there is a high degree of kayfayb between them and they often stoke conflict on both sides. The problem is symmetrical, and it far predated the past decade.
[4] I'm going to play my, "Actually, I am a real American" card on you here - race relations were actually doing pretty well in America from the 1990s-2014. This time is almost entirely down to the Democrats. White American racial supremacist or separatist politics were pretty thoroughly suppressed during this time, by reasonable definitions.
Racial animosity was stoked for political purposes since the founding of the country itself, and it's much more documented than the handful of policy examples you're trying to talk about now.
[5] This is a bit more complex, but there are basically three or four factors.
[5a] The Democrats implicitly, but not explicitly, overhyped what they could reasonably have hoped to achieve with the election of Barack Obama. This isn't about Republican obstructionism. They had two options; they could either (i) admit that one black American President wasn't going to be enough to close outcome gaps by itself, and that they didn't have solid programs to implement, or (ii) claim that they had been foiled because the whole country was evil and racist (even though huge numbers of white Americans voted for Obama). They chose the second, due to weak moral character.
Recall that forcing schools to implement phonics is a Republican program. Republicans believe in absolute capability, not purely relative capability, and so from a Republican perspective, a rise in absolute capability should lead to greater employment, reduced welfare spending, and lower taxes for their constituents.
[5b] Collective intergenerational ethic justice claims allow collapsing centuries of inter-group claims into short window of time, allow moving claims between people (upping limits dramatically), and are often made in a way that is unfalsifiable (e.g. 'no you can't check if that residential school actually has a mass graveyard; that's genocide denial!'). Fighting back looks like breaking the inter-ethnic peace, which is strongly taboo'd for good reason.
Since this allows unlimited claims with zero accountability, including zero responsibility for delivering actual infrastructure, it is an excellent, if evil, choice for a political machine that has tapped out legitimate gains [3].
Note that this doesn't need to happen consciously. People can see activists engaging in this behavior and succeeding, and then copy it. It's more like the brake of personal judgment (and punishment for bad actors) is required to stop it.
[5c] Democrats overall have undergone a psycho-moral regression, on average, and are now more politically tribal than they were in 2008. I don't expect you to accept this at all, I'm just stating it because...
[5d] Democrats seem to have basically collapsed something called the "Emerging Democratic Majority" theory (the author of which has now written "Where Have All the Democrats Gone?"), in which (i) demographic change would give Democrats a "durable majority" (ii) assuming that they do "progressive centrism." They didn't like the second part, so they just ignored it and went turbo-immigration, and didn't evaluate what the strategic consequences of that would be.
Internally, this wouldn't register as "breaking a rule," because (i) it would be framed as "this will give us victory because Republicans are just racist," and "if Republicans weren't racist, then it would be no problem for them," and then (ii) there would be no follow-up whatsoever on whether Republicans (or indeed, anyone) actually can sort out all the problems, as it would be assumed that some Democrat somewhere already has all of the answers, and in any case, it would be suspect to doubt it. Typical partisan behavior.
From the other direction, immigration restrictionists and skeptics would have felt that they were, in the interests of harmony, deliberately not making the strongest, most pessimistic arguments, and that there was a mutual understanding which was violated.
Part 1.b
This part is going to be a bit brutal and legalistic. I apologize for the slog.
[6] It is the combination of three factors that creates the critical condition: (i) unfiltered mass immigration, (ii) lack of gap-closing interventions, and (iii) explicitly racialized/ethnicized redistribution. This is setting aside sectarian conflict.
[6a] If a complete and cost-effective suite of gap-closing interventions exists, such that any man can be trained up, perhaps not to the level of Einstein, but to the level of a highly-competent engineer, then global outcome convergence is largely a function of capital diffusion (and therefore the removal of obstacles to capital diffusion). Any immigrant is mostly fine, since reliably on the next generation, or shortly thereafter with his grandchild, there will be no difference in productivity between his child and the natives.
[6b] If reliable gap-closing interventions do not exist, or they are not complete, then there may be intergenerationally durable differences in group outcomes along highly visible lines, such as ethnicity or visible ancestry.
[6c] The existence of such durable gaps [6b] creates the opportunity for potential particularist gains from redistribution along explicitly racial or ethnic lines, with the high visibility of these characteristics making this coordination easier. This creates an opportunity for a political entrepreneur to create and distribute ideology to coordinate political mobilization and patronage along these lines, taking some of the power and resources from the transfer process for himself.
This is the product of a divergent distribution of class interests. (See the Curley Effect for an example of exploiting this.)
[6d] The inability to "opt out," and the potentially intergenerational character (so that their children can't "opt out" either), makes it less feasible for people to avoid being a target. (This is one of the reasons that this class of conflict is so dangerous.)
[6e] If immigration is highly filtered, then immigrants can be carefully selected for a similar distribution of class interests to the natives. This makes the potential net gains from explicitly ethnic redistribution smaller, not only materially, but also psychologically (the two groups are closer to being peers).
This assumes, of course, that the immigrants do not vote for more immigration, which may result in less filtering.
[6f] The more immigrants from a country there are, the less filtering there will be, and the more the existing beliefs, values, expectations, and intervention-resistant share of academic performance in the origin country will matter.
[6g] This also means that "assimilation" will be more difficult as a matter of course, and (very obviously) not linearly (due to economies of scale in cultural goods/services, and increased political power, including inherent political power outside of the electoral system).
[6g] In the event that explicit ethnic redistribution is done, but demographic ratios are fixed, then the redistribution should eventually settle on some fixed ratio based on the relative demographic balance of power, as the opportunities for political entrepreneurship decline. This means that expected losses from ethnic redistribution are relatively fixed and can be planned around - not ideal, but possible to make functional.
[6h] Under mass unfiltered immigration, demographic ratios are constantly changing, which means that the relative demographic balance of power is not only constantly changing but constantly becoming unknown, which means that opportunities for ethnic political entrepreneurship are constantly renewing, which means that the expected losses are not fixed, and are likely to be constantly increasing.
[6i] As such, it is quite rational and normal for a population to accept slow cultural and demographic change, but not rapid cultural and demographic change, even setting aside their own cultural capital (such as language, which the new guys may not speak; learning a new language is not free).
[7] The combination of the three factors [6] creates the potential for "demographic lockout" from the electoral system, which is not present if any of the three factors is missing.
[7a] If the distribution of class interests between groups does not converge, or is consistently being reset, then because ideological development is not free or instant, even under a two-party system, one of the two parties may not be able to change rapidly enough to be viable at the national level.
[7b] Even under a two-party system, if the distribution of cultural or class interests is too disjoint, then forming an ideology to contest the redistributionist party may be too difficult. That is, the span of interests may be too large for successful compression into a unifying ideology.
[7c] Additionally, mass immigration favors viewing the resources of the polity as belonging to "the Other" rather than to oneself and one's grandchildren, partly due to low investment, and partly due to the usual human foolishness, and thus as spoils to be redistributed, rather than as valuable capital infrastructure to be maintained and defended. (It's really dumb, but what do you think all that welfare fraud in Minnesota is about? They're obviously not thinking about the long-term health of the polity. A formation's not a 'stationary bandit' if it ain't stationary.)
[7d] The largest problem, however, is the ethnicized redistribution itself.
By coming in and being given resource transfer for consumption or private investment, rather than as genuine investment in the long-term benefit of the polity, on an ethnic basis, individuals will likely (i) become dependent on these transfers over time, and have a higher net price to seek an honest living later (which is difficult for the defending political formation to outbid - "good governance" pays distantly and broadly, not immediately), and (ii) psychologically rationalize the ethnic transfers to preserve their sense of being a good person.
You might say that this is part of how colonialism, slavery, and so on work. Well, yes, if you have something like slavery cropping up, you ideally want to get rid of it early, before people have a chance to become heavily invested in it, not only financially, but also morally, in terms of their self-image.
Industrial capitalism and even industrial market socialism, for all their problems, can at least be said to be increasing capital stocks.
[7e] This process will proceed iteratively. Since the mode of power gain is extractive, not productive, there will be continuous bids for more ethnic extraction [6h], while the target ethnic group will not be able to resist these bids electorally [7a][7b], and even if they could, may find it politically costly to roll them back [7d].
[7f] Part of the spoils to be redistributed will be positions within the central government. These will be awarded to less-competent personnel on the basis of ethnic/political loyalty, unless someone at the top actively punishes this behavior in order to maintain international competitiveness. (Which, if the ideology is too internalized, they may not.)
This will gradually weaken the authority and power of the central government [1][2], while leaking officer-grade personnel to competing power networks, and providing a potential profit for them along the ethnic axis that would not otherwise exist (the redistributed resources, and reduced rights).
TMS: "thinking internal national politics mirror international relations"
[7g] Thus, if the process is allowed to run and is not interrupted (which hopefully it is!), the result is a gradual loss of power by the central government, a rise in power by competing ethnic networks, and a potential breakup of the polity along ethnic lines when the latter exceed the power of the former.
[8] Is this outcome [7g] certain?
[8a] Keep in mind, of course, the groups described [7][8] will not be monolithic. This is about averages and distributions.
[8b] First, it's possible that the process could be interrupted along ethnic lines itself, for reasons of coalitional ethnic politics, although this is not gauranteed. For example, if there is widespread ethnic bloc voting, and the prior majority Group A falls from 55% to 40%, and there is some high-earning minority Group B at 15%, bids could start arising to run extraction on Group B as well, and after so much pressure to internalize group self-interest (which, to be clear, is what U.S. "progressives" have been de facto supporting), members of Group B might decide to switch sides to join members of Group A, and then shut down further immigration.
Again, not gauranteed. Not only cultural differences, but also loyalty networks, and internalization of ideology, may prevent this.
Even if it did happen later on, it will only be after a period of declining production and damage to institutions, so it's better to just avoid the whole arc by shutting it down early.
[8c] The process of racializing everything is not likely to be clean, pretty, or epistemically sound. Legalism may well decline in favor of personalism and ethnic self-interest, which may allow a powerful and charismatic authoritarian figure to power, who then purges much of the redistribution on the basis of some new ideology, rewarding his own power structure.
Not desirable. Better to just avoid that whole arc by not doing this in the first place.
[8d] Early enough in the process, the voters themselves may attempt to shut it down, while doing so is still viable. This might look like, say, a semi-authoritarian personalist populist with a rag-tag crew thrown together at the last minute, who is a bit racist but not really mean about it, but is for some reason all about border security, with his officers gung ho about deporting so many people that it undoes the total count of guys let in by the prior administration.
We are here. If, that is, it sticks.
[8e] By the way [8d], something like this model is how a lot of the contemporary right-wingers are thinking - some of them with less resolution, others in ways that are a lot meaner, but the possibility of a "demographic lockout" (the other side of the "durable majority" [5d]) leaving them with a country that's poorer, more durably socialist, worse-working on every level, with fewer rights (including self-defense rights and freedom of speech), while they're unable to do anything about it, means that, unless Democrats capitulate on race and immigration, they're willing to suffer a lot for Trump.
Immigration is extremely politically difficult to reverse. In the absence of effective gap-closing interventions, and keeping in mind sectarian conflict, it is not surprising that they would feel this way.
[8f] It's possible that unforeseen changes within the Democrats, or Democrats deciding to just finally respond to voter sentiment sometime soon, could resolve the situation. If that's going to happen, then they should just make it clear now by passing legislation that shows their new intent to limit immigration and defund racial harassment. That would go a long way towards reining in the Trump II administration [8e] and get BAP and Moldbug farther away from the ears of political leaders.
[8g] There are also other, unexpected possibilities. For example, as of 2017, monogenic gene therapy became an FDA-approved commercial technology. Even if it costs $500,000 now, costs are likely to come down over time. Before the end of the century, it may radically reshape our relationship to both ancestry and appearance.
[8h] The problem with "maybe it could all just melt tomorrow" is that if the demographic lockout hypothesis is true (the "durable majority"), then reversing it is really expensive, so even a seemingly small estimate will lead to being willing to bear heavy costs to prevent it.
Notably, the response is mostly just very heavy immigration restriction and deportation of people who aren't supposed to be in the country anyway. I'll get to the theory of change in a bit.
[8i] Immigration restriction is just a normal part of statecraft, and has historical precedent as a means of managing ethnic tension and political machine politics in the United States.
[9] Why the Democrats? My theory is that it's significantly driven by a lack of agency, authority, and hierarchy.
[9a] Obama was very good at giving speeches, but was weak in restraining the various interest groups that compose the Democratic coalition, especially after he left office. It isn't clear how much he could have, but he would have needed a different mentality. As for Joe Biden, the man was non-entity because he was too old. If he had been 50, he might have done something, but he didn't.
[9b] As for the old leadership other than Presidents, they're also generally quite old. 10 years is a big difference for a senator that might start at age 60. They may act as focal points for accumulated favors, but they're not willing or able to exercise agency.
[9c] This leaves the various elites and elite-aspirants who are in charge of various interest groups, as well as staffers, political entrepreneurs, and the like, to jockey for power, status, and resources within the coalition's established framework, which they did by being more radical. Purity spiral type stuff. Few of them have the authority to restrain the others towards moderation.
[9d] At the same time, print news was declining, so you get same dynamics in print, and universities were graduating more people than there were likely to be spots for, plus there were already fewer conservatives there, so you get the same dynamics in academia.
[9e] Therefore, the Democratic constellation as currently constituted lacks top-level strategic reasoning. It's quite formless and shifting. (Matt Yglesias, for example, is doing strategic reasoning, but he's not actually in charge.)
[9f] This is actually a huge problem [9e], because it means that it cannot be negotiated with. During the second half of the Biden administration, some right-wingers essentially attempted to threaten Democrats into compliance (this is where some of the rightward shift comes from). Later, they realized that this wasn't feasible, because there is no command structure to internalize the threat. (One of them later called the constellation a "headless cybernetic abomination.")
[9g] Thus the theory of change [8h] after the election was to impose consequences, and thereby alter the incentives on the individual actors. Without liberal cooperation, and thus without proximity and knowledge to carry out fine-grained correction, and with a substantial risk of losing power within 2-4 years, the result could be described as "financial strategic bombing."
[9h] The extended theory of change held by less aggressive members is that cutting off the flow of immigration will influence how Democrats rise to the top, and therefore which Democrats rise to the top. By making the extractive footing less useful as a source of power, we will give relative advantage to those on the productive footing - with whom it is easier to make a deal.
[9i] The problem isn't just at the top. Due to the lower level of psycho-moral development, there's also less strategic reasoning and cognitive empathy (not compassion or agreement, but comprehension) in the mid-range, which means that the mid-range doesn't act as a source of correction for the top. There is a great deal of obedience to the perceived social consensus.
In fact, there often isn't any understanding that any rules or general principles were broken at all. Events that happened just a few years ago are swiftly forgotten as if they never happened. People have video recorded and timed the flips from "it's not happening" to "it's good that it's happening."
Partisanship, of course, isn't unique, and U.S. blues can often do okay outside of politics, but within politics, most of them can't be relied on to fix the party.
[10] As for the people actually living in America, if you walk by an ice cream parlor in the contemporary U.S. South, you will likely encounter young people together with a mixed friend group. Even on the right (JD Vance, David Hines, Wesley Yang) you see a lot of inter-racial marriage. (All three of those men are fathers.)
If the emotional, political, and financial pump is smashed, then things should settle down. Then we can have arguments about tax policy, zoning laws, artificial intelligence, and other issues - and there will be plenty of them to have.
[11] Part of the point of bringing up the tail risk is moral judgment of those (i) increasing its probability while (ii) offering nothing of value whatsoever in return for doing so.
America is the keystone of the global system. As long as the developed countries can just buy bottleneck materials on the global market, they don't need military troops to secure them, including (recursively) needing military troops to secure them before other developed countries secure them. Preventing the Japanese and Germans from remilitarizing again also secures American security interests, so the system is self-perpetuating.
This isn't only a factor at the national body level, but in the elite and ideological layers. If elite personal life circumstances aren't critically driven by national well-being (e.g. "if we don't get oil, we're all fucked"), then they have less incentive to build hardcore national colonial imperialist ideology to coordinate military action to engage in imperialism - not just individually, but in terms of implicit shared knowledge about conditions, so even if someone did it, it would be much less likely to be adopted.
This makes the question of development in poor countries much easier to deal with, as it removes much of the military dimension, and makes foreign direct investment depend mostly on internal conditions (more under the control of local leadership), rather than depending as strongly on whether a rival colonial power will show up and expropriate the factory.
Removing America from the keystone position risks creating a dangerous first-actor problem where the system will continue under inertia until the first new imperialist makes an armed resource grab, kicks off the dependency loop (unless some other country takes up the role of leading an alliance to stop it), and thus drags the whole planet back to the 1800s.
(If you want to say that America hasn't handled this role as well as it theoretically could have, I agree.)
The issue with pointing out one 'unhinged ethnic program' is that you're ignoring the Stephen Millers, the America First Legal program, the Federalist Society, the entire fact that high-blood-pressure far right outrage has replaced a majority of right wing journalism, white identity grievance, etc. all creates these incentives for racial animosity on either side. You can't even argue these were a response to something like 1619 or whatever else - those programs themselves were a reaction to the Civil Rights Movement rollbacks, which existed, of course, as backlash to the 60s, which was backlash to the post-Civil War segregation state, which was a backlash to Reconstruction and emancipation, which was a backlash to actual slavery and colonialism.
[12] You are too buried under the weight of history. Stephen Miller is in the White House because Democrats didn't properly restrain themselves during the Biden Administration, which was supposed to be their opportunity to show Americans that Democrats were normal and Trump was just a weird anomaly. Had they managed to hold it together better (perhaps by electing someone younger, or by staffers acting better), Trump would not have been re-elected.
[13] Backlashes don't have unlimited momentum that lasts forever-on into history. The reason that this pendulum keeps swinging is partly the lack of clearly effective interventions, which when combined with the levelling impulse or sense of justice (it can be either or both in these cases, or even just political entrepreneurship), leads to a cycle of trying, failing, and reacting to that failure, sometimes with some gains maintained across the cycle.
Part 2
The second reply.
It's not a 'single-side' issue, and the interventions on the Right are far more extreme and involve far more use of executive overreach.
[14] This is due to the relative balance of power across institutions, formation size/depth, and newness of the political revolt against the dogmatic and mindless pro-immigration consensus. The same as other countries, the establishment would have been let off the hook if they just bent the knee on immigration.
It's unfortunate, but Republicans cannot really "give up" because the demanded outcome, total inter-group equalization of outcomes, is not something that people know how to achieve right now without cheating (including without doing something immoral that would defeat the point like, "deport everyone who scores too high or too low on the test to Australia").
That NPR article you keep harping on is far from a coherent political program. You're collecting isolated incidents and articles and claiming they have the same documented coherence and collaboration as something like Project 2025.
[15] There were plenty of other bullshit race articles, such as Politico platforming Ibram Kendi calling to subordinate democracy to unappointed race experts, but that's not really the point.
It's a movement of political entrepreneurs operating within a distributed political machine. The lack of hierarchy is part of the point. They don't have a single, unified manifesto, because (1) anyone who tried to make one would be accused of somehow violating the intersectional stack, and (2) they're also doing something that voters obviously don't want.
The illegibility isn't coincidental. That's part of why people like me repeatedly made demands to bound claims, even though this was always refused.
It's a difference in coalition structure producing a difference in mechanics.
DEI, Affirmative Action, the Biden farm aid, the ATC incident (addressed in another response) are all programs which were are are being rolled back entirely, often without too much objection from the Democratic Party. Why? Because proposing these deliberately flawed programs which cause an outrage from their wrestling partner allow the programs to be dismissed, racial animosity to be stoked, and allows both groups to point the finger and maintain the conflicts that power requires.
[16] They started rolling back the DE&I stuff only AFTER it became clear that they had a serious chance of losing the 2024 election, and even then, they've apparently often just renamed the offices.
[17] Yes, it's true that, for example, the California government proposed "reparations" and then quietly tabled them, but the point there is to create an emotional drive for Democrat voters (especially black and 'progressive' white Democrat voters) who aren't paying attention, not to do opposition theater with Republicans.
Have they systematically fired all the people hired to the universities under DE&I statements? I certainly haven't heard of this. So from a political machine perspective, they profitably gained more sinecures even though they did not achieve true maximalism.
TMS: "Why? Because proposing these deliberately flawed programs which cause an outrage from their wrestling partner allow the programs to be dismissed, racial animosity to be stoked, and allows both groups to point the finger and maintain the conflicts that power requires."
[18] One of the reasons that it's important to integrate intelligence distribution into the analysis is that it sets a cap or upper bound on individual elite information processing / performance - as if Elon Musk's public behavior wasn't enough to make that clear on its own.
You are assuming too much solidarity and homogeneity within the elite layer. There is some of that going on (e.g. I agree with a certain Tumblr poster that they've implicitly negotiated a trans rollback of sorts), but this is also a real contest, with real stakes.
"The conflicts that power requires" - this is a bit difficult to put into words, but while the emotional-political engines that are used to drive voter behavior and political investment rely on a kind of epistemic or emotional gerrymandering that makes the stakes seem larger, often by deleting the source of an effect and then reattributing causal information, this isn't a top-down thing from a single power node, but a horizontal thing where elites are building machines to compete for power.
Failures where bids are defeated don't mean that all the bids are fake. Redistribution, welfare programs, and so on really do happen.
[19] Which like, yes, getting battered in the face by Trump II is a bad outcome, but it's partly a result of lying to their own base for too long (letting base expectations get too far out of line) [5a], lying to themselves, and also a lack of hierarchical control [3].
I'd learn a little more about it before crying about it as a revenge fantasy, to be honest. Unless you are a direct descendant of slave owners, this wouldn't have harmed you in any way. Now, those assholes have passed the buck onto you. Why should you stick up for them? They made it your problem.
[20] They people who post "we should have done Reconstruction harder" are the kind of people who post "Grant should've burnt more of the South." It's a fantasy, and performed as toughness posturing in support of the tribe. These people are not policy wonks.
[21] As stated before, the people proposing this don't explain, mechanically, how it would have resulted in a different outcome. It's missing layers - there's a shift in political power, okay, WHAT programs are implemented, HOW do they close gaps by now, and WHY should we believe it would all be solved by now if we started a century earlier, given the existing lack of effective interventions?
We might get to where we are now earlier, which would be an improvement in historical utilitarian terms, but to move beyond it? That's certainly not established, and that's not why they're saying it.
[22] Left-wing racialists see things in racial collective terms. They don't care whether someone is a descendant of a slave-owner or not. "All white people benefit from white supremacy," remember?
Part 3
Skipping to the 4th reply.
I hold, like many social scientists and biologists, that the 'nature/nurture' is a false dichotomy because human biological characteristics influence and alter the environment, which then turns back around and alters human biological characteristics in a feedback loop, to put it very simply. You can't divorce or 'partition' off one from the other.
[23] I don't disagree, which makes the causation difficult to disentangle.
[24] In fact, I take a "compounding capabilities" footing, in which greater capabilities allow an agent more options to either reduce the burden from negative shocks, or take better advantage of positive shocks, so even a small difference can end up compounding over time, depending on environmental conditions.
[25] That compounding capabilities view is why I brought up reading/math earlier - if reading instruction gets messed up, or we cannot find an adequate way to teach math, then this has downstream effects on budgeting, reading medical information, reading safety instructions, understanding what politicians are up to, and so on. At the basic level, this kind of internal capability can't be fully substituted for externally.
[26] On a road with heavy traffic, then a fast car's arrival time will be determined primarily by the traffic, while on a road with light traffic, a fast car's arrival time will be determined primarily by the speed limit. If more effort is successfully put into resolving environmental factors, then more of the remaining variance will be down to non-environmental factors.
[27] A government, which is supposed to help humans, has to be made out of humans. This is one of those compounding problems. If you have a wheelchair-bound population (although wheelchairs allow more mobility than the lack of them does), then they can do a lot more if they're assisted by a non-wheelchair-bound population. However, this requires a non-wheelchair-bound population to be available to assist them, and then you have a potential dependency ratio.
[28] Regarding [26], let's take height as a relatively uncontroversial example, and handle it roughly.
From Wikipedia:
Chinese men, average age 48, published 2022: average height 169.6cm
Japanese men, 16-48, 2018: average height 171.4cm
Swiss men, 20-74, 1987-1994: average height 175.4cm
However, if we go back in time via Our World in Data, where we can add China to the chart, we get an average male height of 164cm there in 1900.
Roughly speaking, a man who bet that...
Chinese men would stay 164cm after industrialization, would be off by ~5cm.
Chinese men would be as tall as Swiss after industrialization, would be off by ~6cm.
Chinese men and Japanese men would each be about the same height after industrialization, would be off by ~2cm.
There could still be significant differences in diet between Switzerland and China, or poverty in rural areas, that could contribute, but China is now a global industrial power.
[29] The real question is the curve for marginal return-on-investment, in not only material or labor costs, but also moral costs, for the differing pathways that we could pursue.
Before industrialization, then industrialization would be the most likely pathway to make food cheap, and thus, if the goal is for Chinese men to become taller, generationally, for the men to become taller. (Industrialization also has a number of other benefits.) If someone else lived in those same conditions, they might also be shorter (see the Germans at various points on the Our World in Data chart).
After industrialization, adding more calories won't accomplish much on this front. At some point, more food stops making someone taller, and starts making them wider. Then you start needing to look into strange hormonal biomedical treatments, bone lengthening surgery, or other such things.
It isn't just that it gets more expensive financially (steel is cheaper than lab equipment), it also has higher organizational costs (steel is less complicated than lab equipment, lab procedures are more complicated than steelmaking procedures, there are more points for knowledge production to go wrong than for steelmaking to go wrong).
[30] Equalization may also get more expensive morally, such that a continued pursuit is not worth it. If more height helps in getting jobs, being perceived as handsome, and with national pride, and another 2cm of height would make Chinese men equal to Japanese men in this respect, is it really worth asking them all to get surgery to this effect?
Take, for instance, Wilson's Disease. One of my classmates died from this disease by the time we graduated secondary school. It's a genetic condition that causes copper to accumulate in your body. It's a genetic condition, no doubt about it. Over time, that extra copper becomes highly toxic, leading to brain and liver damage. Everyone who had this condition died young, just like my classmate. Not even a few years later treatments like Trientine came out. Now, rather than a slow decline resulting in inevitable death, a cascade of environmental changes turned a biological inevitability into a mild inconvenience.
[31] It's great that we have this kind of medication, and it should be noted that the medical system is now advancing on genes themselves [8g]. (This is likely to impose new and exciting moral difficulties later, after we get past the more clear-cut stuff like "curing die-at-30 disease.")
[32] With that said, a production system for medication is both capital-intensive and socially or organizationally intensive. It not only means that someone's survival is even more looped through the capital system than normal, and thus more vulnerable to its disruption, but this is also one of those "the marginal cost goes from 'infinity' to 'merely expensive'" situations.
So in terms of gains, in some sense medication can be called an "environmental" intervention, or a "social" intervention, but it's downstream of the norms, beliefs, values, and so on supporting the capital base, plus the capital base, plus virtuous specialist labor (including the capability of those laborers), so to solve the problem we really have to go quite far away into the social system! That's a lot of supporting infrastructure.
And this problem gets even more complex and less deterministic as we move from monogenic conditions to polygenic traits.
[33] I understand that this even goes so far as "omnigenicity," but I don't think it's impossible to know things about polygenic traits; it's just inherently going to be more statistical.
[34] I tend to take what might be considered an odd view - I am skeptical of almost any individual claim or study which attributes something to evolution, while also treating it as normal that many things could be the result of evolution.
There is no blank slate - all human activity relies on what came before it, the history of material, social, and psychic processes that produce the present moment. Blank slateism is as vulgar and incorrect as believing the present moment is inherent and inevitable.
[35] It's actually possible to go so far as to make an argument against Nick Land, who presents all of evolution as brutal optimization, that among humans, the genome is not solely a record of brutal optimization pressures, but is also a record of human choice (even if it's also a record of what didn't get deleted by saber-toothed tigers).
Part 4
This brings us 'back' to the third reply.
[36] I'll start with a moral statement. The moral value of closing gaps in outcomes between human beings, and gaps between groups of human beings, is not absolute. Identical outcomes require identical behavior, which is contrary to human freedom, and also likely contrary to long-term species survival.
[37] The existing condition of relative genetic immutability is a source of friction, and therefore a source of the preservation of difference via inertia. Cheap polygenic gene therapy would result in a reduction of friction and could therefore, via social pressure, market optimization pressure, or state insurance pressure, result in global homogenization, especially in combination with the Internet and machine translation. (For example, in Vietnam or India, people might use gene therapy to make their skintone lighter, while in America, people might use gene therapy to make their skin slightly darker, with both aiming at a 'lightly tanned' appearance.)
As far as education goes, that's a whole other issue, but you still haven't presented your reasoning as to why these gaps seem to persist in the first place.
[38] That's multi-causal, but simply put, there appears to be no actual requirement that they don't persist.
[39] Which [38] is why I asked you to describe the convergent force which requires that all human beings, or all human cultures, will necessarily fall within the range of outcomes that you believe that they should fall into. Without that force, why should we assume that the outcomes will necessarily converge to within your desired range?
[40] While you stated [23] that the environment and biology and history all influence each other, if you're taking the position that this convergent force cannot be known [39], aren't you also taking the position that convergence cannot be gauranteed, for the same reason?
[41] Regardless, the real question of importance is the relative return-on-investment in materials, effort, time, and morality for each potential intervention path.
[42] Above certain moral costs [36][37], the gaps remaining is more desirable than convergence, as I have stated previously.
[43] The question of heritability (for example, could an insulin issue result in chronic mental fatigue) is most interesting from the perspective of a future intervention branch [8g][31] which requires a tremendous amount of present social support [32] (including the present enforcement of social rules).
It isn't really interesting from the perspective of "moral judgment of diabetics" or "cosmic judgment of diabetics" or "the social reputation of diabetics."
[44] The use of pre-optimization has both moral [36] and systemic [37] problems. Many of the things that could be purchased through e.g. making all of humanity into clones of an Olympic-level chess-boxer, are material things like housing square footage, or power plant output, etc. These matter in extreme situations (going from 0 hospitals to 1 hospital), but they're not the totality of human existence.
This makes the use of aggressive pre-optimization somewhat nihilistic. If there were a magical serum that made each person into the same Olympic-level chess-boxer, such that it qualified as an environmental intervention, making everyone take it would still be nihilistic.
[45] This is why [44] for both moral [36] and systemic [37] reasons, it's much better and less nihilistic to focus on individualized, realized actions.
[46] Admittedly, dependency ratios are a concern [27]. Since it's necessary to have surplus to run development or assistance programs, and to invest in long-term intervention development paths [31], if the dependency ratio gets too far out of whack, this could result in devastating but previously-avoidable problems later, for a net moral loss. However, this only requires that persistence happens, and that suitable, sufficiently cost-effective interventions do not exist (or are not known); it doesn't require a theory as to the origin of that persistence.
I've presented mine and am awaiting for you to elaborate before I engage - the underlying problems upstream of education that affect socioeconomic outcomes have not been addressed meaningfully by liberal policy, and large scale wealth transfer isn't even necessary to achieve more equitable outcomes.
[47] The general impression that I received is that you complained about "liberals" and "recuperation" (the bastardization of left-wing ideas).
This suggested that your approach was that U.S. progressives should "be more leftist." In practice, and this has been my objection the entire time, the bastardization of the ideas is HOW they interpreted "be more leftist."
[48] Thus, telling them to "be more leftist" won't work. Some other resource is missing, and some other path to development must be undertaken. They can't even execute on basic policy (like phonics), they think discipline in classrooms is "racist" (and thus that the discipline itself causes poor performance, rather than disruption being a source of poor performance for everyone else), and we even had them try to prevent teaching algebra in 8th-grade (in SF) for "equity" reasons.
[49] This [48] indicates an extreme focus on group reputation protection, and failure to integrate high-order consequences, including high-order consequences impacting group reputation, which indicates an extremely social way of reasoning, and a lack of psycho-moral development [5c]. This effectively prevents them from implementing sophisticated policy, and turns opportunities for meaningful reform into slogans.
[50] "Socio-economic outcomes," of course, are an output, not just an input. Wealth can cause performance, but performance can also cause wealth. From a compounding capabilities standpoint [24], we can make injections to increase optionality in a favorable way along the path, but outside assistance can only substitute so much for inside capability, due to their relative positions of leverage within the agent-environment interaction.
Many of my policies - which I will gladly share as soon as you give me that list of forbidden explanations, this is my condition - are programs which are beneficial not to one ethnic group, but to all.
[51] Part of my point is that U.S. progressives can't or won't even implement known-effective policies with both low moral and low labor/material costs [48].
[52] Thus when I stated that part of the problem with U.S. wars lately is liberal derangements, part of what I meant is that they're not even running on a Nixonian "balance of power" + "preconditions for democracy" theory. They're assuming that responses to education are extremely elastic, for example, despite them not being elastic in their own country.
Elites aren't some kind of alien creature. They're embedded in a social knowledge graph, like everyone else. They can actually be wrong about things, not merely cynically maneuvering, even though they also cynically maneuver. There's a guy on here much farther to my right, who regularly tries to convince me that everything is doomed. Part of his problem is that while he focuses on elite power, he doesn't have a theory of elite formation, how elites become elites in the first place.
The pandemic learning loss data you cite actually demonstrates that educational environments do influence outcomes - so this is actually an argument for, not against, investment.
[53] What the pandemic learning loss shows is that there's an ordinary return on investment to public schooling, and then, as we see with charter schools apparently having better performance on issues, additional gains after that become more expensive - less financially, and more organizationally or in terms of rule imposition.
[54] In fact, I support charter schools as a political solution to the political problem of public schools either being poorly managed or not being allowed to discipline disruptive or violent students. However, if U.S. progressives were more willing to play ball [48][49], similar marginal gains could probably be achieved through state-run schools.
[55] Thus the learning loss [52] disproves the right-wing (though not mainstream Republican) idea that "schools do nothing" so it "doesn't matter if we drastically limit schooling." It does not establish that a high marginal return-on-investment path through schooling exists.
Additionally, saying things 'top out' is doing massive work for you without actually specifying what the ceiling is, what produces or, or how we know we've reached it rather than just not actually done proper interventions, either via underfunding or just poorly addressing actual structural issues.
[56] This makes sense if you're thinking in terms of cosmic judgment. It does not make sense from a "buying and selling interventions" standpoint.
[57] We've already tried heavy funding. It doesn't work. Many locations offer free school lunches, too, and we did eventually deal with the water in Flint, MI. What's missing is the conversion of money into outcomes. Some sort of structure between money and outcomes is not there, and would have to be there.
As they are right now, U.S. progressives aren't capable [48][49] of providing that structure, and indeed, they are not even capable of discussing it.
Part 5
The fifth reply.
So, the ATC example is actually one of those 1/16ths measure bandaids I've been criticizing in the first place. They changed standards to allow more minority groups (not just non-white folk) while preventing skilled people from entering the field. This was the most 'race instead of merit' hiring that has ever happened in terms of affirmative action or other such policies, and it lasted about four years before being torched, contrary to your claim it was 'Never officially backed down from'. This goes further.
[58] What I mean by "they never officially backed down" is that they didn't change their way of thinking, they just got caught. That's the only reason they stopped. We want a clear expectation, set from the top and enforced, that all personnel engaged in such behavior will be purged as thoroughly as if they were members of the Klan.
[59] Since we were effectively ambushed without provocation (remember, lots of white Americans had to vote for Obama for Obama to win (and I've had to explain "'Republicans' is not 'white Americans'" on this very website)), it isn't enough to silently roll it back. If it's silently rolled back, we still have to spend more on defenses.
I don't mind giving an inch, but I do very much mind giving a mile. As I wrote in my longest essay, Now, Melt: "Liberal left-identitarianism can act as a counter-force to these tendencies [of over-compression of information and natural ignorance regarding minorities], when it is rooted in truth."
A much better program would be expanding training and understanding why only certain groups would be more able to do this job in the first place. (Hint: It's not for anything inherent.) and then, rather than excluding anyone, you create a rising tide which raises all boats.
[60] Something closer to that is what the Democrats were hired to do, it is what they implicitly advertised themselves as doing, but they stopped doing that sometime around 2013.
[61] Black Harvard economist Roland Fryer, for example, was the type to try paying children to read books as an experiment. It didn't work as well as anticipated. Spending money is fine. Even wasting some amount of money is fine. Black Americans are my country's citizens, after all, unlike the entire rest of the planet. Supposedly, Fryer even found one class that was fully converged, one time. But that could have been a fluke from random variation. Random variation is of course compatible with statistical averages. (This is why I make the demand for demonstrated scale - it doesn't become not-my-problem until it is successfully scaled.) But he was #metoo'd, and the punishment was dramatically upgraded beyond what was originally recommended. Some people believe that this is because he found that American cops aren't nearly as racist in shootings as people think - a finding which is relevant if one wants to do good policy, but not relevant if what one wants to do is political battle for resources [18].
So Roland Fryer is, figuratively, the product that was advertised during Obama I, the offering was implicitly switched out with inferior replacements during Obama II, and during the Trump Era, the product quality fell to the level of Ibram X. Kendi.
If they didn't want an economist, and they needed someone left-wing, and that someone had to be black, they could have picked any number of other legitimate black intellectuals they have. Someone like John McWhorter or Glenn Loury probably don't count as left-wing enough, but they are both actually smart.
Democrats could have afforded a left-wing black intellectual who was at least as smart as the average dentist, and surely they must have such an intellectual somewhere!
The point (or at least, effect) of picking someone who was not equipped to take these conversations seriously (and indeed, who once thought that white people were aliens, only to be corrected by his also-black roommate) is to do bad policy. The point (or effect) of doing the bad policy is that it's extractive.
[62] Thus the plan to get Democrats to go back to being a normal political party by cutting off immigration [9h].
Democrats got it into their heads that a "durable majority" was coming so they didn't need to compromise, ever, leading to dropping the product quality into the garbage, which is neither good, in the long-term, for black Americans, nor good for white Americans, nor good for the country as a whole.
Trump is a costly method to achieve this, but there is no viable alternative. Democrats are not going to reform on their own, seeing as they did not start this in response to any massive "white supremacist" event. The underlying conditions must be changed, to make the bad behavior no longer viable. Then, gradually, more reality-oriented Democrats will start winning more internal contests.
DEI programs (some of which had affirmative action components, but these are very diverse and diffuse, which can be as simple and signal-only as just hanging up a banner for black history month to differential education programs) often had components with had nothing to do with denying white people anything.
[63] Motte vs. bailey. The bailey is, "we search extra hard for minority applicants," the motte is, "we require ideological statements of loyalty to racial preferences, which we use to hire politically-preferred races and ideologically-compliant individuals for the positions."
This is why I go through the trouble of defining "woke (pejorative)" as "illiberal left-identitarianism," and why I stated in a prior tumblr reply that the illiberalism is not doing the lifting.
The effect, regardless of intent by U.S. progressives, (and I hate using that word for them; how can anyone who opposes teaching 8th-grade algebra be called 'in favor of progress'?) is to sanewash the illiberalism by mixing it in with the softer, more liberal policies.
[64] Most people could ignore the lack of a "white history month." They grumble at attacks on "mediocre white men" by people who think Elon Musk is "mediocre." (You can say that he's wrong, like saying Napoleon is wrong, but neither is "mediocre.") Eventually, it kept going until the goal was clearly racialized everything, at which point rather than spending the manpower to carefully identify each program, because [58] we don't have a binding agreement where the Democrats will actually stop, so any of our limited manpower we divert to being careful means less manpower to stop them doing new offensives, which further reduces our power to resist them, it was easier to just scrap every program with "DE&I" in the name.
[65] Is that sub-optimal? Sure. The liberals or center-left could stop saying "it's not happening" and agree to go along with our efforts, providing both proximity and fine-grained information, and making it clear that they have the ability and long-term will to continue across administrations, and we could be more gentle.
Many of these programs were purely additive, but there was a concentrated media campaign to paint all of DEI as Beat Up Whitey, and many white people were pushed by the media to be offended by them. This wasn't organic outrage, it was a deliberately manufactured campaign. People bragged about 'changing the brand of Critical Race Theory to something insane'. It's a dedicated, documented campaign.
[66] You mean that there were documented abuses, upon which "conservatives pounced." It would be very convenient for you if it were just "inorganic outrage," but that's not required at all. The New York Times itself admitted that diversity statements were used... by publishing an article where the headline said that, at Harvard, they stopped.
[67] It would be very easy for congressional Democrats to pass a few bills clarifying the matter, but we know that the Biden administration rolled back the Trump executive order - which I read personally, and so I know that many of the statements regarding it from Democrats are just false - banning the bad behavior.
[68] There was no reason to push Kendi except for Democrats to do dumb stuff that they aren't supposed to be doing, either intentionally or due to ideological derangement, and there was no reason to roll back the late Trump I order (instead of patching it) except to do dumb stuff that Democrats weren't supposed to be doing.
My point in saying this isn't to necessarily endorse or condemn any of these, but simply to show how diverse the umbrella term DEI is.
[69] Well yes, that was the advertising for it.
Part 6
The sixth reply.
Efforts to push the FDA to require, for instance, testing of Pulse Oximeters on dark skin to allow for less false negatives of SpO2 loss, expansion of dermatology training datasets for cancer-detecting AI (again, no white people are deprived). Requiring clinical trials (which are rarely paid and require very little in the way of skills) to be more diverse is a net positive, as well, because it allows the studies themselves to be more rigorous and to be controlled for more confounding factors like the ones you talked about earlier. It's a scientific validity program, not a redistribution program.
[70] The program of attacking DE&I that you mentioned [66] would never have been initiated if this were what "DE&I" were limited to.
Similarly, there is now a special brown-colored Band-Aid for people with dark skin. I vaguely recall that it was presented in a weird way when it launched, but ultimately there's little reason for people without dark skin to care.
[71] The people who wanted more data should've been more willing to differentiate themselves from the people who wanted to do crank redistribution, by punching "left" (or "sh-tlib"? whatever), picking clear and obvious bad behavior and criticizing it, instead of letting the legitimacy from the most uncontroversial biological realism of "not all skintones are identical" "so we may need to better calibrate pulse oximeters" be spent by dumb people.
[72] This is also the case for science journalism during the pandemic. The quality of the scientific establishment is still higher than many conservatives assess, even though there are serious problems (like the replication crisis), because (i) "science journalism" leans too far to the left, and then (ii) scientific institutions produce much lower quality public statements concerning political matters (than their normal quality), and their personnel lean left, so then at the end of this pipeline we get, "Your anti-mask protests are unacceptable superspreader events; race riots throughout the country chanting 'abolish the police' are too important to be interrupted for the global pandemic."
So the scientific establishment ends up generating credibility (through e.g. antibiotics) which is then spent down by activists whose actions are generally counter-productive.
Blind resume review (multiple replicated studies, starting with Bertrand/Mullainathan, show that often a racialized name can result in fewer callbacks than ones associated with white people) also focuses more on merit than on race or gender, where qualifications themselves are isolated in favor of tribal ingroup posturing. Structured interviews over unstructured ones allow actual assessment of capabilities, rather than relying on affinity bias, social class signalling, or cultural familiarity. They use identical questions scored against defined criteria and are more predictive of actual job performance, with less defined criteria. It's literally the opposite of a program which gives raw higher scores to particular ethnic groups.
[73] Regarding the resume study, I vaguely recall someone arguing it was actually based on the class loading of each name. Regardless, blind resume review and other such things are not "woke (pejorative)," predate "woke (prejorative)," and were in the water back in 2008.
[74] In other words, the 2013-2014 identitarian turn, where race was strongly brought up to the surface and legibilized, has been largely a mistake. This is due to the difference in both who is considering these things (less intellectual people who don't "get" nuance, the kind of people who would be hardcore Tumblr antis), and how they are being handled and decided (in terms of status within organizations).
[75] This content is supposed to be handled by smart people, quietly and largely implicitly, out of sight, who can understand more than one thing at a time. Then, work can be done quietly on the problem without leaking organizing basis to bad rightists or bad leftists. (This includes restricting immigration - elites were supposed to take the hint on this and restrict immigration more years ago, and should not have required voters to shout it at them. Again, immigration restriction is just part of normal statecraft.)
Unfortunately, although some of this is down to elite competition, elites aren't actually geniuses who already know everything [52].
Pipeline outreach programs, like recruiting from rural schools and community colleges instead of just Ivys, expands the pool of people who know an opportunity exists, and allows skilled and intelligent people from other backgrounds to know something even exists. Your own framework shouldn't object to it - it's just pure information flow correction. Outreach programs address the front end of that problem without altering selection criteria.
[76] This is actually a good example to show the issue.
There's been a scandal where UCSD ended up implementing a remedial remedial math program of middle school math for incoming students who had high GPAs. ("The correlation between the average math grade and the placement result is only around 0.25 on a scale of 0 to 1. In 2024, over 25% of the students in Math 2 had a math grade average of 4.0.")
This means that sh-tleftists, sh-tlibs, whatever you want to call them, the people who are obsessively focused on group reputation protection and don't think about nth-order consequences [49], have essentially rotted-through K-12 grading in the state of California.
This is a huge waste of resources, including limited time on this Earth, for essentially everyone involved. Even if it sounds compassionate to pass these students on, once they get in, they probably won't even get a degree: "Few, if any, students who place into Math 2 have successfully completed an engineering degree."
[77] This is really a good example of what I've been trying to get through to you during the prior conversation: we have a big problem with low-quality "progressives" who are much, much less sophisticated than you, and while the fancy nuanced version you want and espouse would fail gracefully even if it didn't work (or didn't completely work), the low-quality progressives are either unwilling, or unable, to implement it, and the version that they implement will not fail gracefully.
[78] So a pipeline outreach program can be fine, if you don't throw out the test scores, but low-quality progressives will throw out the test scores.
[79] So the chief question is, "How can we improve the quality of the movement, so that the fancy nuanced version is what gets implemented, and how can we sustain that so that it doesn't fall into ruin?" and this is actually a very difficult question. Because you seem pretty sharp, and thus might be able to actually get a bit of traction on that question, that's why I bothered replying over the course of 15,000 words in the initial thread.
[80] Maximum "bitrate (figurative)" of policy is a huge issue. In general, right-wing policies tend to leave more potential gains on the table, but they handle better than a left-wing policy if both are at a low bitrate.

















