Separate anon but Iām curious as to your thoughts about this regarding your most current answered anon ask at the time of writing.
So for me personally as a trans man, i would basically give anything to be seen as male the same way that cis men are. Iām even in favor of a radical reinterpretation of the current concept of the sex binary in a way which would classify trans men/women as male/female sex respectively even though i know that idea has problems itself.
Anyhow, I feel that basically I am coercively pressured to identify as āfemaleā when engaging with the medical system in order to receive healthcare, like by unfairly sacrificing a portion of my autonomy I can maintain access to necessary treatments. Itās been ongoing for so long that I feel sometimes in broader medical discussion I reflexively reduce myself to being āfemaleā due to this, because everyone expects certain organs to be called certain names and to be classified as belonging to a particular sex, and I absolutely despise it.
I donāt particularly have a question tied to this, I just wanted to share my thoughts and perhaps hear yours in return
The ask being referenced.
As requested, here are my thoughts: making access to certain aspects of healthcare conditional upon some sex/gender/identity association is always going to create problems for a portion of the population.
It's ridiculous for anyone to pretend that "male" and "female" are anything even approaching value neutral descriptors, as though their meaning in a medical/biological context could be separated from their societal meaning, as though the sites at which people access medical care are not embedded in a social context. Almost everyone is currently deeply invested in their "belonging" to certain sexed/gendered categories.
I presume it would be understood as an undue hurdle, as humiliating, for perisex cis people to have to accept being classified as "male" or "female" contrary to their societal sex/gender in order to access the healthcare they need. That certain aspects of healthcare continue to be structured in a way that effectively forces intersex and trans people to do just that is an expression of the lack of consideration extended to these populations.
This isn't a problem that can be solved by giving new names to the same "sex categories" either, since obviously e.g. trans women who medically transition and intersex people, depending on their actual anatomy/physiology etc. (not on their assigned sex or identity), need access to "female-specific" healthcare as well. Sex characteristics have no obligation to occur in those combinations that the abstraction of "biological sex" expects them to occur.
A fair amount of ideology that permeates the medical system continues to be structured around metaphysical claims about "purpose" and "normality". "Sex characteristics" are interpreted through a teleological lens, the idea that people are "supposed to" belong to one of two "biological sexes" (abstractions of clusters of statistically related features that are given gendered meaning and treated as platonic ideals) and if the associated features don't all coincide in someone, that person is an aberration, they are not the way they are "supposed to" be. Deviating from these normative "sex categories" is implicitly seen as a personal failure, so having to absorb the resulting negative consequences becomes a natural, value neutral, inevitable consequence - not a problem in need of a solution.
Arguments about "biological sex" are often sophisms spouted by people who treat their unexamined intuitions as a source of metaphysical "facts". An idealist, teleological conception of "biological sex" using needlessly gendered terms/definitions and overstating the coherence of the "sexes" it asserts the existence of is just "basic biology" if you agree to all of its theoretical presuppositions and definitions.
"Because people with the SRY are 'male', having the SRY makes someone 'male'" isn't a statement about some kind of empirical fact, it's a normative claim being asserted in the premise ("people with the SRY ought to be considered 'male'"). When we disagree with this premise, the conclusion drawn from it is meaningless to us. A statement like this isn't "true" or "false", it's just nonsense. If the presupposition is true, so is the conclusion. If the presupposition isn't true, neither is the conclusion. Because the premise is a normative claim (a prescription of how a term ought to be used), it doesn't depend on whether or not anything is or isn't the case. It can't be proven or disproven - it isn't concerned with observable facts of any kind.
I think it's useful to approach the medical system with some level of disdain to resist internalizing this nonsense. The systems and people that make it necessary for you to outwardly identify as "female" are creating this demand based on an oversimplified model of reality expressed in an irresponsible way. You are being failed by the medical system because it either doesn't care about you enough or because it is actively hostile towards your existence.
It's unethical to classify trans men as "female" and trans women as "male" because of the negative consequences that doing so has for them. There is no need to obfuscate the prescriptive nature of this claim. It's unethical for their access to healthcare to be structured in such a way that it effectively requires them to self-classify in that way also. Trans and intersex people deserve dignity and that dignity isn't available to them when they are being misgendered (or "mis-sexed"), either linguistically or structurally. The implementation of this moral imperative is a political problem. Empirical observations or descriptivist linguistics won't solve it for us.
Do you think it is accurate and useful to call trans women female? If so, when and to what degree?
It's as accurate and useful as calling trans women "women". It's as accurate and useful as calling cis women "female". I imagine that most women don't call themselves "women" because they just happen to like the sound or look of the word "woman", but because of its meaning - and I'd assume that meaning is inextricable from femaleness to most people.
The word "female" simply shouldn't be used in a sense that excludes trans women. It's obviously not "accurate" when it's used in a sense that doesn't consider trans women female (e.g. how TERFs use it) and it is "accurate" when it's used in a sense that does, but that's just a tautology.
It's useful to the extent that we mean something by it that applies to trans women (or to the extent we prevent others from using it to mean something that they shouldn't mean by it, for example "people AFAB").
If it's used as an empty signifier when referring to trans women specifically (for the sake of "gender validation") but still used to refer to an imaginary naturalized version of assigned sex ("biological sex") when referring to people who were AFAB then it's less than useless. This kind of nonsense is a problem of people who consider "gendering" to be confined to the domain of signs, disconnected from the domain of meaning.
When "female" is used to refer to a category of person who is oppressed for being classed as female under patriarchy, this obviously includes trans women and excluding them from such a category is simply an incorrect description of reality that goes against trans women's interests because it delegitimizes them as political subjects of feminism.
In any case, as long as anyone at all is considered "female", trying to conceptualize trans women as "non-female women" entails a transphobic (misgendering) resignification of the word "woman" when it refers to trans women.
hi dear! i love your polls but my friend sent me one recently and it looks like ive been blocked, is there a particular reason you usually block people? no need to unblock, i respect the choice, just kinda wanna know what i did _(._.)_
It's a result of this. If you tell me your URL and it looks like I made a mistake, I'll unblock you and remove it from the post.
I assume trhps means The Rocky Horror Picture Show but my apologies to Anon if it's not but they just sent some letters with no clarification so.. - H :)
If you are a visual artist, this post is directed at you.
There is absolutely, emphatically nothing objectionable about trans people who are gender-non-conforming or who do not resemble most cis people of their gender. It isn't a moral failure, it doesn't invalidate their identity, it doesn't mean they're not actually attractive, it doesn't mean they do not actually look visually appealing, it doesn't diminish their worth in any way. A person who takes issue with "clocky" or gender-non-conforming trans people is a transphobic person. "Second-hand dysphoria" is a ridiculously entitled, cruel and self-centered way to frame your own perception of other trans people. All this should be self-evident. (I'm making this clear right at the start so you can stop wasting your time by pretending I disagree with any these things because it would make it easier to attack what I will say next.)
The reason I'm a trans woman is dysphoria. The reason I medically transitioned is that I do not, as much as possible, want to appear like I have undergone androgenizing puberty. The thought of having certain anatomical features is upsetting to me, which is not a moral or aesthetic judgement of these features themselves or people who have them. It also does not mean that I believe that you have to look a certain way to be a woman. It simply means that because the thought of looking a certain way is painful to me, I transitioned. This is inextricable from my being a trans woman. This is not the case for all trans women. But it is the case for many of them and the interests of those for who it is not do not nullify the interests of those for who it is. That being dysphoric is not a requirement for being a trans woman does not mean that trans women who are not dysphoric can speak for trans women who are, can deny the legitimacy or urgency of the needs they have as a result of being dysphoric. I can speak as a dysphoric trans woman because I'm a dysphoric trans woman, not because I'm a trans woman.
I occasionally get upset when I see what is ostensibly meant to be representations of trans women in illustrations. This is because I understand such representations not as "an accurate rendering of the likeness of an arbitrary person that actually exists in a fictional world who happens to be a trans woman" but instead as an indication of how the artist views trans women. It is indicative of which features the artist finds noteworthy in trans women. If the features that are prominent are the same ones that I feel dysphoric about (or that are otherwise strongly associated with men or are part of the visual vocabulary that is used to communicate maleness), I interpret this as being depicted in a way that I dislike being seen (that I would much prefer not being seen at all over). It doesn't make me feel dysphoric, it makes me feel insulted like an offensive caricature - except for the fact that an unintentional insult (a microaggression) is more hurtful because it isn't motivated by a desire to hurt. Be that as it may, representational art is not reality (not even "fictional reality") - it is a form of communication. It says something about what it depicts.
When the artist herself is a trans woman, my perspective changes. In such a case, a (non-antagonistic) illustration representing a trans woman isn't necessarily indicative of how she sees other trans women, it could also be an expression of how she sees herself or how she wants to be seen. Because I don't understand her to be making a statement about me when she draws a trans woman, I am generally unfazed regardless of how much I would not like to be seen in that way.
We are already embedded in ideologies that assign values to physical features. An artistic representation is not placed into an ideological void. It is naive to assume that straightforward depiction of certain features could function as "normalizing" them, as destigmatizing them, as resignifying them as attractive etc. If this were the case it would be enough to passively observe the general population to lose one's aversion to features that are designated as unattractive. But we do not operate on a principle of "everything that we see is good and beautiful". We do not think "ugly" features are "ugly" simply because we haven't been exposed to them enough. Seeing a feature that is regarded as unattractive in a fictional representation of a character belonging to a population you also belong to may simply uncomfortably remind you that you share this "unattractive" feature. The emancipation of the dissonance is a process that happens through acclimatization. In order to resignify a feature generally regarded as "unattractive" as "attractive", it needs to be contextualized as "attractive". This is done through framing, through visual language, through careful omissions, through association with features that are generally seen as "attractive", etc. Perhaps you feel that it is ideologically impure to make such selective use of same the ideology that makes a feature into a signifier of unattractiveness to begin with, but there is no realistic alternative. You cannot browbeat people into developing an appreciation for certain physical features by simply exposing them to them and telling them that they have a moral obligation to find these features appealing - not because it's wrong to do so, but simply because it doesn't work. It doesn't do anything. At most you shame people into being afraid to make aesthetic judgements at all.
Having aesthetic preferences is part of being human. They are shaped by ideology. We can participate in shaping them, we don't have to place ourselves entirely outside and above the cultural production of beauty ideals to gain nothing but a sense of moral superiority. If you refuse to draw fat people beautifully because their worth does not depend on being beautiful, or because all the other factors involved in shaping beauty standards are also regressive, your art will do nothing to disassociate being fat from being unattractive. We must "use the tools of the oppressor" because he is using every tool there is. Get over yourself. Get your hands dirty. Your ultimate goal cannot be to be a better person than an artist reproducing hegemonic beauty ideals, you have to actually succeed in changing those ideals. How guilty you feel about it is immaterial. Either get serious or stop pretending you believe in the possibility of achieving your goal. You must not settle into your role as a sinless outsider to cultural production, you must throw yourself against the mainstream. For a gear train to transmit motion, the teeth have to engage. Don't accept blamelessness in exchange for consigning yourself to uselessness.
If you don't allow yourself a point of attack, there is no attack. You simply agree to disagree with the status quo and voluntarily sequester yourself in your counter-cultural niche. Coward!
What's more, conventional attractiveness in fictional representations is (although it shouldn't be) conflated with moral goodness while features regarded as unattractive are (although they shouldn't be) conflated with immorality. When an artist renders a trans woman in a way that would generally be considered "unattractive" by the standards that are applied to women (which trans women are held to) then regardless of their intention, they risk villainizing them.
You cannot simply "draw a trans woman as you see her" when your perception is rotten with transmisogyny. You do not see reality "as it is", you see it filtered through layers of abstraction informed by ideology. What you take note of and what becomes invisible by being unremarkable is not a feature of reality "as it is". You cannot take the way you would draw cis women as your baseline and then modify all the features that stand out to you as different when you draw a trans woman. The way you would draw a cis woman (barring a photorealistic rendering based on carefully measured photo reference depicting a randomly sampled cis woman) is not a value neutral representation of how cis women actually look, it is an idealized representation of cis womanhood constructed in opposition to an idealized image of cis manhood. If your perception tells you "compared to cis women, trans women look like this" then you need to ask yourself which cis women you are comparing them to and how you would draw those cis women and how those drawings differ from the real cis women they represent.
In the stylized, abstracted, partially symbolic styles commonly found in comics, cartoons, manga, anime, webtoons etc. detail gesturing at realism is often a way to dehumanize the subject being depicted, it has an alienating/distancing effect. An abstracted, simplified, iconic animal or person is a projection surface that lends itself to identification and empathy. The absence of detail is readily filled in with our default assumptions. Fidelity that allows differentiation is a hindrance to identification. A realistic depiction is inscrutable, its symbolic "essence" is obscured by meaningless detail, in its specificity it represents only itself. Instead of being presented with an abstraction that through its visual language communicates to us things we couldn't possibly know from looking at its real world counterpart, we are presented with a facsimile of a real object full of ambiguity and noise that we have to abstract ourselves in the process of making sense of it.
I think a large part of the humor found in "Junji Ito's Cat Diary: Yon & Mu" consists of the cats being depicted in a style that generally refuses to humanize them by way of significant stylization/abstraction. It isn't simply a photo that contains details because reality contains details, it is an artist going out of his way to make you aware of those (sometimes unflattering) details.
This isn't how you draw when you look at the world normally, it's how you draw when you carefully take stock of which parts of your observation actually correspond to physical reality, which requires sustained conscious effort and practice. When drawing from life, a significant hurdle is learning to draw what you see as opposed to drawing "what you think you see". The abstraction your mind inadvertently creates of whatever you observe constantly gets in the way, it encroaches upon the sensory data, it has to be kept in check and accounted for - sometimes literally by learning about the ways in which your perception distorts what you see and drawing what you infer is the ground truth, e.g. reminding yourself that "the lightest shadow value is darker than the darkest halftone value" while rendering, even if it doesn't look that way. "Caricature" and symbolism are much closer to the default, intuitive way to see and depict the world than strict realism.
Children's drawings for example are often highly symbolic. Whether the sun in children's drawings is red or yellow doesn't depend on the actual appearance of the sun or even just the child's personal impression of it, it depends on the cultural norms shaping their understanding of reality and the visual language representing it.
What you notice about your subject is generally only what stands out in comparison to your preconceived notion of what it should look like, your default assumption. What trans women look like to you is not just a function of what they really do look like, it's also a function of what you think women should look like. Which details you find noteworthy enough to represent often says more about how you think about your subject (where she fails to meet your expectations of what a woman should look like) than about your subject herself. In the same way that female character designs are frequently dominated by their "femaleness" in relation to male characters (who have a wider range of designs), trans female characters are frequently dominated by their "transness" in relation to cis female characters. This is not a good thing. It's transmisogyny.
Even when some difference actually does exist in reality, that is not sufficient justification for representing it in a non-photorealistic style. If a difference is represented, who is allowed to become the default and whose appearance is altered to represent that they are "different from the default" is a political choice. In stylized art, you don't actually draw cis women the way they look in reality (instead the depiction is governed by aesthetic, cultural, symbolic considerations that have no equivalent in physical reality), the stylized visual representation refers to its real world counterpart partially by convention, as a symbol, an item of vocabulary in our shared visual language, not simply by literal correspondence to reality. Much like the word "women" doesn't refer to women by looking or sounding like them or otherwise resembling them in some way but simply because that's what we use it to mean.
Take a look at these character designs:
Can you visually distinguish which of these characters are ethnically Japanese, which ones are white and which ones are Half-Japanese in the text of their respective works? Can you tell for which of these characters hair and eye color are representational and for which ones they are symbolic or aesthetic choices? Can you tell the sex/gender of these characters? Can you tell their "anatomical sex"? Can you tell their assigned sex? Can you tell which of these characters are trans? Is it necessary that you are able to discern any of these things from their appearance? Is it a problem if you are unable to? (Do you perhaps think that Japanese artists owe it to white people to draw Japanese people as visually distinct while assuming a perspective that considers whiteness the default, because these characters may all appear white to white people or people living in predominantly white contexts, who project whiteness into the absence of distinguishing characteristics?)
Whether or not (and to what extent) a difference is worth the fidelity required to represent it is not a neutral choice. Art is communication. What you leave vague and what you deem worthy of visual disambiguation is a choice you have control over. If you think it's so important to visually represent the fact that a female character is not cis that you sacrifice the aesthetic appeal and relatability of a simpler and cuter design (which you reserve for cis women because you have never questioned the presupposition that cis women are the default women) in order to do so, for whose benefit are you doing that?
How have you managed to convince yourself that this skull-measuring impulse that has you trying to make a visual argument for the validity and immutability of assigned sex categories is progressive? If you project cis womanhood into the absence of distinguishing characteristics, that is a problem with your perception.
To be frank, I would rather you notice how exceptionally cute I am compared to most cis men than have you meticulously detail every minuscule way in which I fail to live up to the idealized version of cis womanhood that only exists inside your head, to make a spectacle of my perceived inability to live up to misogynistic beauty standards (which trans women are always held to) by rendering every pore on my skin that you think a real woman wouldn't have. If you think drawing trans women without including every last feature associated with masculinity would be a lie by omission, then the way you perceive trans women simply disqualifies you from depicting them. Perhaps you need to look at some cis women, really look at them until you see the actual light hitting your eyes and the symbol disappears - and not just models and actresses and influencers, average people. Maybe then you'll notice that we're not as different as you would very clearly like to believe.
Do you actually care enough to do the work to first see us as we are, and then to notice the things about us that we like about ourselves, to occasionally dignify us with the visual language of cuteness and grace and softness and femininity and gentleness, instead of insisting on the caricatures of people trying but failing to look like women that your ideologically stained perception (or fetish) evidently tells you we are?
Rather than simply being an issue of intent vs. outcome, I believe it is also an issue of being able to execute on one's intent. Representation is an issue that requires delicacy, care, understanding, practice and actual skill. Intending to write a great symphony only results in a great symphony when the composer is able to realize that intention. We do not praise lazy, formulaic, stale or incompetent works simply because it was the intention of the artist to produce something worthwhile. Why then is this a standard we should apply to art which doesn't simply strive for artistic merit but attempts to comment on us, that through its misrecognition isn't simply unappealing but deeply hurtful/harmful? "Representation" is a difficult task that many people are unqualified for because they do not take seriously the work of developing it as a skill.
Not all artistic representation is better than no artistic representation. Don't expect gratitude in exchange for insults because you are incompetent. Slacker!
There's only so much you can justify by saying that "there's nothing wrong with looking a certain way". There's nothing wrong with having bright red skin, cloven hooves, a pointed tail and horns, but people might still come to the conclusion that this kind of depiction isn't a politically neutral choice. If there is no visual overlap between trans women and cis women in your art then perhaps you have some unacknowledged ideas about human sex characteristics as they relate to trans people. "We can always tell" does not become a progressive slogan if you add "and that's beautiful". Objecting to an offensive depiction does not mean accepting that having the features by which the group is being caricatured would actually make a person lesser or that it is impossible for someone to have these features. Trans women aren't being "the real transmisogynists" by objecting to being depicted with a focus on "masculine" features. They are seeing themselves through your eyes, filtered through your ideology, and recognize the distortions transmisogyny introduces.
To say that "it is transmisogynistic to depict trans women with features strongly associated with men" does not mean actually having these features would be indicative of genuine maleness, it means recognizing that they are being attributed to trans women as symbols of maleness.
I do not think "looking like a woman" is what makes me a woman, but I do think being depicted "not looking like a woman" and being depicted as "not being a woman" are exactly identical in a visual medium, because the semiotics of visual media are visual. Womanhood in a visual medium is conveyed through shared visual signifiers of womanhood. There is no private visual language, we have to rely on a shared visual vocabulary. It's not enough to smugly insist "I don't think my drawing looks like a man, maybe your idea of what men and women look like is regressive" because we are not using our personal views to interpret visual language. We use regressive ideas of "what men and women look like" to make sense of visual art because these ideas are part of our shared understanding of visual language. A word's meaning is its use, its shared use. That our shared visual language should be changed does not mean it already has been changed - and acting like it has will have you calling us "trannies" because you don't think it should be an insult. But it still is.
If you want to change the visual language of sex/gender then the point of attack you should choose is not people whose sex/gender is not seen as authentic to begin with, whose appearance is seen as having no bearing on "actual womanhood" or "actual manhood". There is no progressive value whatsoever to the assertion that trans women have the physical features of cis men, this is the most baseline reactionary view there is. It doesn't combat sex/gender stereotypes or roles, it isn't in any way subversive - it simply visually confirms what cisnormativity wants to be true: that trans women are fundamentally different from "authentic women" (cis women), that transfeminized people are fundamentally excluded from "authentic femininity" because of their "biological sex". It reproduces an ideology of immutable sexual difference, of people being safely confined to their assigned sex with no real way to ever transcend these categories. It does this using our shared visual language.
Relying on our shared visual vocabulary of transmisogyny to denote transfeminization is transmisogynistic, regardless of your intent. Your intent not being hostile doesn't make your art non-transmisogynistic, it makes it unintentionally transmiosgynistic. Being unable to parse our shared visual language to determine whether or not your art is transmisogynistic doesn't make you progressive, it makes you an incompetent artist with a concerning lack of awareness of transmisogyny.
MEANING IN A VISUAL MEDIUM IS CONVEYED VISUALLY THROUGH SHARED VISUAL LANGUAGE.
Spare us your lazy sophisms, your posturing about how progressive your own personal view of the semiotics of sex/gender is. When using a language, you have to take into account what its words mean to its other users. Individualist!
I might not have ever realized that I wanted to transition if it weren't for representation that looked like what I wanted to look like, that it was even worth attempting. Why align yourself with the reactionary forces that try to keep trans people from transitioning by implying transition is a futile effort, that we are forever doomed to look, above all, like our assigned sex?
Depicting trans people in a way that suggests an extreme sexual dimorphism based on assigned sex with no overlap doesn't bear out in reality and it's irresponsible, sexist, transphobic and (by my reckoning) intersexist. If you're not a trans woman yourself, you mustn't limit yourself to exclusively depicting visibly trans trans women. You do have some obligations towards people whose reason for transitioning is dysphoria. You can't allow yourself produce what will inadvertently function as anti-transition propaganda when judged by its effect on dysphoric people. You cannot let vulnerable girls think "this (and only this) is how people will see me" when that is the opposite of what they want - and then wash your hands of the result because you did it in the name of "representation".
I don't want you to feel like you have a moral right to completely unrestrained artistic freedom. Representation has to suit the represented, not just the artist - and not just those members of the population being represented that the artist hand-picked because they tell them what they're doing is perfectly fine. That kind of self-serving "listening to [x] voices" where you yourself make the choice which [x] to listen to is worth less than nothing, it's the definition of tokenism. What kind of representation goes out of its way to antagonize the people it claims to represent? I do want you to walk on eggshells. And I want you to do your part in increasing the number of cast off eggshells to walk on by very gently encouraging their occupants to hatch (by letting them know that there are people who will look at them with love in their eyes - love on their terms, love that they can recognize as love, love for what they love about themselves, love that isn't based on painful misrecognition).
When the forces of reaction proclaim "we can always tell", will you allow them to speak through your art? Traitor!
A final note about miscommunication. The later Ludwig Wittgenstein writes that language assumes different meanings depending on the contexts in which it is used. He characterizes these contexts as "language games". Different language games have different rules. In order for communication to be successful, the players have to be aware that they are playing the same game and they have to have a shared understanding of its rules. If one player thinks they are playing a different game, then they will understand the language being used to have a different meaning (because the rules that associate language with meaning change from game to game).
I am sure that a lot of artists have no intention to speak about trans women in general when they depict individual fictional trans women, but they completely fail to create a context that makes this plausible for the audience. For example, a mentally ill character in a work of fiction being a criminal assumes a different meaning when they are part of a large ensemble cast featuring many mentally ill people who aren't criminals than if they had been the only mentally ill character within a work that is otherwise populated by people who are neither mentally ill nor criminals. You, the artist, are not the sole authority over which "language game" you are playing. You have to make it clear to the other players which game you are playing, and you have to do it in a way that doesn't seem like a lie or an excuse. "All the trans women who aren't drawn with visual language that calls them men just happen to be off screen at all times". Be serious about it if you want us to play along.
Don't misunderstand me as saying that you should only draw trans people who perfectly resemble cis people of their own gender (though drawing those is required). That would be overcorrecting. "Clocky" trans people and gender-non-conforming trans people deserve respectful representation. That is a genuinely difficult task within a visual medium, where symbolic and representational aspects compete against each other (there is no benefit to pretending that this conflict doesn't exist). We should not abandon the field to the hostile caricatures that define the visual vocabulary of transmisogyny, but "good intentions" are not nearly enough to make a transmisogynistic caricature into anything else. There simply is no other way than learning to balance conflicting ideological demands against each other, which requires skill.
As an artist you are a propagandist, so learn to recognize how ideology shapes perception (including yours) and learn how to propagandize. Don't be a coward, don't be a slacker, don't be an individualist, don't be a traitor. Don't get defensive because you feel attacked, self reflect. You are being attacked because you make yourself into a nuisance by your careless actions, you can stop being a nuisance at any time by putting down your pen. If you cannot currently depict us respectfully, don't publish your depictions until you can. Not every stage of your artistic development needs to be subjected to public scrutiny.
Be someone that transfeminized people can actually be proud to call their comrade.
Every transfeminized person is negotiating with their social environment for a way to be allowed to exist. There is no entirely self-directed identity. Every identity responds to external pressures. Within feminist spaces, transfeminized people are expected to demonstrate their proximity to cis womanhood in order to be recognized as political subjects of feminism, regardless of how irrelevant that proximity is to their reality of being "seen as" and "treated as" women (misogynized subjects).
The idea that the social location of femboys can be similar to that of trans women (and that these are overlapping categories) assumes the shape of a threat aimed at the precarious recognition of trans women's womanhood (on which they must often rely to justify being political subjects of feminism) in feminist spaces. If we recognize that the social location of (at the very least a subset of) femboys is that of primary targets of (trans-)misogyny regardless of their identity or how progressive or reactionary their politics (or the politics bound up in the construction of the femboy identity) are, then we run the risk of, in the eyes of our watchful minders, proving ourselves insubordinate to the idea of women's liberation (as still primarily understood through a lens of sex-based oppression).
Our role within feminism often appears to be first and foremost to flatter its primary subjects, cis women, by allowing them to confirm their adherence to progressive values (which they do by recognizing our self-declared womanhood as "valid"). We are tolerated within feminist spaces not necessarily because our liberation is genuinely believed to depend on feminism (which it does) but because excluding us would mark those doing it as intolerant. We are tokens to be seen but not heard. Our contributions are regarded with suspicion, we are guests or interlopers who do not understand what it's like to be misogynized, not really. After all, we are AMABs (men) who "identify as women". If we didn't "identify as women" we would simply be AMABs (men). Our supposed community is eager to demonstrate that this is their understanding by reacting with anger and confusion to our rejection of the idea (which to them seems self-evident) that we are "seen as" and "treated as" men, that our social location is that of men (after all, if having been AFAB is enough to become a target of "sex-based oppression" then surely the corollary is that not having been AFAB results in not being a target of "sex-based oppression". How could we be so obstinate as to deny this?).
When we explicitly recognize that e.g. femboys or drag queens, by failing to adhere to the confines of their assigned/imposed maleness (even if not in terms of nominal identity), are marked for transmisogynization, we are accused of "prioritizng men", "believing in AFAB privilege", "being male supremacists" or any number of similar transgressions.
Trans women whose identities are enmeshed with and shaped by mostly feminist discourses are not the only transfeminized people. Many transfeminized people find the niche in which they are able to exist in contexts which place different demands upon them, create different priorities for them. A sex worker has reason to assume an identity that is conducive to doing sex work. A person existing in a transphobic social context has reason to assume an identity that can exist in such a context. A person to whom "transgender/transsexual" is a colonial imposition tied to medical gatekeeping (and with a class character hostile to them) has reason to assume an identity that rejects being conflated with trans womanhood.
There is not always a clear distinction between "true identity" and "mask". There is no final judgement, no identity that cannot be superseded as a result of its holder being released from fetters they were previously bound by or by coming under new limitations. Every identity, no matter how sincere, can turn into dead tissue. Sometimes a mask becomes your real skin. There is no way to exist without a context imposing its limits. We impose them upon each other as well.
There is not a single transfeminized identity the construction of which is not bound up with transmisogyny. Every transfeminized identity is a tightrope act. "Trans woman" is an identity that responds to a myriad of reactionary pressures. Pressures originating from medical gatekeeping, from colonialism, from considerations regarding identity politics, pressures originating from recalcitrant ideas within feminist discourses seeking to disprove our epistemic authority, pressures to distance ourselves from pornography and fetishism and anime and trauma and immaturity and misogyny and whatever else transmisogynists attempt to attribute our transfemininity to in order to dismiss us.
You understand the game that is being played when people in feminist spaces try to make the idea that we have so much in common with cis men palatable to us: We are supposed to accept that assigned sex determines your social location with regards to "sex-based oppression", gender is simply a personal identity that has no bearing on it - the social location of trans women is that of marginalized men who are oppressed perhaps, but not by misogyny (or "anti-AFAB oppression") like cis women and trans people AFAB are. Because people AFAB are seen as having shared "class interests", it is presumed that the same must be true for people AMAB.
In light of that, let me state the kinds of things that trans women have in common with transfeminized people who are not women or do not consider themselves trans in a way that cannot easily be used as a foot in the door to equate us to our oppressors (cis men): What we have in common is that we are among the primary and intended targets of transmisogyny for transgressing against the imposition of maleness (which does not result in us being "seen as" or "treated as" men, in us occupying the social location of men). That we are misogynized. That we are treated as existing for the benefit of cis men. That we are vulnerable to sexual exploitation, abuse and violence. That we are subject to expulsive dynamics resulting in social isolation and precarity. That we are subject to epistemic marginalization. That our femaleness (or proximity to it) or femininity is given the meaning of deviancy or sexual aggression, which justifies our exclusion from accessing the support/resources we need as a result of our (trans-)misogynization and frames any aggression against us as self-defense. That our transfeminization is used to lay the blame for almost anything done to us at our feet (after all, we "chose" this, we were asking for it). It is things of this nature that we have in common.
If we don't want our transfeminism to assume an increasingly racist, classist character, then it must concern itself with transfeminized people who assume identities in which transmisogynistic ideas are bound up (even when those identities and ideas are weaponized against us).
Here's a quote from andrea dworkin's "Right-Wing Women" (this is not an endorsement of her countless terrible political positions on most topics you could think of, I have no interest in laundering her image and this is not an attempt to do so):
Two elements constitute the discipline of feminism: political, ideological, and strategic confrontation with the sex-class system ā with sex hierarchy and sex segregation ā and a single standard of human dignity. Abandon either element and the sex-class system is unbreachable, indestructible; feminism loses its rigor, the toughness of its visionary heart; women get swallowed up not only by misogyny but also by antifeminism ā facile excuses for exploiting women, metaphysical justifications for abusing women, and shoddy apologies for ignoring the political imperatives of women. One other discipline is essential both to the practice of feminism and to its theoretical integrity: the firm, unsentimental, continuous recognition that women are a class having a common condition. This is not some psychological process of identification with women because women are wonderful; nor is it the insupportable assertion that there are no substantive, treacherous differences among women. This is not a liberal mandate to ignore what is cruel, despicable, or stupid in women, nor is it a mandate to ignore dangerous political ideas or allegiances of women. This does not mean women first, women best, women only. It does mean that the fate of every individual woman ā no matter what her politics, character, values, qualities ā is tied to the fate of all women whether she likes it or not. On one level, it means that every womanās fate is tied to the fate of women she dislikes personally. On another level, it means that every womanās fate is tied to the fate of women whom she politically and morally abhors. For instance, it means that rape jeopardizes communist and fascist women, liberal, conservative, Democratic, or Republican women, racist women and black women, Nazi women and Jewish women, homophobic women and homosexual women. The crimes committed against women because they are women articulate the condition of women. The eradication of these crimes, the transformation of the condition of women, is the purpose of feminism: which means that feminism requires a most rigorous definition of what those crimes are so as to determine what that condition is. This definition cannot be compromised by a selective representation of the sex class based on sentimentality or wishful thinking. This definition cannot exclude prudes or sluts or dykes or mothers or virgins because one does not want to be associated with them. To be a feminist means recognizing that one is associated with all women not as an act of choice but as a matter of fact. The sex-class system creates the fact. When that system is broken, there will be no such fact. Feminists do not create this common condition by making alliances: feminists recognize this common condition because it exists as an intrinsic part of sex oppression. The fundamental knowledge that women are a class having a common condition ā that the fate of one woman is tied substantively to the fate of all women ā toughens feminist theory and practice. That fundamental knowledge is an almost unbearable test of seriousness. There is no real feminism that does not have at its heart the tempering discipline of sex-class consciousness: knowing that women share a common condition as a class, like it or not.
Dworkin, Andrea. Right-Wing Women. Coward-Mccann, 1982, pp. 220ā21.
Obviously I do not believe in "sex-based oppression", nor should you. That isn't to say that I think assigned sex (or imposed gender) doesn't shape the oppression we face, just that it is not an extricable axis of oppression in its own right that neatly divides oppressed from oppressor along the lines of assigned sex. I do however believe that oppression is something that is imposed on us without our assent. We do not need to "identify our way into being oppressed" by saying we are trans women. That we are transmisogynized is a reality we recognize, not one we have to choose. We cannot allow any standard other than the fact that we are oppressed to influence the recognition of our shared oppression. It's our shared oppression that pulls us into relation with each other and nothing else. Our shared self-interest (in that regard) is a result of our shared oppression, not of our similarity, of a shared identity. That doesn't mean we're natural allies, there are many antagonisms between transfeminized people along the lines of race, class, imperial core citizenship etc. which frequently outweigh their shared transmisogynization in shaping their aggregate interests.
Trans women have made note of the fact that we are misogynized/feminized before we claim womanhood as an identity many times. But we must not make the mistake of treating this as quantum-misogyny, misogyny that can only be retroactively recognized as misogyny once we recognize ourselves as women. It is misogyny regardless of how we think of ourselves after it has already occured. We cannot be satisfied with saying "we experienced misogyny because it was inevitable that at some future point we would come to recognize ourselves as women". That we consider ourselves women and that we are misogynized/feminized have the same cause, they are not the same fact. Then we must either say "everyone who is misogynized/feminized is a woman because 'woman' is exclusively a class descriptor and not an identity" which is a pretty egregious idea considering that we don't have to do that and it's needlessly offensive and paternalistic to anyone but people who already consider themselves women - or we recognize that while all women are misogynized/feminized, not all misogynized/feminized people are women (I recommend this).
You cannot say that travestis, for example, are not transmisogynized - because they are some of the most transmisogynized people that exist by any metric you could think of. You also cannot say that all travestis are women if you want to grant them the agency to speak for themselves, which you must. It's simply not the case that all travestis consider themselves women and that's where you must leave it at if you don't want to turn your transfeminism into a chauvinist project. Ascribing womanhood to transfeminized people outside the imperial core who explicitly reject it is as much a colonial endeavor as third-gendering them when they do claim womanhood. You must accept the fact that transfeminized, transmisogynized, TMA people are a somewhat heterogeneous category. That is the utility of terms like these.
To understand the different transfeminisms in the region, it is essential to understand the nuances of different forms of self-identification. For many people interviewed, travesti identity is at the center of transfeminisms. Travesti is a uniquely Latin American identity category with variations in each country. Originally meant as a transphobic slur directed at trans sex workers, the term has been re-appropriated and resignified to name a political identity that asserts the right to self-identify beyond the constraints of gender normativity.
Argentinian activist Lohana Berkins explains: āAs travestis, we construct our identity by challenging the meanings that the dominant culture assigns to genitals. Society reads into peopleās genitals and forms expectations regarding their identities, skills, social positions, sexuality, and morality. It is assumed that a body with a penis will have a masculine subjectivity, while a body with a vagina have a feminine subjectivityā (Berkins, 2007).
In other words, the use of the term travesti as a political category performs an epistemic insubordination, transforming a concept derived from a biomedical ā pathologizing ā standpoint into an identity category based on oneās gender identity. Another key aspect of travesti identity is that, since many travesti people do not identify themselves with the term āwoman,ā it is a non-binary category: āTravestis have a feminine gender identity, but not all travestis recognize themselves as women, and when the term āwomanā is used as a synonym of gender, the experiences of many travestis who do not want to be recognized under the term āwomanā are excluded. I opt for speaking about āwoman-ismsā and āfemale-ismsā since we share the experiences of being labeled within what is defined as feminine, but not necessarily within cis-hetero patriarchal molds (Interview with LetĆcia Nascimento, 2021).
For this reason, travesti must be understood āas a strongly political, āsudacaā identity, which is related to language, to our region, and to an entire genealogy associated with a history of struggle in which our first movements got together in the streets to say āthis is travesti identityāā (Florencia Guimaraes, 2021).
As stated by MarĆa Clara AraĆŗjo, travesti āis an identity constructed on Latin American soil, and I think that it is important for us to ensure that we do not translate this term when we speak with European and United States institutions because our experiences as travestis in Cali, Rio de Janeiro, La Paz, Monterrey, or Santo Domingo bring with them aspects that are very much from our locality, from the reality in which we are immersed in Latin America. And what is particular to this reality? The experience of a violence that never ends, of a continual crisis that looks as if itās never going to end, and we are within that context that has a colonial originā (MarĆa Clara AraĆŗjo, 2021).
As with the term travesti, the term cochón is used in Nicaragua, and it does not coincide with the binary idea increasingly attributed to the term ātrans.ā Cochón, cochona, or cochonx is used to refer to people assigned male at birth, but whose identity and/or gender expression does not follow the traditional norms of masculinity or homosexuality. āCochón is non-binary because it is attributed to someone who is neither man nor woman, but this term [non-binary] comes from the North.ā In addition, cochón is a term that marks intersections with race and colonialism; those who call themselves cochónes/as/xs are Black, poor, or live in marginalized neighborhoods (Interview with Elyla Sinvergüenza).
Cochón is another case of resignification of a slur, turning it into an affirming identity that brings pride beyond the categories proposed by the LGBT acronym, and establishes itself as a political subject in the fight for the rights of gender non-conforming people, particularly those with non-binary feminine and racialized identities. Cochón/a/x also allows those who identify with the term to distance themselves from colonial identity frameworks and categories, and to collectively construct themselves in community spaces. Hence, the term has considerable political potential.
Finally, some people also strategically use the words trans, queer, or non-binary because, although they are colonial and come from the āGlobal Northā, they are politically useful to engage in conversations and build common agendas with transfeminist movements in other countries or regions, but always keeping a critical perspective (Interview with Daniela Núñez; Elyla Sinvergüenza, and Florencia Guimaraes, 2021).
It might be amusing to assume the voice of an orientalist anthropologist and talk about the US third sex category of the "faggot", but if you conclude from a quip like that that surely every transfeminized person in the world must actually want to be understood as a (trans) woman, then you have not conducted a thorough enough investigation. The reason you can't simply say e.g. "travestis are women" isn't because some orientalist scholar invites you to imagine the noble savages transfeminized people of Latin America as too enlightened for binary genders - it's because it's a political identity (which has as its name an intentionally reclaimed and resignified slur) that includes both people who are women and people who explicitly reject that identity.
Liberation comes from political action, not identity. Identity politics are only useful insofar as they are conducive to concrete political ends. It does not matter which aesthetic demands an identity satisfies. It does not matter which hollow affirmations are applied to an identity. What matters is recognizing our shared oppression, because that is what we must organize against (if our transfeminism is aiming to have any real world utility at some point). What also matters is that transfeminized people whose self-interest is not shared by all transfeminized people are afforded the right to make demands of our transfeminism as internal minorities.
If we universalize the experiences of one particular subject of transfeminism then we are bound to replicate those failures of previous feminisms which intersectional feminism attempts to tackle.
When Sojourner Truth rose to speak, many white women urged that she be silenced, fearing that she would divert attention from women's suffrage to emancipation. Truth, once permitted to speak, recounted the horrors of slavery, and its particular impact on Black women:
"Look at my arm! I have ploughed and planted and gathered into barns, and no man could head me - and ain't I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man - when I could get it - and bear the lash as well! And ain't I a woman? I have born thirteen children, and seen most of 'em sold into slavery, and when I cried out with my mother's grief, none but Jesus heard me - and ain't I a woman?"
By using her own life to reveal the contradiction between the ideological myths of womanhood and the reality of Black women's experience, Truth's oratory provided a powerful rebuttal to the claim that women were categorically weaker than men. Yet Truth's personal challenge to the coherence of the cult of true womanhood was useful only to the extent that white women were willing to reject the racist attempts to rationalize the contradiction - that because Black women were something less than real women, their experiences had no bearing on true womanhood. Thus, this 19th-century Black feminist challenged not only patriarchy, but she also challenged white feminists wishing to embrace Black women's history to relinquish their vestedness in whiteness.
Contemporary white feminists inherit not the legacy of Truth's challenge to patriarchy but, instead, Truth's challenge to their forbearers. Even today, the difficulty that white women have traditionally experienced in sacrificing racial privilege to strengthen feminism renders them susceptible to Truth's critical question. When feminist theory and politics that claim to reflect women's experience and women's aspirations do not include or speak to Black women, Black women must ask: "Ain't We Women?" If this is so, how can the claims that "women are," "women believe" and "women need" be made when such claims are inapplicable or unresponsive to the needs, interests and experiences of Black women?
The value of feminist theory to Black women is diminished because it evolves from a white racial context that is seldom acknowledged. Not only are women of color in fact overlooked, but their exclusion is reinforced when white women speak for and as women. The authoritative universal voice - usually white male subjectivity masquerading as non-racial, non-gendered objectivity is merely transferred to those who, but for gender, share many of the same cultural, economic and social characteristics. When feminist theory attempts to describe women's experiences through analyzing patriarchy, sexuality, or separate spheres ideology, it often overlooks the role of race. Feminists thus ignore how their own race functions to mitigate some aspects of sexism and, moreover, how it often privileges them over and contributes to the domination of other women. Consequently, feminist theory remains white, and its potential to broaden and deepen its analysis by addressing non-privileged women remains unrealized.
An example of how some feminist theories are narrowly constructed around white women's experiences is found in the separate spheres literature. The critique of how separate spheres ideology shapes and limits women's roles in the home and in public life is a central theme in feminist legal thought. Feminists have attempted to expose and dismantle separate spheres ideology by identifying and criticizing the stereotypes that traditionally have justified the disparate societal roles assigned to men and women. Yet this attempt to debunk ideological justifications for women's subordination offers little insight into the domination of Black women. Because the experiential base upon which many feminist insights are grounded is white, theoretical statements drawn from them are overgeneralized at best, and often wrong. Statements such as "men and women are taught to see men as independent, capable, powerful; men and women are taught to see women as dependent, limited in abilities, and passive", are common within this literature. But this "observation" overlooks the anomalies created by crosscurrents of racism and sexism. Black men and women live in a society that creates sex-based norms and expectations which racism operates simultaneously to deny; Black men are not viewed as powerful, nor are Black women seen as passive. An effort to develop an ideological explanation of gender domination in the Black community should proceed from an understanding of how crosscutting forces establish gender norms and how the conditions of Black subordination wholly frustrate access to these norms. Given this understanding, perhaps we can begin to see why Black women have been dogged by the stereotype of the pathological matriarch or why there have been those in the Black liberation movement who aspire to create institutions and to build traditions that are intentionally patriarchal.
Because ideological and descriptive definitions of patriarchy are usually premised upon white female experiences, feminists and others informed by feminist literature may make the mistake of assuming that since the role of Black women in the family and in other Black institutions does not always resemble the familiar manifestations of patriarchy in the white community, Black women are somehow exempt from patriarchal norms. For example, Black women have traditionally worked outside the home in numbers far exceeding the labor participation rate of white women. An analysis of patriarchy that highlights the history of white women's exclusion from the workplace might permit the inference that Black women have not been burdened by this particular gender-based expectation. Yet the very fact that Black women must work conflicts with norms that women should not, often creating personal, emotional and relationship problems in Black women's lives. Thus, Black women are burdened not only because they often have to take on responsibilities that are not traditionally feminine but, moreover, their assumption of these roles is sometimes interpreted within the Black community as either Black women's failure to live up to such norms or as another manifestation of racism's scourge upon the Black community. This is one of the many aspects of intersectionality that cannot be understood through an analysis of patriarchy rooted in white experience.
Crenshaw, Kimberle () "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics," University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1989: Iss. 1, Article 8. Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1989/iss1/8
You must not make an identical experience of oppression the criterion for who is and isn't a political subject of transfeminism. A white trans woman from the imperial core who doesn't engage in sex work isn't as at risk of transfemicide (or travesticide) as a racialized transfeminized sex worker in Latin America who may or may not consider herself a woman. A closeted trans woman's experiences are different from an out trans woman's experiences. A transfeminized person who goes stealth as a cis woman has different experiences from a visibly or openly trans one. A Black drag queen who medically transitions (who has to navigate the racism and transmisogyny present in society in general and the drag scene in particular, as well as the misdirected hostility from mainstream trans activism) has an experience of oppression that is probably substantially different from that of a white trans woman in western europe who refuses to transition so as to not jeopardize her upper middle class lifestyle and convinces herself that not transitioning socially or medically is actually the most radical way to be a woman when you think about it (and that transfeminized people who have to navigate a world of actualized, directed transmisogyny and suffer the economic downward mobility and expulsive social dynamics that come with it are regressive conformists).
Shared oppression in one regard does not actually render us into a contiguous class with shared interests, because we are segmented by a number of factors that intersect to create our social location. If we overstate our commonalities, we justify those of us most able to make themselves heard speaking for all of us, to sideline the interests of internal minorities among transfeminized people. If we want any "general" transfeminism at all, it has to be a transfeminism that is based on solidarity. That solidarity must first and foremost be extended from those whose oppression is mitigated by certain factors to those whose oppression is unmitigated. A white trans woman must be a traitor to her interests as a white person in order to be a political ally to a racialized trans woman when their interests are at odds. We cannot rely on sexed/gendered oppression outweighing all other contradictions by chance in order to create a shared destiny (as tends to be presupposed in the radical feminist imagination and rhetoric). Unfortunately feminism must rely on an ethical mandate for its cohesion, which makes for notoriously weak bonds.
For once I will talk about myself.
When I thought I couldn't be a girl because I was embedded in an ideology of naturalized sex categories, I still presented in a way that made lots of people think I was a girl because I wanted to look like a girl and be seen as a girl. I learned about ideas like "gender identity" when I looked into medically transitioning because the idea of growing up to look like a man felt like I was rotting alive. Before I knew transition was a possibility I had resigned myself to taking my life once I couldn't pass as a girl anymore because of my age. I didn't pay attention in school (regrettably) and messed around with adult men since I was 13 because I wasn't going to need an education anyway because I didn't have any doubt that I was going to be dead before it would matter - thinking about the future was unbearable. I starved myself starting at about age 10 because I wanted to limit the effects of puberty as much as possible. That was the horizon of my imagination as a transfeminized child who at some point started understanding herself as a "trap". When I was 14 I read "The Picture of Dorian Gray" and the idea that youth was the only thing that really mattered really resonated with how I was already being led to think about myself. My boyfriend at the time (an adult man) had joked that the reason he was leaving me was because I wasn't small and cute enough anymore to suit his tastes when I no longer had to tiptoe to kiss him. It wasn't a joke to me.
I do hate the concept of the trap or the femboy for how it extols the transient beauty of youth, for how it tells transfeminized adolescents that there is only a tiny timeframe in which they can look like girls and to be satisfied with that brief amount of time and then move on and integrate into society as men. Am I wrong? I don't want transfeminized children who are like I was to see adulthood as the event horizon. Being forced to undergo completely preventable grotesque body horrors while the message being communicated to you is "the fact that your girl(ā)hood is a limited time offer makes it more valuable when you think about it", isn't that cruel? I can't accept it.
I will never hate anyone who identifies with a concept like that for doing so. I just want the spaces they occupy to be saturated with medical information about puberty blockers and HRT. I want those resources to be available to them regardless of their identities and regardless of their reasons for wanting them with no gatekeeping, with as little friction and financial burden as possible. I want these things to be completely destigmatized. I want them to occur without regard for the wishes of parents/guardians or objections of healthcare professionals. I want the (trans-)misogynistic death cult that tells them that only "natural beauty" is valuable to be purged from existence.
(If you, an enlightened feminist, object that they should simply learn to value things about themselves other than their youthful/feminine looks instead of pursuing medical interventions, then I sincerely hope you never had any kind of skincare routine beyond washing your face. And they're not at all wrong to think it is the only thing they are being valued for. The only reason I will ever accept for why someone shouldn't transition is that they don't want to, never that they shouldn't want to, not even in your utopian fantasy.)
I'm a transsexual because I wanted to medically transition and then I did. I'm a woman at least partially because understanding myself as a woman was a requirement for being allowed to medically transition (If you find my saying that surprising, please read Sandy Stone's "The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto"). I'm a woman at least partially because that's how I can explain the fact that I'm misogynized to feminists who wouldn't be able to make sense of it otherwise. I'm not being insincere when I call myself a woman but it describes a social location before anything else, it's a political identity. (It's not like I have a particular wish to be something else either.)
I'm also a trap because (beyond my sentimental attachment to the term) I resent the fact the concept of the "trap" has the stipulation built in that it is for others to decide whether or not it applies to a person, that it is an observer-based classification - a value judgement based on perceived sexual attractiveness, perceived youthfulness and perceived resemblance of a cis girl. I want to deny any would-be appraisers the authority to make that judgement, I'm making it for them. I refuse to grow out of it regardless of how much others may wish to romanticize the idea of fleeting beauty.
The history of the ē·ć®åØ (otokonoko) concept by which the anglophone ideas of "trap" and "femboy" have been heavily influenced (even before the peak of the otokonoko boom, through popular characters like Bridget from "Guilty Gear XX") should probably also be acknowledged, although I can't speak on it with any particular authority (feel free to correct me if you are better informed). It is a relatively recent concept that has its origins in subcultures surrounding commercial properties (manga, anime, games etc.) and is somewhat disconnected from older forms of non-normative gender expression and LGBT subculture. There isn't just a single definition of the term ē·ć®åØ (some contradict each other), it's not generally seen mutually exclusive with trans womanhood, either in fiction (Oozora Hibari, who is universally agreed to be of central importance to the development of the ē·ć®åØ concept, unambiguously self-identifies as a girl in the text) or in reality, and many transfeminized people (including trans women) have been involved in shaping the subculture surrounding the concept.
The term ē·ć®åØ itself is a play on the word ē·ć®å (otokonoko, "male child" i.e. "boy") wherein the character å (ko, "child") is replaced with the character åØ (ko, meaning "girl" or "daughter"), resulting in a word that is read exactly like "boy" but written to approximately mean "male girl".
Broadly speaking, ē·ć®åØ refers to a person who was assigned male, is by some standard "anatomically male" and also (usually based on the judgement of a third party, e.g. the reader of a work of fiction or an onlooker) cute and apparently female - often regardless of their gender identity. There are obviously transmisogynistic ideas bound up in it and you can point them out (e.g. the naturalization of assigned sex by attributing maleness irrespective of identity), it can be applied in dehumanizing ways, sex workers may be pressured to present themselves as ē·ć®åØ regardless of their actual identities, and giving the assessment of onlookers primacy over internal identity is objectifying - but there is no need to extend your criticism beyond what can be justified or to equate the people who do identify with the term to its underlying ideological assumptions.
Do you not think you are somewhat out of line when you make sweeping statements that assert that ē·ć®åØ are simply stand-ins for trans women when many of the people most directly concerned in this discussion (self-identified ē·ć®åØ) complain on their social media accounts about westerners imposing their normative ideas about non-normative gender onto them against their will? (Obviously self-identified ē·ć®åØ are not a monolith and they are not the only people who have a right to participate in that conversation as the term is not only applied to people who are fine it, but this is what I have seen a fair amount of on Japanese twitter. I can't say how representative that is of a general attitude). Do you think Japanese girls and girls(ā) need the guiding hand of a US citizen (the most progressive people) to learn how to do their own gender the correct way? Isn't that way of thinking awfully condescending?
Does my holding on to the label "trap" when it's so obviously, undeniably transmisogynistic make me an insufficiently disciplined transfeminist in your eyes? I don't think it should.
I do not think we should be indulging and reifying the cis feminist impulse to make the recognition of our (trans-)misogynization (and the resulting social location) conditional upon us explaining ourselves as women. I think this dynamic is an important reason for why transfeminized people are not allowed to be non-binary. If we understand distance from (trans) womanhood in terms of personal identities as directly proportional to distance from (trans-)misogynization, then we are failing to account for many of the criteria that actually mark people for (trans-)misogynization - we put the onus on individuals to describe their identity in a way that is congruent with this identity-based conception of social location.
We must draw a distinction between acknowledging that cis women are treated as the default, essentialized political subject of feminism and reproducing this position. Both the idea that misogyny as experienced by cis women accounts for the totality of misogyny and the idea that non-cis women are less misogynized because of their distance from the essential misogynized subject (cis women) are mistakes in thinking. It is correct that we insist on our similarity to cis women (because we are similar and that similarity shapes our oppression), but we mustn't let that similarity become a condition for the misogyny we experience to be recognized as misogyny. The lived experiences of cis women cannot be the benchmark for what is and isn't misogyny. Transfeminized people are primary, intended targets of misogyny for who they actually are (not for who they are "seen as") just as much as cis women are. Their social location is determined by misogyny just as fundamentally as that of cis women is.
Even if you don't come away agreeing with me, thank you for hearing me out.
Hi, I just wanted to say that your posts really helped me understand what people mean when they say TMA/TME. I feel like there's a lot of screaming matches in the trans community, hypocrisy, people not hearing each other, conflicting definitions of proposed terminology... You've provided a lot of clarity for me personally ^^
My take on controversial terminology in trans discourse tends to be "it's an imperfect attempt to fill a lexical gap" and I think that definitely applies here. I feel like I lot of criticisms come from that imperfection, but terminology shouldn't have to be perfect to be useful.
The literal interpretation of "exempt" can make it pretty confusing, but I think if more people sat down and took the time to understand what people actually mean by it, it wouldn't be nearly as controversial. Maybe people will come up with something more intuitive at some point? But for now, I think TMA/TME works okay enough.
Though, I guess people would probably rip apart whatever other proposal comes later anyway. The whole "you just want to know what's in my pants" criticism always just seemed unwarranted and transphobic. That criticism never made sense to me, and had nothing to do with the word "exempt" being used.
Ramble ramble sorry lol. Keep up the good work!
I'm glad my posts were helpful. I've mostly switched to "transfeminized"/"non-transfeminized" and "transmisogynized"/"non-transmisogynized" to communicate the same concepts, since they seem to be somewhat less controversial and perhaps easier to intuit.
Though, I guess people would probably rip apart whatever other proposal comes later anyway.
Shortly after I first used "transfeminized" I got this reaction:
The whole "you just want to know what's in my pants" criticism always just seemed unwarranted and transphobic. That criticism never made sense to me, and had nothing to do with the word "exempt" being used.
That tactic is over a decade old, it predates "TMA"/"TME" terminology and was already used when trans people still primarily discussed their relationship to transmisogyny in terms of "CAMAB" and "CAFAB".
Insinuating transfeminized people are being sexually inappropriate in response to their attempts to formulate a model of their oppression is probably just an effective strategy because it's easy for people to accept.
It makes even less sense with "TMA"/"TME" (or any other P or ¬P terminology), but when all you have is a hammer (transmisogyny), everything looks like a nail.
People whose end goal is transmisogyny denial (even if they nominally believe that something called "transmisogyny" exists) probably won't accept any framework that treats transmisogyny as a real form of oppression, regardless of the form it takes.
Opinion poll on Emi Koyama's "Transfeminist Manifesto"
ā Are you a "trans woman" as definied in the "transfeminist manifesto"?
For the purpose of this manifesto [...] the phrase ātrans womenā is [...] used to refer to those individuals who identify, present or live more or less as women despite their birth sex assignment to the contrary.
ā” Does the "transfeminist manifesto" put forward an accurate account of the social location of "trans women" with regards to "male privilege"? If you are a "trans woman" (as defined above), does it correctly describe your own lived experiences? Is the theoretical framework it uses viable? In short, is it (more or less) correct?
(If you haven't read it, I have included an excerpt below the cut. Here is the full text.)
⢠Do you consider the contents of the "transfeminist manifesto" to be transmisogynistic?
Please select your answer carefully.
ā Trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
ā Trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
See results
Voting ended onApr 14
For the sake of clarity: I'm making this poll because I consider the continual deployment of this work by non-transfeminized trans people in intra-community discourses to be a very blatant form of tokenization. It is frequently used to speak over transfeminized people and dismiss the standpoints they have communally achieved. Rather than being treated as an author who speaks for herself, Emi Koyama is elevated to the position of a token spokesperson for transfeminized people (and an authority on their lives) by way of vulgarized standpoint epistemology. Because the "transfeminist manifesto" is deployed in this fashion, this question becomes relevant: "What do the people being spoken for think about it?"
Excerpt from Emi Koyama's "Transfeminist Manifesto":
The Question of Male Privilege
Some feminists, particularly radical lesbian feminists, have accused trans women and men of benefiting from male privilege. Male-to-female transsexuals, they argue, are socialized as boys and thus given male privilege; female-to-male transsexuals on the other hand are characterized as traitors who have abandoned their sisters in a pathetic attempt to acquire male privilege. Transfeminism must respond to this criticism, because it has been used to justify discrimination against trans women and men within some feminist circles.
When confronted with such an argument, a natural initial response of trans women is to deny ever having any male privilege whatsoever in their lives. It is easy to see how they would come to believe that being born male was more of a burden than a privilege: many of them despised having male bodies and being treated as boys as they grew up. They recall how uncomfortable it felt to be pressured to act tough and manly. Many have experienced bullying and ridicule by other boys because they did not act appropriately as boys. They were made to feel ashamed, and frequently suffered from depression. Even as adults, they live with the constant fear of exposure, which would jeopardize their employment, family relationships, friendships and safety.
However, as transfeminists, we must resist such a simplistic reaction. While it is true that male privilege affects some men far more than others, it is hard to imagine that trans women born as males never benefited from it. Most trans women have "passed" as men (albeit as "sissy" ones) at least some point in their lives, and were thus given preferable treatments in education and employment, for example, whether or not they enjoyed being perceived as men. They have been trained to be assertive and confident, and some trans women manage to maintain these āmasculineā traits, often to their advantage, after transitioning.
What is happening here is that we often confuse the oppression we have experienced for being gender-deviant with the absence of the male privilege. Instead of claiming that we have never benefited from male supremacy, we need to assert that our experiences represent a dynamic interaction between male privilege and the disadvantage of being trans.
Any person who has a gender identity and/or an inclination toward a gender expression that match the sex attributed to her or him has a privilege of being non-trans. This privilege, like other privileges, is invisible to those who possess it. And like all other privileges, those who lack the privilege intuitively know how severely they suffer due to its absence. A trans woman may have limited access to male privilege depending on how early she transitioned and how fully she lives as a woman, but at the same time she experiences vast emotional, social, and financial disadvantages for being trans. The suggestion that trans women are inherently more privileged than other women is as ignorant as claiming that gay male couples are more privileged than heterosexual couples because both partners have male privilege.
Tensions often arise when trans women attempt to access āwomenās spacesā that are supposedly designed to be safe havens from the patriarchy. The origin of these "women's spaces" can be traced back to the early lesbian feminism of the 1970s, which consisted mostly of white middle-class women who prioritized sexism as the most fundamental social inequality while largely disregarding their own role in perpetuating other oppressions such as racism and classism. Under the assumption that sexism marked womenās lives far more significantly than any other social elements, they assumed that their experience of sexism is universal to all women regardless of ethnicity, class, etc. ā meaning, all non-trans women. Recent critiques of the 1970s radical feminism point out how their convenient negligence of racism and classism in effect privileged themselves as white middle-class women.
Based on this understanding, transfeminists should not respond to the accusation of male privilege with denial. We should have the courage to acknowledge ways in which trans women may have benefited from male privilege -- some more than others, obviously -- just like those of us who are white should address white privilege. Transfeminism believes in the importance of honoring our differences as well as similarities because women come from variety of backgrounds. Transfeminists confront our own privileges, and expect non-trans women to acknowledge their privilege of being non-trans as well.
By acknowledging and addressing our privileges, trans women can hope to build alliances with other groups of women who have traditionally been neglected and deemed āunladylikeā by white middle- class standard of womanhood. When we are called deviant and attacked just for being ourselves, there is nothing to gain from avoiding the question of privilege.
Before the TMA/TME dichotomy was put in those terms, people found issue with the fact that in order to discuss transmisogyny without talking over transfems they had to reveal some combination of their ASAB, gender or trans status in some way. TMA/TME is a gesture at a solution that allows people to locate themselves in relation to structural transmisogyny while revealing only the absolute minimum information required to do so. It is also a terminology that allows for discussing transmisogyny without making any extraneous assertions or assumptions pertaining to the subjects of discussion.
The fact that this is the most minimal possible terminology for discussing transmisogyny in terms of group relationships makes it seem like our last line of defense against saying "it's not a problem to speak over transfems" and that seems to be precisely what some people are aiming for: The accusation that we just want to dismiss the views of everyone who isn't transfem is made openly with the implication being that wanting to prioritize the perspectives of transfems in discussions about the oppression of transfems is indicative of something akin to transfem-supremacy.
I don't see what we can take away or add or change to address the criticisms made of TMA/TME to the satisfaction of the critics. Informally we could just say transfem and non-transfem but by doing that we have to include all TMA people under the label "transfem". We are already constantly forced to do this for the sake of communication, but it is flattening the possibility space allotted to our identities considerably and it is misleading.
Would any of the criticisms actually be assuaged by us changing the terms to more closely reflect the literal meaning we intend? If we chose terms that precisely conveyed a meaning like "primary target of structural transmisogyny" and "not a primary target of structural transmisogyny" would anyone at all actually be satisfied? Or would the goalposts be moved once again?
I see questions like "Should we perhaps make a binary like this for other forms of oppression too? Should we say ableism-affected and ableism-exempt?" put forward as an argument against these terms and I just don't think this would be a big deal. The reason we don't usually need to do that is that it's generally understood how purposefully obfuscating your your own relationship to a form of oppression in controversial discussions of it is suspect. Have we abandoned standpoint epistemology altogether at this point, or is ours a special case?
We are told that we are creating a new binary by using TMA/TME terminology but that is presupposing that that this binary didn't already exist before we put it into language. The criticism simply assumes its desired conclusion. It makes the brute assertion that TMA people aren't affected by transmisogyny qualitatively differently from TME people to begin with (and we're not allowed to litigate this assertion). It denies outright that transmisogyny is what we mean by it and tells us that we shouldn't mean by transmisogyny what we do mean by it. We are told that we are reinforcing or even creating the arbitrary, inconsistent, socially constructed systems on the basis of which we are oppressed by acknowledging the arbitrary, inconsistent, socially constructed systems on the basis of which we are oppressed in our analysis.
"You just want to know what's in people's pants" I do not, and you know it. "You just want to know people's ASAB" I do not, and you know it. Keep your words out of my mouth. What I want is for people to not try to pull the wool over our eyes and stealthily define transmisogyny out of existence by, without acknowledging it, introducing the non-existence of transmisogyny as a settled matter in the premises on the basis of which they criticize our terminology.
If transfems attempting to insist on their ability to not be talked over about their own oppression seems to you like they are engaging in the epistemic marginalization of everyone else then you are a transmiosgynist and deserve to be identified as such. It is because of our epistemic marginalization even in LGBT and trans spaces that we need terms like these. Stripping us of the tools to even attempt to counterbalance our epistemic marginalization by acknowledging it will simply allow for our epistemic marginalization to go unacknowledged once again, to let others speak for us and over us, to re-enshrine the absolute moral right to never have to listen to us.
hi, i have a genuine question. in how you define transfem, whats the difference between transfem and tma?
ive been looking into your blog earlier and saw your poll where you and a majority of those who answered defined transfem as
A person who has maleness/non-femaleness legally/institutionally/socially imposed upon them against their will and "transitions/transgresses towards" femaleness/femininity/womanhood. A trans person who is barred from the social location of cis womanhood regardless of their own wishes.
maybe i missed it or you havent done it, but i couldnt find a post of you defining "transmisogyny affected" so im just gonna use the definition other people ive seen on tumblr
š¬ 39Ā Ā š 3545Ā Ā ā¤ļø 4104Ā Ā·Ā a common (and exhausting) misconception seems to happen around the word "exempt". let's be clear: transmisogyny isn'
from the post and the replies, its definition of tma is pretty much identical to how you defined transfem.
am i missing something, did i misunderstand anything? /genq
from how i understand it, its pretty much identical so im confused in your third paragraph in this post (the one im reblogging);
I don't see what we can take away or add or change to address the criticisms made of TMA/TME to the satisfaction of the critics. Informally we could just say transfem and non-transfem but by doing that we have to include all TMA people under the label "transfem". We are already constantly forced to do this for the sake of communication, but it is flattening the possibility space allotted to our identities considerably and it is misleading.
so im assuming theres a difference between tma and transfem (or at least based on how you define it). can you explain what it is?
"TMA" is a category that we use for the purposes of feminist analysis, it should not be understood as anything resembling an identity.
"Transfem" is often understood as an identity category that many people who must correctly be analyzed as "TMA" or "transfeminized" or "transmisogynized" do not identify with (e.g. because they do not understand themselves as "trans").
"Transfem" probably has additional less definite connotations that I did not include in my "definition" because they are not "essential" to its meaning. People do not use natural language words like "transfem" in strict accordance with definitions, definitions are abstractions that attempt to explain how words are used. Their actual usage is what determines their meaning.
What sets different transmisogynized identities apart from each other may be cultural, it may be subcultural, it may be an aesthetic preference, it may be ideological, it may be class, it may be a relationship to colonialism or imperialism or racism etc.
Every transmisogynized person could identify as "transfem" if they wanted to (there are no "additional requirements"), but transmisogynized people should not need to identify as a "transfem" (or allow themselves to be identified as such by others) to have their oppression as primary targets of transmisogyny acknowledged.
Imposing "transfem" as an identity onto people (or entire populations) who may reject it is (at the very least) counterproductive.
It's more or less an extension of this argument from "A Short History of Trans Misogyny" by Jules Gill-Peterson:
While no one but the most delirious imperialist can innocently survey the globe to put a single stamp on trans womanhood or trans femininity, it is possible to narrate the global creation of trans misogyny through colonial and class-based arrangements of sex, gender, and sexuality. Instead of presuming trans femininityās coherence in advance and then using history to certify it, this book examines where and when trans femininity became a fault line in broader histories, including the repressive practices of colonial government, the regulation of sex work, the policing of urban space, and the line between the formal and informal economy. In this way, the method of this book is deceptively simple: it uses the history of trans misogyny to understand where trans-feminized people were lit up by the clutches of violence and how they responded to its aggressions. In doing so, we learn what makes trans misogyny unique and get a glimpse at how wildly diverse people around the world have come to find themselves implicated in trans femininity and trans womanhood, whether or not they wanted to be.
For these reasons, I maintain a difference between trans femininity and trans womanhood or trans women. The first is meant to signal a broad classification by outside observers, including aesthetic criteria and the history of ideas attached to people who have been trans-feminized. Trans womanhood and women, on the other hand, name people who saw themselves as intentionally belonging to a shared categoryāin other words, who tried to live in the world recognized as women, whatever that category meant to them contextually. Everyone in this book may have been trans-feminized, and all may have been brought into the orbit of trans femininity, but only some considered themselves to be trans women in response. These careful, empirical distinctions remind that trans misogyny has had the effect of pulling huge swaths of people into relation with one another, like Black trans women in New York City and kathoeys in Bangkok, who but for the accidents of history may never have seen each other as having anything in common. It does not weaken the category of trans femininity, or the political project of trans feminism, to examine trans women alongside hijras, street queens, transvestites, and Two-Spirit people, even if few to none of the latter would identify as trans women. On the contrary, it reveals just how narrow the Western definition of woman has been, since many groups of people reject it as a colonial limitation, even when it arrives in a trans idiom.
Gill-Peterson, J. (2024). A Short History of Trans Misogyny. Verso Books.
as a "TMA" person, my issue with the term is that in regards to how I actually see it used, it is used as an identity and effectively synonymous with transfem and works to obfuscate what is actually being described by being an ambiguously interpretable acronym. the terms "transfeminised" and "transmisogynised" that you use here I think do a much better job of accomplishing what "TMA" is ostensibly supposed to do with much less room for ambiguity.
"TME" on the other hand I genuinely find stupid on the face of it, if the point is to get away from discussions about identity and instead to talk about oppressive dynamics and the groups they affect (something which differs between contexts), constructing an identity outgroup of people who you describe as categorically exempt from that oppression is just about the fastest way to shoot yourself in the foot, and to make matters worse, practically, most of the time I see the term used it's to redefine transmasculine people as an oppressor class and erase the transphobia and misogyny they do still face. here in particular I think it's vital to speak plainly about what specific group your analysis is actually referring to in the individual case (cis people as an oppressor group? transmasculine people as a model minority? all people who do not face transmisogyny and as such do not have to think so much about its pressures?) rather than trying to construct some singular coherent outgroup.
(this idea is only present in one of the screenshots here so I'm not assuming the people above agree with it but I do wanna address it so I'm doing so separately) I also think the idea that afab people are never "really" victims of transmisogyny because they can "exempt" themselves is just... a fundamental misunderstanding of how transmisogyny and transfeminity... function? there are many trans people, even today, who live "stealth" and are entirely indistinguishable from cis women, and transmisogynists know this. the idea that there's a categorical immutable difference between trans women and cis women that makes one always tma and the other always tme is the same "we can always tell" bs from a different angle. it has nothing to do with materialist analysis of oppressive dynamics, it's sheer platonism, and, ironically, sexism, in the fundamental sense of "belief in discrete categories of sex". generally, afab people are far, far less likely to be transmisogynised than amab people, but to turn this into an exclusive categorical distinction is in fact just reconstructing the binary framework of sex.
I can only speak for myself, not for @doe-eyed-disaster.
I have already largely switched to using "transfeminized"/"non-transfeminized" some time ago.
Part of the reason the term "TMA" is used as effectively synonymous with "transfem" is that most "TMA" people on tumblr also identify as "transfem". That part is unproblematic. The other part is probably respectability politics (trans women not wishing to be associated with drag queens or femboys especially) and anxieties about the standing of trans women in feminist discourses.
It's not important whether you classify transmasculine people as part of an "oppressor class" with regards to transmisogyny. Being part of an "oppressor class" does not imply (or even suggest) that someone is not oppressed in their own right. Being oppressed does not prevent transmasculine people from being beneficiaries of transmisogyny at the expense of transfeminized people, nor does it create a shared self-interest in the eradication of transmisogyny. The fact that transmasculine people can and do unilaterally benefit from transmisogyny creates an investment in its continued existence.
I've written about some of the ways non-transfeminized people benefit from transmisogyny before here. I've also written about coalition-based group politics informed by that fact here.
The argument about "conflation" is entirely unconvincing. "Cis" conflates cis women with their oppressors (cis men). "Non-Black" conflates racialized non-Black people with the white people who oppress them. "Perisex" conflates perisex trans people with perisex cis people who oppress them, etc. This is a non-issue. This "concern" seems to only ever be raised by marginalized people who are uncomfortable with the idea of having their culpability in the oppression of other marginalized people acknowledged. This kind of discomfort is entirely expected and should not shape our analysis in any capacity.
To me the main utility of "TMA"/"TME" isn't in talking about oppressive dynamics instead of identities, it's enabling us to apply frameworks originally formulated in terms of identity politics (intersectionality, standpoint epistemology, etc.) to a context in which the determinant of the oppression does not coincide with a shared self-identification.
The words "affected" and "exempt" must absolutely not be taken literally. How much an individual is actually affected by instances of interpersonal transmisogyny is irrelevant to whether or not they are "TMA" or "TME". These categories are an abstraction, not descriptive terms referring to people's past experiences.
I'll just quote another post of mine:
If you are TME, the way transmisogyny affects you is as a TME person. You can shoot through bulletproof vests, you can see invisible ink, you can eat inedible substances, you can say unspeakable things and water can be liquid below its freezing point. Your relationship to transmisogyny is a different one than that of a TMA person and that difference is what TME/TMA describes.
[...]
I want to appeal to you to consider our positions, our terminology from an angle of self-advocacy in light of how invested others are in transmisogynistically misexplaining our own experiences to us, over us and against us. "Everyone can be affected by transmisogyny" is true in the same way that "everyone can be affected by intersexism" and "everyone can be affected by racism" and "everyone can be affected by ableism" are true. It ceases to be true when it's used to deny that there is a meaningful qualitative difference in how intersex people and perisex people relate to intersexism, how racialized people and those who aren't relate to racism, how disabled people and non-disabled people relate to ableism.
[...]
Reductive, transmisogynistic ideas of transmisogyny like that we only suffer transmisogyny when we are recognized as transfems (regardless of whether those doing the recognizing consider trans women to be women or not) or mistaken for men ignore the fact that even those of us who are "seen as" cis women all day every day have to completely structure their lives around transmisogyny. The fact that I'm a trans woman renders interactions with people who have no idea and even passive states that would have nothing to do with transmisogyny otherwise into transmisogyny because of the way they interact with the objective fact of reality that I am a trans woman. Transmisogyny is not a mental defect of transphoboes and it cannot be reduced to individual interactions or attitudes.
Your relationship to a form of oppression is not defined by your personal, individual experience of that oppression. If you understand it as such you will end up with a politically useless concept.
The nature of the oppression of an oppressed group is determined by the totality of the oppression experienced by its members. The boundary of the group is determined by the logic of the oppression and the political considerations of the oppressed.
Transmisogyny (if the concept is supposed to be useful) isn't "what transmisogynists do, say, or think", it's the oppression of transfeminized people, regardless of its motivation, regardless of whether there is or even could be a motivation.
Large parts of that oppression are structural, the result of transfeminized people coming into contact with systems that do not even acknowledge the fact that they are transfeminized. Other parts are tied to the fact that transfeminized people recognize themselves as transfeminized and their awareness of transmisogyny shapes the way they interact with a world based on that understadning. Other people may not know that a trans woman wasn't AFAB, but she does, and she has to take transmisogyny into account in how she interacts with the world as a result.
It's irrelevant that transmisogyny can "affect" individual people outside of the groups marked for transmisogynization. It's irrelevant to what transmisogyny is and it's irrelevant to who it targets that a cis woman might be harmed because she is mistaken for a trans woman, even if that cis woman has been "affected" (in a literal sense) by transmisogyny. Such a cis woman remains "TME" regardless of the severity of the harm she experienced. She is definitely a real victim of transmisogyny, but "victimhood" does not determine one's relationship to a system of oppression.
It's not "we can always tell", it's "whether or not anyone can 'tell' is irrelevant to what we mean by these terms".
Calling something "materialist" doesn't make it useful and calling something "idealist" doesn't make it useless. Oppression doesn't stop existing the moment it isn't actualized. Walking across a minefield doesn't retroactively become safe if you survive it. Not crossing a minefield because you know it's there is not being unaffected by its existence. Oppression cannot be analyzed in terms of discrete instances of harm.
It is a mistake to conclude from the fact that an oppressed category has no inherent properties or essence, that it must therefore lack identifiable boundaries altogether.
Our assigned sex (or imposed gender) fundamentally shapes our social location because there are structures in place (social, familial, institutional, legal, etc.) that ensure that it does - not because it is "inherent" or "natural" or has some kind of extra-discursive "reality". It is "real" in the sense that it is a social construct with real material consequences, like money or laws. Acknowledging this fact isn't "reconstructing the binary framework of sex", it is taking note of the fact that this framework is extant and continues to affect us, no matter how much we wish it didn't. Just like the law or money don't become irrelevant as a result of being social constructs, assigned sex doesn't become irrelevant as a result of being a social construct.
That trans women are barred from the social location of cis womanhood on the basis of their assigned sex doesn't mean that there are any inherent or immutable differences between trans women and cis women. Being aware that people on one side of a wall are no different from those on the other side doesn't make the wall disappear. It's there as a matter of fact, not as a matter of logical necessity. From the fact that something isn't necessarily the case (and shouldn't be the case) you cannot conclude that it isn't actually the case.
If we do not reproduce the logic of our oppression in the form of a model of our oppression, we render ourselves unable to understand it and can only wonder at each identifiable instance of it post factum. The logic on the basis of which we are oppressed is obviously reactionary. This logic is expressed in (or inferred from) the way society is organized, not just the personal beliefs people hold.
We are not subscribing to the reactionary logic on the basis of which we are oppressed by acknowledging the fact that this logic generates the oppressible categories it sorts us into.
We may be able to obscure our "belonging to" an oppressed category (according to the logic that generates the category) and individual people who do not "belong to" the category (according to the logic that generates the category) may be mistaken for people who do "belong to" it. This can be acknowledged, but it does not matter. Nothing can be gained from mystifying our oppression and pretending it is too arbitrary to model.
Opinion poll on Emi Koyama's "Transfeminist Manifesto"
Please consider reblogging this poll, I would like the sample to capture as large a portion of the trans community on [tumblr] as possible.
ā Are you a "trans woman" as definied in the "transfeminist manifesto"?
For the purpose of this manifesto [...] the phrase ātrans womenā is [...] used to refer to those individuals who identify, present or live more or less as women despite their birth sex assignment to the contrary.
ā” Does the "transfeminist manifesto" put forward an accurate account of the social location of "trans women" with regards to "male privilege"? If you are a "trans woman" (as defined above), does it correctly describe your own lived experiences? Is the theoretical framework it uses viable? In short, is it (more or less) correct?
(If you haven't read it, I have included an excerpt below the cut. Here is the full text.)
⢠Do you consider the contents of the "transfeminist manifesto" to be transmisogynistic?
Please select your answer carefully.
ā Trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
ā Trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
See results
Voting ended onApr 14
For the sake of clarity: I'm making this poll because I consider the continual deployment of this work by non-transfeminized trans people in intra-community discourses to be a very blatant form of tokenization. It is frequently used to speak over transfeminized people and dismiss the standpoints they have communally achieved. Rather than being treated as an author who speaks for herself, Emi Koyama is elevated to the position of a token spokesperson for transfeminized people (and an authority on their lives) by way of vulgarized standpoint epistemology. Because the "transfeminist manifesto" is deployed in this fashion, this question becomes relevant: "What do the people being spoken for think about it?"
Excerpt from Emi Koyama's "Transfeminist Manifesto":
The Question of Male Privilege
Some feminists, particularly radical lesbian feminists, have accused trans women and men of benefiting from male privilege. Male-to-female transsexuals, they argue, are socialized as boys and thus given male privilege; female-to-male transsexuals on the other hand are characterized as traitors who have abandoned their sisters in a pathetic attempt to acquire male privilege. Transfeminism must respond to this criticism, because it has been used to justify discrimination against trans women and men within some feminist circles.
When confronted with such an argument, a natural initial response of trans women is to deny ever having any male privilege whatsoever in their lives. It is easy to see how they would come to believe that being born male was more of a burden than a privilege: many of them despised having male bodies and being treated as boys as they grew up. They recall how uncomfortable it felt to be pressured to act tough and manly. Many have experienced bullying and ridicule by other boys because they did not act appropriately as boys. They were made to feel ashamed, and frequently suffered from depression. Even as adults, they live with the constant fear of exposure, which would jeopardize their employment, family relationships, friendships and safety.
However, as transfeminists, we must resist such a simplistic reaction. While it is true that male privilege affects some men far more than others, it is hard to imagine that trans women born as males never benefited from it. Most trans women have "passed" as men (albeit as "sissy" ones) at least some point in their lives, and were thus given preferable treatments in education and employment, for example, whether or not they enjoyed being perceived as men. They have been trained to be assertive and confident, and some trans women manage to maintain these āmasculineā traits, often to their advantage, after transitioning.
What is happening here is that we often confuse the oppression we have experienced for being gender-deviant with the absence of the male privilege. Instead of claiming that we have never benefited from male supremacy, we need to assert that our experiences represent a dynamic interaction between male privilege and the disadvantage of being trans.
Any person who has a gender identity and/or an inclination toward a gender expression that match the sex attributed to her or him has a privilege of being non-trans. This privilege, like other privileges, is invisible to those who possess it. And like all other privileges, those who lack the privilege intuitively know how severely they suffer due to its absence. A trans woman may have limited access to male privilege depending on how early she transitioned and how fully she lives as a woman, but at the same time she experiences vast emotional, social, and financial disadvantages for being trans. The suggestion that trans women are inherently more privileged than other women is as ignorant as claiming that gay male couples are more privileged than heterosexual couples because both partners have male privilege.
Tensions often arise when trans women attempt to access āwomenās spacesā that are supposedly designed to be safe havens from the patriarchy. The origin of these "women's spaces" can be traced back to the early lesbian feminism of the 1970s, which consisted mostly of white middle-class women who prioritized sexism as the most fundamental social inequality while largely disregarding their own role in perpetuating other oppressions such as racism and classism. Under the assumption that sexism marked womenās lives far more significantly than any other social elements, they assumed that their experience of sexism is universal to all women regardless of ethnicity, class, etc. ā meaning, all non-trans women. Recent critiques of the 1970s radical feminism point out how their convenient negligence of racism and classism in effect privileged themselves as white middle-class women.
Based on this understanding, transfeminists should not respond to the accusation of male privilege with denial. We should have the courage to acknowledge ways in which trans women may have benefited from male privilege -- some more than others, obviously -- just like those of us who are white should address white privilege. Transfeminism believes in the importance of honoring our differences as well as similarities because women come from variety of backgrounds. Transfeminists confront our own privileges, and expect non-trans women to acknowledge their privilege of being non-trans as well.
By acknowledging and addressing our privileges, trans women can hope to build alliances with other groups of women who have traditionally been neglected and deemed āunladylikeā by white middle- class standard of womanhood. When we are called deviant and attacked just for being ourselves, there is nothing to gain from avoiding the question of privilege.
Yep. Both "transtrender" and "theyfab" came out of 4chan's /lgbt/ board during the start of their transmed era (they're still transmeds but have moved onto other things since such as shitting on those who transitioned early, or those who transitioned "too late")
THATS SO WEIRD I HAD NO IDEA ABOUT ANY OF THAT !!! i cant believe i didnt know i was super into transtrender discourse back in the day (6th grade),,, i thought they originated on tumblr thatās so fascinating
to be fair though is it bad of me to say it checks out that they came from 4chan. they really do feel like the sort of hateful terms that would come from that place. it checks out that 4chan is transmed in general honestly
Yeah sorry but it is a 4chan term, despite what people like to claim about how "theyfab came from Twitter to dunk on transmisogynistic trans men". It's a 4chan term, as is most slurs and epithets against trans people, speaking as someone who literally was on the board when it and others were coined.
I have no particular interest in defending the usage of the word "theyfab", but the claim that it originated on 4chan is misinformation, no matter how much you want it to be true.
The earliest usage of "theyfab" on 4chan is this post:
There are multiple archives of 4chan which start many years before this post and none of them show an earlier instance of the term "theyfab".
Here are a few links to support that claim:
archiveofsins.com
archived.moe
desuarchive.org
Here is a tumblr post predating it:
(archive link)
A tweet predating it:
(archive link)
A facebook post predating it:
(archive link)
The term "transtrender" literally predates the creation of the /lgbt/ board on 4chan in 2013.
Being a 4chan user does not enable you to know what happens outside of 4chan. Maybe you missed that crucial detail.
Before the TMA/TME dichotomy was put in those terms, people found issue with the fact that in order to discuss transmisogyny without talking over transfems they had to reveal some combination of their ASAB, gender or trans status in some way. TMA/TME is a gesture at a solution that allows people to locate themselves in relation to structural transmisogyny while revealing only the absolute minimum information required to do so. It is also a terminology that allows for discussing transmisogyny without making any extraneous assertions or assumptions pertaining to the subjects of discussion.
The fact that this is the most minimal possible terminology for discussing transmisogyny in terms of group relationships makes it seem like our last line of defense against saying "it's not a problem to speak over transfems" and that seems to be precisely what some people are aiming for: The accusation that we just want to dismiss the views of everyone who isn't transfem is made openly with the implication being that wanting to prioritize the perspectives of transfems in discussions about the oppression of transfems is indicative of something akin to transfem-supremacy.
I don't see what we can take away or add or change to address the criticisms made of TMA/TME to the satisfaction of the critics. Informally we could just say transfem and non-transfem but by doing that we have to include all TMA people under the label "transfem". We are already constantly forced to do this for the sake of communication, but it is flattening the possibility space allotted to our identities considerably and it is misleading.
Would any of the criticisms actually be assuaged by us changing the terms to more closely reflect the literal meaning we intend? If we chose terms that precisely conveyed a meaning like "primary target of structural transmisogyny" and "not a primary target of structural transmisogyny" would anyone at all actually be satisfied? Or would the goalposts be moved once again?
I see questions like "Should we perhaps make a binary like this for other forms of oppression too? Should we say ableism-affected and ableism-exempt?" put forward as an argument against these terms and I just don't think this would be a big deal. The reason we don't usually need to do that is that it's generally understood how purposefully obfuscating your your own relationship to a form of oppression in controversial discussions of it is suspect. Have we abandoned standpoint epistemology altogether at this point, or is ours a special case?
We are told that we are creating a new binary by using TMA/TME terminology but that is presupposing that that this binary didn't already exist before we put it into language. The criticism simply assumes its desired conclusion. It makes the brute assertion that TMA people aren't affected by transmisogyny qualitatively differently from TME people to begin with (and we're not allowed to litigate this assertion). It denies outright that transmisogyny is what we mean by it and tells us that we shouldn't mean by transmisogyny what we do mean by it. We are told that we are reinforcing or even creating the arbitrary, inconsistent, socially constructed systems on the basis of which we are oppressed by acknowledging the arbitrary, inconsistent, socially constructed systems on the basis of which we are oppressed in our analysis.
"You just want to know what's in people's pants" I do not, and you know it. "You just want to know people's ASAB" I do not, and you know it. Keep your words out of my mouth. What I want is for people to not try to pull the wool over our eyes and stealthily define transmisogyny out of existence by, without acknowledging it, introducing the non-existence of transmisogyny as a settled matter in the premises on the basis of which they criticize our terminology.
If transfems attempting to insist on their ability to not be talked over about their own oppression seems to you like they are engaging in the epistemic marginalization of everyone else then you are a transmiosgynist and deserve to be identified as such. It is because of our epistemic marginalization even in LGBT and trans spaces that we need terms like these. Stripping us of the tools to even attempt to counterbalance our epistemic marginalization by acknowledging it will simply allow for our epistemic marginalization to go unacknowledged once again, to let others speak for us and over us, to re-enshrine the absolute moral right to never have to listen to us.
hi, i have a genuine question. in how you define transfem, whats the difference between transfem and tma?
ive been looking into your blog earlier and saw your poll where you and a majority of those who answered defined transfem as
A person who has maleness/non-femaleness legally/institutionally/socially imposed upon them against their will and "transitions/transgresses towards" femaleness/femininity/womanhood. A trans person who is barred from the social location of cis womanhood regardless of their own wishes.
maybe i missed it or you havent done it, but i couldnt find a post of you defining "transmisogyny affected" so im just gonna use the definition other people ive seen on tumblr
š¬ 39Ā Ā š 3545Ā Ā ā¤ļø 4104Ā Ā·Ā a common (and exhausting) misconception seems to happen around the word "exempt". let's be clear: transmisogyny isn'
from the post and the replies, its definition of tma is pretty much identical to how you defined transfem.
am i missing something, did i misunderstand anything? /genq
from how i understand it, its pretty much identical so im confused in your third paragraph in this post (the one im reblogging);
I don't see what we can take away or add or change to address the criticisms made of TMA/TME to the satisfaction of the critics. Informally we could just say transfem and non-transfem but by doing that we have to include all TMA people under the label "transfem". We are already constantly forced to do this for the sake of communication, but it is flattening the possibility space allotted to our identities considerably and it is misleading.
so im assuming theres a difference between tma and transfem (or at least based on how you define it). can you explain what it is?
"TMA" is a category that we use for the purposes of feminist analysis, it should not be understood as anything resembling an identity.
"Transfem" is often understood as an identity category that many people who must correctly be analyzed as "TMA" or "transfeminized" or "transmisogynized" do not identify with (e.g. because they do not understand themselves as "trans").
"Transfem" probably has additional less definite connotations that I did not include in my "definition" because they are not "essential" to its meaning. People do not use natural language words like "transfem" in strict accordance with definitions, definitions are abstractions that attempt to explain how words are used. Their actual usage is what determines their meaning.
What sets different transmisogynized identities apart from each other may be cultural, it may be subcultural, it may be an aesthetic preference, it may be ideological, it may be class, it may be a relationship to colonialism or imperialism or racism etc.
Every transmisogynized person could identify as "transfem" if they wanted to (there are no "additional requirements"), but transmisogynized people should not need to identify as a "transfem" (or allow themselves to be identified as such by others) to have their oppression as primary targets of transmisogyny acknowledged.
Imposing "transfem" as an identity onto people (or entire populations) who may reject it is (at the very least) counterproductive.
It's more or less an extension of this argument from "A Short History of Trans Misogyny" by Jules Gill-Peterson:
While no one but the most delirious imperialist can innocently survey the globe to put a single stamp on trans womanhood or trans femininity, it is possible to narrate the global creation of trans misogyny through colonial and class-based arrangements of sex, gender, and sexuality. Instead of presuming trans femininityās coherence in advance and then using history to certify it, this book examines where and when trans femininity became a fault line in broader histories, including the repressive practices of colonial government, the regulation of sex work, the policing of urban space, and the line between the formal and informal economy. In this way, the method of this book is deceptively simple: it uses the history of trans misogyny to understand where trans-feminized people were lit up by the clutches of violence and how they responded to its aggressions. In doing so, we learn what makes trans misogyny unique and get a glimpse at how wildly diverse people around the world have come to find themselves implicated in trans femininity and trans womanhood, whether or not they wanted to be.
For these reasons, I maintain a difference between trans femininity and trans womanhood or trans women. The first is meant to signal a broad classification by outside observers, including aesthetic criteria and the history of ideas attached to people who have been trans-feminized. Trans womanhood and women, on the other hand, name people who saw themselves as intentionally belonging to a shared categoryāin other words, who tried to live in the world recognized as women, whatever that category meant to them contextually. Everyone in this book may have been trans-feminized, and all may have been brought into the orbit of trans femininity, but only some considered themselves to be trans women in response. These careful, empirical distinctions remind that trans misogyny has had the effect of pulling huge swaths of people into relation with one another, like Black trans women in New York City and kathoeys in Bangkok, who but for the accidents of history may never have seen each other as having anything in common. It does not weaken the category of trans femininity, or the political project of trans feminism, to examine trans women alongside hijras, street queens, transvestites, and Two-Spirit people, even if few to none of the latter would identify as trans women. On the contrary, it reveals just how narrow the Western definition of woman has been, since many groups of people reject it as a colonial limitation, even when it arrives in a trans idiom.
Gill-Peterson, J. (2024). A Short History of Trans Misogyny. Verso Books.
If you ask a TERF what the "radical" in "radical feminism" means, chances are she will tell you that it refers to locating the root cause of women's oppression in their belonging to a "sex class"* that is subjugated under patriarchy for the sake of controlling their reproductive capacity ("radical" being used in the sense of "pertaining to the root").
(*not all TERFs use "sex class" terminology, but the structure of the arguments being made is largely identical.)
The "trans exclusionary" part refers to trans women being excluded from the scope of the analysis that this kind of feminism offers on account of not belonging to the "sex class" whose reproductive capacity (i.e. the ability to bear children) is being controlled.
"Trans Exclusionary Radical Feminism", for as long as that term has existed, has never "excluded" all trans people from its analysis. It has always "included" transmasculine people (whose gender is usually disregarded and disrespected by its proponents) as "belonging to the sex class" whose reproductive capacity is being controlled. TERFs have used the expression "You can't identify your way out of oppression" illustrating this idea to the point of it becoming a cliche.
That isn't to say that TERFs necessarily like transmasculine people: The charge of pursuing an individual solution to a structural problem - that trans men are "members of the female sex class trying to escape their oppression" through misguided means, that trans men are simply trying to change their location from oppressed to oppressor while leaving the oppressive structure intact - has been frequently directed at transmasculine people.
This accusation, however, is only one of attempting to do so: TERFs do not believe that it's actually possible to escape "sex based oppression" by way of transitioning or any other individual action. They do not believe that transmasculine people are granted a position that allows them to benefit from "sex based oppression" as they do not believe patriarchy allows "women" to escape their "sex class".
In practice, this "inclusion" of transmasculine people is often abusive and entails paternalistic and manipulative attempts at making them detransition and "desist" to bring them back into the fold of "womanhood", which is inimical to their actual interests and may have catastrophic consequences for the target if successful.
The account that TERFs offer of transfems' plight under patriarchy is simply that they are facing a secondary oppression as "gender non conforming males" for subverting the gender roles assigned to them on the basis of their "sex class" as "males". According to TERF analysis, trans women are not oppressed on the basis of their womanhood because the oppression of women is "sex based oppression" aimed at controlling the reproductive capacity of the "female sex class".
The charge that TERFs make against trans women (which serves as the basis for excluding them from feminist organizing) is that they are infiltrating and derailing/subverting feminism. Trans women are thought to be "males" (biologically, physically, socially, psychologically etc.) whose interests are not aligned with those of the "female sex class" but with those of the "male sex class" and who will therefore divert the goals of feminism away from the liberation of the "female sex class" if granted the right to participate in the formulation of feminist agendas.
The actual interests of transmasculine people are thought by TERFs to align with the liberation of the "female sex class" so they see no reason to exclude them from feminist organizing. At most, transmasculine people are thought of as having a "false consciousness" and being mistaken about what is and isn't in their interest on account of identifying with an oppressor class they are not actually a part of.
Do TERFs hate men? That depends on what is meant by "hate" and "men". To TERFs "men" means "members of the male sex class" (cis men, transfems) and doesn't include trans men (whom they view as "women"/"members of the female sex class"). TERFs believe that "men" have structural power over "women" based on these sex classes. They believe that there are coherent class interests that unite the members of each "sex class". How they actually "feel" about "men" is somewhat variable and ranges from relatively neutral academic analyses viewing them as an oppressor class to ascribing them more or less demonic essential characteristics.
Trans women aren't seen like other "men" by TERFs though: They are conceptualized (in explicitly conspiratorial terms) as something like the storm troopers of patriarchy - an especially militant advance force (possibly giving up their humanity and becoming a kind of medically constructed monstrosity) to strike at the core of feminism with the goal of hollowing it out and clearing the path for "colonizing" and resorbing it into the patriarchal mainstream. Trans women are understood as an especially nefarious category of person because they are seen as posing a direct threat to the ability of "women as a sex class" to organize among themselves, to develop and use the language and theory they need to understand their own oppression and thereby resist patriarchy and bring about their liberation. Trans women are not just seen as attackers of "female safe spaces", they are seen as the attack itself. Their very existence is made out to be a stratagem devised against feminism and "women".
How and why the "sex class interests" of transfems supposedly align with those of "men" is never quite explained in materialist terms. In this point, TERFs invariably have to fall back on idealist concepts like biological determinism, spiritual essence, socialization, etc. Whereas transmasculine people are seen as having a "false consciousness" for mistaking where their material interests lie, the question of the material interests of transfems is never quite advanced. By some mechanism, by some unexplained (and sometimes metaphysical) force they benefit from "sex based oppression" in ways that e.g. an infertile cis woman would not. It essentially doesn't matter, it's an a priori assumption. "Belonging" to the "male sex class" itself is thought to grant access to structural power and the ability to benefit from "sex based oppression", even when no real world mechanism to that effect exists.
"Hating men" is neither a defining nor a unique feature of TERF ideology. There are some TERFs who arguably do hate men and there are others who do not. There are feminists who "hate men" in nearly every school of feminism. Even the most toothless iteration of liberal "girl power" feminism had its "male tears" mugs. The defining feature of TERF ideology is the exclusion of trans women from its conceptualization of women's oppression and from feminist organizing, justified with the supposed "class interests" of trans women being those of the "male sex class".
Trying the redefine the meaning of "TERF" in an attempt to obfuscate the specificity of this ideology's hostility towards transfems is dishonest and transmisogynistic on its own. Trying to do so while also claiming that transfems' material interests actually do align with those of cis men, the central distinguishing claim of TERF ideology, is such an unbelievably repulsive act of hypocrisy that it should disqualify anyone who does so from participating in the discourse surrounding trans women's oppression entirely.
This could be my daughterās last night⦠and I fear it may be the hardest.
I sit beside her, watching the change in her features from exhaustion, each breath labored, her strength slowly fading. She is no longer the playful child who once filled our home with laughter⦠now she can barely open her eyes.
Today, she whispered to me softly: āIām so tiredā¦ā
I wish I could take all her pain away and give her just one moment of relief, but I am powerless, left only with prayers and tears.
Her condition is worseningānot because hope is gone, but because we cannot afford the urgent treatment and food she needs. Time is slipping by, and with every hour, she weakens further.
Her siblings live in constant fear⦠they watch her and donāt understand why their sister can no longer play with them, why her pain never leaves. Their little hearts cannot bear it, and neither can mine.
I appeal to everyone reading these words⦠please donāt leave us alone in this suffering.
My daughter needs a chance to live, to return to being a child, to stay with us.
Your donation, no matter how small, could make a real difference today.
Your share could reach someone who can save her.
Please⦠do not ignore this plea.
This may be the last chance to save her life.
Please please help us please share and Donate nowš
Even the smallest donation can make a big difference please don't leave me.š
im not at all surprised that emi koyama is one of the ppl that would look a the absolutely horrific representation of trans women and determine that trans mens relative invisibilty constituted oppression
you are thinking about media representation, but i was thinking more in terms of political representation. i was in the community when trans activists were lobbying for rights in portland and multnomah county in the late 90s and early 2000s (equal employment by city itself and its contractors, state ID, non-discrimination ordinance, jail booking policy, etc.) and it was always (predominantly white middle-class) trans womenās voices and concerns that were prioritized. it was my impression at the time that trans men were marginalized in the trans movement and community a way similar to how poor trans women of color were, and i was working to fix that.
we clearly live in a totally different era now, but please have some understanding about the specific historical context in which i wrote things i did.
it looked that way at the time, based on my limited knowledge and observation. i have since realized the extent to which trans women were actively excluded from womenās movement, which is something i was oblivious to.
Opinion poll on Emi Koyama's "Transfeminist Manifesto"
Please consider reblogging this poll, I would like the sample to capture as large a portion of the trans community on [tumblr] as possible.
ā Are you a "trans woman" as definied in the "transfeminist manifesto"?
For the purpose of this manifesto [...] the phrase ātrans womenā is [...] used to refer to those individuals who identify, present or live more or less as women despite their birth sex assignment to the contrary.
ā” Does the "transfeminist manifesto" put forward an accurate account of the social location of "trans women" with regards to "male privilege"? If you are a "trans woman" (as defined above), does it correctly describe your own lived experiences? Is the theoretical framework it uses viable? In short, is it (more or less) correct?
(If you haven't read it, I have included an excerpt below the cut. Here is the full text.)
⢠Do you consider the contents of the "transfeminist manifesto" to be transmisogynistic?
Please select your answer carefully.
ā Trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
ā Trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Correct. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Transmisogynistic.
ā Not a trans woman. ā” Incorrect. ⢠Not transmisogynistic.
See results
Voting ended onApr 14
For the sake of clarity: I'm making this poll because I consider the continual deployment of this work by non-transfeminized trans people in intra-community discourses to be a very blatant form of tokenization. It is frequently used to speak over transfeminized people and dismiss the standpoints they have communally achieved. Rather than being treated as an author who speaks for herself, Emi Koyama is elevated to the position of a token spokesperson for transfeminized people (and an authority on their lives) by way of vulgarized standpoint epistemology. Because the "transfeminist manifesto" is deployed in this fashion, this question becomes relevant: "What do the people being spoken for think about it?"
Excerpt from Emi Koyama's "Transfeminist Manifesto":
The Question of Male Privilege
Some feminists, particularly radical lesbian feminists, have accused trans women and men of benefiting from male privilege. Male-to-female transsexuals, they argue, are socialized as boys and thus given male privilege; female-to-male transsexuals on the other hand are characterized as traitors who have abandoned their sisters in a pathetic attempt to acquire male privilege. Transfeminism must respond to this criticism, because it has been used to justify discrimination against trans women and men within some feminist circles.
When confronted with such an argument, a natural initial response of trans women is to deny ever having any male privilege whatsoever in their lives. It is easy to see how they would come to believe that being born male was more of a burden than a privilege: many of them despised having male bodies and being treated as boys as they grew up. They recall how uncomfortable it felt to be pressured to act tough and manly. Many have experienced bullying and ridicule by other boys because they did not act appropriately as boys. They were made to feel ashamed, and frequently suffered from depression. Even as adults, they live with the constant fear of exposure, which would jeopardize their employment, family relationships, friendships and safety.
However, as transfeminists, we must resist such a simplistic reaction. While it is true that male privilege affects some men far more than others, it is hard to imagine that trans women born as males never benefited from it. Most trans women have "passed" as men (albeit as "sissy" ones) at least some point in their lives, and were thus given preferable treatments in education and employment, for example, whether or not they enjoyed being perceived as men. They have been trained to be assertive and confident, and some trans women manage to maintain these āmasculineā traits, often to their advantage, after transitioning.
What is happening here is that we often confuse the oppression we have experienced for being gender-deviant with the absence of the male privilege. Instead of claiming that we have never benefited from male supremacy, we need to assert that our experiences represent a dynamic interaction between male privilege and the disadvantage of being trans.
Any person who has a gender identity and/or an inclination toward a gender expression that match the sex attributed to her or him has a privilege of being non-trans. This privilege, like other privileges, is invisible to those who possess it. And like all other privileges, those who lack the privilege intuitively know how severely they suffer due to its absence. A trans woman may have limited access to male privilege depending on how early she transitioned and how fully she lives as a woman, but at the same time she experiences vast emotional, social, and financial disadvantages for being trans. The suggestion that trans women are inherently more privileged than other women is as ignorant as claiming that gay male couples are more privileged than heterosexual couples because both partners have male privilege.
Tensions often arise when trans women attempt to access āwomenās spacesā that are supposedly designed to be safe havens from the patriarchy. The origin of these "women's spaces" can be traced back to the early lesbian feminism of the 1970s, which consisted mostly of white middle-class women who prioritized sexism as the most fundamental social inequality while largely disregarding their own role in perpetuating other oppressions such as racism and classism. Under the assumption that sexism marked womenās lives far more significantly than any other social elements, they assumed that their experience of sexism is universal to all women regardless of ethnicity, class, etc. ā meaning, all non-trans women. Recent critiques of the 1970s radical feminism point out how their convenient negligence of racism and classism in effect privileged themselves as white middle-class women.
Based on this understanding, transfeminists should not respond to the accusation of male privilege with denial. We should have the courage to acknowledge ways in which trans women may have benefited from male privilege -- some more than others, obviously -- just like those of us who are white should address white privilege. Transfeminism believes in the importance of honoring our differences as well as similarities because women come from variety of backgrounds. Transfeminists confront our own privileges, and expect non-trans women to acknowledge their privilege of being non-trans as well.
By acknowledging and addressing our privileges, trans women can hope to build alliances with other groups of women who have traditionally been neglected and deemed āunladylikeā by white middle- class standard of womanhood. When we are called deviant and attacked just for being ourselves, there is nothing to gain from avoiding the question of privilege.
When copies of Koyama's "Transfeminist Manifesto" were distributed without her involvement as she gave a presentation at the University of Washington in Seattle in 2013, she wrote this on her blog:
I personally do not want this particular article to be distributed further, unless it is made explicit that Manifesto is a dated, historical piece. I wrote the article more than a decade ago, and given that transgender community has expanded and changed rapidly over the last decade, I feel that it is no longer relevant. There are also many other texts exploring the intersection of feminism and trans politics, so there is no reason to keep Manifesto around, except of course as a historical artifact.
[...]
I donāt know who was responsible for pirating and distorting my work. I would feel a little bit better if it was done by a trans woman, but I doubt it: most trans women understand that Manifesto belongs in a different historical moment, and probably would not distribute it, other than to discuss the history of transgender activism.