The American Revolution should have failed...and if you'd been making odds in July 1776 with perfect information about material conditions, you would have been right. No navy. No treasury. No power to tax. A professional British army landing against a force that had never won a battle. Enlistments expiring in five months.
The author of this piece is a macro analyst writing from Santiago Capital Research, and their work typically examines the dollar system, capital markets, and great power competition...which is precisely why they're circling back to 1776 now.
Here is their central observation: the Continental Congress committed what they call "the single cockiest act in the history of statecraft." They declared independence at the *beginning* of the war, not the end...when they had nothing to show except a guarantee of defeat if they lost. They announced the result before the contest. A competent analyst in Philadelphia in July 1776, looking honestly at every observable fact, would have concluded the rebellion fails. And that analyst would have been right about every fact except the only one that mattered.
The mechanism turns on a single human decision. In March 1783, with the war essentially won militarily, Washington's own officers were on the edge of turning the army against Congress. He stopped the mutiny by reaching for his spectacles and invoking his gray hair and failing eyesight in service to his country. Then in December of that year, the man who could have been a king handed his commission back. Every incentive, every precedent in human history, and virtually all the men around him supported the opposite choice. He chose to remain a man instead.
> "That gap, between being right about all of the evidence and wrong about the conclusion, is the most expensive analytical error in finance, and it is being committed at scale right now...but the direction it is being committed in has flipped."
The author argues this matters because the credit of the United States was manufactured out of dead currency and unpayable debt in 1790, and it worked only because of what Washington did in 1783...a reminder that the observable facts about debt and solvency can be completely right while conclusions about systemic collapse are completely wrong.
Full analysis of American credit and contrarian risk













