[nihilnovijournal]

The consequences of banning the phrase “Polish Death Camps”

Polish Sejm has given the green light to a bill to criminalize statements such as “Polish Death Camps” which suggest Poland bears responsibility for crimes committed by Nazi Germany. As I have written before, few things aggravate Poles more than the phrase “Polish Death Camps” due to the simple fact that it engages in revisionist history. But the law is a horrible idea. Here’s why.

First, there has been a lot of progress made on this issue in the past few years, mostly due to the activity of Polish American groups and organizations. The Piast Institute, for example, always reacts swiftly to any claims of “Polish death camps” or “Polish concentration camps,” correcting the historical inaccuracies the moment they get printed or published online. The Kosciuszko Foundation organized a massive grassroots effort to demand that the news organizations change their style books to make sure the phrase is not used by journalists. About 308,000 people from across the world have signed its online petition, including former Presidents of Poland Lech Wałęsa and Bronisław Komorowski, among other dignitaries. The petition resulted in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, two of the highest circulation newspapers in the US, changing their stylebooks and promising more historical care in covering the WWII atrocities. Perhaps most notably, the AP also changed their stylebook and it now reads: “For World War II camps in countries occupied by Nazi Germany, do not use phrases like Polish death camps that confuse the location and the perpetrators. Use instead, for example, death camps in Nazi-occupied Poland.” This is a huge deal, as the AP Stylebook is the most widely-used journalistic style guide in the United States. As a result, the tireless efforts of many organizations and individuals over the years have simply worked. 

Secondly, the current debate will only backfire. Poland is not a salient topic in the global, or American, media. But look at what happened to the Google searches over the past week, as the story about the law came out. 

There was a huge spike in searches for "Polish Death Camps" in the US, Canada, Australia, Germany, Israel, and across the globe. In that sense, an attempt to ban the phrase totally backfired, spiking interest in the term across the world. 

Similar dynamics can be found on social media. The hashtag #polishdeathcamps reached nearly two million users all over the world according to data from Keyhole, although a more comprehensive analysis shows that the reach was about 28 million people. Meanwhile, the hashtag germandeathcamps reached only 1 million people...

This is not limited to the internet. Several years ago, I set up a google alert for any reference to “Polish death camps.” From time to time I get updates, usually from an obscure source that nobody is exposed to. In recent days, my google alerts have been red hot, with daily updates. “Polish death camps” are everywhere in the media and usually in the context of the controversy with Israel. In the past week, there were 164 articles in the prominent global news outlets referencing “Polish death camps” and the controversy surrounding the law according to data from Factiva. In the US, major outlets, like the Washington Post, NY Times, ABC News or NPR have been reporting on it. But the coverage is not restricted to the outlets easily labeled by the right as “liberal.” Fox News has been covering it as well, and so have the conservative sources like The Daily Caller or Breitbart, which have been positive in their coverage of the PiS government. The coverage in all media tended to be negative to Poland, focusing on rising anti-Semitism and far-right tendencies of the PiS government. 

I hope that this will make the lawmakers in Poland rethink their efforts. The key to protecting Poland from historical revisionism is not in banning phrases, but in education, engagement and dialogue. The amount of damage that the proposed law has already done in the last few days will be difficult to undo, and this whole fiasco should serve as an example of what not to do in situations like this. 

[nihilnovijournal]

“Polish Death Camps” in books and online

Quantifying the degree to which the historically inaccurate term "Polish death camps" appears in the media has been a task for me for a while now. As I've described here several times before, we have a decent idea about how the media treat this topic, but what about books? Thankfully, there is the Google N-gram data based on millions and millions of scanned books. So, what patterns do we see in books? First, the use of the term "Polish death camps" has been on a downwards trajectory through most of the 1990s, but there has been a spike in the mid-2000s. How does the pattern look like past-2008? We don't know, Google does not make these data available. However, it is important to put these numbers in perspective.

Once we include the phrase "German death camps" for comparison, we see that, with the exception of books published in the early 1950s, the use of GDC dominated, though perhaps not with the margins that one would hope it would. Furthermore, there is the troubling trend from the mid-2000s, where we see a framatic decrease in the usage of "German death camps" and a corresponding increase in the usage of "Polish death camps."

Including "Nazi death camps" gives us an even clearer perspective. It is clearly the term that dominates the discussion. Perhaps not surprisingly, as any student of the time period would likely recognize that in most books and newspaper articles they've ever read, it is the term "Nazi death camps" that tends to dominate in the literature, at least the English language literature. Two points warrant highlighting. First, even here, there is a noticeable dip in the usage of the term "NDC" at the expense of "PDC." This is concerning. Second, the usage of the term has absolutely exploded between the mid-1960s and 2000, increasing by 500%. The above shows how successful Germany has been in promoting the usage of the more historically whitewashing terminology of Nazi instead of German death camps. The implications of that choice of terminology are great, as they alter how people think about WWII.

So what do the people think? Well, instead of looking at polls, Google makes some of the search history available and its a good insight into what the public thinks about. These trends are from the United States alone.

It is immediately apparent that "Polish death camps" is not something that the American public thinks about very often, if at all. The term is barely searched. The one noticeably large spike, in May of 2012, came after President Obama's gaffe. The higher search intensity persisted into June, but them subsided to the usually low levels.

Introducing "German death camps" into the mix showcases, again, that this term is definitely more on a public's mind than Polish death camps, and there is a pattern of regularity, a seasonal trend, as time series statisticians would call it.

Similar is the case with "Nazi death camps." Again, this term dominates the public's mind. Though that dominance is not as profound as it is manifested in books. Furthermore, the seasonality is remarkable, quite possibly following the news cycle which focuses a lot of attention on commemorating liberation of the camps. 

What are the implications of this? As I've written before, we've had some great successes in fighting the "Polish death camps" usage among the media outlets in the United States. Clearly, the renewed focus should be on book publishers and the internet. There are some nice new tools available online to fight our least favorite historical lie, but an orchestrated effort, much like the one that has been focused on the media, needs to be implemented.

Dominik Stecuła

[nihilnovijournal]

Polonia amerykańska a walka o dobre imię Polski

W Polityce (nr 10 (3049) z dnia 2016-03-02; s. 48-50), historyk Adam Leszczyński pisze o przepisie na dobre imię Polski, a w szczególności o tym, że pomysł karania „oszczerców” (a w wersji lajt “ludzi niekompetentnych historycznie”) za pomocą paragrafu jest raczej oznaką słabości niż siły.

Według projektu ustawy, który wkrótce ma trafić do Sejmu, śledztwa wszczynałby z urzędu pion śledczy IPN. Miałby się on zajmować również „dbaniem o dobre imię Polski za granicą”. Kara grzywny i ograniczenia wolności groziłaby nawet za „nieumyślne i wbrew faktom” publiczne przedstawianie takich treści. Możliwe byłoby także wytaczanie procesów cywilnych – nie tylko przez instytucje państwowe, ale także przez organizacje pozarządowe, np. takie jak działająca od trzech lat Reduta Dobrego Imienia – Polska Liga przeciw Zniesławieniu. „Oszczercy milczcie i bójcie się” – skomentował projekt ministerstwa założyciel Reduty Maciej Świrski.

Jak zauważa Leszczyński, 

Nie wiadomo, jak nowe prawo będzie działało w praktyce. Pozwy od polskich władz zachodni dziennikarze mogą po prostu wrzucać do kosza. Fakt, że dziś zwykle reagują na protesty, ma źródło wyłącznie w ich dobrej woli. Polskie państwo nie jest ich w stanie do niczego zmusić ani w żaden sposób ukarać.

Przytacza też przykład Turcji, która wprowadziła podobne prawo. Nie podziałało. Działa coś zupełnie innego: drugofalowa strategia cichej perswazji. Tutaj autor daje przykład GMF oraz Anti-Defamation League. Na koniec, Leszczyński pisze o tym jak taka strategia mogłaby wyglądać dla Polski:

W polskiej sprawie można więc wyobrazić sobie dobrze finansowaną organizację pozarządową, która działałaby w USA i prowadzona byłaby przez ludzi mieszkających na miejscu i dobrze znających reguły amerykańskiego życia publicznego. Taka instytucja rzeczywiście mogłaby „walczyć o dobre imię Polski”, organizując kampanie społeczne, pisząc protesty oraz przygotowując kampanie informacyjne o polskiej historii (profesjonalnie przygotowana strona internetowa z materiałami, do której można byłoby odesłać, na pewno by nie zaszkodziła). Byłaby skuteczna także wobec tych, którzy jakikolwiek pozew z Polski wyrzucą po prostu do kosza.

Tajemnicą poliszynela jest że amerykańska Polonia nie cieszy się zbytnią popularnością lub szacunkiem w kraju (oczywiście poza elektoratem PiS). Ale oczywistą oczywistością jest fakt że organizacje o których marzy Leszczyński istnieją od wielu lat i robią na rzecz Polski w amerykańskiej świadomości bardzo wiele. 

Według danych US Census Bureau, w USA żyje prawie 10 milionów osób identyfikujących się w jakimś sensie z Polską (piąta największa grupa, po Niemcach, Irlandczykach, Anglikach i Włochach). Bardzo wiele z tych osób aktywnie działa w różnych polsko-amerykańskich oraz polonijnych organizacjach które od lat są wyczulone na różnego rodzaju drwiny z Polskich emigrantów (tzw. “polish jokes”) oraz na różnego rodzaju kłamstwa, ignorancję historyczną czy inne kłamliwe pomówienia z gatunku “polskich obozów zagłady.” To właśnie dzięki dekadom pracy tych organizacji, dzięki ich sprawnej, zkoordynowanej i szybkiej reakcji, “polska polityka historyczna” odnosiła w ostatnich latach sukcesy. 

Jeden przykład to zeszłoroczna kompromitacja szefa FBI, James’a Comey’a o Polakach mordujących swoich żydowskich sąsiadów, ramię w ramię z Niemcami i reakcja na tą wpadkę. Oczywiście w Polsce nastąpiło oburzenie i krytyka “polityki historycznej” rządu. Ale warto pamiętać o tym, że sukcesem był sam fakt trafienia kontrowersji wokół słów Comey’a do środków masowego przekazu na Zachodzie. Według internetowej bazy danych Factiva, wpadka Comey’a i reakcja z jaką się spotkała, pojawiła się w 375 artykułach prasowych. Najwięcej, bo aż 24 razy, pisała o tym agencja Reuters. Na Fox News pojawiło się 17 artykułów na ten temat, a na łamach The Washington Post 15. Ponadto kilkakrotnie pisał o tej kontrowersji The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, portal Yahoo, sieć ABC, BBC, londyński The Times, The Guardian, agencja AP, rosyjskie RIA Novosti, izraelski Jerusalem Post oraz liczne gazety kanadyjskie. Pomiędzy 19 a 24 kwietnia ukazało się w anglojęzycznych mediach ponad 200 artykułów na ten temat. Ten przykład pokazuje więc, że polska i polonijna presja działała. Dzięki tej presji tysiące czytelników, widzów i słuchaczy dowiedziało się dlaczego słowa Comey’a wywołały oburzenie i dostało mało lekcję historii. 

Oczywiście czymś co boli nas jako Polaków i polskich-amerykanów najbardziej jest użwyanie w mediach określenia “polskie obozy śmierci” lub “polskie obozy koncentracyjne.” Polskie media często donoszą o tego typu incydentach, ale ile ich jest dokładnie, nie wiadomo. 

Według internetowej bazy mediów LexisNexis, w latach 1970-2012 pojawiło się w światowych mediach 521 artykułów w których autor użył stwierdzenia “polskie obozy koncentracyjne” lub “polskie obozy śmierci”, z czego 331 w ważnych, anglo-języcznych publikacjach. Większość, bo aż 126 w mediach amerykańskich, 79 w mediach brytyjskich, 63 w kanadyjskich, 40 w australijskich oraz 23 w (anglo-języcznych) mediach izraelskich.

W ostatnich dekadach najczęściej o “polskich obozach śmierci”, bo aż 42 razy, pisała agencja AP. Ponad 1700 gazet oraz 5000 stacji telewizyjnych oraz radiowych traktuje AP jako swoje źródło informacji, więc te 42 artykuły mogły się ukazach w tysiącach mniejszych gazet, stacji radiowych oraz programach telewizyjnych. Rola AP w szerzeniu historycznych bzdur jest więc absolutnie kluczowa. Drugi na liście jest londyński The Times z 38 artykułami, 28 razy pisał o “polskich obozach” The Washington Post, a 23 razy izraelski The Jerusalem Post (którego nakład, co ciekawe, jest większy w USA niż w Izraelu).  

Analiza liczby artykułów w najważniejszych mediach amerykańskich (The New York Times, The Washington Post oraz agencja AP) w latach 1970-2011 pokazuje że nie istnieje jednolity trend w używaniu określenia “polskie obozy śmierci”. W ostatnich trzech dekadach używa się tego typu określenia dosyć rzadko, zwykle mniej niż w dziesięciu artykułach na rok. Najwięcej, bo 13 artykułów ukazało się w 2012 roku, kiedy Prezydent Obama użył określenia “Polish death camps”, co spotkało się z dużym oporem Polski oraz środowisk polonijnych, więc większość artykułów w tym roku koncentrowała się na kontrowersji wokół słów Obamy i oburzeniu Polaków.

Wydaje się więc, że owa dobrze finansowana organizacja pozarządowa o której pisze Leszczyński miałaby duże pole do działania w zwalczaniu kłamliwych i szkodliwych określeń jak “polskie obozy śmierci”. Jednak trzeba zauważyć jak wiele w ostatnich latach zdziałała na tym froncie amerykańska polonia. Organizacje, takie jak Fundacja Kościuszkowska, Instytut Piast czy Kongres Polonii Amerykańskiej walczą w USA z określeniem “Polish death camps” z dużymi sukcesami. Petycja Fundacji Kościuszkowskiej i energiczne działania jej uwczesnego prezesa, Alexa Storożyńskiego, aby raz na zawsze skończyć z terminem “polskie obozy śmierci”, została podpisana przez ponad 308 tysięcy osób, między innymi przez Prezydenta Bronisława Komorowkiego, Prezydenta Lecha Wałęsę, historyka Normana Davies’a oraz inne ważne osobistości. Petycja, wraz z bardzo częstymi i energicznymi działaniami Polonii oraz MSZ poskutkowały i w 2012 roku AP, The New York Times oraz The Wall Street Journal, czyli najważniejsze i najbardziej wpływowe media amerykańskie zmieniły swoje tzw. “style booki”, czyli wytyczne redakcji dla dziennikarzy aby w żadnym wypadku nie używać określenia “Polish death camps.” Redakcje, które często obrażały w ten sposób Polskę uderzyły się w pierś i obiecały poprawę. Cała kampania przeciwko “polskim obozom” została opisana przez dziennikarską organizację Poynter Institute. Dużo dzieje się też w mediach społecznościowych, gdzie na Facebooku dziarsko działa grupa Polish Media Issues która czujnie monitoruje media na całym świecie i szybko koordynuje reakcję ponad dwóch tysięcy swoich członków. Instytut Piast w Detroit zapoczątkował inicjatywę PACI (Polish American Communication Initiative) w celu połączenia Polonii i uproszczenia dostępu polonijnej społeczności do mediów oraz polityków. Trudno nie nazwać takiego obrotu sprawy sukcesem. 

Warto więc wspierać Polonię w tego typu działaniach, bo jak pokazuje przykład Ameryki i problemu “Polish death camps”, dobrze zsynchronizowane i konretne działania przynoszą rezultaty. Celem, więc, nie powinno być opracowywanie nowego modelu prowadzenia polityki historycznej, ale ulepszenie obecnego modelu poprzez wsparcie istniejących instytucji oraz powielania tego modelu w innych krajach oraz ułatwienie współpracy rządu z polonijnymi organizacjami na terenie całego świata.

Dominik Stecuła – autor jest dyrektorem badań w polonijnym ośrodku badawczym Piast Institute w Detroit oraz doktorantem na wydziale politologii Universytetu Kolumbii Brytyjskiej w Vancouver w Kanadzie. 

[nihilnovijournal]

Pora na polonijne okręgi wyborcze

W zakończonych niedawno wyborach parlamentarnych zwyciężyło Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. Co ciekawe, PiS zaskoczył nawet w stolicy, wygrywając po raz pierwszy od dawna. Głosy zza granicy okazały się kluczowe. Wystarczy spojrzeć na wyniki wyborów nie uwzględniając zagranicy. PiS i PO zdobyły tyle samo głosów, 29 proc. Jednak wliczając Polonię, PiS wychodzi na prowadzenie, a bardzo zyskują też Kukiz oraz KOWRIN.

Kolejność bez Polonii: PO oraz PiS – 29 proc Nowoczesna R. Petru – 14 proc Zjednoczona Lewica – 9 proc Kukiz – 6 proc Partia Razem – 5.5 proc KORWIN – 5 proc

Kolejność uwzględniając Polonię: PiS – 30 proc PO – 27.5 proc Nowoczesna R. Petru – 13 proc Zjednoczona Lewica – 8.5 proc Kukiz – 8 proc KORWIN – 6 proc Partia Razem – 5.5 proc

Patrząc bardziej dogłębnie na wyniki, widać że aż 30 proc z głosów oddanych na Kukiza oraz partię KORWIN w okręgu nr. 19 zostało oddanych za granicą. 18 proc z głosów PiS to głosy Polonii, podczas gdy tylko 11 proc głosów PO pochodziło zza granicy. W sumie za granicą oddano prawie 175 000 głosów, o 50 000 więcej niż na Mokotowie, najludniejszej dzielnicy stolicy. Za granicą oddano dwa razy więcej głosów niż w Częstochowie lub Toruniu. A wszystkie te głosy poszły do Warszawy i zmodyfikowały wyniki z tego okręgu, chociaż preferencje wyborcze Polonii niezupełnie pokrywają się z tymi Warszawiaków.

W najludniejszych okręgach w USA i Kanadzie zwyciężył PiS z 70 procentowym poparciem. W Wielkiej Brytanii zwyciężył Kukiz z 24 procentowym poparciem, przed PiS (23 proc) i Korwinem (20 proc). Kukiz oraz Korwin zwyciężyli też w Holandii, a PiS w Australii (41 proc), we Francji (39 proc) oraz w Niemczech (31 proc).  Widać więc że Polonii i Warszawiakom nie po drodze jeśli chodzi o preferencje wyborcze. Skąd te różnice? Trudno powiedzieć, ale na pewno wpływ na te wyniki ma fakt że PiS pielęgnuje swój polonijny elektorat, często go odwiedzając. A PO w ostatnich latach nie wykazywała jakiegokolwiek zainteresowania diasporą, szczególnie amerykańską oraz kanadyjską.

Warto się zastanowić co zrobić z tym, że wliczanie polonijnych głosów wydaje się nie fair dla Warszawiaków. Najlogiczniejszym rozwiązaniem wydaje się utworzenie okręgu wyborczego dla Polonii. Nie jest to nowość, 11 krajów, w tym cztery europejskie (Chorwacja, Francja, Włochy oraz Portugalia) od dawna posiadają okręgi wyborcze specjalnie dla obywateli mieszkających za granicą. We Francji dla diaspory przypada 12 mandatów, czyli prawie 4 procent z 331 mandatów we francuskim parlamencie.

Wprowadzenie podobnej instytucji w Polsce sprawi że i Warszawiacy i Polonia będą mieli takich reprezentantów jakich sobie wybiorą. Warto się nad takim rozwiązaniem zastanowić.

[nihilnovijournal]

Increasingly, in stories about the second world war, however, the word “German” is disappearing, and “the Nazis” are the people Britain and its allies were fighting. This is a worrying political correctness. We were fighting the Germans in the second world war and a number of them were members of the Nazi party. The concentration camps that killed six million Jews had staff that were members of the Nazi party of German nationality but also a large number of people who were simply German nationals. (...) The idea of separating Germany from the Nazis is an extremely worrying development and everybody who cares about the Holocaust, and historical accuracy, ought to be objecting to this interpretation.

Matthew Evans of the British House of Lords

[nihilnovijournal]

O kluczowej roli Polonii w polskiej polityce historycznej

Od czasu już zakończonej kampanii wyborczej, wygranej przez Andrzeja Dudę, nie cichną głosy ulepszenia polskiej polityki historycznej. W pewnym sensie miarka przebrała się po kontrowersjach wokół słów szefa FBI Jamesa Comey’a oraz gry “Apples to Apples” firmy Mattel, w której na jednej z kart pada określenie “nazistowska Polska.” Podczas publicznej debaty na ten temat, wielu komentatorów uznało Polską politykę historyczną ostatnich lat za porażkę, a jeszcze inni uważają że Polska nie ma polityki historycznej jako takiej. Jest to jednak nieobiektywna diagnoza. Analizując trendy w opisach Polski w światowych mediach, szczególnie jeśli chodzi o “polskie obozy śmierci”,  polityka historyczna ta okazała się większym sukcesem niż sądzi wielu komentatorów i polityków.

Przede wszystkim sam fakt, że kontrowersje wokół słów Comey’a trafiły do środków masowego na zachodzie przekazu znaczy wiele. Według internetowej bazy danych Factiva, wpadka Comey’a i polska reakcja z jaką się spotkała, pojawiła się w 375 artykułach prasowych. Najwięcej, bo aż 24 razy, pisała o tym agencja Reuters. Na Fox News pojawiło się 17 artykułów na ten temat, a na łamach The Washington Post 15. Ponadto kilkakrotnie pisał o tej kontrowersji The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, portal Yahoo, sieć ABC, BBC, londyński The Times, The Guardian, agencja AP, rosyjskie RIA Novosti, izraelski Jerusalem Post oraz liczne gazety kanadyjskie. Pomiędzy 19 a 24 kwietnia ukazało się w anglojęzycznych mediach ponad 200 artykułów na ten temat, więc polska presja działała, a media informowały o naszym oburzeniu w sprawie słów szefa FBI. Kompromitacja firmy Mattel też nie pozostała bez echa. Pojawiło się ponad 30 artykułów na ten temat, najwięcej w Fox News (5) oraz ABC News (3). Fakt że polskie oburzenie i presja sprawiają, że temat pojawia się w mediach, jest nowością, gdyż na codzień zachodnie media nie wykazują szczególnego zainteresowania Polską. Generalnie więc dużo więcej osób słyszało ostatnio o tym dlaczego nie wolno pisać “nazistowska Polska,” niż kupiło grę “Apples to Apples” co niewątpliwie jest sukcesem.

Oczywiście czymś co boli nas jako Polaków najbardziej jest użwyanie w mediach określenia “polskie obozy śmierci” lub “polskie obozy koncentracyjne.” Poprzez dostęp do internetu i łatwy wgląd w światowe media, wydaje nam się że określenia z gatunku “polskie obozy śmierci” są częste. Jednak jak częste i które media najczęściej używają tych skandalicznych określeń, pozostawało niewiadomą.

Według internetowej bazy mediów LexisNexis, w latach 1970-2012 pojawiło się w światowych mediach 521 artykułów w których autor użył stwierdzenia “polskie obozy koncentracyjne” lub “polskie obozy śmierci”, z czego 331 w ważnych, anglo-języcznych publikacjach. Większość, bo aż 126 w mediach amerykańskich, 79 w mediach brytyjskich, 63 w kanadyjskich, 40 w australijskich oraz 23 w mediach izraelskich.

W ostatnich dekadach najczęściej o “polskich obozach śmierci”, bo aż 42 razy, pisała agencja AP. Ponad 1700 gazet oraz 5000 stacji telewizyjnych oraz radiowych traktuje AP jako swoje źródło informacji, więc te 42 artykuły mogły się ukazach w tysiącach mniejszych gazet, stacji radiowych oraz programów telewizyjnych. Rola AP w szerzeniu historycznych bzdur jest więc kluczowa. Drugi na liście jest londyński The Times z 38 artykułami, 28 razy pisał o “polskich obozach” The Washington Post, a 23 razy izraelski The Jerusalem Post (którego nakład, co ciekawe, jest większy w USA niż w Izraelu).  

Analiza liczby artykułów w najważniejszych mediach amerykańskich (The New York Times, The Washington Post oraz agencja AP) w latach 1970-2011 pokazuje że nie istnieje jednolity trend w używaniu określenia “polskie obozy śmierci”. W ostatnich trzech dekadach używa się tego typu określenia dosyć rzadko, zwykle mniej niż w 10 artykułach na rok. Najwięcej, bo 13 artykułów ukazało się w 2012 roku, kiedy Prezydent Obama użył określenia “Polish death camps”, co spotkało się z dużym oporem Polski oraz środowisk polonijnych, więc większość artykułów w tym roku koncentrowała się na kontrowersji wokół słów Obamy i oburzeniu Polaków. 

Wydaje się więc, że jeśli chodzi o kłamliwe i szkodliwe określenie “polskie obozy śmierci” polska polityka historyczna okazała się fiaskiem, gdyż trendy z mediów pokazują w miarę stałą liczbę artykułów używających tego określenia. Przykładowo, w latach 1991-2006 pojawiło się w najważniejszych mediach 96 artykułów zawierających “Polish death camps” ale tylko w 30 przypadkach redakcje wystosowały korekty. Łatwo jednak zapomnieć, że od kilkunastu lat MSZ oraz organizacje polonijne, takie jak Fundacja Kościuszkowska, Instytut Piast czy Kongres Polonii Amerykańskiej walczą w USA z określeniem “Polish death camps.” Petycja Fundacji Kościuszkowskiej i energiczne działania jej uwczesnego prezesa, Alexa Storożyńskiego, aby raz na zawsze skończyć z terminem “polskie obozy śmierci”, została podpisana przez ponad 308 tysięcy osób, między innymi przez Prezydenta Bronisława Komorowkiego, Prezydenta Lecha Wałęsę, historyka Normana Davies’a oraz inne ważne osobistości. Petycja, wraz z bardzo częstymi i energicznymi działaniami Polonii oraz MSZ poskutkowały i w 2012 roku AP, The New York Times oraz The Wall Street Journal, czyli najważniejsze i najbardziej wpływowe media amerykańskie zmieniły swoje tzw. “style booki”, czyli wytyczne redakcji dla dziennikarzy aby w żadnym wypadku nie używać określenia “Polish death camps.” Redakcje, które często obrażały w ten sposób Polskę uderzyły się w pierś i dokonały poprawy. Trudno nie nazwać takiego obrotu sprawy sukcesem. 

  Kontrowersje wokół słów Comey’a oraz kompromitacji firmy Mattel są więc w pewnym sensie konsekwencją działań Polonii amerykańskiej oraz MSZ w ostatnich latach. Fakt, że media zachodnie zainteresowały się tą sprawą jest rezultatem długoletniej pracy wielu środowisk stojących na straży dobrego imienia Polski oraz prawdy historycznej.  Priorytetem więc nie powinna być debata o fiasku polskiej polityki historycznej, ale rozszeżenie polityki ostatnich lat o inne kraje, gdzie media nie spotkały sie z takim oporem Polski i Polonii w sprawie kłamstw historycznych, jak miało to miejsce w USA. Nie wolno też zapominać w kraju, że Polska polityka historyczna jest prowadzona nie tylko przez rząd, MSZ, Prezydenta czy Premiera, lecz ważną role odgrywa tutaj polska diaspora. Warto więc wspierać Polonię w tego typu działaniach, bo jak pokazuje przykład Ameryki i problemu “Polish death camps”, dobrze zsynchronizowane i konretne działania przynoszą rezultaty. Celem, więc, nie powinno być opracowywanie nowego modelu prowadzenia polityki historycznej, ale ulepszenie obecnego modelu, poprzez współpracę z polonijnymi organizacjami na terenie całego świata. 

Dominik Stecuła – autor jest dyrektorem badań w polonijnym ośrodku badawczym Piast Institute w Detroit oraz doktorantem na wydziale politologii Universytetu Kolumbii Brytyjskiej w Vancouver w Kanadzie. 

[nihilnovijournal]

A brief note on the recent presidential elections in Poland

The real winner of the Polish elections: No One of the I Don’t Care party.

Recent presidential elections in Poland concluded with a surprise win of Andrzej Duda, a charismatic young candidate of the Law and Justice party (PiS), who narrowly defeated the incumbent president Bronisław Komorowski of the ruling Civic Platform (PO).

A lot has been written on the elections over the past weeks, but one topic remains overlooked, and that is the relatively low turnout. Plurality of voters (44%) decided to stay at home or cast an invalid vote.

What’s interesting on this map is that, per usual, former borders and divisions of Poland are highly visible. Almost always it’s the 1914 borders but this time it’s 1939 borders. Areas that were Polish before WWII demonstrated higher voter turnout, while those that were German at the time seem to be dominated by the “don’t care vote.”

This is a guest post by Szymon Pifczyk, who studies Business Analytics at the Katowice University of Economics in Poland. He is interested in cartography and demographics. He blogs at Arduous Trifles. You can reach Szymon at szypifczyk (at) gmail.com.

[nihilnovijournal]

Jeb Bush and the Polish American Vote

I recently encountered a news story about Jeb Bush, a presumed Republican presidential contender, who will traveling to Europe in June (specifically Poland, Germany and Estonia) to “to get a first-hand view of European economic and security challenges.”  

Foreign policy has been growing in importance in the battle to determine President Barack Obama's successor, with Republicans questioning Obama's handling of the threat from Islamic State and Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Bush’s visit will give him a chance to lay out his differences with Obama, a Democrat, particularly when it comes to NATO as alliance members Poland and Estonia watch events in Ukraine with alarm. Polish politicians have repeatedly called for increased U.S. military presence in the region.

(...)

 In Poland and Estonia, Bush will meet government and business leaders and leaders of civic and other organizations.

Much like Mitt Romney in 2012, a trip to Poland is presumably a part of the strategy to win over Polish American vote during the 2016 elections, especially in the crucial swing states. How effective is this strategy? Here are a few points worth making, in light of the Piast Institute surveys that we have been conducting over the years.

1.  According to the 2013 Piast Institute survey, about 23% of Polonia identifies as Republicans (with 36% declaring being Independent and 36% aligning with the Democrats). Polish Americans, however, are fairly conservative. A plurality of almost 39% declare having a conservative ideology, 25% are centrists, and about 37% are liberal. Furthermore, 10% of Democrats identify as conservative with another 21% of Democrats declaring being Moderate/Centrist, which is a population that, conceivably, a candidate like Jeb Bush might appeal to.  A further 37% of Independents are also conservatives. 

2. Poles vote in general elections. Over 92% declare being registered voters, 85% declared voting in 2008 presidential elections, and 95% declared voting in 2012 (these are likely inflated numbers, though many districts with high concentrations of Polish Americans corroborate these figures, as they experience very high voter turnout).

3. Polish American voters are consistent, but they do not vote in a bloc. 86% of 2008 Obama voters voted for Obama again in 2012. 90% of McCain voters voted for Romney in 2012. More than half of third party voters in 2008 voted for a third party candidate in 2012. 10 million Polish American voters is an appealing political target for candidates, but it would be difficult to garner the votes of most of the community. A centrist, conservative candidate, however, might be capable of not only getting the votes of Republicans and many Independents, but also appeal to conservative and centrist Democrats. 

4. Going to Poland to talk about security and economic development is a good strategy to appeal to Polish American voters. Although the Piast surveys have been conducted before Russian annexation of Crimea and the subsequent aggression in Ukraine, Polish Americans were always weary of Russia. In 2013, 61% of Polish American Republicans viewed Russia as an Adversary (at the time only 36% of Democrats did, that number is likely higher now). Almost half (47%)  of Independents and 43% of third party voters also viewed Russia as an Adversary. Furthermore, other than the universal interest in including Poland in the visa waiver issue, which is a priority for all Polish Americans regardless of political stripe, Republicans are much more interested in military cooperation between the two nations, including building a missile shield in Poland (32% of Republicans identify those two issues as most important, while only 13% of Democrats do). It seems that focusing on these topics would be a winning strategy for Polish American Republicans and the more hawkish Democrats.

5. This is perhaps the most important: if we’re thinking about the primary elections, this strategy is probably not very useful. Bush has a lot of opponents on a path to nomination, and he needs to perform well in the initial primaries in Iowa, New Hampshire and South Carolina. Appealing to Polonia in those states is not the best strategy, as there are very few Poles there. Furthermore, and this goes for primaries in general, we don’t know how many Polish Americans actually participate in the primaries. What we do know is that outside of general election voting, Polish Americans don’t really participate in politics through volunteering or donating money, which casts doubt about them reporting massively to the voting booths during the primary season. But this is merely a speculation, as we simply don’t have the data on this topic. 

Dominik Stecuła is the Director of Research and Data Analysis at the Piast Institute and a doctoral student in political science at the University of British Columbia. He is the founder of Nihil Novi.

[nihilnovijournal]

On giving, Polish Americans, and Political Influence

I recently came across an interesting ranking (World Giving Index) compiled by Charities Aid Foundation. The report looks at how likely people of selected countries are to “give” three things: help (helping a stranger), time (volunteer their time), and money (donate money to a charity). 

It turns out that the US leads the world in “helping a stranger,” with 79% of respondents indicating they help strangers. US is 9th in the world in donating money, with 68% of respondents donating and 5th in volunteering time, with 44% of the people declaring volunteering. Poland, on the other hand, does very poorly. In terms of helping strangers, only 35% of Poles declare doing that, which lands the country at the not very prestigious 118th spot in the world. Volunteering? Only 9% of Poles do it, which places the country in 114th spot in the world. Also, only 21% of Poles donate money to charity, which places Poland in the 75th spot in the world. 

This is bad news for Polish civil society, social capital, for Poland in general. It indicates low levels of what sociologists and political scientists call generalized trust, which plays a big role in a healthy functioning society and political system. It also highlights a major discrepancy between Poles and Americans. Which, on the other hand, got me thinking about the question that plagues the Polish American community for decades, which is why are we not more effective politically in the US. 

An important part of what it means to participate politically in the American political system involves not only casting a ballot, but also volunteering (for a campaign, political party, a specific issue, a specific candidate, etc) as well as donating money to a party, candidate or a cause. It also means contacting your elected representative, signing a petition, etc. We know that many Americans do these things regularly, they contact their legislators, volunteer, donate. But if Polish Americans are as prone to “giving” as Poles are, according to the CAF report discussed above, then perhaps the lack of Polish American political influence in the US is rooted in the fact that Poles simply do not participate in the system at high enough levels. Luckily, the Piast Institute public opinion survey from 2013 asked a question about political participation other than voting, so we can begin to address this question.

So, what does the data say about Polish American political participation? For starters, 44% of respondents do NOT belong to any organizations. This is not a strictly a question of political participation, but it deals with participation in general, and plurality of Poles don’t belong to any organizations. The other indicators are equally troubling. 

When asked about their political participation (outside of voting) patterns, majority (68%) of Polish Americans declare not volunteering or donating money to politics. 3% volunteered in the last election cycle, 21% donated money, and 8% did both. These numbers are not dramatically low, however, considering that the sample is made out of informed and active Polonia, and that 95% of the respondents declared voting in 2012 presidential elections, the numbers do seem lower than they should be. It is important to note, however, that there are some nuances in the data. 

These patterns are most visible when looking at political donations. People who have lived in the US longer are more likely to donate than people who more recently immigrated to the US. Respondents who have lived in the US for 20+ years are 5 times as likely to donate as people who have been in the US for less than 10 years. Similarly, the questions of identity play a role. Respondents who identify as Polish are the least likely to donate money, while people who identify as Polish Americans (twice as likely) and Americans (three times as likely) are substantially more likely to donate money to politics. It is also the older respondents who are most likely to donate (65+) and the youngest age group is the least likely to donate, unsurprisingly. Men also donate more money than women. 

In terms of volunteering, the patterns differ a bit. Younger people, females, and Poles more likely to volunteer than other groups. In terms of both volunteering AND donating, people who have been in the US their whole life or for 20+ years volunteer and donate in higher proportions than other groups. 

This is, by no means, an ideal and complete exploration of the topic of political influence of Polish Americans. Surely, other factors matter, such as lack of sufficient interest in Polish and Polish American matters by many political contenders, lack of Polish and Polish American candidates for political offices, lack of an organized lobbying effort on behalf of Poland and Polish Americans as a community, Polish Americans not voting as a block, along with a plethora of other issues result in a diminished political influence of Polish Americans. However, poor political participation should not be overlooked. We often are proud of very high voter turnout in primarily Polish districts, and of the independence of Polish American voters (the unusually high proportion of Polish Americans who vote for third party candidates). What we overlook, however, is the fact that many Poles and Polish Americans do not fully play the political game the way it is meant to be played - through generosity in giving time and money. Perhaps when candidates and political parties will realize that the Polish American electorate is part of the fuel that keeps their electoral machines going, Polish Americans will get their due influence. 

Dominik Stecuła is the Director of Research and Data Analysis at the Piast Institute and a doctoral student in political science at the University of British Columbia. He is the founder of Nihil Novi.

[nihilnovijournal]

Polish society is aging

Below is a series of maps and figures by Szymon Pifczyk, a contributor to Nihil Novi on a broad topic of the aging of Polish society. There are several key points that Szymon makes.

1. Most Polish families are having either one child or no children. 

2. There are substantially fewer young people in Poland now than 25 years ago...

3. ...but significantly more older people than 25 years ago. 

4. The generation that came after Millenials (kids born in 2000 or after) is just half the size of the Millenials' population.

Data comes from the Polish National Statistics Office (GUS). 

This is a guest post by Szymon Pifczyk, who studies Business Analytics at the Katowice University of Economics in Poland. He is interested in cartography and demographics. He blogs at Arduous Trifles. You can reach Szymon at szypifczyk (at) gmail.com.

[nihilnovijournal]

The power and influence of the Polish language

A recent academic paper looks at a new exciting measure of global influence of languages. 

Languages vary enormously in global importance because of historical, demographic, political, and technological forces. However, beyond simple measures of population and economic power, there has been no rigorous quantitative way to define the global influence of languages. Here we use the structure of the networks connecting multilingual speakers and translated texts, as expressed in book translations, multiple language editions of Wikipedia, and Twitter, to provide a concept of language importance that goes beyond simple economic or demographic measures.

(...)

In this paper, we used network science to offer a previously unidentified characterization of a language’s global importance. The GLNs, mapped from millions of online and printed linguistic expressions, reveal that the world’s languages exhibit a hierar- chical structure dominated by a central hub, English, and a halo of intermediate hubs, which include other global languages such as German, French, and Spanish. Although languages such as Chinese, Arabic, and Hindi are immensely popular, we docu- ment an important sense in which these languages are more peripheral to the world’s network of linguistic influence. For example, the low volume of translations into Arabic, which had been identified as an obstacle to the dissemination of outside knowledge into the Arab world (14), is indicated by our book translation GLN and matched by the peripheral position of Arabic in the Twitter and Wikipedia GLNs.

So where does Poland stack up?

There are 43 million Polish speakers around the world and the GDP per capita of a Polish speaker is a respectable $20,326. More or less middle of the pack. But when we look at the specific components of language influence as measured by book translations, multiple language editions of Wikipedia, and Twitter, Polish does rather well (with the exception of Twitter).

When we look at Wikipedia articles, Polish is 9th in the world with 6.5 million edits and almost 50,000 editors (almost as many as China). 

On Twitter, however, Polish language practically does not exist. This is a shame, because Twitter, like it or not, serves as a forum for global elites.

This is consistent with other studies of the Twitter-verse, which demonstrate that among Twitter users followed by world leaders, the top performing Pole is Radosław Sikorski, who has 275,299 followers, among which 69 are world leaders. This is roughly as many as Pope Francis or Christiane Amanpour, a famous CNN journalist. Polish President, Bronisław Komorowski, is only followed by 12 world leaders. So, Polish presence on Twitter is significantly below average, especially for such a tech-savvy nation. A recent academic paper on Twitter corroborates this conclusion. 

  When it comes to book translations, Polish again places at the top, at number 10. There were over 14,000 translations from Polish and over 75,000 translations to Polish in the examined time period. 

Poland is also doing very well in terms of number of famous people on Wikipedia that are and speak Polish. In both categories, Poland is 7th in the world, behind Italy. 

All in all, this new measure of influence shows that Polish language remains globally important and influential, but Poles need to work harder on the Twitter-verse to boost our global influence in the future. On Twitter, Radek Sikorski should pave the way for other Poles on how to establish and cultivate presence that helps to elevate the importance of Poland and Polish language globally. 

Dominik Stecuła is the Director of Research and Data Analysis at the Piast Institute and a doctoral student in political science at the University of British Columbia. He is the founder of Nihil Novi.

[nihilnovijournal]

Languages of interwar Poland

Back in the interwar period, Poland was one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Europe. Minorities made up 31% of population. Ukrainians, Belarussians and Ruthenians were concentrated mostly in the East, Germans lived in the West and Lithuanians populated the northernmost counties. Poland has also a very large Jewish community, concentrated mostly in larger cities. Warsaw alone was home to over 300,000 Jews, making it the largest Jewish city in the world second only to New York City.

Kamień Koszyrski county in was the most non-Polish county, with just 7.05 percent citizens claiming speaking Polish at home, followed closely by Drohiczyn and Kosów counties with 7.06 and 7.16 percent population speaking Polish respectively, all three in Polesie Voivodeship. There were 68 majority-minority counties in Poland (out of 261) populated by 8.6 million people (or 27.1 percent of total population).

Ukrainian was the most common minority language, with 3.2 million speakers. Yiddish ranked second, with 2.5 million speakers.

Belarussian language was most commonly spoken in the Northeast, the area which now constitutes Belarus and Lithuania, and a tiny scrap that remained Poland. There are almost 50,000 Belarussians in Poland today.

Lithuanians were, and still are, a small minority in Poland. They were concentrated around Vilnus, a modern day capital of Lithuania and in 1931 a major Polish city. 

Germans made a sizable minority in Greater Poland and Upper Silesia. Today, German speakers are the second largest minority in Poland. 

Jews constituted a major part of Polish society and were present across the country. The Jewish population of Poland declined from over 3 million in 1939 to 7508 in 2011, with millions of Polish Jews perishing in the Nazi Holocaust.

Modern day Ruthenians identify as Ukrainians or Lemks, so there are no modern day statistics on that group. 

Ukrainians were the largest minority group in Poland in 1931. In 2011, there were only about 30,000 Ukrainians in Poland, but that might change in light of the recent events in Ukraine. 

"Local" language was the most commonly chosen one in Polesie voivodeship, a very poor and uneducated area. 

There were 22 million Poles in 1931. Today, population of Poland is 38 million.

As the national boundaries shifter after World War II, many Poles had to leave their homes and move West.

This is a guest post by Szymon Pifczyk, who studies Business Analytics at the Katowice University of Economics in Poland. He is interested in cartography and demographics. He blogs at Arduous Trifles. You can reach Szymon at szypifczyk (at) gmail.com.

[nihilnovijournal]

Poland and the Social Progress Index

You might have seen Michael Green's popular TED talk about the measurement he created called the Social Progress Index. The measure, according to Green, is a standard to rank societies based on how much they meet the needs of citizens. In that way, its supposed to be 21st century's answer to, as Green argues, outdated and ubiquitous gross domestic product or GDP. How does Poland stack up on that measure?

Poland is 27th in the world with a score of 77.44 (high is a maximum). New Zealand, world leader, has a score of 88.24 and Poland does about as well as Chile, Italy, Slovakia, South Korea or Latvia. Slovenia, Estonia, Slovakia and Czech Republic all score higher than Poland. 

But what exactly is the index? 

The concept is composed of several sub-concepts, such as Basic Human Needs, Foundations of Wellbeing and Opportunity. Each are then composed of other sub-concepts and then each of them are composites of several measures. For example, Tolerance and Inclusion is composed of: 

Tolerance and Inclusion measurement is where Poland suffers a low score of 54, placing 54th in the world behind Bolivia, Laos and Burkina Faso. Poland is well below the global median on that measure. Its particularly the tolerance for homosexuals where Poland is doing very poorly, with a score of 19 (64th in the world!). Tolerance for immigrants is also quite low. On a different note, Health and Wellness is also a major problem with Poland being 82nd in the world.

Poland does the best on Personal Rights (24th in the world), Nutrition and Basic Medical Care (16th), Personal Safety (22nd), Access to Information (18th), and Ecosystem Sustainability (16th). More detailed results are below.

Overall, its an interesting approach and an interesting measure that is certainly substantially broader and closer to the people than GDP. Like all other such measures, the Social Progress Index has its faults (full methodological appendix is here), but its also useful as food for thought in terms of where Poland succeeds and where there is still work to be done (tolerance seems one societal aspect that needs improvements). 

Dominik Stecuła is the Director of Research and Data Analysis at the Piast Institute and a doctoral student in political science at the University of British Columbia. He is the founder of Nihil Novi.

[nihilnovijournal]

Public trust in physicians is dismally low in Poland

The prestigious New England Journal of Medicine conducts an annual analysis of public trust in physicians around the world. In 2014, Poland ranked last among 29 analyzed countries. Only 43% of the public believe that doctors in Poland can be trusted. In Switzerland (no. 1 in the world) 83% of the public trust doctors. Poland trails Bulgaria, Croatia, Turkey, and all of its neighbors. 

Poland also ranks 25th out of 29 countries in terms of satisfaction with their last visit (only 23% of the people are satisfied with their last doctor's visit). Surprisingly, the United States is 24th in terms of trust in physicians, though in terms of satisfaction with their last visit, Americans place 3rd in the world. 

The lack of trust can be dangerous as it could lead to negative health outcomes. For example, not trusting medical professionals could go hand in hand with generating a fertile ground for misinformation, like the mistrust of vaccinations and their perceived dangers. Both Poles and Americans have been subjected to many false claims that vaccinations cause autism, for example, and the lack of trust in doctors ensures that there is no authority to combat these false and dangerous claims. 

Governmental policies also don't strengthen the medical profession's standing in the public eye in Poland. Hundreds of Polish doctors have not yet signed contracts for the treatment of patients in 2015, leading to tens of thousands of patients being left without medical care and scores of clinics being closed around the country. This has caused long queues at the outpatient departments at the clinics which have opened their doors in 2015. Doctors are even considering a nationwide strike. With these events in mind, it does not sound like public trust in doctors will be rebuild in 2015 in Poland. 

Dominik Stecuła is the Director of Research and Data Analysis at the Piast Institute and a doctoral student in political science at the University of British Columbia. He is the founder of Nihil Novi.

[nihilnovijournal]

Secret prisons, torture, and the American-Polish relationship

Recent release of the US Senate's report on CIA torture has put an uncomfortable glare on Poland's role as host of one of the CIA's secret prisons. Although the report does not specify Poland as one of the hosts by name, it is clear that what the report calls “detention site blue” is a prison in Stare Kiejkuty, a remote village in northeast Poland. For many years, Poland denied existence of the prison, but recently, former President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, along with former Prime Minister Leszek Miller, acknowledged that they knew about the prison, though did not know about torture. 

In a bizarre way, the prison could be viewed as a testament to resurgent Polish-American ties, as the US authorities did not trust the governments in Afghanistan, Thailand or Pakistan. Poland, on the other hand, was seen as a safe place and a trusted ally. 

Jan Cienski, the Warsaw correspondent for The Economist, says that, "Many Poles, including most Polish politicians, feel that even if torture took place that it was acceptable because of the circumstances after the 9/11 attacks. Poland was simply being a good ally. Warsaw really felt that the US was their key foreign ally at this point and that cooperating with the CIA was an integral part of being a good NATO ally.” But it wasn't just about being a "good ally." Poland has reportedly received $30 million in the aftermath of opening the site for American use from the CIA. 

The issue, despite the silence by Polish authorities over the years, hasn't gone unnoticed. Polish prosecutors opened an investigation in 2008, but it has gone nowhere so far.  However now the pressure on Poland is mounting, as the government is under pressure from the European Court of Human Rights and faces lawsuits from people allegedly tortured there. 

One question is why did Poland do this. Are Poles fine with torture? The answer is: they are not. Majority of Poles (62%) believe that torture should never be permitted, 7% is open to using that method whenever needed and 20% believe the use of torture to be justified to save lives of innocent civilians, according to a 2008 poll. In a 2006 poll, the distribution of responses was almost identical, indicating that the attitudes seem deeply rooted in Polish society. What's interesting, though, is that In a Piast Institute Poll from 2009/2010, we found that among Polish Americans, only 33% believed that torture is always unjustified. A poll conducted among the general American public around the same time found similar results. In other words, the Polish public is much more opposed to the practice of torture than Americans seem to be, including Americans of Polish descent. Of course, the definition of torture is not set in stone, but according to a recent ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 49% of Americans think the CIA's treatment of suspected terrorists amounted to torture, while 38% did not, and 13% were unsure. In the same poll, 57% of Americans believe that the use of torture can be justified (often or sometimes). Only 20% said it can never be justified. The issue is also polarized by partisanship, with Republicans thinking these tactics are justified and Democrats thinking they are not.  

Regardless of what the American people and authorities believe to be justified, the Polish government agreed to to hand off a location and wash their hands of what happens there. For added irony, it was a left wing government. In the name of allegiance to the United States, it allowed the CIA to conduct acts that most Poles find unjustifiable at all times. That was, at the time, what being a good ally of the US meant to Polish officials. Now Polish image has been hurt both globally and in the US itself. Being a good ally is backfiring, including with the nation that Poland so desperately tried to ally itself with. 

Dominik Stecuła is the Director of Research and Data Analysis at the Piast Institute and a doctoral student in political science at the University of British Columbia. He is the founder of Nihil Novi.

[nihilnovijournal]

Executive orders on immigration by US presidents

According to Dr. Thaddeus Radzilowski of the Piast Institute, 40-45,000 Poles illegally in the US meet the criteria of President Barack Obama's executive action on immigration.

It's worth remembering that executive actions on immigration by US Presidents have a long history. In the years 1981-1987 President Ronald Reagan provided EVP for Poles in response to the Polish communist government's declaration of martial law in Poland. EVP or extended voluntary departure is basically a grant of protection from deportation with a work permit, similar to what President Obama offered to "dreamers." President Reagan's actions affected 7,000 Poles. More information about that can be found here. 

Dominik Stecuła is the Director of Research and Data Analysis at the Piast Institute and a doctoral student in political science at the University of British Columbia. He is the founder of Nihil Novi.

[nihilnovijournal]

This is Polish immigration to the US, in one chart, spanning 1820-1970. There is missing data for the beginning of the 20th century (the data, by the way, comes from the Census Bureau and the Historical statistics of the United States, Colonial times to 1970).

For the first decades, the number of Poles immigrating to the US remained in single digits per year. There was a large increase in the mid-1870s, and then an even larger boom in the 1880s and 1890s, culminating in 40536 people migrating in 1892. Between 1890 and 1895, almost 100,000 Poles immigrated to the US.

The first few years of newly independent Poland also could be characterized by a sizable exodus to the United States. In 1921 along, over 95,000 Poles relocated to the US. The first half of the 1920s saw almost 190,000 Poles immigrate to the US. 

In the post-WWII era, there have been several spikes in immigration patterns, including right after the war in the late 1940s, in the mid to late 1950s and in the late 1960s. The numbers never reached the previous scale, however. In the 25 year period between 1946 and 1970, only 70,000 Poles immigrated to the United States. 

Dominik Stecuła is the Director of Research and Data Analysis at the Piast Institute and a doctoral student in political science at the University of British Columbia. He is the founder of Nihil Novi.