“Corruption,” originally.

A blog collecting every use of the term “corruption” among the records of the Framers. Submitted to the Supreme Court as an appendix to an amicus brief by Lawrence Lessig for the Constitutional Accountability Center.

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Richard Harrison (via John McKesson's Notes) 06/23/1788

I trust that Men Chosen for their Superior Virtue or Superior Fortune cannot be so far lost to their own Interest as to suffer Corruption-- From the Circumstances of the Country wise to have a Small No. and there is provision to encrease it It will work advantages to this State and Security to the Liberties of every Man among us--

Source: John McKesson's Notes of the New York Ratification Convention

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Rufus King 03/20/1816

The States may now severally direct the manner of choosing their own Electors; it is proposed that the manner shall be prescribed by the Constitution. This, Mr. K[ing] thought would be an important change, and the only change suggested in the Constitution which he deemed an improvement. He thought he might venture to say, that if there was any part of the Constitution deemed by its framers and advocates to be better secured than any other against the enterprises which have since occurred, it was the very provision on the subject of elections to the Presidency. The idea was, that the action of that particular agency which has since controlled it, was as much displaced by the Constitutional plan of election of President and Vice President, as could possibly be devised. The opinion had been that all undue agency or influence was entirely guarded against; that the men selected by the people from their own body would give their votes in such a manner as that no opportunity would be afforded for a combination, to change the freedom and popular character which naturally belonged to the electoral bodies. Such had been the idea of the nation at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. We all know, said he, the course which this thing has taken. The election of a President of the United States is no longer that process which the Constitution contemplated. In conformity with the original view of the authors of that instrument, I would restore, as thoroughly as possible, the freedom of election to the people ... It was with the people the Constitution meant to place the election of the Chief Magistrate, that being the source least liable to be corrupt.

Source: Farrand's Records Volume 3: Rufus King in the United States Senate

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Rufus King 03/18/1824

The dangers to which experience had shown that the election of Executive Chiefs are liable; dangers which had led other nations to prefer hereditary to elective Executives, were, without doubt, well considered by the members of the General Convention, who, nevertheless, did indulge the hope, by apportioning, limiting, and confining the Electors within their respective States, and by the guarded manner of giving and transmitting the ballots of the Electors to the Seat of Government, that intrigue, combination, and corruption, would be effectually shut out, and a free and pure election of the President of the United States made perpetual. ...

Source: Farrand's Records Volume 3: Rufus King in the United States Senate

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James McHenry 11/29/1787

That the attendance of Members in the General Legislature at a great distance from their respective abodes might not be obstructed and in some instances prevented either by design or otherwise in withholding any Compensation for their Services, Convention thought it most adviseable to pay them out of the General Treasury, otherwise a representation might some times fail when the Public Exigence might require that attendance -- Whether any Members of the Legislature should be Capable of holding any Office during the time for which he was Elected created much division in Sentiment in Convention; but to avoid as much as possible every motive for Corruption, was at length Settled in the form it now bears by a very large Majority.

Source: Farrand's Records Volume 3: CXLVIa. James Mchenry before the Maryland House of Delegates

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James McHenry 11/29/1787

The Election of the President according to the Report of the Committee of Detail was intended to have been by ballot of both Houses; to hold his appointment for Seven Years, and not be Capable to be reelected; but this mode gave an undue influance to the large States, and paved the way to faction and Corruption -- all are guarded against by the present method, as the most exalted Characters can only be Known throughout the whole Union -- His power when elected is check'd by the Consent of the Senate to the appointment of Officers, and without endangering Liberty by the junction of the Executive and Legislative in this instance.

Source: Farrand's Records Volume 3: CXLVIa. James Mchenry before the Maryland House of Delegates

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Gouverneur Morris (notes of James Madison) 07/20/1787

Mr. Govr. Morris's opinion had been changed by the arguments used in the discussion. He was now sensible of the necessity of impeachments, if the Executive was to continue for any time in office. Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life interest, much less like one having an hereditary interest in his office. He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard agst it by displacing him. One would think the King of England well secured agst bribery. He has as it were a fee simple in the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II was bribed by Louis XIV. The Executive ought therefore to be impeachable for treachery; Corrupting his electors, and incapacity were other causes of impeachment. For the latter he should be punished not as a man, but as an officer, and punished only by degradation from his office. This Magistrate is not the King but the prime-Minister. The people are the King. When we make him amenable to Justice however we should take care to provide some mode that will not make him dependent on the Legislature.

Source: Farrand's Records Volume 2: Madison, Friday July 20--in Convention

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Gouverneur Morris 07/17/1787

If the Executive be chosen by the Natl. Legislature, he will not be independent on it; and if not independent, usurpation & tyranny on the part of the Legislature will be the consequence. This was the case in England in the last Century. It has been the case in Holland, where their Senates have engrossed all power. It has been the case every where. He was surprised that an election by the people at large should ever have been likened to the polish election of the first Magistrate. An election by the Legislature will bear a real likeness to the election by the Diet of Poland. The great must be the electors in both cases, and the corruption & cabal wch are known to characterize the one would soon find their way into the other. Appointments made by numerous bodies, are always worse than those made by single responsible individuals, or by the people at large.

Source: Farrand's Records Volume 2: Madison, Tuesday July 17. in Convention

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Gouverneur Morris (notes of James Madison) 07/20/1787

Mr. Govr Morris admits corruption & some few other offences to be such as ought to be impeachable; but thought the cases ought to be enumerated & defined:

Source: Farrand's Records Volume 2: Madison, Friday July 20--in Convention

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Gouverneur Morris (notes of James Madison) 09/04/1787

6-- the indispensable necessity of making the Executive independent of the Legislature. -- As the Electors would vote at the same time throughout the U. S. and at so great a distance from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible also to corrupt them. A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after the trial of the impeachment.

Source: Farrand's Records Volume 2: Madison, Tuesday Sepr. 4. 1787. In Convention

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Gouverneur Morris (notes of James Madison) 08/14/1787

He was agst. rendering the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices. He was for rendering them eligible agn. after having vacated their Seats by accepting office. Why should we not avail ourselves of their services if the people chuse to give them their confidence. There can be little danger of corruption either among the people or the Legislatures who are to be the Electors. If they say, we see their merits, we honor the men, we chuse to renew our confidence in them, have they not a right to give them a preference; and can they be properly abridged of it.

Source: Farrand's Records Volume 2: Madison, Tuesday Aug. 14. In Convention

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Federal Farmer - An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, New York 05/02/1788

It is easy to perceive that there is an essential difference between elections by pluralities and by majorities, between choosing a man in a small or limited district, and choosing a number of men promiscuously by the people of a large state; and while we are almost secure of judicious unbiassed elections by majorities in such districts, we have no security against deceptions, influence and corruption in states or large districts in electing by pluralities. When a choice is made by a plurality of votes, it is often made by a very small part of the electors, who attend and give their votes, when by a majority, never by so few as one half of them. The partialities and improprieties attending the former mode may be illustrated by a case that lately happened in one of the middle states.--Several representatives were to be chosen by a large number of inhabitants compactly settled, among whom there were four or five thousand voters. Previous to the time of election a number of lists of candidates were published, to divide and distract the voters in general--about half a dozen men of some influence, who had a favourite list to carry, met several times, fixed their list, and agreed to hand it about among all who could probably be induced to adopt it, and to circulate the other lists among their opponents, to divide them. The poll was opened, and several hundred electors, suspecting nothing, attended and put in their votes; the list of the half dozen was carried, and men were found to be chosen, some of whom were very disagreeable to a large majority of the electors: though several hundred electors voted, men on that list were chosen who had only 45, 43, 44, &c. votes each; they had a plurality, that is, more than any other persons: the votes generally were scattered, and those who made even a feeble combination succeeded in placing highest upon the list several very unthought of and very unpopular men.

Source: Federal Farmer - An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, New York

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Federal Farmer - An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, New York 05/02/1788

Next, we may observe, that representatives are to be chosen by the people of the state. What is a choice by the people of the state? If each given district in it choose one, will that be a choice within the meaning of the constitution? Must the choice be by plurality of votes, or a majority? In connection with these questions, we must take the 4th sect. art. 1. where it is said the state legislatures shall prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections; but congress may make or alter such regulations. By this clause, I suppose, the electors of different towns and districts in the state may be assembled in different places, to give their votes; but when so assembled, by another clause they cannot, by congress or the state legislatures, be restrained from giving their votes for any man an inhabitant of the state, and qualified as to age, and having been a citizen the time required. But I see nothing in the constitution by which to decide, whether the choice shall be by a plurality or a majority of votes: this, in my mind, is by far the most important question in the business of elections. When we say a representative shall be chosen by the people, it seems to imply that he shall be chosen by a majority of them; but states which use the same phraseology in this respect, practice both ways. I believe a majority of the states, chuse by pluralities, and, I think it probable, that the federal house of representatives will decide that a choice of its members by pluralities is constitutional. A man who has the most votes is chosen in Great-Britain. It is this, among other things, that gives every man fair play in the game of influence and corruption.

Source: Federal Farmer - An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, New York

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Federal Farmer - An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, New York 05/02/1788

In every point of view, in which I can contemplate this subject, it appears extremely clear to me, that the senate ought not generally to be a council of appointment. The legislature, after the people, is the great fountain of power, and ought to be kept as pure and uncorrupt as possible, from the hankerings, biasses, and contagion of offices--then the streams issuing from it, will be less tainted with those evils. It is not merely the number of impeachments, that are to be expected to make public officers honest and attentive in their business. A general opinion must pervade the community, that the house, the body to impeach them for misconduct, is disinterested, and ever watchful for the public good; and that the judges who shall try impeachments, will not feel a shadow of biass.

Source: Federal Farmer - An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, New York

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Federal Farmer - An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, New York 05/02/1788

In considering the principle of rotation I had occasion to distinguish the condition of a legislator from that of mere official man33--We acquire certain habits, feelings, and opinions, as men and citizens--others, and very different ones, from a long continuance in office: It is, therefore, a valuable observation in many bills of rights, that rulers ought frequently to return and mix with the people. A legislature, in a free country, must be numerous; it is in some degree a periodical assemblage of the people, frequently formed--the principal officers in the executive and judicial departments, must have more permanency in office. Hence it may be inferred, that the legislature will remain longer uncorrupted and virtuous; longer congenial to the people, than the officers of those departments. If it is not, therefore, in our power to preserve republican principles, for a series of ages, in all the departments of government, we may a long while preserve them in a well formed legislature. To this end we ought to take every precaution to prevent legislators becoming mere office-men; chuse them frequently, make them recallable, establish rotation among them, make them ineligible to offices, and give them as small a share as possible in the disposal of them.

Source: Federal Farmer - An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican, New York

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Brutus III 06/01/1789

The great body of the yeoman of the country cannot expect any of their order in this assembly-the station will be too elevated for them to aspire to-the distance between the people and their representatives, will be so very great, that there is no probability that a farmer, however respectable, will be chosen-the mechanicks of every branch, must expect to be excluded from a seat in this Body-It will and must be esteemed station too high and exalted to be filled by any but the first men in the state, in point of fortune; so that in reality there will be no part of the people represented, but the rich, even in that branch of the legislature, which is called the democratic.-The well born, and highest orders in life, as they term themselves, will be ignorant of the sentiments of the midling class of citizens, strangers to their ability, wants, and difficulties, and void of sympathy, and fellow feeling. This branch of the legislature will not only be an imperfect representation, but there will be no security in so small a body, against bribery, and corruption- It will consist at first, of sixty-five, and can never exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants; a majority of these, that is, thirty-three, are a quorum, and a majority of which, or seventeen, may pass any law-a majority of the senate, or fourteen, are a quorum, and eight of them pass any law-so that twenty-five men, will have the power to give away all the property of the citizens of these states-what security therefore can there be for the people, where their liberties and property are at the disposal of so few men?5 It will literally be a government in the hands of the few to oppress and plunder the many. You may conclude with a great degree of certainty, that it, like all others of a similar nature, will be managed by influence and corruption, and that the period is not far distant, when this will be the case, if it should be adopted; for even now there are some among us, whose characters stand high in the public estimation, and who have had a principal agency in framing this constitution, who do not scruple to say, that this is the only practicable mode of governing a people, who think with that degree of freedom which the Americans do-this government will have in their gift a vast number of offices of great honor and emolument. The members of the legislature are not excluded from appointments; and twenty-five of them, as the case may be, being secured, any measure may be carried. [...] The more I reflect on this subject, the more firmly am I persuaded, that the representation is merely nominal-a mere burlesque; and that no security is provided against corruption and undue influence. No free people on earth, who have elected persons to legislate for them, ever reposed that confidence in so small a number.

Source: Brutus III

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Roger Sherman 08/19/1789

The representations of several of the states are too large, and have been justly complained of the rights of the people are less secure in a large, than in a small assembly: The great object is information; and this may be acquired by a small number, and to better purpose than by a large. It has been said that a future legislature will not encrease the number, should it be found necessary: If that supposition is true, the present house will not agree to this motion, unless we suppose that a future house will be less patriotic than the present: as to the largeness of the number being a security against corruption, I do not think it is; the British house of commons consists of upwards of 500 members, and yet money enough has always been found to corrupt a sufficient number for the minister's purpose.

Source: Newspaper Report of the House of Representatives Debates on August 19, 1789

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George Mason 09/12/1787

This government will set out a moderate aristocracy: it is at present impossible to foresee whether it will, in its operation, produce a monarchy, or a corrupt, tyrannical aristocracy; it will most probably vibrate some years between the two, and then terminate in the one or the other.

Source: Farrand's Records Volume 2: Objections to this Constitution of Government