#implicit improper dependence

[ocorruption]

Timothy Pickering 12/24/1787

These objectors make a loud out--cry about standing armies; as tho’ a large and oppressive one, like the armies of the European nations, must be the necessary consequence of the adoption of this system: but this proceeds either from a want of discernment, or a design to excite a false alarm. We have a standing army at this hour--a small one indeed, & probably not adequate to the security of our frontiers; (tho’ Congress have not the means of enlarging it, however necessary it may become:) And whilst we have frontiers to defend, and arsenals to secure, we must continue to have a standing army.--The fallacy lies here. In Europe large standing armies are kept up to maintain the power of their hereditary monarchs, who generally are absolute. In these cases the standing armies are instruments to keep the people in slavery. But remember that in the United States a standing army cannot be raised or kept up without the consent of the people, by their representatives in Congress--representatives whose powers will have very limited durations, and who cannot lay a single burthen on the people of which they and their children will not bear their proportion. The English (& no people have been more jealous of their liberty) have never gone farther than to declare that a standing army ought not to be kept up without the consent of parliament. It is very possible indeed that this consent may sometimes be improperly obtained, through the undue and corrupt influence of an hereditary monarch: But as we have not nor in the ordinary course of our affairs have reason to expect any such creature in the United States, we may make ourselves easy on this head.

Source: Timothy Pickering to Charles Tillinghast

[ocorruption]

Centinel I 10/05/1787

Thus we see, the house of representatives, are on the part of the people to balance the senate, who I suppose will be composed of the better sort, the well born, &c. The number of the representatives (being only one for every 30,000 inhabitants) appears to be too few, either to communicate the requisite information, of the wants, local circumstances and sentiments of so extensive an empire, or to prevent corruption and undue influence, in the exercise of such great powers; the term for which they are to be chosen, too long to preserve a due dependence and accountability to their constituents; and the mode and places of their election not sufficiently ascertained, for as Congress have the controul over both, they may govern the choice, by ordering the representatives of a whole state, to be elected in one place, and that too may be the most inconvenient.

Source: Centinel I

[ocorruption]

Richard Harison (notes of John McKesson) 06/24/1788

Corruption a few Words-- Corruption cannot be exercised with the public Money The Article of the Constitution an effectual Check agt. Corruption by Office-- The Gent of the Committee will suppose the Amendmt not only useless but Improper--

Source: John McKesson's Notes of the New York Ratification Convention Debates (June 24, 1788)

[ocorruption]

James Madison 06/05/1788

He next objects to the exclusive legislation over the district where the seat of the Government may be fixed. Would he submit that the Representatives of this State should carry on their deliberations under the controul of any one member of the Union? If any State had the power of legislation over the place where Congress should fix the General Government; this would impair the dignity, and hazard the safety of Congress. If the safety of the Union were under the controul of any particular State, would not foreign corruption probably prevail in such a State, to induce it to exert its controuling influence over the members of General Government?

Source: Journal Notes of the Virginia Ratification Convention Proceedings

[ocorruption]

Thomas McKean (notes of Thomas Lloyd) 12/10/1787

In some states the electors vote viva voice, in others by ballot; they ought to be uniform, and the elections held on the same day throughout the United States to prevent corruption or undue influence. Why are we to suppose that Congress will make a bad use of this power, more than the representatives in the several states?

Source: Thomas Lloyds Notes of the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (December 10, 1787)

[ocorruption]

James Wilson (notes of Thomas Lloyd) 12/04/1787

It is said that the House of Representatives will be subject to corruption, and the Senate possess the means of corrupting, by the share they have in the appointment to office. This was not spoken in the soft language of attachment to government. It is perhaps impossible, with all the caution of legislators and statesmen, to exclude corruption and undue influence entirely from government. All that can be done, upon this subject, is done in the Constitution before you. Yet it behooves us to call out, and add, every guard and preventative in our power. I think, sir, something very important on this subject is done in the present system. For it has been provided, effectually, that the man that has been bribed by an office shall have it no longer in his power to earn his wages. The moment he is engaged to serve the Senate, in consequence of their gift, he no longer has it in his power to sit in the House of Representatives. For "no representative shall, during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office, under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time." And the following annihilates corruption of that kind: "And no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either house, during his continuance in office." So that the mere acceptance of an office as a bribe effectually destroys the end for which it was offered. Was this attended to when it was mentioned that the members of the one house could be bribed by the other?

Source: Thomas Lloyd's Notes of the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (December 4, 1787)

[ocorruption]

James Wilson (notes of Thomas Lloyd) 12/11/1787

To have the executive officers dependent upon the legislative would certainly be a violation of that principle so necessary to preserve the freedom of republics, that the legislative and executive powers should be separate and independent. Would it have been proper, that he should be appointed by the Senate? I apprehend, that still stronger objections could be urged against that-cabal, intrigue, corruption-everything bad would have been the necessary concomitant of every election.

Source: Thomas Lloyds Notes of the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention

[ocorruption]

Brutus III 06/01/1789

The great body of the yeoman of the country cannot expect any of their order in this assembly-the station will be too elevated for them to aspire to-the distance between the people and their representatives, will be so very great, that there is no probability that a farmer, however respectable, will be chosen-the mechanicks of every branch, must expect to be excluded from a seat in this Body-It will and must be esteemed station too high and exalted to be filled by any but the first men in the state, in point of fortune; so that in reality there will be no part of the people represented, but the rich, even in that branch of the legislature, which is called the democratic.-The well born, and highest orders in life, as they term themselves, will be ignorant of the sentiments of the midling class of citizens, strangers to their ability, wants, and difficulties, and void of sympathy, and fellow feeling. This branch of the legislature will not only be an imperfect representation, but there will be no security in so small a body, against bribery, and corruption- It will consist at first, of sixty-five, and can never exceed one for every thirty thousand inhabitants; a majority of these, that is, thirty-three, are a quorum, and a majority of which, or seventeen, may pass any law-a majority of the senate, or fourteen, are a quorum, and eight of them pass any law-so that twenty-five men, will have the power to give away all the property of the citizens of these states-what security therefore can there be for the people, where their liberties and property are at the disposal of so few men?5 It will literally be a government in the hands of the few to oppress and plunder the many. You may conclude with a great degree of certainty, that it, like all others of a similar nature, will be managed by influence and corruption, and that the period is not far distant, when this will be the case, if it should be adopted; for even now there are some among us, whose characters stand high in the public estimation, and who have had a principal agency in framing this constitution, who do not scruple to say, that this is the only practicable mode of governing a people, who think with that degree of freedom which the Americans do-this government will have in their gift a vast number of offices of great honor and emolument. The members of the legislature are not excluded from appointments; and twenty-five of them, as the case may be, being secured, any measure may be carried. [...] The more I reflect on this subject, the more firmly am I persuaded, that the representation is merely nominal-a mere burlesque; and that no security is provided against corruption and undue influence. No free people on earth, who have elected persons to legislate for them, ever reposed that confidence in so small a number.

Source: Brutus III