philosobean

[philosobean]

How do the dead rise to life?

The gap between inanimate and animate objects is literally the difference between death and life, and one that most people would agree was an extraordinarily rare event to have crossed (in the death to life direction of course), at least on this planet.

Scientists admit that this incredible gap was bridged at least once in the past because, well, I am alive today to write this post and the earth is teeming with life - but how did it happen?

Modern science is no closer today to answering this question than when it began, but arguably the most influential event in human history - the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ - appears to be (on the face of it) a second instance of ‘crossing gap inanimate’.

The death of Jesus on a Roman cross is arguably the best attested historical fact of the ancient world - meaning as confident as we can be of any event in antiquity, we can be sure that Jesus’ dead body lay in the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea as the inanimate equivalent of say 150 lbs of gravel; nothing controversial here - people die all the time.

 But if the belief by Jesus’ disciples (and the Christian church down the ages) is true - that God raised their rabbi from the dead - this means that were modern scientists able to be there in the tomb they would have witnessed a direct reenactment of the origin of life process! Perhaps to their surprise, instead of the impersonal causal mechanism they were expecting to see, they would have experienced a miracle performed by God himself - the personal source and sustainer of all life.

Notes: An object has to 1) be alive 2) desire to stay alive, and 3) desire to reproduce itself in order for evolution to even start - note that attributes 2 and 3 don’t necessarily follow from attribute 1, and that evolution assumes rather than explains any of these attributes.

Inanimate objects don’t possess any of the above 3 attributes (not to mention the information content in DNA) and it’s difficult, if not outright impossible, to imagine a purely naturalistic mechanism that could transform an inanimate object (or collection of objects) into one that is alive and possessing the attributes mentioned above.

[philosobean]

Is capital punishment incomplete?

Because crimes are committed within periods of time, it seems fitting that their penalties should also be meted out over proportionate periods of time. E.g., It’s quite natural to say that serious crimes deserve longer periods of punishment than petty crimes.

The death penalty, however, doesn’t follow this principle and is instead meted out in an instant, apparently leaving swathes of unpunished time just hanging in the air.

This imbalance is compounded when in the case of murder, the math of ending one murderer’s life simply doesn’t add up to the suffering endured by the victim(s) plus their family and friends.

Therefore the death penalty seems to leave the scales of justice permanently imbalanced.

Unless life continues beyond death, the time necessary for the guilty to endure their full penalty (and right the scales of justice) does not exist.

Note that the possibility of the guilty person finishing their sentence (whether in this life or the next) assumes the cessation of lawbreaking altogether.

Just as many inmates continue to break the law while in prison and continue to accrue more jail time, it seems quite plausible that if an afterlife exists an analogous situation could continue (perhaps indefinitely) beyond the grave.

[philosobean]

Do objective moral laws exist?

It seems more people today are saying that morals are relative/subjective, and pointing to different societies having different moral practices as ‘empirical’ evidence. 

I see at least two logical problems with this argument:

The mere fact that people have different views on a particular topic does not mean that no right answer exists - .e.g., when the Big Bang theory was young, most scientists believed in a past eternal universe. The mere fact that scientists held different views on the question of the beginning of the universe didn’t mean that no right answer existed.

Objective moral laws (if they in fact exist) are not material entities - i.e., they are immaterial, and not the kinds of (material) things that exist within our space-time universe. 

Therefore, empirical observations of different societies following different moral practices are simply not relevant to the question of whether objective moral laws exist - moral ontology. (These observations are relevant, however, to the question of how societies come to know of objective moral laws, should they exist - moral epistemology.) 

How then can we answer the question?

Scientific evidence is not the only kind of evidence there is, and I think something like the existential evidence of our lived experience is useful in this case.

Regardless of whether anyone says they believe in relative morality, no normal person actually lives that way. In the same way solipsists (people who believe that they are the only things that exist) look both ways before crossing the road, moral relativists get morally outraged at the injustices they see in the world - an outrage that is inconsistent with their belief that moral questions just don’t have right answers.

Although empirical/scientific evidence can’t be used to answer the question of whether objective moral laws exist, the weight of evidence from our lived experience overwhelmingly points to their objective reality.

[philosobean]

Is information invisible?

Yes, every instance of information we observe (e.g., every word, number, code, picture, equation, etc.) is in fact merely a physical representation of information - information which is by its nature immaterial and therefore invisible.

The only source of information we know of are intelligent minds - which makes intuitive sense since it’s difficult to see how an inanimate, impersonal object like a rock could ever produce information.

The fact that we encounter representations of information throughout the universe means that information must be as legitimate a part of the furniture of reality as matter, energy, space, and time. 

This means our universe consists of both material and immaterial entities, including the mind(s) that must be the source of all the information that human beings have not produced themselves.

But what mind could be the source of the information in such things as the laws of physics and chemistry, and the DNA code?

[philosobean]

When can we derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’?

Normally we can’t - which is why we can’t logically derive morality from science - but why not?

A logically valid conclusion contains only the information present in its premises.

A normative conclusion like, ‘We ought not steal,’ contains (hidden) within it value-laden information - e.g., people have inherent value/dignity and violating that value is objectively, morally wrong.

But scientific premises do not contain value-laden information, because its modus operandi of Methodological Naturalism - the view that God or anything like God need not be considered to do science - excludes the possibility of objective moral values of any kind.

But recognizing and setting aside the assumption of Methodological Naturalism (or Atheism for short) immediately makes room for the existence of objective moral values, making it logically valid to derive an ‘ought’ (a moral obligation) from an ‘is’ (a value-laden premise).

Premise 1: “... at the beginning of creation God ‘made them male and female.’

Premise 2: ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.’ So they are no longer two, but one flesh. 

Conclusion: Therefore what God has joined together, let no one separate.”

(Mark 10:6-9)

[philosobean]

How is it that we can even comprehend the rationality of the universe?

Not only does the universe’s rational structure (i.e., its ordered behavior according to physical laws) cry out for explanation, but so does its intelligibility - i.e., our cognitive capacity to comprehend it as such. 

If we, along with the millions of other life forms on earth are products of the evolutionary process alone, it seems far more likely that we should not have this cognitive capacity - for, as far as we know, this ability has not evolved in any other life form on the planet.

Furthermore, if this cognitive capacity were in fact evolutionarily advantageous for survival, we would expect to see other species (having evolved in similar environments) converging on this same trait - as in the shapes of fins in marine animals and wings in birds. 

The complete absence of any evolutionary convergence on the cognitive capacity in question raises real concerns on the validity of the evolutionary mechanism as an explanation of its origin.

[philosobean]

Causes and Reasons Revisited

There are two kinds of explanations: physical/mechanical explanations (i.e., causes) and personal/self-conscious explanations (i.e., reasons). E.g., two explanations to the question ‘Why is the kettle on?’ could be 1) ‘Because it’s plugged into the socket and the current of electrons heats up a metal plate…’ or 2) ‘Because Tom wants a cuppa.’ 

Anything that begins to exist must have an explanation for its existence.

All matter, information, organic life, and human consciousness began to exist either at the Big Bang or afterward – i.e., none of these things exist necessarily by some quality of their own nature; they all exist contingently.

Since matter, energy, space, and time all began to exist at the Big Bang there cannot logically be a physical/causal explanation for their existence. This leaves only a personal explanation to account for the beginning of the physical universe.

Information and human consciousness are both immaterial by nature, and so cannot logically have a physical/causal explanation for their existence either. This leaves only a personal explanation to account for the beginning of all information and human consciousness.

Organic life is fascinating because it combines matter, information (DNA), and consciousness (at least in humans). But just like its separate components, it cannot logically have a physical/causal explanation for its existence - again leaving only a personal explanation to account for the beginning of organic life in the universe.

Therefore, to logically explain the beginning of the physical universe, as well as the information, organic life, and human consciousness within it, there must necessarily exist a personal/self-conscious, intelligent, and immeasurably powerful creator of it who exists outside of its space-time dimensions.

[philosobean]

Why is mercy so mysterious (part 3)?

Although seldom couched in these terms, mercy is actually a form of injustice (albeit a good kind) - i.e., someone being offered something (forgiveness) they don’t deserve.

Only a victim of injustice (the bad kind) has the right and the choice to extend mercy to the perpetrator or not - i.e., it makes no sense for me to forgive a perpetrator for a wrong done to a third party.

In order for the victim to freely extend mercy to the perpetrator, s/he must willingly bear another act of injustice - s/he must unjustly bear the pain of forever withholding from the perpetrator the punishment they deserve. I.e., In every act of forgiveness, the victim (in a real sense) unjustly bears the just punishment due the perpetrator - and as a result, even justice (demanding punishment for wrongdoing) is satisfied.

The victim’s choice to extend mercy (and consequent bearing of unjust pain/punishment) is independent of the perpetrator’s choice to accept or deny it. 

Since forgiveness is optional, why would a victim ever choose to forgive a perpetrator? 

Pragmatic reasons aside (such as the many established psychological and health benefits of forgiveness), I think there can only be this one unselfish motive: the victim remembers that s/he was also once a perpetrator, and was shown mercy.

Colossians 3:13 

[philosobean]

Can mind = matter (part 2)?

A = B, if A and B share all their attributes in common.

If minds are the same as brains (matter) then they too should share all their attributes in common.

But minds appear to have attributes that are not shared by brains:

Minds have thoughts (units of information) that can be copied/transferred billions of times to other minds without those copies taking up any more space in the universe; while paper, and other things made of matter, can only be reproduced by those copies taking up more space in the universe.

Minds have thoughts that are often about things other than themselves - e.g., I can have a thought about a tree. But it’s not obvious how trees can have leaves, or anything else made of matter, that can be about anything at all.

Minds make undetermined/free choices, while the movement of ocean waves, and other things made of matter, are strictly determined by the laws of physics.

Therefore, minds are not the same as matter.

[philosobean]

Can mind = matter (part 1)?

It’s strange to realize that the totality of my experiences of the world (external to my mind) are actually my interactions with mental perceptions in my own mind. I.e., Each and every one of us are completely encased in our mind’s own virtual reality of the external world (Kant’s phenomenal realm), and there is in principle no direct way of accessing (without the use of our senses) any object in the actual external world (Kant’s noumenal realm). 

Interestingly, this state of affairs opens up the possibility that the external world may not really exist, and that the totality of my experiences of it may in fact be mental figments of my imagination (e.g., The Matrix).

This kind of thinking led Descartes to conclude that a person’s belief in the existence of his own mind is the only sure bedrock and starting point for all subsequent reasoning - ‘I think, therefore I am.’

But what then is the explanation for the existence of my own mind (let alone the logic with which I've been using)? Materialists (as opposed to Dualists like Descartes) claim that our minds are just the same as our brains (made of matter), but how plausible is this claim?

[philosobean]

Thankful to whom for what?

We can only be thankful to other persons, not things. E.g.:

We are not thankful to Christmas presents (since presents aren’t persons); we are thankful to Santa (or our parents) for Christmas presents.

Thankfulness implies the receiving of an undeserved good. E.g.:

Workers do not feel thankful to their employers for receiving wages, since workers deserve their wages.

But apart from earned wages, is there anything good that we may possess (which others do not), that is ours by right? E.g., health, education, employment, a growing economy, a safe society, a working judicial system, a democracy, loving relationships, etc. 

Although we need not feel thankful to employers for our wages, should we not feel thankful for those good things (health, education, employment opportunities, etc.) that enable us to earn wages at all?

Nurturing thankfulness for all our undeserved blessings is healthy for the soul, but exactly to whom are we thankful?

[philosobean]

Can an irrational process produce a rational outcome?

In other words, can naturalistic evolution (an irrational/mindless process) explain the existence of human rationality/minds?

Naturalistic evolutionary theory says that all life on earth evolved by adapting to the changing physical environment.

These adaptations are in all cases physical adaptations, except one – human beings.

Human beings are not physically adapted (well) to any particular environment, and in fact from day one, could not have survived anywhere without the non-physical/mental ability for rational thinking (e.g., tool-making, planning, etc.).

But how could changes in the physical/non-rational environment (i.e., changes to the physical requirements for survival) exert selective pressure on an organism to develop a non-physical/rational adaptation? 

Examples of rudimentary ‘rational’ behaviors in animals (other than humans) are considered to be chance evolutionary byproducts (happy accidents) of what are mainly physical adaptations. Although the beginnings of ‘rational’ behavior appear in Nature, evolutionary pressure has not been directed toward enhancing rationality but instead always toward developing finer physical adaptations - dolphins, apes, and elephants (which display rudimentary rational behavior) are exquisitely adapted to their environments, unlike humans.

If rationality is in fact a chance evolutionary byproduct (for which no physical environmental pressure could exist), what then is the best explanation for the emergence of the unprecedented and astounding rationality of human beings?

[philosobean]

Is there a word behind the world?

Dividing all reality into material (physical - mass, energy, space, time) and immaterial realms (nonphysical - mind/consciousness) raises some interesting implications about words and languages.

The existence of words presupposes the existence of a language (a system of characters and grammatical rules) - i.e., the language must exist before anyone can learn or invent any new words in that language.

Human beings create languages, but these are always based on a pre-existing language. 

Therefore, the very first human language user/creator must have learned (been taught) that language from a non-human language user/creator (since there would have been no human language users around).

Since words and languages are immaterial entities that can only exist within minds, this non-human user/creator of the original language must have been an immaterial mind/consciousness. 

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God... In him was life, and that life was the light of all mankind... 

Isn’t it fascinating that non-physical words which exist in the immaterial realm of the mind can also exist in the material realm as their physical representations/symbols (e.g., the written word, the spoken word, the felt word - braille, etc.)?

The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have seen his glory, the glory of the one and only Son, who came from the Father, full of grace and truth. (John 1:1-14)

[philosobean]

Do moral questions have right answers, and if so how can we know them?

Most (if not all) contentious cultural questions are moral in nature, and most (if not all) people hold to their moral beliefs very strongly. It’s therefore easy to see why societies tend to polarize around particular moral issues (e.g., same-sex marriage). 

I.e., All societies operate under the assumption that moral questions do in fact have objective right and wrong answers.

But here’s the rub: whether people realize it or not, the existence of objective moral truths (i.e., moral laws) imply the existence of an objective moral lawmaker - seeing as moral laws are the kind of things that can only be issued by a person, and can’t sensibly emerge from impersonal entities like rocks and trees. Since moral laws can only come from a personal lawmaker (and not an impersonal Nature) the only way human beings could ever discover these laws is if they were communicated (i.e., revealed) to us by the lawmaker.

Isn’t it then logically inconsistent for people holding worldviews that deny the existence of an ultimate moral lawmaker (e.g., secular humanists) to take hard line moral positions on contentious cultural issues?

[philosobean]

Why is mercy so mysterious (part 2)?

I think love is what in fact holds justice and mercy together, making them both virtues rather than curses - keeping them from degenerating into unbearably oppressive or immoral principles, respectively.

Imagine a boy who’s disobeyed his father’s instruction to clear away his toys from atop the stairs. The boy’s little sister trips on his toys, falls down the stairs and breaks her arm. Pure justice demands ‘an eye for an eye’ (or in this case a broken arm), but no good and loving father would break his boy’s arm in the name of justice. Out of love and compassion for both of his children (including his daughter, the victim), the father must punish his son to meet the demands of justice, but by mercy refrains from meting out the full sentence* - especially if the boy expresses genuine remorse. The boy’s receiving mercy comes with many virtuous ripple effects, but a major one is that it creates an environment conducive to the restoration of broken relationships.

* Whenever an act of mercy is shown, the full demands of justice are (by definition) not met by the guilty party (i.e., the scales of justice are not balanced), and as such the remaining price must be paid by another party... Who then has paid the price for mercy to exist in our universe?

[philosobean]

Why is mercy so mysterious (part 1)?

mer·cyˈmərsē/

noun

compassion or forgiveness shown toward someone whom it is within one's power to punish or harm.

---

The idea of perfect justice, where everyone always and only received just what they deserved, seems to exclude acts of mercy altogether. 

Then why is the idea of mercy such an esteemed moral value in every human society? Why do defense lawyers even bother appealing to the mercy of the court expecting to have their arguments heard? 

On the one hand a world of pure justice would be unbearably oppressive, while on the other hand a world of pure mercy would wave away real wrongdoing... and yet the moral nature of reality seems to hold these paradoxical concepts inextricably together!

What holds justice and mercy together, and why do we so highly value the ideal of justice tempered with mercy? 

[philosobean]

What are properly basic beliefs?

Properly basic beliefs are axioms (or first principles) that are by definition not based on any other beliefs, and therefore cannot be proven - i.e., we believe in them on faith. They form the foundations on which all of our other beliefs are built. Here are just a few I’ve come across:

The laws of logic are objectively valid

There exists an external world outside of my mind

The external world is ordered and uniform in nature

My senses reliably perceive the external world

My memories reliably record past experiences

I and other human beings have freedom of will

I and other human beings have inherent dignity and value

I and other human beings are bound to objective moral obligations 

Whether we realize it or not, every normal human being holds to at least these properly basic beliefs (and probably many more). And although they, by definition, cannot be proven by appeal to other beliefs, they can be ‘packaged’ in worldviews (i.e., whole systems of belief) either successfully (coherently) or unsuccessfully (incoherently).

Does your worldview adequately account for at least this set of our properly basic beliefs?