#moral duties

[philosobean]

When can we derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’?

Normally we can’t - which is why we can’t logically derive morality from science - but why not?

A logically valid conclusion contains only the information present in its premises.

A normative conclusion like, ‘We ought not steal,’ contains (hidden) within it value-laden information - e.g., people have inherent value/dignity and violating that value is objectively, morally wrong.

But scientific premises do not contain value-laden information, because its modus operandi of Methodological Naturalism - the view that God or anything like God need not be considered to do science - excludes the possibility of objective moral values of any kind.

But recognizing and setting aside the assumption of Methodological Naturalism (or Atheism for short) immediately makes room for the existence of objective moral values, making it logically valid to derive an ‘ought’ (a moral obligation) from an ‘is’ (a value-laden premise).

Premise 1: “... at the beginning of creation God ‘made them male and female.’

Premise 2: ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.’ So they are no longer two, but one flesh. 

Conclusion: Therefore what God has joined together, let no one separate.”

(Mark 10:6-9)

[borlotosa]

Fraud seems to belong to the cunning fox, force to the lion; both are wholly unworthy of man.

Cicero: De Officiis (I.xiii.41)

[borlotosa]

To be drawn by study away from active life is contrary to moral duty.

Cicero: De Officiis (I.vi.19)

[borlotosa]

Notes on De Officiis

Cicero explains that the virtue of justice and charity not only contribute to society as a whole but also add to the character of the individual. Justice protects men from men and the weak from those in a position of power. It is under the concept of justice that laws are formed and Cicero disagrees with laws that are made to strip some of their belongings (I.vii.20). However, he also believes that each individual has a duty to their society. Aspiring to greatness and wealth is entirely acceptable so long as they are achieved honestly and without injury to others. Cicero expresses a disapproval of those who obtain success through force or fraud since it is at the expense of one’s fellow citizens (I.xiii.41).

Cicero also feels that moral character requires one to commit acts of charity for the benefit of all society but the level of assistance offered must be in proportion to individual relationships. Charity is not an individual act to assist one person but “an interchange of acts of kindness” so that all receive assistance when there is a need (I.vii.22). While this suggests that there are no truly selfless deeds, it also encourages one to relate another’s need to one’s own and value it as such. Encouraging all to help someone in need allows them to hope that the assistance will also be there if ever they should need it. Nevertheless, all charitable acts must be weighed for cost and benefit as well as obligation. Less is owed to a stranger than to one’s own family but if even a stranger was in need of something that would cost nothing to give it should be provided for them (I.xvi.51). What assistance is provided must also be evaluated based on the need of the individual (I.xv.49). Cicero felt that offering assistance to one who is not in need of it is only done for personal gain and therefore not a moral act of charity at all.

While it would seem that one should at all times be charitable, Cicero feels that doing so without careful consideration is not as virtuous (I.xv.49). He seems to imply that the effort one puts into evaluating each action adds to the value of the act itself. If you are equally kind to all then no kindness is too extraordinary.