Finally: cooking pics to go with the bombast.
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Finally: cooking pics to go with the bombast.
The rules about responding to call outs arenât working
Privileged people rarely take the voices of marginalized people seriously. Social justices spaces attempt to fix this with rules about how to respond to when marginalized people tell you that youâve done something wrong. Like most formal descriptions of social skills, the rules donât quite match reality. This is causing some problems that I think we could fix with a more honest conversation about how to respond to criticism.
The formal social justice rules say something like this:
You should listen to marginalized people.
When a marginalized person calls you out, donât argue.
Believe them, apologize, and donât do it again.
When you see others doing what you were called out for doing, call them out.
Those rules are a good approximation of some things, but they donât actually work. It is impossible to follow them literally, in part because:
Marginalized people are not a monolith.Â
Marginalized people have the same range of opinions as privileged people.
When two marginalized people tell you logically incompatible things, it is impossible to act on both sets of instructions.
For instance, some women believe that abortion is a human right foundational human right for women. Some women believe that abortion is murder and an attack on women and girls.
âListen to womenâ doesnât tell you who to believe, what policy to support, or how to talk about abortion.Â
For instance, some women believe that religious rules about clothing liberate women from sexual objectification, other women believe that religious rules about clothing sexually objectify women.Â
âListen to womenâ doesnât tell you what to believe about modesty rules.Â
Narrowing it to âlisten to women of minority faithsâ doesnât help, because women disagree about this within every faith.
When âlisten to marginalized peopleâ means âadopt a particular positionâ, marginalized people are treated as rhetorical props rather than real people.
Objectifying marginalized people does not create justice.
Since the rule is literally impossible to follow, no one is actually succeeding at following it. What usually ends up happening when people try is that:
One opinion gets lifted up as âthe position of marginalized peopleâÂ
Agreeing with that opinion is called âlisten to marginalized peopleâ
Disagreeing with that opinion is called âtalking over marginalized peopleâ
Marginalized people who disagree with that opinion are called out by privileged people for âtalking over marginalized peopleâ.
This results in a lot of fights over who is the true voice of the marginalized people.
We need an approach that is more conducive to real listening and learning.
This version of the rule also leaves us open to sabotage:
There are a lot of people who donât want us to be able to talk to each other and build effective coalitions.
Some of them are using the language of call-outs to undermine everyone who emerges as an effective progressive leader.Â
They say that they are marginalized people, and make up lies about leaders.
Or they say things that are technically true, but taken out of context in deliberately misleading ways.
The rules about shutting up and listening to marginalized people make it very difficult to contradict these lies and distortions.Â
(Sometimes they really are members of the marginalized groups they claim to speak for. Sometimes theyâre outright lying about who they are).
(For instance, Russian intelligence agents have used social media to pretend to be marginalized Americans and spread lies about Hillary Clinton.)
The formal rule is also easily exploited by abusive people, along these lines:
An abusive person convinces their victim that they are the voice of marginalized people.
The abuser uses the rules about âwhen people tell you that youâre being oppressive, donât argueâ to control the victim.
Whenever the victim tries to stand up for themself, the abuser tells the victim that theyâre being oppressive.
That can be a powerfully effective way to make victims in our communities feel that they have no right to resist abuse.Â
This can also prevent victims from getting support in basic ways.
Abusers can send victims into depression spirals by convincing them that everything that brings them pleasure is oppressive and immoral.Â
The abuser may also isolate the victim by telling them that it would be oppressive for them to spend time with their friends and family, try to access victim services, or call the police.Â
The abuser may also separate the victim from their community and natural allies by spreading baseless rumors about their supposed oppressive behavior. (Or threatening to do so).
When there are rules against questioning call outs, there are also implicit rules against taking the side of a victim when the abuser uses the language of calling out.
Rules that say some people should unconditionally defer to others are always dangerous.
The rule also lacks intersectionality:
No one experiences every form of oppression or every form of privilege.
Call-outs often involve people who are marginalized in different ways.Â
Often, both sides in the conflict have a point.
For instance, black men have male privilege and white women have white privilege.
If a white woman calls a black man out for sexism and he responds by calling her out for racism (or vice versa), âlistened to marginalized peopleâ isnât a very helpful rule because theyâre both marginalized.
These conversations tend to degenerate into an argument about which form of marginalization is most significant.
This prevents people involved from actually listening to each other.
In conflicts like this, itâs often the case that both sides have a legitimate point. (In ways that are often not immediately obvious.)
We need to be able to work through these conflicts without expecting simplistic rules to resolve them in advance.
This rule also tends to prevent groups centered around one form of marginalized from coming to engage with other forms of marginalization:
For instance, in some spaces, racism and sexism are known to be issues, but ableism is not.
(This can occur in any combination. Eg: There are also spaces that get ableism and sexism but not racism, and spaces that get economic justice and racism but not antisemitism, or any number of other things.)
When disabled people raise the issue of ableism in any context (social justice or otherwise), theyâre likely to be shouted down and told that itâs not important.
In social justice spaces, this shouting down is often done in the name of âlistening to marginalized peopleâ.
For instance, disabled people may be told âyou need to listen to marginalized people and de-center your issuesâ, carrying the implication that ableism is less important than other forms of oppression.
(This happens to *every* marginalized group in some context or other.)
If we want real intersectional solidarity, we need to have space for ongoing conflicts that are not simple to resolve.
Tl;dr âShut up and listen to marginalized peopleâ isnât quite the right rule, because it objectifies marginalized people, leaves us open to sabotage, enables abuse, and prevents us from working through conflicts in a substantive way. We need to do better by each other, and start listening for real.
Rambling thoughts on neo-fascist fallacies
Unlike the communists and communists-in-spirit, who say (and often sincerely believe!) that they are taking away your freedoms for your own good or the good of the oppressed, the fascists and fascists-in-spirit have a philosophy which doesnât require them to uphold even a pretense of caring about other human beings. So while the average neo-fascist troll may not consciously admit it, their concern about being identified with the KKK or Nazis is purely a PR issue, not at all moral. These peopleâs only real issue with those groups is that history and public opinion still look unfavorably on them (though clearly they perceive that this is changing as they get ever bolder in espousing or defending openly racist/fascist ideals).
If anything their most serious beef with these historical groups arises out of their shared philosophy of ultra-nationalism. Tellingly, when pressed to explain WHY the Nazis are so hated the neo-fascists will often fall back (with varying degrees of subtlety) on the only reason that makes sense personally to them: they werenât us. An American who shares the Nazisâ exact beliefs on racism, antisemitism, nationalism, etc. may take offense at being compared to them because he is American, and they are German.
By the same token, their attempts at anti-left propaganda often exhibit a shade of this literal-minded absolutism in reverse: anti-fascist groups are morally equivalent to Nazis, they say, because they sometimes wave a flag that has similar colors. Hillary Clinton is like Hitler because she is a power-hungry politician. Nazis and Bernie Sanders fall under the same category because they both have the word âsocialistâ in the name of their party. The actual beliefs and actions of the German Nazi Party are immaterial; in fact, thanks to their selective ignorance of history (reinforced by a selective ignorance passed on through mainstream Western culture) many neo-fascists treat the Nazis or KKK as if they had no actual beliefs beyond genocide, thereby making it impossible to compare such groups with themselves (since they have not committed genocide yet). Itâs quite possible many of these people donât even regard THEMSELVES as having an ideology; their beliefs are simply the objective, unassailable truth.
Obviously this is not (necessarily) true of ones smart enough to be influencers and organizers, like Bannon; but the genius of these people is their facility in sheparding the passions of âfoot soldiersâ guided along by crude fallacies and gut-level prejudices as part of a grand design.
Nazis are basically about always choosing the Greater Evil.
eyyyyyyyyyyyyyy muh man
do you ever look at Successfulâą people your age and feel like youâre just floating your way thru life like a very bewildered and directionless bumblebee
Fuck, I intended to float through life like a directionless bumblebee. When I was a kid, I basically wanted to grow up to be a somewhat larger kid, ie: a NEET. I more-or-less stumbled into wanting adult things by accident after already fucking up my early adulthood.
Super Galaxy Giga Drill Break!
I feel like my feelings about âweird EAâ are hopelessly biased by the fact that Brian Tomasik is a great person
I genuinely think the whole âdo fundamental particles sufferâ thing is a reasonable line of thought. I think I might be hopelessly biased by the fact that all the counter arguments Iâve seen* have just been bald-faced absurdity bias. (I really wanted to make a scathing comment about the quality of the arguments but Iâm trying to follow through on my commitment to not engage in satire.)
* Not all the counter arguments I can imagine, mind you.Â
I donât know if you think my blogging today has qualified as bald-faced absurdity bias, but it is and does reflect my basic objection to that sort of argumentation. I canât speak for shlevy, but I suspect the point of his original post was also to respond to speciically this sort of thing.
I decided to go find the actual article rather than joking summaries, and I found this post. And it goes so completely off the rails in the introduction, in the first paragraph, and in fact in the first sentence that it seems hard to engage with productively.
The very first sentence of the argument is:
In order to reduce suffering, we have to decide which things can suffer and how much.
And by that point heâs already made the mistake Iâve been criticizing. Heâs lost the plot. He has:
Decided the purpose of ethics is to reduce suffering.
Detached that decision from the reason he came to that conclusion in the first placeâheâs left it as an unmoored axiom.
He now starts worrying about whether that axiom might apply to things he hadnât thought of originally.
But when he does decide that it has radically different implications, his response is to throw away his original goals and run with the crazy axiom, rather than using that feedback to modify or restrict the scope of his axiom.
This is exactly the process I was criticizing in the other numbered list I put in a post today. (At least Iâm apparently consistent in my criticism).
Like, my fundamental response to that essay is to ask Brian Tomasik: âWhy do you care about suffering?â Thereâs the tautological answer, which is âI think suffering is bad.â And if thatâs the only answer, then thereâs no way to argue with that but thereâs also not terribly much content.
But realistically, people get their feeling that suffering is bad from somewhere. And Tomasik knows this, and points to it in sentence number two (donât worry, Iâm stopping here, not going sentence by sentence through the entire piece):
Suffering by humans and animals tugs our heartstrings and is morally urgent, but we also have an obligation to make sure that weâre not overlooking negative subjective experiences in other places.
I would rewrite the first half of that sentence a bit, into âSuffering by humans and animals tugs our heartstrings, and is [therefore] morally urgent.â We feel that suffering is bad because when we see other people suffer, that makes us sad. We think itâs a bad thing. We want to make it stop. And therefore we value reducing suffering.
But when I see a mosquito suffering, I donât feel bad. (Except insofar as itâs suffering, and therefore not dead, and dead mosquitos are far preferable to live ones). I donât feel good, either. I donât care. I donât even know what mosquito suffering looks like!
And most people donât. Most people donât have any objections to mosquitoes dying, or video game characters losing lives, or to two protons repelling from each other. And most of the people who do get upset by those things are people who have trained themselves to do so, through the sort of confused quasi-argument that I have been critiquing.
And this is the reason I find this sort of logical slide truly objectionable, rather than amusing. This argument takes things that are perfectly harmless, gets people to become upset by them, so that they generate actual suffering in actual people. I want people, and especially the people I like, to be happy. I am not pleased when people find more ways to make them sad.
When you start with âI donât like it when my friends are unhappyâ, try to formalize that, and wind up with âbut itâs even worse when electrons are forced to be near each otherâ, you have lost something. Your model is not matching the thing youâre trying to model. Your axioms donât generate the system you were envisioning. Your delivered product does not meet the design specs. You have fucked up.
Ozy says that Brian Tomasik is a lovely person. I have never met him, but I genuinely 100% believe that. I would like him to be happy, and so I wish he would not follow confused arguments to give himself more sources of stress.
I think youâre missing the case for trying to rationalify our moral intuitions beyond just âwhat tugs at my heartstringsâ.
If I watched a movie about a cute kid who was starving in Sudan, it would tug at my heartstrings and I would want to help the kid.
In fact, I havenât watched this movie, and I havenât thought about the famine in Sudan in months.
I could take a really immediate/self-regarding view of ethics, where the whole point of ethics is to make myself happy. In that case, maybe if I saw the movie, I would donate to help the particular kid in the movie, but no other kid, and my heartstrings would feel better, and so there would be no problem. Maybe I would even just avoid seeing the movie, since I know it would make me want to give away money (which, since my heartstrings are currently untugged, seems to present-me like a waste). Maybe I would give away money to the cute kids in Sudan (who tug at my heartstrings) but not to non-cute kids (who donât).
But if I think morality is about anything other than making my conscience shut up, it seems like I should accept some common-sense axioms. Like âeven though cute kids tug at your heartstrings, and non-cute kids donât, probably cuteness shouldnât determine worthiness of helpâ. Or âjust because they made a movie about only one kid, doesnât mean that the other kids donât matter and wouldnât be just as sympathetic if you saw movies about themâ. These seem kind of like basic logical actions: âwell, thereâs no real difference between Movie Kid and other kids, and I donât endorse treating equivalent people differently for no reason, so I guess Iâll care about all the kids.â
I feel like if you donât think you should apply basic logical actions to your moral system, and you endorse morality just being âmaking my conscience shut up about this specific incidentâ, then youâre at LEAST as morally weird as people who worry about insect suffering.
But if you do apply basic logical actions to your morality, then you get a slippery slope question of which logical actions to take and which ones not to. If you try do all the actions and be logically consistent, you end up as Brian Tomasik.
So I guess Iâm positing a trilemma, one branch of which you have to take:
1. Agree that morality is just about placating your random desires, to the point where, if you want to help a cute kid in a movie, itâs almost nonsensical to ask whether that implies you should help identical but less cute kids who werenât in movies.
2. Accept that morality is subject to the normal rules of logic, but then make a cowardly retreat from this as soon as it becomes inconvenient.
3. Become Brian Tomasik.
All of these options seem about equally unappealing to me, so I think I try to be an awkward three-footed mutant with one foot in each bin.
First of all, I would never want to be read as implying that Iâm not incredibly morally weird. Thereâs a reason Nietzschean Ăbermensch narratives have a lot of resonance for me. (âThose who write new values on new tablets, etc.â) But I think your trilemma is wildly overstated.
This is partly repeating the post I made while you were presumably writing this one, so apologies for that.
My ethics are about making me happy and satisfied with myself. Because thatâs all that ethics can be, because there is no God and there is no great judge. My ethics are an answer to the question âwhat do I want to do?â
But of course I have things I want other than âto get the biggest possible dopamine hit in the next thirty seconds.â I want to be the sort of person I want to be. I want to be happy with the decisions Iâve made. And because of {mumble about biology and evolution} a lot of what I want is for other people to be happy and healthy and free.
I like people. I want them to be happy. And thus my ethics call for me to do things that make other people happy.
A big ingredient of this is some sort of reflective equilibrium. Once you have preferences about the sort of person you are, that imposes some consistency constraits, and this is where Iâm slightly repetitive. If I feel an urge to help âthatâ toddler, but also feel like I donât want to be the person who only helps toddlers who happen to be shoved in my face, then I might respond accordingly, by helping some other toddlers instead.
I, personally, want to be the sort of person who doesnât respond to emotionally manipulative pleas at all, but does take calculated and optimized approaches to achieving things effectively. And this is why Iâm fundamentally sympathetic to/supportive of groups like GiveWell.
But a reflective equilibrium is reflective and itâs an equilibrium. Itâs reflective because thereâs a feedback loop. You have an initial set of values, and then you take steps to harmonize them. And that changes things subtlely, or sometimes not-so-subtlely. (Leaving aside situations where you actually change your mind for other reasons).
But at every step of this reflection you need to connect back to your actual grounding. And eventually you settle down to where all these things are relatively consistent, and then you have a stable equilibrium to work from.
I feel like what happens with Tomasikâlike arguments is a loss of that reflective grounding. Rather than having a feedback loop from intuitions to principles to intuitions to principles, he has a straight chain from intuitions to principles and then discards the intuitions like a booster rocket. And that lets his new principles get really divorced from where they started out.
This process is totally internally consistent. But if you just want to be internally consistent, thatâs easy. You can be internally consistent and believe anything. (Arguably, you can even be internally consistent while believing two contradictory things, as long as you also believe, like the tortoise, that believing two contradictory things is not a contradiction).
Internal consistency and reflective equilibrium donât demand that you abandon your foundations.
You call the slide from ânormal moralityâ to âBrian Tomasikâ a slippery slope. I see it more as a jagged terrain with a bunch of awkward obstacles that Tomasik seems determined to vault.
I see why people want to extend the logic of âdonât kill peopleâ to âdonât kill chickens eitherâ. I disagree, but I see the pull of it, because most people actually do care about whether, say, animals are suffering in front of them. Thereâs a coherent reason to use the word âsufferâ to describe humans in pain and also puppies in pain.
Once you extend that to insects, though, youâre stretching the word beyond what people actually care about. Youâre making the Worst Argument in the World, and saying âthis thing is like that thing in one way, and thus this thing is bad like that thing is.â And Tomasik keeps making that move, from animals to insects to video game characters to subatomic particles. There is no reason to do that.
I guess maybe the short version is this. I donât think that applying logic to your ethical code is a bad thing. But I think people have a bad habit of generating a principle, equivocating on the definitions of the words in that principle, and thus getting a new principle out of it that is basically unrelated in any reasonable way to where they started.
And thatâs why I want to talk about grounding your feedback loop in the intuitions and values you started with. It protects you from this sort of equivocation and linguistic trickery.
And this is a fundamental problem of model-building in general. You build a model. You extrapolate. You get a lot of interesting conclusions. And then you go back, and you check to make sure that in the situations where you know the answer, your model gives you the right one. If it doesnât, that means your model is broken. Not that the world is.
Iâm not sure if the difference between you and Brian (and I think I fall somewhere in the middle) is any of the following things:
1. You are very reasonably doing some kind of reflective equilibrium, and Brian is foolishly following principles off a cliff when he knows they arenât true.
2. Brian is checking his conclusions against his moral intuitions exactly as often as you are, and his moral intuitions are responding âI think this might be trueâ at points where yours are saying âThis definitely isnât trueâ.
3. Both you and Brian are seeking a reflective equilibrium, but this is an inherently messy process where you pass some thoughts through a giant black box marked âSEEKING A REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUMâ, and your and Brianâs black boxes have spit out different results, and you donât know why.
I think youâre assuming very heavily that itâs 1. Iâm not so sure, because I think I share some of Brianâs intuitions, in some very weak way, and I can imagine being a person who holds them in a stronger way.
But excuse me, what causal phenomenon are you guys actually trying to capture? Why do we keep treating decision-making or morality as this weird kind of thing where we take Intuitions, formulate them into Axioms, extrapolate Conclusions from the Axioms, and then try to bring the whole thing into Reflective Equilibrium?
Havenât we all learned our lessons that intuition is not truth, our verbal minds are biased, language is full of tricks, and non-natural hypotheses lead to bad reasoning?
At least in this phyg/phyle of people, why are we bothering with a non-naturalistic theory of âethicsâ as if it had any more about-the-world, not-just-a-language-game content than the ruleset of Magic the Gathering?
who wants to buy this book I will never get around to writing
Chapter 1: Haha Just Kidding, ADD Was Made Up By Pfizer. Anyway Unrelated I Am Uniquely Bad At Being Alive and No One Can Figure Out Why
Chapter 2: Where Did I Put That? Nope, Itâs Gone
Chapter 3: Why Being Bored Is Literally The Same As Dying
Chapter 4: ADD And Your Love Life: Why Bother?
Chapter 5: A Short Story I Drew About A Little Rabbit Named Herbert Who Goes On Adventures
Chapter 6: I Donât Have Time To Not Be Photoshopping
Chapter 7: You Interrupted Me in the Middle of Tetris And Other Reasons Iâll Be Making Your Life A Sulky Hell All DayÂ
Chapter 8: Where Can A Grown-Up Go to Scream? (Nowhere.)
Chapter 9: You Just Told Me Huge News About Your Life, but I Donât Know What It Was Because Thereâs a TV in the Corner of This Bar Chapter 10: I Would Love to Tell You Why I Am Crying, but I Already Forgot. Itâs Just Happening Now Chapter 11: Bankruptcy
Chapter 12: I Have Walked into This Room Five Times and Neglected to Address The Reason I Originally Did So Each Time
Chapter 13: Public Embarrassment: Is it Real?
Chapter 14: All the Facts I Learned When I Read Wikipedia for Five Hours Yesterday
Chapter 15: Youâre Right, This Is Exactly The Same As When You Feel Sort of Unfocused Half An Hour Before You Leave Work
Chapter 16: Will My Employer Believe Me When I Let Them Know I Have a Learning Disability and Mental Illness or Will They Keep Assuming That I Donât Care Enough About My Job To Listen to Instructions the First Time
Chapter 17: Thank God Youâre Here to Argue With Me that I Donât Have This Diagnosis Invented to Explain Why Small Children are Fidgety. Oh Good, You Have Examples of Times I was Productive and Calm
Chapter 18: That Was Hilarious, Please Tell Me More Stories of Times I Couldnât Figure Out Something That Was Common Sense
Chapter 19: Goodnight Sweet Book Iâll Never Finish
Chapter 20: I Couldnât Do It Right The First Time I Tried, Burn the EvidenceÂ
Chapter 21: I Could Say Something, or I Could Say it in My Head Where No One Will Hear it if the Words or Syllables are in the Wrong Order, Assuming Iâm Using The Correct Words At All Instead of Mismatching Them
Chapter 22: 5pm, Time For Breakfast
Chapter 23: Following Directions on a Piece of Paper. Just Kidding itâs Still Under The Pile on My Desk.
Chapter 24:Â âJust Do Itâ Well Fuck Why Didnât I Think of That. Goddamn Genius Doctor Superman Over Here.
Chapter 25: People that Walk Around Without Gesturing to a Conversation Only They Are Having. How Do They Do It?
@fowelesinthefrith
Chapter 26: This Book Is Too Long, Do You Actually Expect Me To Read All Of This Chapter 27: Guess What I Did With My Free Day
Chapter 28: My Academic Career Is Falling Apart
Chapter 29: Why You Never Turn In Homework
Chapter 30: I Would Write Study Tips But I Literally Once Procrastinating Studying For Finals By Putting Sticky Tabs In My Math Book Instead Of Actually Studying
Chapter 31: Maintaining Relationships
Is Difficult
Chapter 32: Doesnât Everybody Struggle With Basic Self Care?
Chapter 33: I feel thirsty; I think Iâll make a cup of tea.
Chapter 34: Why is there a cold cup of tea on the cupboard?
Every timeâŠ
Chapter 35: Let Me Tell You About the Wonders of Hyperfocus and How I Stayed Awake for Two Days Because I Didnât Have Plans and Nobody Distracted Me From the Internet Until I Literally Passed Out. Twice.
Chapter 36: Did That Happen Yesterday or Three Years Ago?
Chapter 37: Did That Actually Happen or Was It A Dream?
Chapter 38: I Went Three Months in the Dark Because I Forgot the Lightbulb Was Broken Until I Needed It at Night.
Chapter 39: I Need a List to Tell Me What to Write a List For.
Chapter 40: What is a Normal Sleep Phase?
Chapter 41: I Really, Genuinely Want to Watch That TV Show, But Realistically Itâs Never Going to Happen
Chapter 42: What Did I Do With the Form My Insurance Sent Me to Get That $77 Check Reissued That I Forgot to Cash Last Winter
Chapter 43: I Wrote a Really Tight Discussion Section for This Article In My Head Between 4 and 6 This Morning, But Itâs Gone Now
Chapter 44: All The Essays I Started Writing But Then Took A Break From So I Can Never Pick Them Up Again
Chapter 45: 101 Iâm A Bad Person Who Should Try Harder, If I Can Remember To Finish The List
Chapter 46: Iâve been living with a combination of a dysfunctional brain, an abusive childhood, and constant discouragement from my environment since age 6. Every two years life kicks me in the balls again. The intake specialist at that one hospital didnât believe someone could have a life story so fucked up. Someone please just fix this or kill me.
CrossingsCon 2017!
Iâve got a badge and a hotel room booked. Just need flights now. Anyone looking for a room still? It comes with a second bed Iâm not gonna use, as is. This would be on a Pay What You Can basis: from each cousin according to their abilities, to each cousin according to to their needs!
Over on the far side: roasted bell peppers with zaâatar and cinnamon (undercooked).
On the front-right: âChinese cucumber saladâ, recipe taken from the New York Times. A bit fucked up and drowned in dressing to cover accidentally using chili sesame oil in place of regular, when there was already spicy. Can really use chilling before serving!
On the front-left: turkey kielbasa and onions, cooked in a skillet like anything else.
https://srconstantin.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/in-defense-of-individualist-culture/ is a good post. The summary:
1. Individualism and strong communities both have good points and bad points 2. But individualism is better 3. Also, you couldnât rebuild society on the model of a strong community anyway, because if you tried people who didnât like it could leave, and youâd have to become a tyranny to prevent that. 4. Itâs perfectly fine to have a generally individualistic society where people are allowed to voluntarily form communities that they like. 5. And realistically we should expect most people to eventually exit from them. 6. If those are good nice communities, people will exit peacefully. 7. If theyâre bad communities, theyâll use a lot of abuse and shaming to keep people from exiting, but eventually people will still exit. 8. And in any case, weâll always have regular individualist society, which is pretty good.
Sarah mentions Ron Dreherâs âBenedict Optionâ thing as an example of someone forming a community in a generally individualist society where they can do what they want, and so sort of a success story. But I actually find Dreher really scary.
Dreherâs fundamental question is: what if regular individualist society becomes unbearably bad? What if the best culture isnât the one that succeeds in a free marketplace of ideas? Or, more idiosyncratically: what if Moloch wants to kill everything you love?
(this last one is definitely true for everyone, but I mean in the sphere of culture in particular, in the short-term)
Like, what if arguments for false things are more convincing (to the average person who debates politics) than arguments for true things? What if certain ways of life are irresistably addictive but ultimately unsatisfying? What if the Iron Law of Institutions / the principle of cancer means that people who defect against everyone else in certain ways will inevitably rise to the top?
Dreherâs plan is âbuild your own community isolated from the greater culture behind strong wallsâ. The problem is, either you restrict information flow and exit rights (in which case youâre abusive and evil) or you allow these things (in which case Moloch can still get to you and youâre dead).
The only reason Dreher isnât more pessimistic than he is is because heâs Christian and assumes God will sort this out in some sense. Like, he talks about âpreservingâ Christian culture until such time as the outside world is ready for it, but more realistically, heâs trying to slow entropy. Which is a fine thing to do as long as you realize youâll fail at some constant rate until you die.
I donât care about Christianity. What scares me is the possibility that the kinds of cultures that promote *my* values are memetically unfit. Liberalism hasnât been looking so healthy lately. There are all these people saying that we should stop resolving problems through debate, that violence is good, that free speech is stupid, that scientific truth-seeking should be circumscribed by the greater good, et cetera. These people are on both the left and the right, but the left is scarier since it has momentum and the tide of history on its side. The left is losing badly in the sense that Republicans control everything, but most Republicans are sort of idiots (sorry, it had to be said) who are resisting illiberalism for the wrong reasons, kind of by coincidence. Like, regressive-leftism would have conquered everything by now except for the weird coincidence that 51% of the population is kind of crazy in a way that happens to exactly counterbalance them. THe number of people who are resisting for the right reasons is a small minority.
I think this is what the (tiny percentage of) insightful NRx people are saying. That everything other than the worst Twitter hatemob youâve ever seen is an unnaturally low-entropy state, and is going to fail unless we use the traditional tools of closed societies (eg restriction of information, autocracy, etc) to protect ourselves from it. That tolerance and free thought are basically as fragile as the strains of Christianity Dreher wants to save, only without the illusion that God is protecting them.
But even tyranny isnât a long-term solution. Tyrannies eventually fail: the USSR fell, most cults dissolve quickly, this isnât *actually* a good fix. Instead, I think itâs more useful to just argue for good things and against bad things as best I can, hope that Iâm part of the gradient pushing towards a better attractor state. Also, genetically engineer people for higher intelligence to change the game in our favor. Also, AI.
If the Republicans control everything, itâs really bizarre to conclude that:
1) The Left have the tide of history on our side.
2) The Republicans are idiots.
In fact, if you accept (1), you need to become even more skeptical about (2).  If the Republicans manage to control everything despite the tide of history itself, that means they are most likely extraordinarily clever.  After all, clever is winning, and winning is clever.
A priori, the winning side are presumed to be smarter than the losing side! Â Sure, maybe we donât have the tide of history on our side here on the Left. Â Maybe weâre just stupid and doing things really wrong.
But it sure as hell looks as though the Republicans have cleverly rigged the game in their favor and will continue to do so.
Not sure why, but Iâve gone and prepared a healthy breakfast.
Can we just⊠normalize teens loving their parents? Like obviously youâre not obligated to if your parents are shitty, but damn, I love my mom. Sheâs there for me all the time and sure we have rough patches but honestly sheâs the greatest. Like. We need teens to know that they donât have to hate their parents just cause.
It must be nice to come from a nonabusive family. One that doesnât traumatized every emotional interaction to the point where you drive away any sign of love as a form of manipulation because thatâs all that you were raised with. đ€·ââïž
Okay⊠so I tried to bury this post but somehow it came back on my dash even though I am so sick of it. But the only reason I felt the need to respond is that Iâm not from a nonabusive family. At all, actually. Iâm just saying that my friends in middle and high school constantly discouraged/continue to discourage me from having a good relationship with my mom lol.
why is it that whenever some1 wants to express their happiness on this website someone always replies with their tragic life story
Yeah, well, thereâs a lot of us. Actually, I didnât realize that my mom was being emotionally abusive on top of my dadâs physical abuse until more than a decade later. The only thing that really got it across to me that threatening me with foster care all the time was abusive was, well, dating someone from a healthy family and realizing, HOLY SHIT, THATâS WHAT A HEALTHY FAMILY DYNAMIC LOOKS LIKE. THEYâRE SO NICE TO EACH-OTHER.
Asks for the Northeast are open!
Ask anything to:
the boring professional Connecticut
the intellectual Massachusetts
the deceivingly charming Rhode Island
the nature-loving Vermont
the fiercely independent New Hampshire
and the reserved Maine!
The only difference between Connecticut and Massachusetts is that Connecticut has better pizza and Massachusetts has more bros to hide the disgusting inner professional.
If productivity-enhancing techniques and other domain-general self-help stuff (e.g. CFAR) were actually useful, wouldnât we see more successful people talk about using that stuff? Â Not necessarily naming particular systems or productivity gurus, but crediting some of their success to domain-general life habits.
Maybe the techniques can help normal people get a bit more productive, but cease to be relevant at high levels of achievement (either because everyone is already as productive as they can be, or because at those levels quality of output matters more relative to raw quantity, since everyoneâs already done lots of repetitive practice).  Still, that would be a problem for people who expect more out of these techniques.  For instance, Iâve heard people talk about the idea of powergaming your way to world-class achievement by âstackingâ enough productivity boosts, perhaps exploiting some sort of compound interest.  (I donât think Iâm strawmanning this; yes, it sounds silly to me too.)  If domain-general stuff was this powerful, you would think itâd be widespread among successful people.
(The really successful people Iâve known and read about have tended to live and breathe their work, in such a way that âproductivityâ didnât seem to arise for them as an issue.)
I think really successful people never credit explicit productivity skills because from their perspective, those arenât really skills. Â Theyâre just things you do, because thatâs how you study and thatâs how you work.
I just met with a tutor last week about getting into a PhD program. I asked about study habits, and he told me a bunch of stuff that he did during his time at MIT.
Basically, it boiled down to a lot of the organization techniques they taught you in middle school, but turned up to 11. What he learned to do was plot out a day-by-day calendar of his study schedule months ahead of time, to study an hour per course per day whether or not he had homework to do, to use practice tests and old problem sets to âhackâ and âoptimizeâ his grades, etc. He explicitly described studying as a matter of figuring out exactly how to precisely predict his grade before taking the exam, and then taking the exam as a kind of last flourish.
(And the crazy thing was, he wasnât a computer-science or pure maths major as youâd expect from talking like that.)
From his perspective, he was just talking about putting in the work. From my perspective, he was talking about planning out and executing the work with a degree of precision and control I never thought was realistic.
In short, he sounded a lot like a really committed CFAR-type person. Nobody had ever told me this stuff. Hell, my partnerâs a workaholic lifelong A-student with double degrees, and nobody ever told *her* this stuff.
Oh, and for a last thought: when my partner picked me up, we both Had Some Major Thoughts about how you need a lot of privilege for all this productivity planning, all that precision and control, to actually work. Then, when you start getting used to that level of productivity as How You Do rather than as a trained skill, it further compounds the privilege, because now you have the privilege of giving your work or studies your undivided attention, the privilege of having been taught productivity skills most people donât get, and then the further privilege of the compounded returns in skill and knowledge from previous years of applying yourself to material most people never even see.
In short, once you find out how exactly meritocrats become meritocrats and produce their (genuinely meritorious) work, it looks a whole lot like every single meritocrat comes from years upon decades of compounding material privilege.
After all, who can plan a study schedule four months ahead if your outside jobâs boss can change your schedule within 24 hours of the exam, or if you donât know whether the rent will get paid this month?
If productivity-enhancing techniques and other domain-general self-help stuff (e.g. CFAR) were actually useful, wouldnât we see more successful people talk about using that stuff? Â Not necessarily naming particular systems or productivity gurus, but crediting some of their success to domain-general life habits.
Maybe the techniques can help normal people get a bit more productive, but cease to be relevant at high levels of achievement (either because everyone is already as productive as they can be, or because at those levels quality of output matters more relative to raw quantity, since everyoneâs already done lots of repetitive practice).  Still, that would be a problem for people who expect more out of these techniques.  For instance, Iâve heard people talk about the idea of powergaming your way to world-class achievement by âstackingâ enough productivity boosts, perhaps exploiting some sort of compound interest.  (I donât think Iâm strawmanning this; yes, it sounds silly to me too.)  If domain-general stuff was this powerful, you would think itâd be widespread among successful people.
(The really successful people Iâve known and read about have tended to live and breathe their work, in such a way that âproductivityâ didnât seem to arise for them as an issue.)
I think really successful people never credit explicit productivity skills because from their perspective, those arenât really skills. Â Theyâre just things you do, because thatâs how you study and thatâs how you work.
I just met with a tutor last week about getting into a PhD program. I asked about study habits, and he told me a bunch of stuff that he did during his time at MIT.
Basically, it boiled down to a lot of the organization techniques they taught you in middle school, but turned up to 11. What he learned to do was plot out a day-by-day calendar of his study schedule months ahead of time, to study an hour per course per day whether or not he had homework to do, to use practice tests and old problem sets to âhackâ and âoptimizeâ his grades, etc. He explicitly described studying as a matter of figuring out exactly how to precisely predict his grade before taking the exam, and then taking the exam as a kind of last flourish.
(And the crazy thing was, he wasnât a computer-science or pure maths major as youâd expect from talking like that.)
From his perspective, he was just talking about putting in the work. From my perspective, he was talking about planning out and executing the work with a degree of precision and control I never thought was realistic.
In short, he sounded a lot like a really committed CFAR-type person. Nobody had ever told me this stuff. Hell, my partnerâs a workaholic lifelong A-student with double degrees, and nobody ever told *her* this stuff.