trying on a metaphor

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Cosimo Galluzzi
wallacepolsom
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Lint Roller? I Barely Know Her
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@searchingforaugust
Conor Clarke
(by Jessica.Lutz)
i am the beast i worship.
death grips, “beware”
A problem with the left
In my humble opinion, the left’s reaction to the Tories’ recent election win is seriously concerning. The reaction highlights the demand for considerable introspection and the evaluation of goals and priorities due to the current risk of the left walking into very illiberal territory. In the following article, taking a leaf out of Nietzsche’s book, I will use the genealogical method to reveal one of the core commitments of liberalism. I will then place that commitment in the current context and within a broader Rawlsian framework of political liberalism in the hope that the left might be better able to tackle what I perceive to be its current shortcomings.
What is the origin of liberalism as we know it? What circumstances gave rise to its establishment? As I see it, liberalism was born of the religious wars that swept across Europe during and in the aftermath of the Christian Reformation. Competing and irreconcilable conceptions of the good life vied for dominance on the continent, presenting a mere two options: the utter obliteration of non-adherents, or the toleration of alternative ways of living and sets of beliefs. These options were the result of Christianity being a religion of salvation. Such a religion predetermines the good life by reference to God’s will, an irrefutable authority admitting of no compromise, and claims authority over all peoples for all times. In comparison, the religions of the Ancients (the Greek and Roman religions) were civil religions. So long as one partook in civil life (voted, rowed in the fleet when called upon to do so, participated in festivities, etc.), then what one considered to be the good life was not of much concern for others and was thus determined by each. Since the former option, that of utter obliteration, simply came at too high an economic and human price, liberalism, the toleration of other reasonable conceptions of the good life, won out. [It should be noted that ‘reasonable’ in this context denotes only those conceptions of the good life that do not entail affording to oneself privileges that are denied to others, thus implying a kind of reciprocity.] This came to a head with the signing of the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, the treaty that formally allowed rulers to decide the religion of their domains. Further devolution, down to the individual level, of the ability to legitimately conceive of a reasonable conception of the good life continued over the following centuries, resulting in our current right to freedom of conscience.
What this empirical-historical fact is meant to reveal is just how central the principle of toleration is to liberalism, specifically to liberalism in a political sense. Political liberalism does not choose sides when presented with competing and irreconcilable conceptions of the good, it only moderates their conduct between each other. A politically liberal state, such as the UK, does not decide which reasonable ways of living are right and which are wrong, it remains impartial and merely provides a structure of rights and duties within which those forms of life interact. Of course there may be many unreasonable conceptions of the good which deny privileges to some and not to others (such as fascism, racism, sexism, homophobia, most religious extremism, etc.) in the face of which political liberalism is committed to their condemnation. Otherwise, if the principle of reciprocity is satisfied, then liberalism in a political sense must remain indifferent. Should political liberalism speak out one way or another, then it becomes self-contradictory.
It might be helpful to further distinguish what exactly I mean by liberalism in a political sense, that is, political liberalism, as opposed to liberalism’s other forms. The primary source of confusion on the left, as I see it, comes with the conflation of liberal ideology and political liberalism. Liberal ideology, for the purposes of this piece, should be understood in the broadest sense possible, primarily as denoting left-wing ideals in general (whatever they might be). The crux of the matter, however, is that liberal ideology is simply another conception of the good. It comprises the set of ideals that are accepted only by liberalism’s adherents and is thus irreconcilable with other reasonable conceptions of the good. If we are to be liberal in a political sense, then reasons for political decisions that are justifiable only on liberal grounds, only by reference to those liberal ideals, are entirely closed. Arguments that denounce the scrapping of disability benefits, for instance, on the grounds that doing so is immoral, by reference to the liberal conception of morality, should thus be immediately discredited. Instead, arguments for and against issues must be based on commonly accepted grounds, such as examinations of statistically and empirically verifiable facts or on a conception of morality that both debating participants can accept. Thus far, the majority of arguments on the left that I am aware of have primarily been moralistic in nature and reference a liberal conception of morality in doing so. This is the first issue that we on the left must be conscious of and address by moving away from appeals to ideology in our attempts to justify our positions and proposals.
Where does this discussion lead us then? What relevance does it have to the left’s reaction to a right-wing majority government? Take the 9 May march on Downing Street. While organised under the guise of being anti-austerity, I think it fair to assume that the real motivation, at least for many attendees, was, in fact, anti-Tory. I justify this claim by noting I think it unlikely that the protest would have taken place should Labour have won the election even though they, too, plan to continue austerity (albeit not to the same extent). While this is undoubtedly a contestable claim, let us suppose for the sake of argument that it is true, that the majority of protestors joined the demonstration to object the Tory win. Would such a demonstration not be purely ideologically motivated if it would not have occurred if Labour had won considering that both parties will continue austerity? Moreover, would it not be unreasonable, in the sense we have defined it, to not accept the Tories’ right to govern but to accept Labour’s? Like I said, these claims are definitely contentious, stemming from considerable speculation. Nevertheless, I think it would be admitted that, more generally, anti-Tory sentiment is on the rise and calcifying, becoming entrenched in left-wing attitudes, a trend that we must be acutely aware of and take steps to remedy, at the very least because, on an instrumental level, it only harms a cause to demonise its opposition.
This is not to say that the Tories should not be fought. An EU referendum, further privatisation of the NHS, harsh budget cuts across the board and all the rest of it would be, I think, disastrous policies to pursue. My point here though is that the left must be wary of how we fight lest we risk becoming inconsistent. If we are to be liberal in a political sense, then we are committed to the toleration of other reasonable ways of living of which I think the principles of conservative ideology (as the counterpart to liberal ideology discussed above) is but one. Having said that, I do not think of the far-right ideology, instantiated by parties such as UKIP, as reasonable since they would indeed afford privileges to themselves that they would deny to others (exemplified by their opposition to same-sex marriage). However much one may disagree with the Tories, they (mostly) satisfy the principle of reciprocity in their policies and thus deserve to be engaged with with the same respect we expect from them. This should read as a warning against righteous indignation and moralistic superiority.
We, as liberals, are committed to toleration – that is what it means to be a liberal. But we now run the risk of becoming increasingly marginalised and caricatured as the counterparts to those we denounce as intolerant in the name of toleration. We have to up our game, so to speak, to the level of impartiality when debating issues in a political context. We can no longer afford to be the movement that pursues high ideals because those ideas are not common to all people, people who have exactly the same right and ability to conceive of and adhere to their own ideals. Any infringement on that devolved ability is a hint of a pre-Augsburgian time and a stain on our credibility. It’s time for the left to stop thinking of itself as the sole group with reasonable solutions to the real problems that face us; we aren’t. It’s time for the left to take a deep breath, compose itself, and engage with the right as equals.