The problem when discussing African development is that, so often, what is best for Africa is decided not by African officials but by policy‐makers in Washington or Beijing. The conflict between these two differing viewpoints may decide the future of African development. The Washington Consensus, as the previous hegemon, has been involved in Africa for several decades (for better or worse). Previously unchallenged, it forced Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) onto countries that were unable to bear the burdens they imposed. More recently, however, this superpower has been threatened by a new global approach ‐ “China’s approach to bilateral relations and economic development, characterized by Joshua Cooper Ramo as the ‘Beijing Consensus,’ provides an alternative to development and political economic reforms espoused by ‘the West’ and typified by the “Washington Consensus” of the World Bank and IMF”.1 The involvement of the international system’s two superpowers in Africa in the 21st century has naturally sparked debate over whether this is a new ‘Scramble for Africa’, or indeed a new “march into Africa”2 and, vitally, which country’s approach (if either) is best for African development. What this paper hopes to show is that there is enough of a difference between the two Consensuses to justify the debate, but the difference is not as significant as some commentators believe. Ultimately both have a lot to offer Africa whether they are successful will depend on African governments.
