#imjin war

[redsamuraiii]

Gou - Himetachi no Sengoku / Gou - Princess of the Warring States (Ep 31)

The invasion of Korea came to a halt when Hideyoshi proposed a deal, which the Ming only accept if Japan was to be its subject just as the Joseon (Korea) was a tributary state to the Ming (China).

Insulted, Hideyoshi rejected the deal and resume the Imjin War. Tokugawa Ieyasu urged restraint with Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Ishida Mitsunari as the ongoing war is pointless, but was ignored.

[ishido-enjoyer]

hEY !! SARAH!! i'm so sorry to have to ask you this question, but you're the ONLY Japan (and specifically Ishida) enthusiast I know .. and i need to know

if you happen to know (in the most academic and easy to understand way i can phrase it) To what extent did Mitsunari support or shape Toyotomi Hideyoshi's ambitions toward Korea and China?

'cause I can't really tell if he was just an executor, or an active advocate: a loyal functionary carrying out policy, or a deeply trusted insider helping shape and sustain that policy??? Ishida what were you doing.. will we ever know because of Tokugawa...

Hello! Sorry for taking so long to reply.

I wish I had the resources to deep-dive into this (and everything else Mitsunari-related) more thoroughly, but there is just so little available on him in English that it’s like pulling teeth for me to find much on him at all at this point. And even trying to find Kindle books on him I can use Kindle’s translator tool to read is proving to be challenging thanks to the abundance of AI slop currently infesting Amazon.

There is a great book in English on Hideyoshi’s Korean war—Samuel Hawley’s The Imjin War (see my loooong post about it here), but unfortunately it doesn’t go at all into whether Mitsunari supported or opposed Hideyoshi’s plans to conquer Korea and China, but it does highlight Mitsunari’s role in the peace negotiations which I think does help to shed some light on his true feelings about the whole endeavor.

In the summer of 1593 Hideyoshi sent a list of seven demands that were to be issued to the Ming through Konishi Yukinaga (one of the primary commanders of Hideyoshi’s forces in Korea, who would later fight for Mitsunari at Sekigahara and be beheaded alongside him on November 6, 1600), and three commissioners: Ohtani Yoshitsugu (who would die fighting for Mitsunari at Sekigahara), Mashita Nagamori, and Mitsunari himself. The seven demands were pretty ludicrous and wildly out of touch with reality. Hideyoshi expected the Ming Emperor to send one of his daughters to marry the Emperor of Japan, insisted on Korean princes/minsters being handed over to Japan as hostages, demanded that Korea be carved up and some of its provinces given to Japan, that trade between China and Japan be reestablished, among other things. As Hawley puts it, “It is clear that Hideyoshi’s understanding of the conflict, and more generally his view of the world, was too far removed from that of the Chinese and the Koreans for there to be any common ground between the two sides. And without common ground, there was no basis for peace.”

Mitsunari and his cohorts did what they could with what they were given and Yukinaga tried to assure the Ming envoys that the seven demands were merely meant to be a starting point for further negotiations. (But as Hawley says, “Just how much the taiko was willing to compromise, however, remains unknown.”) Hideyoshi’s English biographer Mary Elizabeth Berry has suggested that the demands were meant to be an attempt by Hideyoshi to “save face” in a war that was not going as smoothly as he had anticipated. The ensuing negotiations—over the course of which Yukinaga and the three commissioners gradually altered Hideyoshi’s unreasonable demands in ways the Ming would find more palatable—took over three years to conclude, and the Ming delegation didn’t end up actually going to meet with Hideyoshi in Osaka personally until October 1596. Their meeting with him ended up going disastrously (the Ming basically put on an elaborate ceremony to establish Hideyoshi as a vassal king, not their equal), and Hideyoshi eventually found out the extent to which his commissioners had taken liberties with their task, and Mitsunari and the others were removed from their positions, and Hideyoshi was barely talked out of ordering Yukinaga to commit seppuku. And of course Hideyoshi eventually retaliated for this perceived humiliation by ordering a second invasion of Korea, this time purely for the purpose of slaughtering as many Koreans (and their Ming allies) as possible.

So, I don’t currently know whether Mitsunari initially supported the idea of the Korean/Chinese conquest. I don’t, however, believe that he was high up enough on the totem pole, so to speak, to have shaped Hideyoshi’s views towards this invasion; from what little I can glean about him so far, Mitsunari seemed to be more concerned with the domestic affairs of Japan, and if I had to guess I’d say he probably wasn’t particularly in favor of his lord’s grandiose schemes of world conquest. The campaign was popular among the more militant types, men like Kato Kiyomasa and Fukushima Masanori, who lived for fighting and who viewed the administrator Mitsunari with a certain measure of contempt, and Kiyomasa at one point attempted to basically torpedo the peace negotiations when he discovered the extent to which Mitsunari and the others were deviating from the Taiko’s demands. Kiyomasa would’ve happily continued the war; he led his men over the Korean border into China and briefly battled the Jurchen. I think Mitsunari had a more realistic view of the impossibility of Hideyoshi’s end goal being accomplished and just wanted to bring it all to an end while helping his lord “save face” as much as possible.

Thanks for the ask! I wish I had more details on Mitsunari, but I'm still working towards that. Hopefully one day I'll be able to write about him with more confidence and more sources at my disposal.

[odaclan]

Rotating volley technique possibly exist in Sengoku Japan

Previously in my Nagashino post, I mentioned that the popular story of the rotating volley tactic is considered dubious. The main reason for it is that the source of it is completely unknown. At some point it became a just-so story in the Edo era, and was affirmed as fact by the Meiji government, clearly without properly checking its veracity. 

Even Oze Hoan’s Shinchouki text (this is not Ota Gyuuichi’s Shinchoukouki), which is already considered dubious in the first place, only recorded that the Oda forces had 3000 guns. It also did not describe a rotating volley tactic. 

However, even if this artillery tactic is not explicitly used in the Nagashino battle, there is proof that the Japanese troops are aware of and seemingly well-trained trained in this tactic at least as of the late Sengoku. It was known to have been used in Hideyoshi’s Korean war, as recounted by the people of Ming and Joseon:

In 1593, for example, Ming General Song Yingchang (宋應唱, 1536－1606) noted that the Japanese employed the musketry volley technique, writing that he feared the Japanese would “break into squads and shoot alternately against us (分番休迭之法).” In 1595, Korean King Sŏnjo shared the same apprehension that “the Japanese [would] divide themselves into three groups and shoot alternately by moving forward and backward (若分三運, 次次放砲)?”

From "Big Heads, Bird Guns and Gunpowder Bellicosity: Revolutionizing the Chosŏn Military in Seventeenth Century Korea", a thesis by Kang Hyeok Hweon.

Maybe there were records of this method employed in domestic battle that the researchers just haven’t discovered yet. For now it’s still unclear where and when the Japanese troops learned of this. Just that they seem well trained enough in it during the battles mentioned above. 

It’s noteworthy, however, that this rotating volley tactic was already a very well-known method of warfare in China as early as 750s AD in the Tang dynasty. First, it was used by archery and crossbow units. Then, they evolved the technique to be used with guns. Below is a description of a battle in the year 1414:

“The commander-in-chief (都督) Zhu Chong led Lü Guang and others directly to the fore, where they assaulted the enemy by firing firearms and guns continuously and in succession. Countless enemies were killed.”

From “The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World” by Tonio Andrade. 

Especially noteworthy is that the enemy’s army described in this passage are also mounted troops. It’s not impossible that the Japanese somehow learned of the above literature from Ming, and then put it in practice, though without proof we cannot assume too much.

King Seonjo’s description, specifically, sounds like the kind of rotating volley usually described in the Nagashino stories. This brings to mind how many times I’ve seen cases of Edo period stories inserting anachronistic objects or settings into narratives of the past, so it could be how this legend was born. Perhaps the Edo storytellers took the volley technique that wasn’t known or used until later, and just assigned it to Nagashino for dramatic flair. 

[mysageukinbio]

Various newspaper clippings of shots from The Imjin War (KBS, 1972).

[pixoplanet]

It's October 26th. ⚔️ On this day in 1597, the Imjin War's Battle of Myeongnyang took place off the southwest coast of Korea. Admiral Yi Sun-sin (pronounced Yee Soon Shin)'s Korean fleet of 13 ships dealt a humiliating defeat to Commander Todo Takatora's Japanese fleet of between 120 and 330 vessels (depending upon whether or not you count Todo's roughly 200 non-combat support ships).

Using his knowledge of the Korean coastline's tides and currents, Admiral Yi lured the Japanese fleet into the dangerous Straits of Myeongnyang, where his forces sunk or crippled 30 Japanese warships. Actually, many of the Japanese ships sunk themselves by colliding with each other as they unsuccessfully tried to navigate the straits' whirlpools and eddies.

Todo was wounded, and half of his officers were either wounded or killed. Given the disparity in quantity of ships, outnumbered by at least ten-to-one, the Battle of Myeongnyang is regarded as one of the most tactically brilliant victories in the history of warfare. Both North and South Koreans today celebrate Admiral Yi as a national hero – the hero of the "Miracle of Myeongnyang." ☮️ Peace… Jamiese of Pixoplanet

[hahahakeemu]

Took a little break from Gwanggaeto the Great this week (cause it’s a long ass show) and started Kingdom. Ya know... The show that takes place during Joseon when zombies come out. So if you wanted a mix of Joseon and Train to Busan, that’s the show for you. I went in pretty skeptical, but the show is actually kinda good. I just started season 2 last night (as it just came out last night. It was all good timing) and, wow, the first episode of season 2 is easily the best so far. I won’t post much to avoid spoilers, but season 1 was nice. The first episode is slow and seems like any typical Joseon drama. “I want to be king but court politics is restraining me, ahh!”, and that jazz. But, after that, it picks up. It’s a real short show, so if you wanna waste time and watch something entertaining, this is the one.

Also, this show takes place not long after the Imjin War (임진왜란) which is pretty funny placing. I need someone to make reference to Admiral Yi (이순신 장군) ASAP, just to show him some love. Speaking of that war, the actor who is the villain of this show is also a villain in that movie that came out about Admiral Yi. I think it’s called Roaring Currents. He’s in a bunch of other stuff too. Gotta love him.

[peashooter85]

Korean musketeer during the Imjin War, 1592 - 1598.

[redsamuraiii]

Why Samurai Lords hates Ishida Mitsunari

Ishida split the Toyotomi Clan as he only wants the Taiko to trust him and no one else.

Ishida proposed the idea of holding the lord's families as hostages to prevent uprising knowing that the lords hates him

Ishida openly disrespects other lords despite of their experiences, contributions and loyalty displayed to the Taiko.

Ishida manipulate the Taiko into breaking his promises with his allies and former enemies, making more enemies along the way

Ishida criticizes those who opposes his decision by telling them that to oppose him is to oppose the Taiko which deserves a punishment

Instead of providing proper logistic support being an administrator, Ishida is only there to report their shortcomings to the Taiko

Although it's his fault for not ensuring proper logistic supply which caused them to retreat, he blames them for failing and retreating

Instead of reporting the truth to the Taiko, he changes his report to save himself while throwing all the lords under the bus to be blamed

All the while, the Taiko himself is totally oblivious of the real situation thanks to Ishida's false reports while his Samurai are suffering

The Taiko even send ridiculous conditions which will prolong the war instead of ending it as he thinks he still have the upper hand

The only person who listens to the Samurai lords is Tokugawa Ieyasu who have been against the war since the beginning like the others

While the Samurai are suffering in Imjin War due to Ishida Mistsunari incompetence and false report, the oblivious Taiko is enjoying himself.

It's no wonder the Samurai lords who serves the Toyotomi later switch side to the Tokugawa during the Battle of Sekigahara.

Strategist Kanbei / Gunshi Kanbei (Ep 38 - 42)