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Scott Hahn on Andrew Willard Jones' Integralism
Note: For a brief definition of integralism, see “Integralism in Three Sentences” by Pater Edmund Waldstein, O.Cist. But where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where.…
Liberalism is not a polite or charitable tolerance of diversity. It is civic nihilism, civilly enforced, poisoning all it touches.
In religion, it undermines Truth, reducing faith to personal opinion within a private sphere of social life. In politics, it denies the human purpose towards the Good, reducing political freedom to selfishness. In economics, it detaches wealth from virtue and the common good, encouraging greed and exploitation. In culture, it idolizes the self, isolating people from their communities, disorienting all human action.
Instead of a constant war between religion, government, economy, and culture, these ought to be integrated and unified in Christ. This is the purpose of integralism.
Integral/Metamodern consciousness charts:
The latter chart comes from Hanzi Freinacht’s “Listening Society” and can be neatly mapped onto Ken Wilber’s stages of consciousness or the comparative chart above.
In May 1989, protestors in Tiananmen Square erected a plaster statue of the Goddess Democracy. For . . . .
Jiang’s Confucian state would have a tricameral legislature. Popular legitimacy would be embodied in a House of the People, with members elected by universal suffrage. Cultural legitimacy would be embodied in a House of the Nation, made up of nobles, descendants of heroes, and representatives of China’s Daoist, Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian minorities. Sacred legitimacy would be embodied in the House of Ru, an assembly of Confucian scholars chosen for their virtue and learning. Voting in concert, the two lower houses would be able to block initiatives proposed by the House of Ru, including those targeting religious minorities. But the House of Ru could unilaterally veto a bill supported by the other two chambers if it contradicts heaven’s teaching, as in the case of same-sex marriage.
Alongside the three houses of the legislature, Jiang envisions a symbolic monarch and a Confucian Academy. Once again, Jiang proposes a tripartite design that reflects the three forms of legitimacy. The tricameral legislature as a whole represents the will of the people. The symbolic monarch represents historical continuity. The Confucian Academy represents the supreme way of heaven.
Only a hereditary monarch of ancient extraction, Jiang argues, can represent the historical continuity of the Chinese state. Only a religious academy that derives its legitimacy from adherence to unchanging truths can resist the forces that would impel China toward genocide, unjust war, and destruction of the countryside. Though he has shed his youthful Marxism, Jiang continues to agree with many left-wing critiques of capitalist exploitation. But instead of supporting utopian dreams of perfect equality, he proposes the creation of a non-capitalist elite that can restrain the money power.