3. The Ionian Revolt (500-493)
The Thread of Events and the Problems Posed "Then trouble ceased for a while, until it broke out again in Ionia. This time it came from Naxos and Miletus" (V.28*). This is how Herodotus begins a long passage on the revolt of Ionia, with nothing more to say about the period between the conquests of Otanes (V.27: around 510) and the prelude to the revolt (499). Here is Herodotus's version of the chronological sequence of events. Around 500-499, the tyrant of Miletus, Aristagoras, nephew of Histiaeus (who since 511-510 had remained at the court of Darius; V24), came to Artaphernes with a proposition that would be to their mutual advantage. Certain Naxian aristocrats, driven from their island by the people, had come to seek aid from Aristagoras on the basis of their friendly relations with Histiaeus. Since he did not have the forces necessary for this undertaking, Aristagoras turned to Artaphernes, showing him the advantages of such an expedition: "You will add to the King's dominions not only Naxos itself but the other islands of the Cyclades, such as Paros and Andros, which are dependent on it. Then with the Cyclades as your base you will have no difficulty in attacking Euboea" (V.3*). With Darius's consent, Artaphernes gathered a major force whose command he entrusted to Megabates, "a cousin both of Darius and himself."-*- Dissension arose very quickly between Megabat.es and Aristagoras: the best they could do was leave the exiled Naxians in a fort and return "to the mainland. The expedition had been a failure" (V.30-35*).
Motivated by the fear of dismissal and by a message from Histiaeus, Aristagoras decided on open revolt against Darius, despite opposition expressed by the historian Hecataeus of Miletus. After winning over the tyrants who had participated in the expedition to Naxos, "Aristagoras, in open rebellion, set himself to damage Darius in every way he could think of" (V370*. One of his first acts was "pretending to abdicate his own position in favour of a democratic government [isonomy], and then went on to do the same thing in the other Ionian cities" (V.38*). Conscious of his military inferiority, he left for Greece. At Sparta, he was politely turned away by King Cleomenes I, despite tempting promises of booty from barbarians "who have little taste for war" (V.49*). "From Sparta, Aristagoras went on to Athens" (V55-0-). "Persuaded to accede to Aristagoras' appeal, the Athenians passed a decree for the dispatch of twenty warships to Ionia" (V,97o), which were soon followed by five from Eretria (V.98).
Hostilities began with a raid launched by the Ionians against Sardis itself (499?). Unable to capture the acropolis, which was defended by Artaphernes in person, the Ionians burned the city below it, then retreated. Pursued by Persian forces, they suffered a major defeat near Ephesus. At that point the Athenians recalled their ships (V.99-103). Soon, however, the revolt spread from Byzantium in the north to Caria in the south (498-497), then to the Cypriot city-states except for Amathus. Persian forces disembarked on the island: the Ionians won a sea battle, but the Persians won on land and after some months took the last resistant cities (V. 104-16). On the continent, the Persian generals pursued the land offensive until the Carian declaration of war forced them to send men there. After an initial victory, the Persian army fell into an ambush where its leaders perished (V. 116-22). Nonetheless, the remaining Persian generals pursued a systematic reconquest of the Hellespontine and Ionian towns (497). Aware of the impossibility of defeating the Persian forces, Aristagoras relinquished power to Pythagoras, then set sail for Myrcinus, a prior gift from Darius to Histiaeus. He was then lost in a little-known battle against Thrace (V. 122-26). These were the conditions, Herodotus says, upon Histiaeus's return to Sardis (496?). He was soon to die by order of Artaphernes. The Ionian fleet was concentrated at Lade but was weakened by overt or covert defections to the Persians. The Persians won a victory at Lade, whereupon Miletus, besieged by land and sea, had to surrender (VI. 1-22; 494). The victory was followed by merciless vengeance (VI.22-41; 493). Herodotus ends his tale with a description of the measures taken by Artaphernes to restore law and order (VI.42-43).
This is the bare-bones outline of what Herodotus relates. It is obvious that the importance Herodotus places on these events is out of proportion to Darius's greater concerns in an Empire that thereafter extended from Macedonia to the Indus. Furthermore, between 500 and 493, the Great King was engaged in a number of other enterprises on which the Ionian situation had not the slightest effect. This observation doubtless captures some aspect of historical reality. But it also rouses certain methodological reservations, since it is based implicitly on the silence of both the Greek and Persian sources. Of course this silence means nothing, since royal inscriptions are not narrative texts. By way of comparison, we would have no idea of the extent of the policy carried out by Darius in the Nile Valley if we did not have Egyptian documents. There is one hint of the Ionian revolt found in a Persepolis tablet (Q 1809): a travel voucher indicates in fact that Datis (see p. 158) returned from Sardis in February-March 494, bearing a royal authorization. It is tempting to suppose that he came on Darius's order to make a tour of inspection of Asia Minor on the eve of the final offensive (which was quite certainly ordered by the king himself and his advisers). There can be no further doubt that the Persian forces based in Cilicia were under direct orders from the central administration to launch a vast offensive against Cyprus in 497 (V.I08). Herodotus's tale of the final moments of Histiaeus also shows that Darius intended Artaphernes to operate on royal instructions (VI.30), in the same way that he had obtained the king's permission before launching the expedition against Naxos (V.31-32). While it is possible that Darius in the beginning (as Herodotus records in a suspicious passage; V.105) did not harbor great fears, confident as he was of the military superiority of his troops, it is more certain that the operations could not fail to stimulate his irritation and his desire to be done with them. It is in this context that Herodotus reports that Histiaeus persuaded the Great King to allow him to return to Miletus to convince his compatriots to abandon the fight. In fact, Darius's western strategy required him to mount a vigorous effort to retake the coast of Asia Minor. To lose it at this date would have amounted to an infinitely more serious failure than what he had experienced on the Ukrainian steppes. Furthermore, the Ionian revolt poses a series of historical problems whose importance exceeds the limited geographical context of the Asia Minor coast. An analysis of these events can in fact enlighten the political and military situation of the whole Empire at the beginning of the fifth century, as well as the nature of the bonds that united the central, satrapal, and local powers. To answer all these questions, historians ceaselessly analyze Herodotus, because, except for a few brief allusions elsewhere (e.g., Diodorus IX.25), and despite Plutarch's attacks on him (Mal. Her. 24 [Mor. 861]), he represents our only source of information. For Herodotus, the description of the revolt is intimately linked to a wider historiographic objective: to explain the origins of the wars between the Persians and the Greeks. And in his mind it is clear that the Ionians, for whom he did not harbor the least sympathy, played a despicable role: their revolt brought on devastation (V.28). The burning of Sardis offered the Persians a pretext for launching a war of reprisals against Eretria and Athens (V.102), and the sending of Athenian and Eretrian reinforcements "was the beginning of trouble not only for Greece, but for the rest of the world as well" (V.97*). Aristagoras is presented as a crazy man, guided at first by the fear of losing power at Miletus and ready to involve the Greeks in a hopeless revolt (V.35): when he urged the exiled Paeonians in Asia to recapture their countries, it was not to achieve any advantage for the Ionians, it was simply "to annoy Darius" (V.98*). Herodotus also states (not unmaliciously) that Aristagoras himself did not take part in the raid on Sardis (V.99). And finally, unable to follow through to the end the operations he had initiated, this "poor-spirited creature" left Asia Minor for Thrace (V.l 24-26-5*)
An Economic Crisis? The problem, obviously, is that Herodotus clearly does not ask the questions to which historians seek answers. Many uncertainties remain, including those of a chronological nature. This is most vexing for those attempting to reconstruct a chain of cause and effect. But the origins and development of a revolt over such a long time are particularly problematic. Many have wondered whether the Persian conquest set in motion an economic crisis in the cities of Asia Minor. Completely opposite responses continue to be offered. But the documentation is so sparse.. . . Herodotus's evaluation is often cited: It "Miletus during the same period had reached the peak of her prosperity and was the glory of Ionia" (V.28o). But this statement must be placed in context. Herodotus records that some time earlier the city had in fact been torn by civil disorder, which was settled by Parian arbitrators. The discussion clearly shows that in Herodotus's eyes (V29) the supposed wealth arose solely from planting crops again on land that had previously been laid waste —nothing more. If Aristagoras applied to Artaphernes to lead the expedition against Naxos, it was because Miletus was incapable of bearing the expense by itself (V.30-35). Clearly, Miletus was not "wealthy" enough for it to pursue an independent policy. Once Histiaeus had returned to Miletus (as always, according to Herodotus), he explained to his compatriots why he had urged Aristagoras to pursue revolt, as follows: "Darius had been planning a transfer of population, intending to settle Phoenicians in Ionia, and Ionians in Phoenicia" (VI.3o). This passage is sometimes cited to claim that the Persians, after conquering the Mediterranean front, had systematically favored the Phoenicians over the Greek dependencies and that this policy had caused the commercial ruin of the Ionian cities. But this intepretation is not based on any independent sources. For one thing, Herodotus does not conceal the fact that he believes that this explanation is incorrect. For another, we could just as easily suppose that the satrapal courts of Asia Minor created a market that profited the craftsmen of the Ionian cities. And it seems likely that a not insignificant portion of the Greek pottery imported to the Near East was at this time coming from the cities of Asia Minor. Greco-Phoenician competition, which is often made much of, must not be overestimated, no matter how important their political conflicts were in attracting the favor of the Great King (cf. VIII.90). The king never chose one or the other as a privileged commercial partner! A remarkable, recently published (TADAE C.3.7) Aramaic document from the time of Xerxes (475) attests that Ionian and Phoenician merchants could be found side by side in an Egyptian port and that, at several sites, Phoenician and Greek pottery types are mixed. Besides, the Ionians also encountered competition in the Greek world, particularly from the Athenians, who during the sixth century had progressively won some of the Aegean trade from the Ionians, in the northern regions. But it is not possible to analyze the consequences of this competition for the economic position of Miletus and other Ionian towns with any precision.
Civic Tensions and Achaemenid Power What is most surprising is that the troubles arose around 500, whereas conditions might have been more favorable earlier on, during the great upheavals of 522-520 (when Darius came to power), for instance, or during the Scythian expedition (503), for another. While it is true that, during the accession of Darius, Oroetes' power hardly presented conditions that were amenable to the awakening of movement away from the Persians in the Greek cities of Asia Minor, Herodotus explicitly states that, during Darius's Scythian expedition, the Ionian tyrants, who were powerfully pressured by the Scythians to abandon Darius, seem to have had all of the requisites in hand to choose the path of secession. It was this path, according to Herodotus, that was proposed by Miltiades the Athenian, "master of the Chersonese on the Hellespont and in command . . . they should take the Scythians' advice, and so liberate Ionia" (IV. 137-38*). Histiaeus of Miletus (still according to Herodotus) tried to use arguments for democracy to convince his colleagues to secede:
Each one of them owed His position as head of a state to Darius, and in the event of Darius' fall, he himself would be unable to maintain his power at Miletus, and all the rest of them would find themselves in a similar difficulty. Each state would be sure to turn against absolute government, and agitate for democracy. (IV. 137*)
Herodotus's version is not free of imprecision (the role of Miltiades, for example) or anachronism. It is clear that here he puts in Histiaeus's mouth an argument that was actually used by Aristagoras at the beginning of the revolt. This indicates at least that, from Herodotus's point of view, the Greek cities at this time faced an internal political problem, which was closely linked to the relationship they maintained with Persian power. This debate throws singular light on the nature of the contradictions within which the Greek tyrants found themselves, caught between two irreconcilable ambitions: liberation from Persian protection and retention of their own power. The measures taken by Aristagoras at the beginning of the open rebellion are presented by Herodotus as follows. After having seized the commanders who had participated in the expedition to Naxos, he made the following decision (V.37-38*):
To induce the Milesians to support him (hekontes), he began by pretending to abdicate his own position in favour of a democratic government [isonomy], and then went on to do the same thing in the other Ionian states, where he got rid of the political bosses. Some of them he drove out; those he had arrested on the ships which had joined his expedition to Naxos he handed over to the cities to which they respectively belonged, hoping thereby to get the goodwill of their former subjects. At Mytilene, Coes was taken out and stoned to death the moment the people got their hands on him; at Cyme, however, Aristagoras was allowed to go free, and most of the other cities showed a similar leniency.
Right away we find Herodotus passing judgment without compassion on Aristagoras, in whose democratic fervor he does not believe for a moment ("by pretending"). But, aside from this, his presentations of the situations of 513 and 499 are based on his conviction that an absolute connection existed between the tyrants and Achaemenid authority. From the time that the Achaemenids took power, the expulsion of the tyrants was a prerequisite for rebellion. And, on this point, it is difficult not to agree with Herodotus. To be sure, not all of the tyrants were imposed by Achaemenid intervention. When Histiaeus left for Susa, it was his son-in-law and cousin Aristagoras who took over (V.30). This illustrates the fact that transmission of the job of tyrant proceeded along family lines in the first place. At the same time, as Histiaeus says, it appears clear that the dominion they exercised over their respective cities was directly connected to the support given to them by the Achaemenid power. At any rate, most of the tyrants driven away by Aristagoras's actions immediately turned to the Persian camp ( VI.9-10), where they provided the Persians with inside information (cf. VI. 13). In the eyes of the Ionians, the dominion to which they were subject was exercised jointly by the Persians and their tyrant (VI.21). The situation was the same in Cyprus: as soon as his brother Onesilus took power and rebelled against the Persians, Gorgus, the king of Salamis, "transferred his allegiance to Persia" (V.104*). When Herodotus writes that after the Persian victory "the people of [Salamis] restored [it] to their former ruler Gorgus" (V.l 15*), he is saying that the power of Gorgus was legitimate (with respect to the monarchic traditions of Salamis), but at the same time he shows that this legitimacy could not be restored without the assistance of Persian military might. Of course, we cannot see any underlying ideological preference on the part of the Persians, who had simply decided during one period in the history of the Greek cities that alliance with the tyrants was the best way to establish their own dominion. From this point of view, the policy pursued by the Persians in Asia Minor was not fundamentally different from the policy that they followed in the other conquered countries—to support the local elites, as long as they agreed to play the game. But, at the first offense, the king could fire them and name other, more submissive leaders. Furthermore, Darius's policy regarding the sanctuaries of Asia Minor does not seem to have differed essentially from his policy in Babylonia, Egypt, or Judah.
The Naxos affair shows that the power of the great families, from which the tyrants of Asia Minor came, was threatened by popular pressure; then the representatives of this "great" party were removed by the people (demos; V.30). Whatever the exact sociological realities reflected by Herodotus's words, it is clear that Naxos had just undergone a democratic (or isonomic, the difference is not important here) revolution. These democratic or isonomic tendencies in Asia Minor did not appear suddenly, since, for example, around 575-550, an inscription attests to the existence of magistrates and a "popular" assembly at Chios (ML 8). It is also possible that the nearby example of Athens ("Clisthenian revolution") had again induced the will of the "people" to undo the "tyrannical" protection of the great families. Under these conditions, Aristagoras understood that, to have some chance of success, they had to enlarge the social bases of the rebellion, and in order to do this, they had to give in to the "isonomic pressure" (which, obviously, Miletus also fell, as Herodotus suggests; V.28-29). This policy also allowed Aristagoras to take control of operations: by asking each town to name strategoi ('generals'), he could be reasonably sure that these strategoi would henceforth operate under his direction. This decision attests to Aristagoras's political cleverness. The tyrants of 513 made the best choice they could between external dependence and internal democracy. At this time (513), "the liberation of Ionia" —a slogan allegedly defended by Miltiades, though we do not know what motivated him to say this—was certainly not an effective mobilizing slogan any more than it was in 500. In other words, it is not possible to explain the genesis of the Ionian revolt in terms of a (nonexistent) "national consciousness" or in terms of a "hereditary enemy" (i.e., "the Persians have always been our enemy"), two concepts that were forged later in Greece by polemecists such as Isocrates. The Ionian attitude toward Persian dominion was not determined solely by perceiving the Persians to be culturally different. Instead, and more importantly, it was determined by the social status of each group within the context of the Greek city and by the efforts these groups put forth to advance their interests. Aristagoras was able to carry this thought to its logical conclusion: to make war on the Persians presupposed that the social groups who up until the present had been excluded from power were now included. It is appropriate to add a closing remark that allows us to establish another link between internal tensions and revolt against Persia. The remark is fostered by the measures taken by Artaphernes at the end of the revolt. Herodotus states very clearly that "these measures were conducive to peace" (VL42*). Given that they related essentially to the idea of tribute (and not just to its amount), we are led to think that the exacting of tribute within each city had posed or, more precisely, revealed or even exacerbated internal social tensions. This was a process perhaps not greatly removed from the process in Judah fifty years later (Neh 5:1-3): the inequable exacting of tribute from the rich and poor perhaps played the role of accelerating political and social tensions. In the case of the Ionians, at any rate, supporting the revolt promoted a hope for an end to this external pressure and the consequent internal sociopolitical pressure. The Strategy of Aristagoras: The Beginnings of the Revolt Supposing that the preceding interpretations partly or fully reflect the truth, we still need to understand why and how, at that particular moment, Aristagoras raised the banner of revolt. To this end, we must first return to the story of the expedition to Naxos. Early on, there was no question of not cooperating with Artaphernes (the satrap of Sardis). Because all of the ships were under the command of Persian captains, Aristagoras's first move was to seek the aid of Artaphernes. The Naxians who were exiled from their island promised financial contributions, and these are the terms under which Aristagoras approached Artaphernes. Upon notification of the mobilization, other towns were required to send oarsmen to the royal fleet. Of course, from the beginning, the alliance betrayed contradictory agendas. Aristagoras hoped to gain in prestige from it; Artaphernes, on the other hand, knew well that the expedition was a Persian expedition, ordered by the king, with a real Achaemenid objective —to lake control of an island that Aristagoras represented to him as the key to the Cyclades (V.31). Very quickly, mistrust arose between Aristagoras and the Persian head of the armada, Megabates. It increased some lime later, when the Persians found themselves short of money (V.34). In fact, it is likely that, as was customary, Artaphernes had received strict orders from the central authority that released a specific amount of funds calculated on the basis of the number of ships and soldiers conscripted and the expected duration of the expedition. It was at this moment, according to Herodotus, that Aristagoras decided to revolt. For this, Herodotus provides only explanations of a personal nature. He adds that Aristagoras had received instructions regarding a revolt from Histiaeus, still in his gilded cage in Susa. But the story he gives is highly suspect (V.35*). In no way was Aristagoras unaware of the superiority of the Persians. The Greeks' only hope —as Hecataeus puts it, but surely Aristagoras was also aware of this—was to take the offensive on the sea: Hecataeus "advised them to work for control of the sea." The only solution was to seize the Persian fleet which, after its unhappy return from Naxos, had just berthed at Myus. Iatragoras was sent to Myus to seize the captains of the ships (i.e., the tyrants who had contributed to the Naxos campaign), and most certainly also to seize the ships by making a daring attack on the naval base. But in seizing the royal fleet, the Greeks also had to settle the budgetary problem. The maintenance of a large armada (perhaps 200 ships) was very expensive (we can estimate the cost as at least 60 talents a month, not counting maintenance and repairs). The Persians had solved the problem by conscription and tribute. The expense is the reason Aristagoras proposed that they seize the treasuries of Didyma: "If that were done, he had good hope that they might succeed in gaining command of the sea" (V.36*). His proposal was rejected. "They did decide, none the less, to throw off the Persian yoke," says Herodotus. Though Aristagoras's strategy seems to make sense so far (or at least, if the modern historian can give it meaning!), it is hard to understand why, upon his return from Europe (where he had won the cautious support of Athens and Eretria), he decided to begin an expedition against Sardis after mooring the fleet near Ephesus. The Greeks arrived without mishap near Sardis, thanks to Ephesian guides, who led them by roundabout paths. However, they proved unable to capture the fortress, whose virtually impregnable position is stressed by all of the ancient sources—at any rate, it was inaccessible to a small, hard-pressed troop lacking siege engines. Aristagoras must have been aware that in a very short time Artaphernes would be able to raise mounted troops, all the Persians stationed west of the Halys" (V.102*). That is, the army reserve would be sure to advance from the lands awarded to Persian nobles of the imperial diaspora, and, indeed, they did respond: the Greeks had to flee in disorder toward Ephesus before the survivors of the combat were even able to disband (V. 102). Shortly, Athenians and Evetrians abandoned the Ionians, who had to face the Persians alone (V. I03). If, taking the opposite tack from Herodotus, we postulate that Aristagoras was not crazy, then we must recognize that he had good reasons for acting as he did. For one thing, we should note that he put on the line only a very small part of his forces: the fleet and the soldiers it carried were intact and ready for other battles. Could not the reason for the attack on Sardis be related to an urgent need to give a signal to the populations of Asia Minor? They could not help but be impressed by an offensive so unprecedented that no parallel can be found in the entire history of Persian dominion in Asia Minor, other than Agesilaus's attempt a century later and another led by Alexander more than 160 years later (under very different conditions). In other words, we are suggesting that Aristagoras would have had no illusions about the military effectiveness of the undertaking but that most of all he hoped to gain political advantage from it. The fact remains that the Greek fleet quickly made a veritable propaganda tour of the Asia Minor coast, from the Hellespont to Caria. A large portion of the peoples and cities joined the rebels (V. 103), as did all of the Cypriot kings, except the king of Salamis, who fled to the Persians, and the king of Amafhus, who was soon besieged by the other Cypriot forces (V. 104). The Persians soon won a land victory on Cyprus (aided by the defection of some Cypriot contingents), but the royal Persian fleet, comprising Phoenician contingents, was defeated by the Greeks (V. I08-114), and the Ionian fleet then retook Ionia (V. 115).
It is also possible that by the incursion of a Greek army at Sardis Aristagoras hoped to damage the prestige and authority of Artaphernes. Herodotus speaks of dissensions in the court at Sardis in a chronological context of the mysterious return of Histiaeus, just after the attack on Sardis by Aristagoras (V. 105-7). Herodotus's chronology is suspect, however, and what he says about the Sardis political situation may be pertinent to an understanding of Aristagoras's motives for an attack: Histiaeus sent letters to the Persians who were found in Sardis, as if to men with whom he had previously had conversations on the subject of rebellion. But the intrigues were discovered by Artaphernes, and this time lie put a great number of Persians to death (VI.4). Regardless of the uncertainties surrounding these events, they do explain the dissensions that surrounded Artaphernes. It is likely that, although he was the king's brother, he had received less than favorable correspondence from Darius and he no longer had the total confidence of all of the Persians, who must already have been frustrated by the Ionian raid, which implied failure on the part of the intelligence services. It is in any case the first attestation of this kind of atmosphere in the satrapy's leadership circle after the Otanes affair. The execution of numerous Persians is evidence of deep differences over the strategy to follow.
The Persian Victory We may assume that Aristagoras's plans, whatever they were, so far had gone fairly well. But the problems posed above remained. For one thing, except for a quick defeat in Caria, the Persians retained absolute supremacy on land. Several detachments of troops moved toward the coastal towns, rapidly seizing ("one each day"!) very important ports—Abydos, Lampsacus, Clazomenae, Cyme, and others (Herodotus V. 116-17, 123), This deprived the Greeks of the harbors and open ports essential to the fleet, which had to find water and supplies as well as shipyards for repairs (cf. Arrian, Anab. 1.18-19). Never were the Greeks able to set foot on the Asian continent again. Histiaeus tried to disembark later on, when he left Lesbos, in order to get wheat in the rich territory of Atarnaeus. However, he was defeated by "Harpagus, who was in the neighbourhood at the head of a large army" (VI.28*). The superiority of the Persian cavalry was total. Only Agesilaus, a century later, was able to challenge it, however ephemerally, by raising a cavalry in the Greek cities and so providing a way "of not hav[ing] to carry on a skulking warfare" (Xenophon, Hell. 111.4.15*). ...the pursuit of naval operations presupposes one has settled his budgetary problems. For this reason, Herodotus says, Aristagoras summoned a council: he "realized that he had no chance against Darius." Herodotus uses this occasion to resume his attacks on Aristagoras, whom he accuses of laying the ground for his own flight (V.124*). Actually, the tyrant proposed to take Myrcinus in Thrace, where Histiaeus had received a territorial grant from Darius in 513. Against the advice of Hecataeus he took to the sea and died after a battle against the Thracians, whose town he had besieged (V. 126) No doubt by this means Aristagoras intended to get his hands on fresh resources of wood and money that would allow him to fund the war by sea (cf. V.23). This moreover is the same reasoning followed by Histiaeus when, preparing for his return to Miletus, he resolved to attack Thasos, which was also renowned for its rich mines (VI.28). Previously, he had attempted to get himself back on the water by requisitioning the merchant ships that plied the Bosporus (VI.5). It is still more remarkable that in 494 the Greeks were still able to put into service 353 triremes, according to Herodotus. However, by then the Persians had had the time and means to rebuild a fleet of 600 ships with the help of contingents sent by the Phoenicians, Cypriots, Cilicians, and Egyptians (VI.6-9). Even though Herodotus's numbers must be taken with a grain of salt, they at least communicate the inequity in forces. The Greeks had obviously thrown the last of their resources into the one battle, because they knew all too well that the outcome would decide the war (VI.6-9). The Ionians did not have adequate financial resources or excel in unity, despite efforts put forth by Aristagoras at the beginning of the revolt to get a unified command under way (V.38). Several times the Ionians clearly tried to revive the earlier Ionian League artificially, as their meetings at the Panionion (the festival of the Ionian cities) show. This was obviously done with no great success or conviction, the more so because on the one hand not all the Ionian cities were engaged in the combat and on the other because Aeolian and Carian cities had taken part. The battles on Cyprus had already shown that it was every man for himself. Stesenor of Curium, for instance, did not hesitate to switch to the side of the enemy in the middle of a battle (V. 113). When at the end of the operations the Persians decided to concentrate their forces against Miletus, the Greeks met one more time at the Panionion. It was there decided to abandon the mainland (the Milesians were left to defend their walls alone) and to gather the fleet at the island of Lade, opposite Miletus. The unified facade quickly crumbled under threats from the Persian generals and under the influence of the tyrants who accompanied them. The fighting spirit that the commander Dionysius tried to instill in his troops rapidly faded, with the soldiers refusing to undergo the difficult discipline he tried to impose on them (VI. 12). Under these conditions and faced with increasing disunity, the Samian part of the coalition lent a friendly ear to Aeaces, the old tyrant of their island who had been deposed by Aristagoras, and were persuaded that they could never defeat the Persians. The plaints put in the soldiers' mouths by Herodotus evidence deep discouragement (VI. 12). We must observe in this regard that the people were probably exhausted, considering the abandonment of the fields (frequent levies of men as soldiers and oarsmen), ravages of war (the Persians held the flatlands: VI.28), and doubtless also the financial pressure (enormous budgetary needs), which probably conceded nothing to the burden of Persian tribute! All in all, Herodotus remarks, the Samians preferred to return to the joint dominion by the tyrant Aeaces and the Persians. He mentions that the Milesians, on the other hand, were, some time later, against returning to Histiaeus: "the people there had had a taste of liberty and were too well pleased to have got rid of Aristagoras to be willing to welcome another ruler of the same stamp" (VI.5*). The fact remains that, during the battle engaged by the two fleets near Miletus, a large portion of the Samian vessels left Ladian waters, followed by others: "Most of the allies defected." At least this is Herodotus's version (VI.9-15), who, it is true, harbored no sympathy for the Ionians.
It was soon Miletus's turn to surrender. Besieged by land and sea, the inhabitants had no chance in the face of enemies who had long been masters of the art of siege (VI. 18). as they had already demonstrated at Barca (IV.200) and Cyprus (V.115-16): "Five years after the revolt of Aristagoras, [the Persians] made themselves masters of the whole city" ([493] VI. 170). The last pockets of resistance were mopped up in a relatively short time. Some Carian cities that were still armed folded under the weight of the Persian armies (VI.25). And, at the beginning of 493, the royal fleet took to the sea again and subjugated the last of the holdouts one by one: "In this way," remarks Herodotus, "the Ionians were reduced for the third time to slavery—first by the Lydians, and then, twice, by the Persians" (VI.32-0-). Soon, Artaphernes took appropriate measures to restore the stability of Persian dominion in the cities, while maintaining the appearance of their autonomy...” - Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire. Translated by Peter T. Daniels. Winona Lake, Indiana: Eisenbrauns, 2002. pp. 146-156. Image is of the Altıkulaç Sarcophagus, 400-380 BCE.
