In 1920, Freud presented a new psychoanalytic understanding of humans in his work Beyond the Pleasure Principle. His approach became more pe
“In 1920, Freud presented a new psychoanalytic understanding of humans in his work Beyond the Pleasure Principle. His approach became more pessimistic. According to his previous view, the pleasure principle was a comprehensive account of the workings of the human psyche. Freud saw a person as striving inherently for pleasure and avoiding suffering. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud came to the disappointing conclusion that human beings are not, first of all, intent on avoiding suffering, but rather, on the contrary, that they are self-destructive beings whose psyche is guided by the drive to death. Veterans of the First World War were among those who convinced Freud of this key role of the death drive.
Todd McGowan urges political philosophers to finally stop turning a blind eye to the fact that the human being is driven by the death drive. Moreover, he not only defines the human as driven primarily by the desire for death but also speaks of the death drive as the basic constitutive structure of society. He uses Lacanian understanding of the desire for death as when he writes: “Death drive is an impetus to return to an originary traumatic and constitutive loss.” [ii] The Lacanian subject is, itself, primordial and irretrievable loss, and its sociality is constituted as a sharing of this loss with others. The death drive simultaneously constitutes sociality and threatens it. Sociality requires self-sacrifice, which is one of the forms of actualization of the death drive. The basis of moral, that is, pro-social human behavior, involves sacrificing oneself, reducing one’s interests to nothing, thereby actualizing one’s inner emptiness. Caring for another implies the neglect of one’s own interests; that is, it implies the partial humiliation of oneself, and the exaltation of the other. It is the recognition of one’s own insignificance and of the fragility and mortality of the other that makes us human. Caring for the other involves this aspect of partially killing ourselves and, through this, uniting with others. Instantiating our own insignificance and the vulnerability of others are the foundations of sociality, and they can be understood as being death-driven processes.
In her work, Catherine Malabou seeks to go further than Freud in his conceptualization of the death drive. According to her, Freud failed to consider the death drive as not only destructive but also, simultaneously, as formative. For Freud, the death drive meant a cessation or failure in the process of forming or shaping. Malabou offers a concept of ‘destructive plasticity’ to replace the Freudian concept of the death drive. She uses this to demonstrate that the destructive element of the human psyche is also formative. Destructive plasticity not only destroys, but also forms identities; it gives rise to the walking dead, living forms of death, instead of forms of life. The walking dead die within life and continue to exist in the form of death. Such identities are traumatized either organically (for example, as a result of brain injuries) or psychologically (for example, as a result of participation in hostilities).
The perspective of treatment can’t be used for the analysis of the work of destructive plasticity. The walking dead are truly tragic figures who cannot be saved, which is why they are overlooked by the psychological perspective with its positively oriented thinking. Malabou argues that the concept of destructive plasticity is applicable (to varying degrees) to every human today. Everyone is traumatized. We are all not quite alive. We are like the walking dead, a surviving piece of death, rather than a surviving piece of life. Considering that the death drive is a constitutive feature of the human psyche and of all human sociality, it therefore seems to be a necessary and honest theoretical construction for the analysis of recent Ukrainian-Russian relations.
It seems to me that Žižek’s definition of the desire for death is suitable for analyzing Russia in its relation to Ukraine. Russia demonstrates precisely this desire for death, acting as an undead, irrational, and stupid destructive force. It devastates itself, acting against its own interests. Russia is a monster that has gone crazy, destroying everything in its path. She acts in desperation as if she has nothing to lose, as if there is nothing human left: only madness remains. It seems that instead of aiming at preserving the remnants of humanity, on the contrary, she deliberately shows the maximum amount of inhumanity. For example, by purposefully and cynically destroying the Drama Theater in Mariupol, where hundreds were taking refuge, or shooting a woman with her newborn child. Russia covers its actions, as it has done before, with the narrative of care and justice. But this narrative is being more and more denounced as terrifying, weak excuses formed within the delirium of its madness. It speaks like a mad person who mutters something that seems to resemble, though only remotely, familiar language.
In this madness, there lies exposed the bareness of inner emptiness and inner meaninglessness. Russia is like a mad person whose actions cannot be predicted because she does not act (and does not even pretend to act) in defense of her own interests. She acts desperately and chaotically. We are witnessing a huge bloodthirsty creature who is dead on the inside, unaware of its own mortality.
Ukraine is for me the most obvious example of what McGowan describes as an altruistic death driveв. Ukrainians are characterized by indestructible and desperate resilience, inspired by love for their homeland. Love for Ukraine is not ordinary nationalism in the form of pride in one’s nation. This love has always been painful, like love for something not strong and powerful, but rather tragic. Yet, they often completely refuse to take the position of a victim. This is sincere love, which is not for something, but in spite of everything. Even before the war, Ukrainians sometimes associated Ukraine with something permanently at death’s door. The initial version of the Ukrainian anthem begins with the words “Ukraine has not yet died.” I remember how we joked in childhood that Ukraine was permanently in a state of dying; I wasn’t able to comprehend at that time all the pain of these words. The most common internal image of Ukraine for Ukrainians is as suffering, desolate, but at the same time persistent and beloved. Lesya Ukrainka refers to Ukraine as a “fateless” mother: she is “sad, weary” but at the same time she is “the only one, dear” to Ukrainians.
Since the death drive is the basic structure of the individual and society, we cannot get rid of it. But we can modify the form of its actualization. Today we can only choose different forms of suffering and dying, modes of existence in the mode of the tragic. There could no longer be any talk of optimism. In this regard, the whole world has a lot to learn from Ukraine, from its self-destructive humanity, its ability to support others and sacrifice themselves for others, even when it needs support more than others. In his essay Reflections on War and Death Freud warned that one should never adapt to war since it dehumanizes everyone. The only question is when. In the words of Freud, “[the war] forces us again to be heroes who cannot believe in their own death, it stamps all strangers as enemies whose death we ought to cause or wish; it counsels us to rise above the death of those whom we love”.”
An interview with the writer Masha Gessen about why Putin might dare a nuclear strike on Poland, what democratic leaders don’t grasp that au
“What Putin has been doing for many, many years is building up to a big war. At a certain point, I felt crazy for saying it because the big war kept not starting. But the logic of his rhetoric, the logic of his actions, the logic of totalitarianism in general — all of these things required a big war. Since his Munich speech in 2007, there has been a constant and open insistence on re-establishing Russia as a great power and a refusal to recognize what's referred to as the world order.
There is the constant glorification of what Russians call “the great patriotic war.” The repeated reminders to the world that Russia fought the Second World War and won it for the universe. That message is unambiguous. The message is that because Russia won the war, it has the right to at least share in world dominance. It earned that right by winning World War II. It earned the right to be a superpower. But the saber-rattling that was involved in this unceasing celebration of the victory in World War II was also a message to both self and the world that we can repeat the big war.
The logic of totalitarianism is imperial. It is expansive. You can only fully mobilize a population if you have a big war to mobilize behind. There was a cheap version of that mobilization when Putin annexed Crimea in 2014. Most Russians were elated and gave a level of totalitarian support for the non-military victory. But that effect wore off after a while, and now you have to have a bloody version of the big war.
What do you think is a path out of this current war?
I don't think peace in good faith is possible. The best-case scenario is a long pause in the fighting necessitated by Russia's clear military failure. Even though the only reason for the pause is this failure, and it's not that Putin has achieved his aims, from his point of view, it would be a temporary respite for Russia to regroup and strike again. But if we're lucky, that pause would be somewhat extended, and then maybe he'll die. That's the best-case scenario.
Worst-case scenario, a nuclear strike.
Either Ukraine or Poland.
Is that the worst-case scenario but an infinitesimally small possibility in your mind?
It's not at all small. Rule No. 1 is to listen to and believe the autocrat. Putin keeps reminding the world that Russia has nuclear weapons. I'm really terrified by a couple of interviews given recently by Dmitry Peskov, Putin's press secretary, and Sergey Karaganov, an influential foreign policy expert in Kremlin-adjacent circles.
Peskov was asked whether Putin will rule out nuclear weapons, and he said no. That's a matter of policy. Clearly, that is a decision that's been made. That’s on the table. If it’s on the table, as Chekhov teaches us, it is going to strike sooner or later. Of course, there is still the question of whether he will die sooner than he pushes the nuclear button.
In the Karaganov interview, he goes on about how the NATO treaty is basically fiction and how Article Five doesn't obligate NATO countries to come to the defense of other members. This is a very important idea in both Russian and Ukrainian foreign policy circles for different reasons. Nothing happens automatically in NATO. If it's a war of nerves, NATO is likely to lose because of its lethargic, complicated structure.
Russia is essentially saying, What are you going to do if we fire a tactical nuclear weapon at a military airport in Poland? This is something that they see themselves justified in potentially doing because those military airports are being used to supply military equipment to Ukraine. Considering there's no automatic response, do you want to be drawn into a shooting war with Russia?
We keep hearing on this side of the Atlantic that we don't want to be drawn into a shooting war with Russia. It's being heard loud and clear there, too, and it's being interpreted as basically shifting the goalpost further and further away from the Russian border.
I don't think there will be a Russian Federation within its current borders or anywhere close to them when this is over, provided there is a “when this is over.” I do have a little bit of hope.
The Russian Federation is a truncated empire, waging its last big imperial war, which it will eventually lose. I don't know what kind of devastation it will wreak on the world before it does, but it will lose. It may lose its last great imperial war the same way Germany lost theirs after devastating the whole world. When it does, the empire will break up. I think there will be a State of Moscow and a State of St. Petersburg. I think dozens of countries will end up existing on the largest landmass in the world.
I hope to live long enough to help create something in the new State of Moscow. But it may be a while.”