#moqattam

[cairobserver]

From Tahrir Square to Emaar Square

[Illustration of Emaar Square used for advertising and real estate promotion]

ترجمة عربية للمقال متاحة على هذا الرابط

In mid-February the Egypt subsidiary of the UAE-based Emaar signed a protocol with the Egyptian Defense Ministry which clears the way for the construction of Emaar Square, a mixed-use development with open-air shopping for international luxury brands. The development is part of the company's exclusive Uptown Cairo. Emaar is the developer behind the world's tallest building, Burj Khalifa. The Egyptian Defense Ministry is in many ways Egypt's largest land owner/manager and the massive property that is now being developed by Emaar with Uptown Cairo's exclusive residential clusters and golf course is/was owned by the military and was previously unavailable to the market.

In the years leading up to 2011 visions of the future of Cairo as imagined by the former regime and its businessmen began to emerge. That vision, known as Cairo 2050, would have led to the mass eviction of thousands of families to transform the city into pockets of high-end residential development, golf courses and shopping centers. Much of the investment power for these projects were to come from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The former regime was intent to the Dubaization of Cairo and close ties between the money (Gulf capital) and power (the regime and the military) were being built. These projects were halted after the revolution took an unwanted turn (Qatar-backed Muslim Brotherhood coming to power and Qatar competing with Saudi/Kuwait/UAE for financial control in Egypt). Now, many projects are back on track, including the Maspero triangle and Uptown Cairo.

Those who celebrate the Dubai model and wish for its expansion across the region make the unethical choice of ignoring the fact that the Gulf cities of the last decade emerge out of a very specific relation between political power and capital (often one and the same). The expansion of such model into cities such as Cairo with vastly different demographics and where a military functions not as an institution of the state but as caretaker with unchallenged access both to politics and capital (in the form of assets such as land and resources for example), such a model in this context would have disastrous impact on the urban majority who will be marginalized in favor of serving an entrepreneurial transnational minority (perhaps working in Dubai and using their money to obtain property in Cairo's Dubai-style enclaves), who will ultimately occupy the role of the colonial-era elites of the past. The urban majority will be moved out of the way when necessary and put to work under unacceptable conditions, with no power to mobilize and with little pay.

So why is this interesting? First, this is not a free market. When the military is arguably the biggest land owner with no civilian oversight makes a direct and opaque deal with a developer to build an exclusive and gated community in the heart of the capital, this is not a free market. The development is framed by the government as part of "building Egypt" and attracting investment while in fact all this is doing is creating more opportunity for private accumulated capital (buyers) to be locked into cages (gated development) with no access to democratic municipal management: those wealthy buyers won't pressure the government for services, they will deal with a company instead.

Second (and not to state the obvious), this is not a democracy, and certainly not revolutionary. The protocol signed in Feb included the Housing Ministry, Local Development Ministry, Investment Ministry and the Governorate of Cairo. All these state institutions are partaking in one of Cairo's most exclusive developments while the majority of the city's population is abandoned. This cooperation between these state institutions will, for example, allow for Emaar to built a private road to link the Uptown Cairo/Emaar Square with Cairo's road network. This private road will require the "cleansing" of Jabal al-Ahmar area (which is likely to mean the forced eviction of some poor people to get them out of the way). Egyptian state institutions, including the military, have a lengthy track record of forcibly evicting residents, and using lethal force to do it, in favor of private interests.

Why are so many state institutions failing to solve Egypt's mounting urban problems, many of which are directly caused by these very institutions, why are they coming together to sign a protocol for a private highway to a private city? This is not the first time such uneven attention was paid by state institutions towards serving an exclusive minority with links to political and military power while turning a blind eye on the needs of the majority.

[The location of Uptown Cairo showing in yellow dotted lines the private roads linking to the city's network. The land size of the development is comparable to the neighborhood of Zamalek]

This latest protocol went unnoticed in the news, in a way it is business as usual. So how did we get from Tahrir Square to Emaar Square?

In Egypt, urban space continues to be the stage for the struggle not only to shape the spaces of the city but also for creating new forms of democratic representation. The protests taking place in Egypt starting in 2011 and the ensuing political upheaval shed light on questions of space and political participation, particularly how spaces of the everyday have become sites of resistance, revolution and transformation. The underlying theme which has been consistent from the beginning of this most recent chapter in Egypt’s history of urban protest is the desire to (re)construct democracy from the bottom up.

The Egyptian revolt hasn’t been discussed in local and international media outlets as an urban struggle, or more specifically as a movement seeking to “overcome the isolations and to reshape the city in a different social image from that given by the powers of developers backed by finance, corporate capital, and an increasingly entrepreneurialy minded local state apparatus.”  The city has in fact been shaped by power and capital in ways which have manifested in the extreme unevenness of development resulting from the neglectful rule of the state towards the urban majority while providing concessions to international developers (namely Gulf real estate investment) or local entities, namely individuals, associations or corporations linked directly to the police and military state apparatus.

The struggle in Egypt manifest in urban space since 2011 is one directly linked to the ways in which power and capital have produced socially and economically unjust urban experiences. In Egypt the more generic terms of “corporate capital,” “finance,” and “state apparatus” aren’t helpful to put into relief the specific interlinking of power and economy accessible to the military and police, state institutions with a monopoly over violence in the name of the state, which have functioned in ways similar to corporations in other contexts, thus bearing weapons in civilian spaces and having direct access to capital and assets such as land and building materials that directly shape cities and their development.

[Image circulated in social media last month purporting to show the "Israeli-style separation wall" construction to enclose Uptown Cairo from its surroundings. It would be useful to think of this wall while contemplating the wall caging Tahrir Square]

The city, as Egyptians have come to know it, is the result of the political and economic structures protected by the regime. Cities, in this current political economy in Egypt, have lost their vital role as places of economic possibilities for the majority of the population. Instead, since the 1970s the state has fallen short of providing services, creating effective systems of urban management, producing plans for urban expansion and where capital can be invested into the production of new urban environments that allow for local private capital to grow while protecting the sanctity of the common, the public sphere and its manifestation in public spaces shared by a wide segment of the urban population.

During this time the military continually protected its grasp on Egypt’s economy leading to a 1997 presidential decree that gave the military the right to all undeveloped lands in the country, making it the largest landowner in Egypt’s history. Land is one of many commodities monopolized by the military, which it then utilizes in opaque sales operations with international investment for exclusive gated communities, beach resorts or shopping malls. The Egyptian military as an institution is perhaps the main beneficiary of Egypt’s political and economic status quo, which has produced the current urban environment. In addition to land, the military produces building materials such as cement and brick, the essential construction materials in Egypt used for everything from luxury condos in gated communities to new residential buildings in informally planned districts expanding onto agricultural land. Finally, the military has access to an unpaid labor force through the country’s mandatory conscription. Often conscripts from lower social standing coming from the poorest parts of the country work in construction sites and in factories producing building materials. More explicitly “as the managers of a state-owned economic empire built on corruption and oppression of working classes, military leaders have become decisively complicit in repressing labor and violating their rights.” The spatial confrontations, often violent, in Egyptian squares between protesters/participants and soldiers/conscripts are in many ways vivid illustrations of Egypt’s struggle over its politics, economy and space, in other words, a struggle towards a more even urban development.

UPDATE 25 February, 2014: As the government suddenly resigned news emerged that the housing minister (his ministry participated in the above discussed protocol) will become Egypt's next prime minister.

Update 26 February, 2014: According to Ahram Online "Egypt's draft investment law contains provisions to prevent third parties from challenging contracts made between the government and an investor." Such a law will protect contracts such as the one discussed above from scrutiny by the public using any legal channels to challenge them.

Update 28 February, 2014: For clarification a paragraph was added above starting with "Those who celebrate the Dubai...".

Also, it has emerged that Mustafa Madbouli, who is chiefly responsible for the Cairo 2050 plan, was asked to become Housing Minister in the new government. The plan was simply waiting for the revolution to be killed and for the values of political participation (with the implications of such participation on the making of the urban environment) heard in Tahrir Square three years ago to be silenced.

[ltltrb]

MOQATTAM PART 2

[ltltrb]

MOQATTAM, CAIRO - PART 1

Lacking a formal waste management system, Egyptian streets are often filled with tall piles of trash. In Cairo, the trash is collected by the poorest of the poor who live in Moqattam, a mountainside slum community right outside of the city. When they collect the waste, it becomes theirs. They take it into their homes, sort through it with their hands, and salvage what they can to sell. Unfortunately, most lack proper sanitation education and end up contract diseases from touching the trash. Walking through the streets, you see homes literally filled with bags of trash and trucks carrying load upon load. Many look down upon these people as the lowest in society, but it felt like an honor to be able to visit this place for a day.

Pictured above is a nonprofit center that provides childcare, health services, and also allows women to come and make products for selling, as well as some of the streets in Moqattam.

[hoqookenglish]

Activists acquitted from inciting violence outside Muslim Brotherhood HQ in Moqattam

The protestors were led by Ahmed Doma, Nawara Negm and Alaa Abdel Fattah.

In defence of those accused, Sameh Ashour, chairman of the Egyptian Bar Association, said that this case was a testament to both the times and the revolution and that ‘what has happened in the past year has never happened in the history of the world - we have seen an organisation not working for the interests of the country, but rather, working for a secret global organisation.’

He added that the case was merely falsification of the truth and that the activists were beaten and dragged a week before the incident while expressing their opinion with only a paintbrush and a pen, and that the group, led by Ahmed Doma and Mervet Mousa and others were dragged and beaten at the hands of the Brotherhood.

He stressed that the lawsuit papers said that Ahmed Doma absconded from prison during another case and that this case was fabricated by the prosecution due to a lack of evidence.

Ashour further stated that amended Article 375 was introduced into the case despite being ruled as non-constitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court in 2006 and that fabricated technical evidence was used against the defendants by skilled members of the Brotherhood.

They forged charges using false content with uncorroborated sources on pages of social networking sites.

Ashour stated that none of the defendants were able to approach the Muslim Brotherhood Headquarters due to the police cordon and stressed the incomplete evidence provided by the first witness who reported the crime.

Saif el-Islam demanded the acquittal of all the accused on account of the absence of evidence against them and that the victims did not recognise them. In addition, there was no physical evidence found on the defendants and the second witness emphasised that the demonstration was peaceful, affirming that the Muslim Brotherhood has been a symbol of oppression during the last year.

Written by Ahmed Abdel Muttalib

Translated by Sinead Stewart

[hoqookenglish]

Cairo Prosecution: 'Police never asked permission to intervene at Muslim Brotherhood HQ'

Ismail Hafiz, chairman of the Prosecution in South Cairo, has denied that the lack of police presence in Moqattam last night was due to the Prosecution denying them authorization. He stressed that from the beginning, the police did not request permission to enter the Brotherhood HQ. Investigations are ongoing.

Enquiries by the Prosecution so far found that a number were killed in the events in the Muslim Brotherhood offices in Moqattam, just outside of Cairo, dying from shots fired in the area.

The headquarters were raided and torched as part of the protests against President Morsi’s one-year anniversary in power. Demonstrators clashed with pro-Brotherhood groups throughout the night.

Some members of the Brotherhood that were present in the HQ fled immediately after protestors stormed the buildings, except for one who was taken hold of by demonstrators.   

Written by Ahmed Abdul Muttalib

Translated and edited by Harry Shukman

[middlejournal-blog-blog]

"Egypt protesters storm Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Cairo"

From Arabiya news online:

Al Arabiya

The headquarters of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo was stormed and ransacked on Monday following deadly clashes there between supporters and opponents of President Mohamed Morsi who hails from the group, an AFP correspondent said. The building in Cairo's Moqattam district was set ablaze before people stormed inside and began throwing things out of the windows, as others were seen leaving with items including furniture. Witnesses told AFP there were no Brotherhood members still inside the building, after they were escorted out by a group of people early on Monday.

The rest of the article can be read here.

Also according to Twitter user Arab Fury ‏@Arab_Fury, members from the Muslim Brotherhood were seen firing live ammunition at protesters:

MB members in #Moqattam fired at protesters attacking their head quarters there killing at least 6 people.

The fire and violence surrounding the headquarters were largely reported on Twitter:

A picture shows an old man took the door of the Muslim brotherhood HQ  pic.twitter.com/qsH6bX1byl

The Daily News Egypt ‏@DailyNewsEgypt

People living in the buildings surrounding the #MB HQ are hanging Egyptian flags out their windows in the Moqattam.

The Daily News Egypt ‏@DailyNewsEgypt

Egyptians opposed to President Morsi set fire to the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Cairo pic.twitter.com/R3vaPkHGI5

[cinemacosmos]

Moqattam clashes speak to political void - Mar. 27th, 2013

During a lull in Friday’s violence, protesters gathered across from a Moqattam mosque to buy refreshments from a kiosk through slits in the protective cardboard wrapped around it by its proprietor.

Despite the surrounding scenery — a rock-strewn street carrying cars with smashed windshields and trees with charred limbs — the crowd was in high spirits, having successfully fought off and captured a few Muslim Brotherhood supporters who had confronted them some distance from Nafoura Square.

  “How many did you knock down?” a neatly dressed teenager asked a large older man resting on the sidewalk with a hook-shaped steel pipe in his lap.

  “A few,” the man looked up. “I wasn’t counting.”

  The teenager plucked his cigarette from his lips and, with his other hand, swung a wooden plank.

  “I got 14,” he boasted. “One by one by one, right on the head.”

  “Bless the youth,” he said.

  The Egyptian revolution began amid chants of “peaceful” intentions, and it remained “peaceful” — even as police stations were routinely burned to the ground and clashes continued to quake the lawless outer governorates. The description remained valid because the then-ruling regime had been presented with an ultimatum, rather than a call for direct confrontation, although it immediately interpreted it as such.

  And it became a badge of honor of sorts in the face of the state’s well-documented insistence on attacking protesters at their most vulnerable — whether sleeping, praying or hospitalized — and its disregard for the lives of its own citizens. Predictably, that government fell and, perhaps just as predictably, the one that followed has adopted the same heavy-handed tactics with zeal.

  In the context of the ongoing revolution, the Moqattam clashes arguably mark a turning point. From the first cries of “peaceful” on 25 January 2011 to the “hunt a Brother" and "kill an infidel” rhetoric of last Friday, it’s easy to see something has changed. Who’s responsible for that change, though, remains less clear.

  Whose fault?

  Khaled Abdel Hamid of the Popular Socialist Alliance believes “Everyone is to blame. Both sides need to realize that individual violence has never been a solution, nor will it fulfill the goals of the revolution.” he says.

  But Abdel Hamid is also quick to point out that “the responsibility, undeniably, lies with the ruling regime. They are as responsible for the actions of their supporters as they are for the actions of their own apparatuses,” he explains. “And these ongoing efforts to marginalize and terrorize the opposition will only bring further instability.”

  He says the Brotherhood and its supporters need to understand that “you cannot attack political activists and not expect certain repercussions.”

  Human rights activist Ghada Shahbandar speaks of being mildly surprised that “after years of relying on us when they were being abused in prisons, the Muslim Brotherhood no longer seems to believe in human rights organizations. We’re hearing them repeat the previous regime’s rhetoric that we are ‘paid agents.’”

  One of the biggest contributors to the deteriorating situation, she believes, is the Central Security Forces. Despite having a heavy presence Friday, with hundreds of soldiers securing the Brotherhood headquarters, the CSF failed “to respond to any of the calls made by Moqattam residents under attack in homes.”

  They similarly showed little interest in preventing scores of people from physically assaulting one another, only breaking their cordon to launch an evening attack on protesters, she says.

  Abdallah al-Kariony, a member of the Doctors Syndicate Freedom Committee and the Brotherhood, also believes the Interior Ministry should be held responsible.

  “In its absence, people are coming up with their own substitutes, and the possible consequences of that are disastrous,” Kariony says. “For the ministry to stand by neutrally, as it has been doing throughout these clashes, is ridiculous and unacceptable. Whatever pressures being put on it that keep it from fulfilling its role must be rejected, and we need to have in place new, effective and realistic laws determining how people can protest.”

  But Shahbandar thinks the overall justice system, or lack thereof, is also to blame. “This escalation can be traced to the total absence of justice since the first clashes outside the presidential palace, despite all the reports we have of the serious injuries, torture and detention perpetrated on the scene,” she says. “Had there been a proper investigation by the state or any punitive action, then the people’s anger would have been contained, and events like Moqattam might have not happened.”

  While she “equally condemns the violence committed by both sides,” Shahbandar does not find it surprising. “This is what happens when you force people to take matters into their own hands,” she asserts.

  For journalist and human rights activist Rasha Azzab, the current situation represents a problem that cannot be solved — one that instead must be un-rooted in its entirety. “The problem,” she says, “is the regime.”

  Violence has plagued the country since President Mohamed Morsy took power, Azzab says, and “the only difference now is that the people are no longer willing to be victims. This violence has set us on the road to hell,” she says. “The people are facing a criminal authority with a thirst for blood and no understanding of justice, so individuals, and eventually group violence, become the only logical way to confront it.”

  But for former Brotherhood member Islam Lotfy “Too many people are benefiting from the violence.” Lotfy, who left the Brotherhood in mid-2011 and became a founding member of the Egyptian Current Party, accuses both sides of playing up the attacks against them to “gain sympathy. And that in itself is an act of providing political cover to the violence,” he says.

  This, he argues, has paved the way for other parties to benefit from the tumultuous situation as they see fit — whether using it as an opportunity to settle old scores or reap new rewards. “The result is we now have a very odd combination of people who are protesting or participating in the protests,” he says. “You have the angry individuals, the political opponents, but also the thugs, the street children, random security personnel.”

  The product of this chaotic combination, he says, is “even more chaos. This is why you can’t justify this violence, even by looking at it as a last resort that the protesters were pushed to,” he says. “People that think that way are anarchists and they may be entitled to their opinion, but I’m opposed to the dismantling of the state.”

  No politics

  While alarmed at the “inevitable” fallout that Friday’s confrontation might bring, Abdel Hamid is more concerned over “the Muslim Brotherhood’s singular vision, and its inability to see alternative options. That’s why they’re alone now,” he says. “That’s how they’ve turned themselves into the counter-revolutionary movement they speak so much about.

  “The lack of any political alternative is the reason why the language of violence has become so prevalent,” he adds. “It’s the drive behind this fresh wave of street clashes, this mentality that finds beating Muslim Brotherhood members in Moqattam to be some sort of victory.”

  Lotfy also has little faith in current leaders, regardless of which side they’re on. He says a solution won’t be easy, with Islamists still bitter over their treatment under former President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the National Salvation Front focused on weakening Morsy’s legitimacy. “We need maturity and people who are capable of looking to the future,” he says.

  For Shahbandar, the Moqattam clashes had “nothing to do with politics.” People are “disgruntled. They put a lot into the revolution. They expected higher standards. They expected, at the very least, to have a president who served all Egyptians,” she says. “Instead, they have the Muslim Brotherhood kidnapping those who speak out. The people are frustrated, and on Friday, they vented.”

  But Kariony insists the focus must be on the bigger picture. “It’s difficult to run the country now, and while there might be some failures on the government’s part, the only way forward remains through the ballot box,” he says. “Otherwise, we’ll find ourselves living in a failed state, like Somalia, or a true dictatorship. Even if it brings horrible results, there are mechanisms within that framework of democracy in place to fix those problems.”

  While doubtful of the ruling regime’s capacity or desire for changing its methods, Abdel Hamid believes the bloodshed will cease as soon as the opposition manages to “form a combined front, which is much harder than it sounds. It takes time,” he says.

  And there are those who worry that time is a luxury Egypt can’t afford to waste. “Egyptians are not a violent people, but they’re quickly learning how to be,” Shahbandar says. “It’s a trait we’re acquiring, and unless we find a way to reverse it, it might come to define us. We have gone from protests, to street fights, to street wars.”

  But Lotfy casts hope away from the traditional political class. “I believe that the younger generations are more capable of forgiveness and the ability to change,” he says. “I believe our hopes lie with them.”

[cinemacosmos]

A day at the Moqattam clashes - Mar. 23rd, 2013

Over the past 26 months, Egyptians have protested in public squares, outside state-run institutions and, more than once, at the gates of the presidential palace; each new setting bringing with it an escalation in dissatisfaction, violence, and demands.

Fed up with a government response seen as only comprising of heavy-handed tactics and the occasional provocative statements from a self-described thick-skinned president, protesters have now directed themselves toward the nation’s seat of power — a privately-owned office building in one of Cairo’s secluded districts. 

At the opposite end of the street from the headquarters and also waiting for the protesters, several vendors sell flags and drinks, and a few paramedics loiter between six parked ambulances. Calls for Friday prayer sound followed by sermons, also amplified: “Our enemies have an anger toward Egypt; we must use it against them,” “there are those who doubt sharia can be applied in the 21st century, but sharia is God’s law, created for any place and time.”

All crowds swell shortly after prayers; protesters arrive carrying handwritten signs (“there isn’t a drop of fuel in the country but we’ll still set fire to the Brotherhood”) and chanting, while outside the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters, supporters recite their own variations on the protestor’s most popular slogans, as well as original ones like “our revolution is about decency, not graffiti”, “Islamic, Islamic, we will not be left out of the world”  and, possibly the longest chant in history, a six-point call-and-response list of the president’s mostly metaphorical accomplishments (“he has purified us!”).

“You should have been here early in the morning,” Reda Ahmed, a vendor, says to Egypt Independent in a low voice. “They were bussing brothers in non-stop, bringing them from Minya. That building,” he nods toward the headquarters, “is about to burst with them.”

As he speaks, the chanting Brotherhood members form a large circle, spinning and holding each other’s hands. “Our Quran is our constitution, our Jihad is our path,” they drone.

Meanwhile, Central Security Forces occupy both sides of the five blocks and a public garden separating the opposing fronts, with approximately 500 soldiers scattered across various formations.

“Look at what they’re wearing,” Mohamed Alaa, a 23-year-old protestor says to Egypt Independent, as well as the soldiers standing within earshot. He then turns to them and gestures at the several layers of body armor they each wear. “I don’t remember you guys being dressed up this heavily outside the presidential palace.” They offer no response.

“What can they say,” Alaa turns back to Egypt Independent. “They have no choice, but they need to understand that we won’t let them stand in our way, and that this isn’t about them anymore.”

While a few protesters on the scene may disagree — there are occasional outbursts of chants against the Interior Ministry — it seems most of the crowd agrees with Alaa, as evidenced by how quickly and sternly those chants are stifled by other protesters, as well as the attempts at reasoning with the frontline.

“You’re our sons,” an elderly lady was seen pleading with a few stone-faced soldiers. “You’ve let yourselves be debased by the violence you’ve committed against us, but you’re still our sons.”

Intermittently, small groups of Brotherhood members move past the protesters, on their way to the headquarters down the street. On every occasion, their presence is announced through calls of “sheep!” from the protesters, many of whom chase the Brothers, bleating loudly. The lack of response only seems to provoke protesters further.

Gradually, arguments break out among the protesters over the purpose of their gathering.

“Why are you chanting ‘peaceful?’” an adolescent shouts in frustration. “Have you all forgotten why we’re here?”

“The police are on our side now, we don’t want to lose that!” comes the reply from a man later identified as Akram Saad, a resident of the area whose only concern of the day is “to avoid clashes.” The 32-year-old’s argument fails to convince, and he’s forced to rely on like-minded protesters to form a cordon of their own around those seeking more decisive action. There is pushing that threatens to turn worse until shouts from the group alert them to a car-full of Brotherhood members coming down the street. The protesters run towards it, the car reverses and swerves off, and the crowd chases it down the street.

Over on the Brotherhood side, its supporters have formed their own frontline, consisting, clearly, of the largest members of their group. They watch the goings-on at the protesters side keenly, until one of their own returns to assure them, “calm down, there’s not that many of them and they’re running around.” The frontline disperses as the same man asks, “Who gave the order for us to form a frontline, anyway?” to which another member replies, “I don’t know.”

At 2 pm, there is another outburst of excitement at the protesters’ side, and another rush down the street. A man has been pulled out of a passing bus, deemed to belong to the Brotherhood, and is being beaten on the street by a small group of protesters. There is immediate swarming around him, shouts of “kill him” and “don’t kill him,” pleas for self-restraint and calls to search the man, to hand him over to authorities. Throughout the debate, the beating never ceases and the man’s head is soon split open. He is carried to a building and protesters fight each other off until an ambulance arrives and the man’s protectors rush him into it. The ambulance drives off and the episode ends without a shred of evidence supporting it.

Across the street, three young men — who appear to be Brotherhood members, and later confirm so to Egypt Independent — watch the scene unfold with grim faces.

“This is civilized behavior?” one of them asks. “Killing each other when we’re all Egyptians?”

When faced with the suggestion that this violence is seen by some as a last resort and others as a response to the ruling party’s methods, the young man shakes his head. “This is not true. The government listens to the majority. If you want to know who the majority is, ask yourself who won the elections.”

“These people on the streets,” the 26-year-old Brother, who wishes to remain anonymous, explains, “they’re all acting for personal benefits, not national ones. If you have a complaint about the government, then express it, and give them the chance to fix it. Don’t get in their way and set fire to the country — that helps nobody.”

When this point of view is later relayed to two young boys — 16 and 17 — wearing ski masks and belonging to the now famous Black Bloc opposition group, they scoff and cuss. “My friend Nader got several rounds of birdshot in his face this week; he lost an eye,” the Black Bloc member says. “And he wasn’t at a protest, he was on his way home from school.”

“It’s oppression, and that’s not a way of life,” the second boy adds. “Not after the revolution. We won’t live like sheep, and we won’t be oppressed again. Otherwise, what did people die for? Why a revolution and all this mess, then?”

A few minutes later, two teenagers with regular scarves wrapped around their faces and bottles in their hands come running down the street, and hurl their bottles at the area where the protesters meet the CSF frontline. There is an outburst of chaos and screaming, and immediate scuffles. Two shots ring out and the scene quiets down before chants rise up again, this time addressing the president’s mother.

Protesters are caught off-guard again when, minutes later, a shot rings out from the residential building they and the CSF frontline are positioned under. The protesters respond by hurling rocks at its windows, two more shots follow from the building, leaving a cloud of smoke over a third-floor window. Two CSF officers appear on the roof, one floor above, and wave for protesters to calm down — one of the officers holds a handgun in his waving hand — and then they disappear and a child briefly peers over the same ledge. The protesters roar in fury, some attempting to raid the building, others pelting it with rocks, aiming for a specific window, but smashing a few others. The CSF soldiers on the ground remain motionless.

Two streets away, another battle ensues, one between the two sides actually in opposition. Marches planned throughout the day have begun arriving to Moqattam, the number of protesters quickly growing. They move past Moqattam’s central Nafoura Square and down Road 13, waving large white flags honoring martyrs on the two-year revolution, and beating drums. Ahead of them, hundreds of individuals run back and forth, breaking off chunks of the sidewalk for ammunition, carrying wounded comrades over their shoulders, hurling rocks and bottles at the approximately 300 Muslim Brotherhood members at the end of the street. There is no clear frontline, just an ebb and flow between the two sides. A knot of protesters forms—they have dragged over an opponent from the other side. An ambulance, one of many parked along the sides of the street, swerves in but the protesters refuse to hand over the man and instead, the ambulance is attacked and forced to drive off. The alleged member of the Brotherhood is only visible in glimpses of bloodstained limbs, and then disappears entirely as the protesters carry him away. The screams are deafening, between those justifying the man’s death, and those deeming it cold-blooded murder. At the end of the street, the man is set on the ground and beaten, picked up and beaten and eventually, tossed into an ambulance. As it drives off, there are disappointed remarks — “he’s still alive” — and two men are seen cheering a young boy, clutching a bag of rocks, for the “punishment” he bestowed on the man. The boy, not possibly older than 10, snarls, “I wanted that Muslim Brotherhood son of a bitch.”

Back at the other end of the street, the Muslim Brotherhood supporters have lost ground, retreating to the top of one of the many rocky hills on the outskirts of Moqattam. The rock pelting goes on, small groups of protesters, mostly adolescents, make their way up the hill, and fistfights ensue between them and the older, burlier Brotherhood members, who are easily outnumbered. On several occasions, protesters come running back, a battered and unconscious adult in their grip. They tumble down the rocky hillside, attract more protesters and provoke more arguments over the merits of mercifulness.

There are calls of warning among the protesters — their numbers well over 1,000, stretching upwards toward the heart of Moqattam — and sure enough, another group of Muslim Brotherhood members comes marching down a side street. The air thickens with rocks, fireworks, smoke; car windows are smashed, and one protestor is seen dousing three small trees with gasoline and setting fire to them, presumably to create some sort of smokescreen.

As the Brotherhood front retreats once again, a subgroup of approximately 20 protesters breaks off and rushes to meet them on the other side of the hill. Along the way, they are struck by rocks from the roof of a nearby building, and their attention diverted. They gather around the building, a crowd quickly follows, and they call for the “cowards” to “show themselves.” A teenage boy pops his head over the ledge and ducks back immediately.

“You’re coming down dead, you son of a bitch!” someone from the ground calls up. Rocks fly as infuriated protesters rattle the gates and climb the walls of Building 211 on Road 33. Simultaneously, someone draws the crowd’s attention to four buses parked further down the street. Moments later, they are in flames.

When asked about proof that the buses belonged to the Brotherhood, various replies are offered:

“There were pictures of Morsy inside the buses.”

“People said they belonged to the Brotherhood.”

“There were Brotherhood members in them, we pulled them out” — a claim that was immediately denied by several protesters within earshot.

From the roof of an adjacent mosque, Muslim Brotherhood members pelt protesters with rocks until the mosque is stormed. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood were being held inside as prisoners, and there was blood splattered across the courtyard floor. One hostage was held outside, a middle-aged man with open wounds all over his face, pleading for his life. Two protesters held him in a tight grip, ignoring the comments of the gathering crowd: “He’s the mosque’s superintendent, I know him.”

But it turned out he wasn’t. Given the chance to explain himself, the man swore he was a construction worker from Maadi who had only come to join the protest.

“Say ‘fuck the supreme guide’” one of his captors challenged him, referring to the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood.

“Fuck the field marshal,” the man said, dribbling blood, referring to the previously ruling Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

His captor slapped him. “The supreme guide, not the field marshal!”

“He can’t hear you,” another protestor explained to his peer. “He’s lost his senses. Let’s search him.”

At the mosque’s two main doors, the same debate was being held: forcing the hostages out versus preserving what remained of the sanctity of a house of God. While some protesters threw themselves at the doors, screaming for justice and the friends they had lost, a larger number pushed back.

“We need to be better than them,” a young man urged. “We need to show them we can be better than their Muslim Brotherhood, that we’re Muslims, too.”

“They’re not Muslim! Don’t insult our faith! God would disown the whole filthy lot of them!”

“Islam is mercy! We need to be merciful!”

“They’ve beaten the mercifulness out of us, they’ve turned our hearts to stone! How much longer?”

“We’ve cut the power and water to the mosque. We have them. They’re not going anywhere until we turn them in.”

“But they don’t belong in a mosque! They just blew one up in Syria and killed its imam! They don’t know anything about Islam!”

At the back of the mosque, nine men stand at a window, communicating with two of the captive Brothers. “How many of you are hurt, and how serious are the injuries?”

“We’re all fine, except for two of us and it’s not an exaggeration to say they’re dying,” comes the reply. “We’ve already called an ambulance but we can’t go out there. All we ask is to let it take the injured. You can keep us here, just convince the others to let the ambulance take our injured.”

“I’ll see what I can do.”

The sun has set and as the nine men talk amongst themselves, a call for prayer is heard from one of the protesters on the other side of the mosque. Two of the men leave and a third approaches the window. “Listen,” he says to the hostages. “We’ll turn the water on for you for five minutes so you can wash up and pray if you want. But do me a favor: when you pray, ask God to put some sense into us. Ask him to calm down people on your side and ours, ask him to save our country.”

Calm  follows, but only at the mosque. Back at the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters, CSF troops have begun firing tear gas on protesters, who have responded by setting fire to the tires they’ve brought with them in order to combat the blinding gases. The streetlights have gone dark, the only illumination coming from the flames. The protesters, regrouping through the smoke, begin to chant against the Interior Ministry and its dogs. This time, there are no calls for restraint.

Rationalizing the violence witnessed throughout the day, activist Alaa Abd El Fattah wrote on his Facebook page upon his return from the clashes in the early hours of Saturday that those protesting against the Brotherhood in the street do not see its rule as legitimate authority.

“Those in the street see that the authority is ignoring its Constitution and its laws, even though the Brotherhood is controlling them both. If you think our moves should respect the rule of law, or at least seek the rule of law, then you will have to find a way to pressure the state, the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood to respect the law,” he wrote.