although there is a strong argument against the contention, i think
political philosophy adds a thoughtful substance to the wrath of the
protestors. (getting it out of the way: the “strong argument against”
being that purposefully-unarticulated wrath, or intuitive wrath, is
the heart of the whole thing—articulated wrath quickly “becomes” a
part of the “political-language system,” and is subject to its
control; that is, the wrath as expressed through “political language”
loses its agency, is transformed, diminished, pared down to nothing,
or what have you; and yeah, there is definitely something to that.)
but still. if your intuition leads to rage, then probably(?) there
are rational arguments out there which may clothe your rage in a
useful form—and the trick then is finding a language enclave which is
good and free—or one at least which has a tendency to be good and
free. and thus, american politicians tend not to care about classical
liberalism vs. egalitarian liberalism, or affirmative vs.
transformative redistributions of wealth; and so i see little harm (of
the kind worried about above—because obviously there might be classist
harm) in clothing protestor wrath in egalitarian political
philosophy.
in any event, the following excerpts are pretty on-point. (note also
that this stuff is pretty tame; communitarians like robin
west tend to be even more out there, in the left.)
“For these writers, the historical emphasis on toleration, plurality
and justice underscore their work; they differ on their interpretation
of toleration, public and private roles, and the perceived need for
opportunities to be created or not. Some modern liberals, however, do
try to remove themselves from classical liberalism (for example,
Kymlicka) and therefore become more like ‘social democrats’, that is,
humanitarians of a socialist bent who assert the primacy of minorities
and even individuals to partake freely in the democratic processes and
political dialogues, or whose emphasis on equality demands an active
and interventionist state that classical liberals would reject.
Dworkin, for example, claims justice is the essential motif of
liberalism and that the state’s duty is to ensure a just and fair
opportunity for all to compete and flourish in a civil society. That
may require active state intervention in some areas – areas that
classical liberals would reject as being inadmissible in a free
economy. Dworkin’s position emanates from Aristotle’s ethical argument
that for a person to pursue the good life he requires a certain
standard of living. Poverty is not conducive to pursuing the
contemplative life, hence many modern liberals are attracted to
redistributive or welfare policies. Such fairness in opportunity to
create equal opportunities underpins John Stuart Mill’s liberalism for
example. However, the modern liberal’s emphasis on equality is
criticized by classical liberals who argue that people are neither
born equal nor can be made equal: talents (and motivation) are
distributed unequally across a population, which means that attempts
to reduce men and women to the same status will imply a reduction in
the ability (or freedom) of the more talented to act and to strive for
their own progression. Similarly, the modern liberal’s criticism of
inherited wealth is chastised as being misplaced: although the policy
connects well to the desire to ensure an equal start for all, not all
parents’ gifts to their children are monetary in nature. Indeed, some,
following Andrew Carnegie’s self-help philosophy, may contend that
monetary inheritances can be counter-productive, fostering habits of
dependency.-IEP http://www.iep.utm.edu/polphil/
“These two authors are noted political philosophers. Ronald Dworkin
… Mr Dworkin’s aim in “Sovereign Virtue” is to rescue the
“endangered” value of equality and to accommodate it to personal
responsibility. He chides modern conservatives for short-changing the
first ideal and old egalitarians for neglecting the second. His own
middle position is what he calls an “ethical individualism” embodying
two principles: it is equally important, for each human life, that it
be successful; and every person has a special responsibility for the
success of his own life.
If you take both these ideas seriously, you will be driven, so Mr
Dworkin argues, to demand equality of resources.
Mr Dworkin is not advocating primitive communism, and the idea of a
market is built in from the start. Resources are equal, in his sense,
if their distribution passes an “envy test”, by which he means that no
one would prefer anyone else’s property bundle. Resources are costed
in terms of social opportunity: the value of my bundle depends on how
much it is worth to everyone else. These two ideas—the “envy test” and
social opportunity cost—come together in an imaginary initial auction
of an island’s resources by shipwreck survivors.
Are we yet at equality? Not quite. Brute luck, which deals out talents
and handicaps, will produce inequality down the road. And Mr Dworkin
thinks that collectively we have a duty to correct for this, too. He
imagines a hypothetical insurance market that would work as follows:
identify the premium the average person would pay to insure against
bad luck; by taxation, collect an amount equal to all the premiums,
then distribute the total so that people receive what they would have
got through insurance.
Equal concern leads Mr Dworkin to equality of resources and this ideal
in turn connects with political legitimacy: a government that does not
show equal concern for its citizens is, he says, a tyranny. If equal
concern amounts to assuring equal resources, this implies that
probably no government is or was legitimate. A weaker and perhaps more
persuasive view is that a legitimate government must show a minimum,
but not necessarily equal, concern for its citizens.
The most ambitious chapter of “Sovereign Virtue” seeks to square
liberty with equality by building liberty into the notion of equal
resources. But might not equal resources be imposed by a benevolent
dictator using a brilliantly programmed computer? That would violate
democracy, but Mr Dworkin’s case for equal resources is meant to work
without appealing to political equality.” –the economist,
http://www.economist.com/node/374861
“Let me begin by briefly distinguishing affirmation and
transformation. By affirmative remedies for injustice, I mean remedies
aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements
without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them. By
transformative remedies, in contrast, I mean remedies aimed at
correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the
underlying generative framework. The crux of the contrast is end-state
outcomes versus the processes that produce them. It is not gradual
versus apocalyptic change.
This distinction can be applied, first of all, to remedies for
cultural injustice. Affirmative remedies for such injustices are
currently associated with what I shall call “mainstream
multiculturalism.” This sort of multiculturalism proposes to redress
disrespect by revaluing unjustly devalued group identities, while
leaving intact both the contents of those identities and the group
differentiations that underlie them. Transformative remedies, by
contrast, are currently associated with deconstruction. They would
redress disrespect by transforming the underlying cultural-valuational
structure. By destabilising existing group identities and
differentiations, these remedies would not only raise the self-esteem
of members of currently disrespected groups. they would change
everyone’s sense of self.
Analogous distinctions hold for the remedies for economic injustice.
Affirmative remedies for such injustices have been associated
historically with the liberal welfare state. They seek to redress
end-state maldistribution, while leaving intact much of the underlying
political-economic structure. Thus, they would increase the
consumption share of economically disadvantaged groups, without
otherwise restructuring the system of production. Transformative
remedies, in contrast, have been historically associated with
socialism. They would redress unjust distribution by transforming the
underlying political-economic structure. By restructuring the
relations of production, these remedies would not only alter the
end-state distribution of consumption shares; they would also change
the social division of labour and thus the conditions of existence for
everyone.
Now contrast this logic with transformative remedies for distributive
injustices of class. Transformative remedies typically, combine
universalist social-welfare programs, steeply progressive taxation,
macroeconomic policies aimed at creating full employment, a large
nonmarket public sector, significant public and/or collective
ownership, and democratic decision making about basic socioeconomic
priorities. They try to assure access to employment for all, while
also tending to delink basic consumption shares from employment.
Hence, their tendency is to undermine class differentiation.
Transformative remedies reduce social inequality without, however,
creating stigmatised classes of vulnerable people perceived as
beneficiaries of special largesse. They tend therefore to promote
reciprocity and solidarity in the relations of recognition. Thus, an
approach aimed at redressing injustices of distribution can help
redress (some) injustices of recognition as well.
This approach is self-consistent. Like affirmative redistribution,
transformative redistribution generally presupposes a univeralist
conception of recognition, the equal moral worth of persons. Unlike
affirmative redistribution, however, its practice tends not to
undermine this conception. Thus, the two approaches generate different
logics of group differentiation. Whereas affirmative remedies can have
the perverse effect of promoting class differentiation, transformative
remedies tend to blur it. In addition, the two approaches generate
different subliminal dynamics of recognition. Affirmative
redistribution can stigmatise the disadvantaged, adding the insult of
misrecognition to the injury of deprivation. Transformative
redistribution, in contrast, can promote solidarity, helping to
redress some forms of misrecognition.
What, then, should we conclude from this discussion? In this section,
we have considered only the “pure” ideal-typical cases at the two
extremes of the conceptual spectrum. We have contrasted the divergent
effects of affirmative and transformative remedies for the
economically rooted distributive injustices of class, on the one hand,
and for the culturally rooted recognition injustices of sexuality, on
the other. We saw that affirmative remedies tend generally to promote
group differentiation, while transformative remedies tend to
destabilise or blur it. We also saw that affirmative redistribution
remedies can generate a backlash of misrecognition, while
transformative redistribution remedies can help redress some forms of
misrecognition.” nancy fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition?
Dilemmas of Justice in a “Postsocialist” Age
http://ethicalpolitics.org/blackwood/fraser.htm
