THE STRUCTURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: Hannah Arendt on Revolution, Freedom and the Council System by NEMESIO S. QUE
Revolution, freedom and the council system are three themes from Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy which are especially re-levant to a discussion of civil society. Revolution is political action par excellence; freedom is the ultimate aim of revolution; while the council system institutionalizes and preserves this freedom. It is a tangible, worldly reality, brought about by people acting together and parti-cipating in the public realm, where they interact with their peers in both word and deed.
In On Revolution, Arendt observes that thus far revolutions have determined the physiognomy of the 20th century. Hence, we need to learn as much as possible from them, such as the joy of appearing in word and deed among one’s peers and the fulfillment of freedom that is inherent in action. Like a pearl diver who descends to the bottom of the sea to pry loose the rich and the strange, the pearls and the coral, and carries them to the surface, we should fathom revolutions in order to bring to light the spirit of freedom and public happiness, and the pathos of novelty, that emerge therefrom.
Arendt’s discussion of revolution derives mainly from two events: first, the French Revolution--a tale of a revolution doomed by its attempt to solve the social questions; and second, the American Revolution--a tale of the success of political action which never lived up to its promise.
Freedom AS THE ULTIMATE AIM OF REVOLUTION
In no uncertain terms, Arendt contends that the content of the public happiness by which revolutionaries are inspired and for which they aspire is freedom itself. If the French and American revolution-aries had anything in common prior to the diverging paths their revolu-tions took, it was a passionate concern for public freedom--participa-tion in public affairs. Both the French and the American revolution-aries were not just demanding reforms in their respective govern-ments; they were aiming for no less than freedom itself, which for them could exist only in public:
It was a tangible, worldly reality, something created by men to be enjoyed by men rather than a gift or a ca-pacity. It was the . . . public space or marketplace which antiquity had known as the area where freedom appears and becomes visible to all.
Freedom, for Arendt, is the ultimate aim of all revolutions. It implies the participation of citizens in the public realm where they appear and mingle with their peers in word and deed. It is more than just the capacity to interact with others; it involves the actual inter-course in debate, argumentation, decision-making that transpire among peers in a politically organized world. In other words, freedom is a demonstrable fact which can be experienced only in action. The raison d’être of action, Arendt asserts, is freedom; and the field of the experience of freedom is action.
In the beginning, the French Revolution was full of the promise of freedom; but it was soon overwhelmed by its concern for the social question. Instead of the dawning of a new era, there was only the twi-light of violence and terror. The American Revolution fiddled with suc-cess; it understood freedom and in its Constitution attempted to make freedom a genuine inheritance for generations to come. How-ever, this attempt ended in failure, for instead of constituting what was novel in the revolutionary spirit, namely, public participation which is the es-sence of freedom, and moving forward, it took a step back and con-centrated on civil liberties and representation in government. The American Revolution failed to come up with a form of government that would reflect the energizing spirit of freedom.
The form of government that best accommodates the revolu-tionary spirit, Arendt believed, is the council system. But it is this council system that the American Revolution, and as matter of fact, all modern revolutions fail to take with sufficient seriousness. What is the council system?
Arendt observes that during the course of revolutions, a new form of government that resembles Jefferson’s ward system emerged with amazing regularity.
In all these revolutions, we are confronted with popular organs which clearly intend to survive the revolutions. This phenomenon impressed Marx and later Lenin who witnessed the spontaneous emergence of such popular organs: Marx during the French Revolution and Lenin during the first Russian Revolution in 1905. Unfortunately, they "never thought of them as possible germs for a new form of government." Both Marx and Lenin regarded them merely as "instruments to be dispensed with once the revolution came to an end."
If, as Arendt notes, nobody will be able to tell the tale of our century without stringing it "on the thread of revolutions," then, no doubt, nobody will be able to tell the story of revolutions without stringing it on the thread of the councils that sprang up again and again during revolutions. And if we are to be truly wise, so Arendt seems to suggest, we must take the council system of government seriously for it is the council system that truly preserves the revolutionary spirit, the spirit of innovation that is inherent in revolutions.
For Arendt, the spontaneous emergence and repetition of the council system in revolutions indicate the need for providing a public space within which citizens can participate in political affairs. The council system is the form of government that best appropriates and founds the spirit of public participation. In this sense, councils clearly intend to outlast themselves as temporary organs of revolution.
Philosophy Department
Ateneo de Manila University
Manila, Philippines