Remarks presented to York University’s Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies Graduating Class of 2023.
Luddites didn’t hate looms. They smashed looms because their bosses wanted to fire skilled workers, ship kidnapped Napoleonic War orphans north from London, and lock them inside factories for a decade of indenture, to be starved, beaten, maimed and killed.
Designing industrial machinery that’s “so easy a child can use it,” isn’t necessarily a prelude to child-slavery, but it’s not not a prelude to child-slavery, either.
The Luddites weren’t mad about what the machines did — they were mad at who the machines did it for and whom they did it to. The child-kidnapping millionaires of the Industrial Revolution said, “There is no alternative,” and the Luddites roared, “The hell you say there isn’t!”
Today’s tech millionaires are no different. Mark Zuckerberg used to insist that there was no way to talk to your friends without being comprehensively spied upon, so every intimate and compromising fact of your life could be gathered, processed, and mobilised against you.
He said this was inevitable, as though some bearded prophet staggered down off a mountain, bearing two stone tablets, intoning, “Zuck, thou shalt stop rotating thine logfiles, and lo, thou shalt mine them for actionable market intelligence.”
-There Is Always An Alternative: Remarks presented to York University’s Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies Graduating Class of 2023
yeah the Yellowstone eruption killed hundreds of thousands of people, but on the bright side, the apocalyptic ash cloud cooled the planet by a couple degrees which really helped with the apocalyptic climate-change-induced flooding.
War, El Niño, Pestilence, and Famine: The Coming Shock to Global Food Supplies
Sulphuric Acid, Naphtha and Super El Niño Polycrisis
The global agricultural and industrial complex is heading into a poly shock, with an upstream sulphuric acid and Naphtha supply crisis colliding directly with a forecasted severe El Niño, generating generational system risks for 2026–2027.
Sulphuric acid is a critical upstream chokepoint; approximately 45% of global consumption is dedicated to the wet-process production of phosphoric acid for phosphate fertilisers.
This chemical bottleneck is currently being compressed by the near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for approximately 49% to 50% of sulphur & Naphtha flows, and by China’s unprecedented mandate to halt all smelter-by-product sulphuric acid exports from May 2026 to protect its domestic agriculture.
India has instituted domestic prioritisation for its fertiliser producers amid annual sulphuric acid demand exceeding 20 million tonnes. This upstream acid deficit opens up a stacked risk exposure, heavily penalising merchant-dependent consumers while favouring captive, integrated producers, and forcing a geopolitical allocation that prioritises food-security fertilisers over pure critical-mineral mining (already inducing visible strain in Chilean/DRC copper SX-EW, Indonesian nickel HPAL, and Kazakh uranium ISR).
This input-side supply collapse coincides with strong atmospheric teleconnections: meteorological consensus (NOAA CPC, IRI, ECMWF) confirms ENSO-neutral conditions will persist through June 2026, transitioning to an El Niño event by May–July 2026 with a 75% probability. Climate meteorology of this type is notoriously difficult to predict exactly, though this has the hallmarks of the strongest in a generation, possibly the strongest since 1877-78.
The convergence of higher nutrient application costs and climatic stress guarantees widespread yield destruction, forcing global agribusiness and sovereign risk systems into a cascading polycrisis spanning food security, delays in the green-energy transition, and severe macro-financial spillovers.
Significant declines in crop yields are shaping up to be severe. The secondary impacts, such as food inflation, transport difficulties through Panama.
Plants, Fertiliser and El Niño. How they interact.
Next year's agricultural crisis is a trap in which a global sulphuric acid and naphtha shortage collides with extreme El Niño droughts and floods.
Most people assume a thirsty plant needs less fertiliser, but to survive heat, crops actually need specific "survival nutrients."
They need phosphorus to give them the energy to quickly grow deep roots to chase receding underground water, and potassium to act as microscopic pumps that tightly close their leaf pores so they don't sweat to death.
These nutrients are naturally locked inside hard rocks and can only be made digestible for plants by dissolving them in massive amounts of sulphuric acid, which is cut off by global trade blockades.
Without this acid, farmers are cornered with very few viable workarounds. They can't just dump heavy concentrations of substitute chemical salts into dry dirt, because those salts will actually reverse the flow of water and suck the remaining moisture right out of the plant's roots (a fatal reaction called "fertiliser burn").
They also can't compensate by simply using cheap nitrogen, because excess nitrogen tricks the plant into growing large, thirsty leaves that act like giant wicks, drying the crop out even faster (known as "haying off").
Farming is about formulas and processes; you can't just skip parts without consequences. Most of the time, you can't skip any part without a crop disaster
Ultimately, because the world is missing a single industrial acid, we are stripping our crops of their only internal defence mechanisms at the exact moment the extreme climate demands them.
So the timing of this poly crisis is really poor. There is no worse time to run out of fertiliser than in a heat wave that is lining up to be
epic.
These are the pathways we need to watch:
Pestilence, Herbicide and Pesticide, and how they are even a bigger risk to Food Security
Public discussion tends to linger on natural gas and the Haber-Bosch process, as if fertiliser were the whole story, yet the deeper vulnerability lies in the petroleum-derived agrochemical chain, where light and heavy naphtha feed the benzene, toluene, and xylene streams that make synthetic crop protection possible.
Those chemicals form the foundation of the recipe for pesticides and herbicides, without which modern agriculture can't exist at a scale capable of feeding the human population on Earth.
Roughly 1.2 million barrels per day of naphtha move through Hormuz, equal to about 48 million metric tons a year, and the paper’s central claim is brutally simple: if that flow is cut, the result is disruption of the basis on which crop yields depend.
A supply chain breakdown might begin in the refineries and steam crackers, pass through aromatic solvents and active ingredients, and end in failed harvests, shattered food trade, and sovereign financial breakdown on a planetary scale.
The system is concentrated, geographically and technically, and because East Asia sits at the point where stranded Gulf feedstock becomes a globally indispensable chemical output.
China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan absorb the bulk of these naphtha flows, with more than 60 per cent of Northeast Asia’s seaborne imports coming from the Middle East Gulf, South Korea sourcing as much as 77 per cent of its total requirement from that region, and Japan drawing more than 70 per cent of its imported volume from the same corridor.
The idea that a deficit can be patched over by improvisation collapses under inspection: bypass pipelines were built for crude, not for rerouting specialised refined products at scale; Russian supply is constrained by sanctions, fleet limits, and voyage times; the United States Gulf Coast exports LPG in strength but does not possess the spare naphtha pool needed to replace a 48 million ton annual loss.
Asian crackers and reformers, which usually carry less than a month of feedstock inventory, therefore move from exposure to force majeure within weeks.
The consequence is a blow to the two processes that sustain the aromatics pool: catalytic reforming of heavy naphtha, which produces reformate rich in toluene and xylene, and steam cracking of light naphtha, which yields pyrolysis gasoline rich in benzene.
Once both channels are starved, the world loses roughly 15 to 19 million metric tons of BTX, an immediate 10 to 15 per cent contraction in global aromatics, with that loss propagating through every dependent downstream chain.
The crisis is not confined to abstract feedstock scarcity but runs straight through the practical question of whether herbicides and pesticides can be literally made and deployed.
Benzene is the underlying molecular scaffold from which chlorobenzene, aniline, and nitrobenzene are derived, and those intermediates in turn sit inside the synthesis pathways for major herbicides, fungicides, and insecticides, including compounds such as 2,4-D, atrazine, anilazine, dichloran, and broader triazole and strobilurin classes. Yet synthesis is only half the problem.
In many ways, this is a more critical bottleneck than fertiliser because pure active ingredients are often lipophilic, unstable, and unusable in field conditions unless they are dissolved in high-boiling aromatic solvents such as Aromatic 100, 150, and 200, each drawn from the C10 to C12 heavy aromatic fractions of catalytic reformate.
These are the solvents that keep emulsifiable concentrates in solution, let the spray remain on the leaf or insect long enough to penetrate, and prevent the active ingredient from precipitating into inert sludge inside the farmer’s tank.
Without them, pesticides cease to function as usable agricultural tools. The usual fantasy of substitution through coal-to-chemicals or methanol-to-aromatics also fails, because those routes are too inefficient, too catalyst-limited, too capital-intensive, and too slow to replace a missing aromatic pool of this size within a single crop cycle.
Once that chemical protection wears off, the biological logic follows.
Modern crops have been bred under conditions of intensive chemical defence, meaning they carry the yield ambitions of industrial agriculture without the hardiness required in an unprotected ecological contest. Or simply, they can't grow without them.
Remove herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides, and the field won't become less efficient; it reverts to open warfare among crops, weeds, insects, nematodes, fungi, bacteria, and viruses, with the crop suddenly exposed and structurally ill-prepared.
This reveals some yield-loss baselines, 34 per cent potential destruction to weeds, 18 per cent to animal pests, and 16 per cent to pathogens, and then translates those pressures into crop-by-crop collapse.
Maize, with a global baseline of about 1.23 billion metric tons, loses 45 per cent of its value, erasing 553.5 million tons. Wheat, from 799.33 million tons, loses about half, destroying 399.6 million. Rice loses roughly 135 million tons, soybeans another 158 million tons, and the combined biomass destroyed totals about 1.246 billion metric tons.
The calory math is harsh: 1,970 trillion kilocalories vanish with maize, 1,334 trillion with wheat, and 486 trillion with rice, for a total of around 3,790 trillion kilocalories, equal to the annual energy requirements of roughly 3.79 billion people. Nor does the damage stop at direct human consumption, because maize and soy are also the feed base of the livestock economy, so the loss of grain becomes the forced liquidation of poultry and swine herds, and with that, the destruction of one of the last buffers of stored protein and dairy calories.
Some of the missing naphtha could be displaced by ethane, propane, butane/LPG, alternative liquid feeds, non-Hormuz naphtha streams, and upgraded pyrolysis oil or bio-naphtha, while some pesticide products could be shifted into SC, WG, EW, OD, or SL formulations using alternative co-solvent systems. It's probably of no consequence that
China's import of ethane
from the US has skyrocketed.
But none of those routes reproduces, on short notice and at a global scale, the same volume and product slate of naphtha-derived BTX aromatics and heavy formulation solvents.
Commodity markets will price in future scarcity immediately, governments will act on anticipated shortfalls rather than observe famines, and the world food economy will naturally shift overnight from trade to hoarding.
China would harden seasonal fertiliser controls into outright export bans, Russia and Belarus will restrict their own flows, and any state with captive stocks of grain, potash, phosphates, or agrochemicals would begin treating them as strategic assets rather than tradable goods.
Brazil is presented as the worst case because it combines immense agricultural output with a dependence on imported fertilisers and pesticides; once those inputs are withheld by countries prioritising domestic survival, Brazil’s fungicide- and herbicide-dependent production model begins to fail, and a major export basin is pulled out of the world market at the worst possible moment.
For chronic food importers such as Egypt, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the shock becomes a balance-of-payments crisis in the strictest sense, since they would face soaring grain and energy prices, collapsing purchasing power, depleted reserves, and the mathematical impossibility of buying enough food in a market defined by physical scarcity rather than ordinary volatility.
A Hormuz naphtha blockade is a famine mechanism camouflaged as a shipping disruption, because once the hydrocarbon-calorie nexus is broken at the feedstock level, the failure travels from crops to markets, and from markets to states, where they eventually land on people and their calorie requirements.
BTX-derived herbicides, insecticides, fungicides and heavy aromatic solvents keep modern monoculture operational. Modern agriculture cant exist without them.
El Niño’s impacts are geographically uneven, though uniformly catastrophic, yet they are large enough to matter through trade and stock dynamics:
WMO notes that El Niño typically brings severe drought to Australia, Indonesia and parts of southern Asia while increasing rainfall in parts of southern South America, and crop-yield studies find that the El Niño-Southern Oscillation materially influences yields across large parts of South Asia, Latin America and Southern Africa, with global mean maize, rice and wheat yields tending to shift downward or sideways during El Niño years even when soybean responses are mixed.
In practical terms, that means heat stress, water stress and disordered planting calendars raise the marginal value of every fungicide, insecticide and herbicide application precisely when the blockade has made them scarce or unusable; FAO and WFP further note that El Niño-linked drought and high temperatures can trigger outbreaks of transboundary pests and diseases, and in the recent Southern African drought farmers in the hardest-hit countries lost, on average, at least half their crops.
The interaction is therefore multiplicative: El Niño won't create a separate crisis running alongside the petrochemical shortage, it synchronises weather stress, biological pressure and agrochemical scarcity across already exposed food systems, accelerating inventory exhaustion, hardening price spikes, and pulling forward the turn to hoarding, export controls and emergency rationing.
Remember I'm not trying to predict what will unfold here because it's too complex to call and a doomer for my taste, all I provide are the facts so folk can assess it for themselves.
Regional Vulnerability Matrix
The collision of acid-driven fertiliser rationing and El Niño climatic stress generates asymmetric risk across the global agricultural landscape.
An assessment mapping these top eight regions on a dual-axis framework, evaluating fertiliser import dependency alongside extreme El Niño exposure, reveals critical clusters of sovereign risk and supply chain vulnerability.
Regions heavily dependent on sea-borne spot markets that also fall within the historical strike zones of Pacific temperature anomalies face a high likelihood of systemic agricultural failure.
The following matrix evaluates the top eight most exposed agricultural basins based on their structural dependency on imported crop nutrients and their meteorological susceptibility to El Niño-induced extremes. Here is a ready reckoner by region :
Sulphuric Acid, Naphtha and Super El Niño Polycrisis
The global agricultural and industrial complex is heading into a poly shock, with an upstream sulphuric acid and Naphtha supply crisis colliding directly with a forecasted severe El Niño, generating generational system risks for 2026–2027.
Sulphuric acid is a critical upstream chokepoint; approximately 45% of global consumption is dedicated to the wet-process production of phosphoric acid for phosphate fertilisers.
This chemical bottleneck is currently being compressed by the near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for approximately 49% to 50% of sulphur & Naphtha flows, and by China’s unprecedented mandate to halt all smelter-by-product sulphuric acid exports from May 2026 to protect its domestic agriculture.
India has instituted domestic prioritisation for its fertiliser producers amid annual sulphuric acid demand exceeding 20 million tonnes. This upstream acid deficit opens up a stacked risk exposure, heavily penalising merchant-dependent consumers while favouring captive, integrated producers, and forcing a geopolitical allocation that prioritises food-security fertilisers over pure critical-mineral mining (already inducing visible strain in Chilean/DRC copper SX-EW, Indonesian nickel HPAL, and Kazakh uranium ISR).
This input-side supply collapse coincides with strong atmospheric teleconnections: meteorological consensus (NOAA CPC, IRI, ECMWF) confirms ENSO-neutral conditions will persist through June 2026, transitioning to an El Niño event by May–July 2026 with a 75% probability. Climate meteorology of this type is notoriously difficult to predict exactly, though this has the hallmarks of the strongest in a generation, possibly the strongest since
1877-78
.
The convergence of higher nutrient application costs and climatic stress guarantees widespread yield destruction, forcing global agribusiness and sovereign risk systems into a cascading polycrisis spanning food security, delays in the green-energy transition, and severe macro-financial spillovers.
Significant declines in crop yields are shaping up to be severe. The secondary impacts, such as food inflation, transport difficulties through
Panama
Plants, Fertiliser and El Niño. How they interact.
Next year's agricultural crisis is a trap in which a global sulphuric acid and naphtha shortage collides with extreme El Niño droughts and floods.
Most people assume a thirsty plant needs less fertiliser, but to survive heat, crops actually need specific "survival nutrients."
They need phosphorus to give them the energy to quickly grow deep roots to chase receding underground water, and potassium to act as microscopic pumps that tightly close their leaf pores so they don't sweat to death.
These nutrients are naturally locked inside hard rocks and can only be made digestible for plants by dissolving them in massive amounts of sulphuric acid, which is cut off by global trade blockades.
Without this acid, farmers are cornered with very few viable workarounds. They can't just dump heavy concentrations of substitute chemical salts into dry dirt, because those salts will actually reverse the flow of water and suck the remaining moisture right out of the plant's roots (a fatal reaction called "fertiliser burn").
They also can't compensate by simply using cheap nitrogen, because excess nitrogen tricks the plant into growing large, thirsty leaves that act like giant wicks, drying the crop out even faster (known as "haying off").
Farming is about formulas and processes; you can't just skip parts without consequences. Most of the time, you can't skip any part without a crop disaster
Ultimately, because the world is missing a single industrial acid, we are stripping our crops of their only internal defence mechanisms at the exact moment the extreme climate demands them.
So the timing of this poly crisis is really poor. There is no worse time to run out of fertiliser than in a heat wave that is lining up to be
epic.
These are the pathways we need to watch:
📷Provide a caption (optional)
Pestilence, Herbicide and Pesticide, and how they are even a bigger risk to Food Security
Public discussion tends to linger on natural gas and the Haber-Bosch process, as if fertiliser were the whole story, yet the deeper vulnerability lies in the petroleum-derived agrochemical chain, where light and heavy naphtha feed the benzene, toluene, and xylene streams that make synthetic crop protection possible.
Those chemicals form the foundation of the recipe for pesticides and herbicides, without which modern agriculture can't exist at a scale capable of feeding the human population on Earth.
Roughly 1.2 million barrels per day of naphtha move through Hormuz, equal to about 48 million metric tons a year, and the paper’s central claim is brutally simple: if that flow is cut, the result is disruption of the basis on which crop yields depend.
A supply chain breakdown might begin in the refineries and steam crackers, pass through aromatic solvents and active ingredients, and end in failed harvests, shattered food trade, and sovereign financial breakdown on a planetary scale.
The system is concentrated, geographically and technically, and because East Asia sits at the point where stranded Gulf feedstock becomes a globally indispensable chemical output.
China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan absorb the bulk of these naphtha flows, with more than 60 per cent of Northeast Asia’s seaborne imports coming from the Middle East Gulf, South Korea sourcing as much as 77 per cent of its total requirement from that region, and Japan drawing more than 70 per cent of its imported volume from the same corridor.
The idea that a deficit can be patched over by improvisation collapses under inspection: bypass pipelines were built for crude, not for rerouting specialised refined products at scale; Russian supply is constrained by sanctions, fleet limits, and voyage times; the United States Gulf Coast exports LPG in strength but does not possess the spare naphtha pool needed to replace a 48 million ton annual loss.
Asian crackers and reformers, which usually carry less than a month of feedstock inventory, therefore move from exposure to force majeure within weeks.
The consequence is a blow to the two processes that sustain the aromatics pool: catalytic reforming of heavy naphtha, which produces reformate rich in toluene and xylene, and steam cracking of light naphtha, which yields pyrolysis gasoline rich in benzene.
Once both channels are starved, the world loses roughly 15 to 19 million metric tons of BTX, an immediate 10 to 15 per cent contraction in global aromatics, with that loss propagating through every dependent downstream chain.
The crisis is not confined to abstract feedstock scarcity but runs straight through the practical question of whether herbicides and pesticides can be literally made and deployed.
Benzene is the underlying molecular scaffold from which chlorobenzene, aniline, and nitrobenzene are derived, and those intermediates in turn sit inside the synthesis pathways for major herbicides, fungicides, and insecticides, including compounds such as 2,4-D, atrazine, anilazine, dichloran, and broader triazole and strobilurin classes. Yet synthesis is only half the problem.
In many ways, this is a more critical bottleneck than fertiliser because pure active ingredients are often lipophilic, unstable, and unusable in field conditions unless they are dissolved in high-boiling aromatic solvents such as Aromatic 100, 150, and 200, each drawn from the C10 to C12 heavy aromatic fractions of catalytic reformate.
These are the solvents that keep emulsifiable concentrates in solution, let the spray remain on the leaf or insect long enough to penetrate, and prevent the active ingredient from precipitating into inert sludge inside the farmer’s tank.
Without them, pesticides cease to function as usable agricultural tools. The usual fantasy of substitution through coal-to-chemicals or methanol-to-aromatics also fails, because those routes are too inefficient, too catalyst-limited, too capital-intensive, and too slow to replace a missing aromatic pool of this size within a single crop cycle.
Once that chemical protection wears off, the biological logic follows.
Modern crops have been bred under conditions of intensive chemical defence, meaning they carry the yield ambitions of industrial agriculture without the hardiness required in an unprotected ecological contest. Or simply, they can't grow without them.
Remove herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides, and the field won't become less efficient; it reverts to open warfare among crops, weeds, insects, nematodes, fungi, bacteria, and viruses, with the crop suddenly exposed and structurally ill-prepared.
This reveals some yield-loss baselines, 34 per cent potential destruction to weeds, 18 per cent to animal pests, and 16 per cent to pathogens, and then translates those pressures into crop-by-crop collapse.
Maize, with a global baseline of about 1.23 billion metric tons, loses 45 per cent of its value, erasing 553.5 million tons. Wheat, from 799.33 million tons, loses about half, destroying 399.6 million. Rice loses roughly 135 million tons, soybeans another 158 million tons, and the combined biomass destroyed totals about 1.246 billion metric tons.
The calory math is harsh: 1,970 trillion kilocalories vanish with maize, 1,334 trillion with wheat, and 486 trillion with rice, for a total of around 3,790 trillion kilocalories, equal to the annual energy requirements of roughly 3.79 billion people. Nor does the damage stop at direct human consumption, because maize and soy are also the feed base of the livestock economy, so the loss of grain becomes the forced liquidation of poultry and swine herds, and with that, the destruction of one of the last buffers of stored protein and dairy calories.
Some of the missing naphtha could be displaced by ethane, propane, butane/LPG, alternative liquid feeds, non-Hormuz naphtha streams, and upgraded pyrolysis oil or bio-naphtha, while some pesticide products could be shifted into SC, WG, EW, OD, or SL formulations using alternative co-solvent systems. It's probably of no consequence that
China's import of ethane
from the US has skyrocketed.
But none of those routes reproduces, on short notice and at a global scale, the same volume and product slate of naphtha-derived BTX aromatics and heavy formulation solvents.
Commodity markets will price in future scarcity immediately, governments will act on anticipated shortfalls rather than observe famines, and the world food economy will naturally shift overnight from trade to hoarding.
China would harden seasonal fertiliser controls into outright export bans, Russia and Belarus will restrict their own flows, and any state with captive stocks of grain, potash, phosphates, or agrochemicals would begin treating them as strategic assets rather than tradable goods.
Brazil is presented as the worst case because it combines immense agricultural output with a dependence on imported fertilisers and pesticides; once those inputs are withheld by countries prioritising domestic survival, Brazil’s fungicide- and herbicide-dependent production model begins to fail, and a major export basin is pulled out of the world market at the worst possible moment.
For chronic food importers such as Egypt, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the shock becomes a balance-of-payments crisis in the strictest sense, since they would face soaring grain and energy prices, collapsing purchasing power, depleted reserves, and the mathematical impossibility of buying enough food in a market defined by physical scarcity rather than ordinary volatility.
A Hormuz naphtha blockade is a famine mechanism camouflaged as a shipping disruption, because once the hydrocarbon-calorie nexus is broken at the feedstock level, the failure travels from crops to markets, and from markets to states, where they eventually land on people and their calorie requirements.
BTX-derived herbicides, insecticides, fungicides and heavy aromatic solvents keep modern monoculture operational. Modern agriculture cant exist without them.
El Niño’s impacts are geographically uneven, though uniformly catastrophic, yet they are large enough to matter through trade and stock dynamics:
WMO notes that El Niño typically brings severe drought to Australia, Indonesia and parts of southern Asia while increasing rainfall in parts of southern South America, and crop-yield studies find that the El Niño-Southern Oscillation materially influences yields across large parts of South Asia, Latin America and Southern Africa, with global mean maize, rice and wheat yields tending to shift downward or sideways during El Niño years even when soybean responses are mixed.
In practical terms, that means heat stress, water stress and disordered planting calendars raise the marginal value of every fungicide, insecticide and herbicide application precisely when the blockade has made them scarce or unusable; FAO and WFP further note that El Niño-linked drought and high temperatures can trigger outbreaks of transboundary pests and diseases, and in the recent Southern African drought farmers in the hardest-hit countries lost, on average, at least half their crops.
The interaction is therefore multiplicative: El Niño won't create a separate crisis running alongside the petrochemical shortage, it synchronises weather stress, biological pressure and agrochemical scarcity across already exposed food systems, accelerating inventory exhaustion, hardening price spikes, and pulling forward the turn to hoarding, export controls and emergency rationing.
Remember I'm not trying to predict what will unfold here because it's too complex to call and a doomer for my taste, all I provide are the facts so folk can assess it for themselves.
Regional Vulnerability Matrix
The collision of acid-driven fertiliser rationing and El Niño climatic stress generates asymmetric risk across the global agricultural landscape.
An assessment mapping these top eight regions on a dual-axis framework, evaluating fertiliser import dependency alongside extreme El Niño exposure, reveals critical clusters of sovereign risk and supply chain vulnerability.
Regions heavily dependent on sea-borne spot markets that also fall within the historical strike zones of Pacific temperature anomalies face a high likelihood of systemic agricultural failure.
The following matrix evaluates the top eight most exposed agricultural basins based on their structural dependency on imported crop nutrients and their meteorological susceptibility to El Niño-induced extremes. Here is a ready reckoner by region :
Primary Compounding Mechanisms
The severity of this polycrisis stems from the simultaneous nature of the supply and climate shocks, as well as the mechanistic way they amplify each other at both the field and supply-chain levels.
The interplay of chemical scarcity, biological requirements, and global logistics creates a landscape in which disruptions rapidly escalate into system failures.
Reduced Application Rates vs. Heightened Per-Hectare Nutrient Demand
Under normal climatic conditions, commercial crops possess a baseline nutrient requirement to achieve optimal yields.
However, under extreme weather stress, such as the severe drought and heat anticipated across the Western Pacific, or the waterlogging expected in South America, plants actually require highly optimised, if not elevated, macro- and micro-nutrient profiles to build root resilience, maintain cellular turgor, and survive. Paradoxically, the unprecedented surge in fertiliser prices forces producers into aggressive rationing.
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) notes that granular urea prices in the Middle East spiked 19% in a single week in early March 2026, while Egyptian urea surged 28%. Furthermore, US domestic sulphur prices surged 165% year-over-year to over $650 per metric ton.
Faced with these ruinous economics, farmers are forced to drastically reduce application rates per hectare. This creates a fatal agronomic divergence: crops are receiving the lowest nutrient inputs precisely when climatic stress demands the highest biological resilience. Because fertiliser yield response is highly non-linear, even modest reductions in application under drought conditions will trigger disproportionately severe crop failures.
Timing Mismatches with Planting Windows
Modern agricultural supply chains are rigidly dictated by inflexible biological clocks. In regions like Australia, Indonesia, and the American Midwest, planting windows for winter grains and dry-season crops are narrow.
The geopolitical necessity of rerouting maritime trade around the Cape of Good Hope, bypassing the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, adds approximately 18 to 22 days to global shipping schedules.
Even if a physical product is secured at a premium, this delayed delivery frequently results in the fertiliser arriving and being applied outside the optimal window. Nutrients applied too late in the crop development cycle fail to translate into biomass or grain yield, effectively rendering the highly expensive inputs functionally useless and locking in yield destruction for the season.
Price and Logistics Spirals
The systemic nature of the disruption has ignited a self-reinforcing logistics and cost spiral that goes far beyond the base commodity price. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint that handles 20 million barrels of oil per day, 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG), and 50% of global seaborne sulphur, has simultaneously spiked bunker fuel costs and created a frantic scramble for alternative bulk shipping capacity.
Furthermore, war-risk insurance premiums for vessels transiting adjacent high-risk zones have surged from 0.25% to as high as 10% of the total hull value, with coverage resetting every seven days. Though let's face it that'll start mattering again when the ships start moving again.
Ag producers face a triple-inflationary bind: the underlying commodity price of the fertiliser has doubled, the maritime freight costs have multiplied due to longer routes and insurance hikes, and the domestic diesel fuel required for on-farm machinery application has spiked.
It was already a marginal business for many.
Political Allocation Dynamics (Fertiliser vs. Pure Mining)
As sulphuric acid rapidly transitions from an abundant, cheap industrial chemical to a critically scarce strategic resource, sovereign governments are intervening directly in market allocation.
China’s decision to implement a comprehensive halt on smelter by-product sulphuric acid exports from May 2026 is an explicit political choice. Chinese smelter economics have deteriorated to a negative US$77 per tonne for Treatment and Refining Charges (TC/RC). Historically, acid exports subsidised these operations.
Beijing has chosen to prioritise domestic fertiliser manufacturing and agricultural autonomy over the export revenues of its smelting sector, effectively removing 4.65 million tonnes (roughly 15% of global seaborne supply) from the market.
In resource-rich developing nations like Indonesia and those in Central Africa, intense domestic political pressure is mounting to divert any available acid away from lucrative critical-mineral extraction (such as copper and nickel) and toward domestic agriculture to stave off food inflation and civil unrest.
This political allocation weaponises the reagent supply chain, transferring the shortage directly onto the balance sheets of multinational mining companies. That's another subject that I'll write about later in the week, but many major producers in the gold, REE, and copper sectors use acid in their production process.
Third-Order & Polycrisis Amplifiers
The interaction of these primary mechanisms causes a cascade of third-order amplifiers that propagate across borders, industries, and asset classes, embedding the polycrisis deep into the global economic structure.
I'm not forecasting this; we are literally tied to the tracks, and we can already hear the train.
Sulphuric Acid, Naphtha and Super El Niño Polycrisis
The global agricultural and industrial complex is heading into a poly shock, with an upstream sulphuric acid and Naphtha supply crisis colliding directly with a forecasted severe El Niño, generating generational system risks for 2026–2027.
Sulphuric acid is a critical upstream chokepoint; approximately 45% of global consumption is dedicated to the wet-process production of phosphoric acid for phosphate fertilisers.
This chemical bottleneck is currently being compressed by the near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for approximately 49% to 50% of sulphur & Naphtha flows, and by China’s unprecedented mandate to halt all smelter-by-product sulphuric acid exports from May 2026 to protect its domestic agriculture.
India has instituted domestic prioritisation for its fertiliser producers amid annual sulphuric acid demand exceeding 20 million tonnes. This upstream acid deficit opens up a stacked risk exposure, heavily penalising merchant-dependent consumers while favouring captive, integrated producers, and forcing a geopolitical allocation that prioritises food-security fertilisers over pure critical-mineral mining (already inducing visible strain in Chilean/DRC copper SX-EW, Indonesian nickel HPAL, and Kazakh uranium ISR).
This input-side supply collapse coincides with strong atmospheric teleconnections: meteorological consensus (NOAA CPC, IRI, ECMWF) confirms ENSO-neutral conditions will persist through June 2026, transitioning to an El Niño event by May–July 2026 with a 75% probability. Climate meteorology of this type is notoriously difficult to predict exactly, though this has the hallmarks of the strongest in a generation, possibly the strongest since
1877-78
.
The convergence of higher nutrient application costs and climatic stress guarantees widespread yield destruction, forcing global agribusiness and sovereign risk systems into a cascading polycrisis spanning food security, delays in the green-energy transition, and severe macro-financial spillovers.
Significant declines in crop yields are shaping up to be severe. The secondary impacts, such as food inflation, transport difficulties through
Panama
Plants, Fertiliser and El Niño. How they interact.
Next year's agricultural crisis is a trap in which a global sulphuric acid and naphtha shortage collides with extreme El Niño droughts and floods.
Most people assume a thirsty plant needs less fertiliser, but to survive heat, crops actually need specific "survival nutrients."
They need phosphorus to give them the energy to quickly grow deep roots to chase receding underground water, and potassium to act as microscopic pumps that tightly close their leaf pores so they don't sweat to death.
These nutrients are naturally locked inside hard rocks and can only be made digestible for plants by dissolving them in massive amounts of sulphuric acid, which is cut off by global trade blockades.
Without this acid, farmers are cornered with very few viable workarounds. They can't just dump heavy concentrations of substitute chemical salts into dry dirt, because those salts will actually reverse the flow of water and suck the remaining moisture right out of the plant's roots (a fatal reaction called "fertiliser burn").
They also can't compensate by simply using cheap nitrogen, because excess nitrogen tricks the plant into growing large, thirsty leaves that act like giant wicks, drying the crop out even faster (known as "haying off").
Farming is about formulas and processes; you can't just skip parts without consequences. Most of the time, you can't skip any part without a crop disaster
Ultimately, because the world is missing a single industrial acid, we are stripping our crops of their only internal defence mechanisms at the exact moment the extreme climate demands them.
So the timing of this poly crisis is really poor. There is no worse time to run out of fertiliser than in a heat wave that is lining up to be
epic.
These are the pathways we need to watch:
📷Provide a caption (optional)
Pestilence, Herbicide and Pesticide, and how they are even a bigger risk to Food Security
Public discussion tends to linger on natural gas and the Haber-Bosch process, as if fertiliser were the whole story, yet the deeper vulnerability lies in the petroleum-derived agrochemical chain, where light and heavy naphtha feed the benzene, toluene, and xylene streams that make synthetic crop protection possible.
Those chemicals form the foundation of the recipe for pesticides and herbicides, without which modern agriculture can't exist at a scale capable of feeding the human population on Earth.
Roughly 1.2 million barrels per day of naphtha move through Hormuz, equal to about 48 million metric tons a year, and the paper’s central claim is brutally simple: if that flow is cut, the result is disruption of the basis on which crop yields depend.
A supply chain breakdown might begin in the refineries and steam crackers, pass through aromatic solvents and active ingredients, and end in failed harvests, shattered food trade, and sovereign financial breakdown on a planetary scale.
The system is concentrated, geographically and technically, and because East Asia sits at the point where stranded Gulf feedstock becomes a globally indispensable chemical output.
China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan absorb the bulk of these naphtha flows, with more than 60 per cent of Northeast Asia’s seaborne imports coming from the Middle East Gulf, South Korea sourcing as much as 77 per cent of its total requirement from that region, and Japan drawing more than 70 per cent of its imported volume from the same corridor.
The idea that a deficit can be patched over by improvisation collapses under inspection: bypass pipelines were built for crude, not for rerouting specialised refined products at scale; Russian supply is constrained by sanctions, fleet limits, and voyage times; the United States Gulf Coast exports LPG in strength but does not possess the spare naphtha pool needed to replace a 48 million ton annual loss.
Asian crackers and reformers, which usually carry less than a month of feedstock inventory, therefore move from exposure to force majeure within weeks.
The consequence is a blow to the two processes that sustain the aromatics pool: catalytic reforming of heavy naphtha, which produces reformate rich in toluene and xylene, and steam cracking of light naphtha, which yields pyrolysis gasoline rich in benzene.
Once both channels are starved, the world loses roughly 15 to 19 million metric tons of BTX, an immediate 10 to 15 per cent contraction in global aromatics, with that loss propagating through every dependent downstream chain.
The crisis is not confined to abstract feedstock scarcity but runs straight through the practical question of whether herbicides and pesticides can be literally made and deployed.
Benzene is the underlying molecular scaffold from which chlorobenzene, aniline, and nitrobenzene are derived, and those intermediates in turn sit inside the synthesis pathways for major herbicides, fungicides, and insecticides, including compounds such as 2,4-D, atrazine, anilazine, dichloran, and broader triazole and strobilurin classes. Yet synthesis is only half the problem.
In many ways, this is a more critical bottleneck than fertiliser because pure active ingredients are often lipophilic, unstable, and unusable in field conditions unless they are dissolved in high-boiling aromatic solvents such as Aromatic 100, 150, and 200, each drawn from the C10 to C12 heavy aromatic fractions of catalytic reformate.
These are the solvents that keep emulsifiable concentrates in solution, let the spray remain on the leaf or insect long enough to penetrate, and prevent the active ingredient from precipitating into inert sludge inside the farmer’s tank.
Without them, pesticides cease to function as usable agricultural tools. The usual fantasy of substitution through coal-to-chemicals or methanol-to-aromatics also fails, because those routes are too inefficient, too catalyst-limited, too capital-intensive, and too slow to replace a missing aromatic pool of this size within a single crop cycle.
Once that chemical protection wears off, the biological logic follows.
Modern crops have been bred under conditions of intensive chemical defence, meaning they carry the yield ambitions of industrial agriculture without the hardiness required in an unprotected ecological contest. Or simply, they can't grow without them.
Remove herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides, and the field won't become less efficient; it reverts to open warfare among crops, weeds, insects, nematodes, fungi, bacteria, and viruses, with the crop suddenly exposed and structurally ill-prepared.
This reveals some yield-loss baselines, 34 per cent potential destruction to weeds, 18 per cent to animal pests, and 16 per cent to pathogens, and then translates those pressures into crop-by-crop collapse.
Maize, with a global baseline of about 1.23 billion metric tons, loses 45 per cent of its value, erasing 553.5 million tons. Wheat, from 799.33 million tons, loses about half, destroying 399.6 million. Rice loses roughly 135 million tons, soybeans another 158 million tons, and the combined biomass destroyed totals about 1.246 billion metric tons.
The calory math is harsh: 1,970 trillion kilocalories vanish with maize, 1,334 trillion with wheat, and 486 trillion with rice, for a total of around 3,790 trillion kilocalories, equal to the annual energy requirements of roughly 3.79 billion people. Nor does the damage stop at direct human consumption, because maize and soy are also the feed base of the livestock economy, so the loss of grain becomes the forced liquidation of poultry and swine herds, and with that, the destruction of one of the last buffers of stored protein and dairy calories.
Some of the missing naphtha could be displaced by ethane, propane, butane/LPG, alternative liquid feeds, non-Hormuz naphtha streams, and upgraded pyrolysis oil or bio-naphtha, while some pesticide products could be shifted into SC, WG, EW, OD, or SL formulations using alternative co-solvent systems. It's probably of no consequence that
China's import of ethane
from the US has skyrocketed.
But none of those routes reproduces, on short notice and at a global scale, the same volume and product slate of naphtha-derived BTX aromatics and heavy formulation solvents.
Commodity markets will price in future scarcity immediately, governments will act on anticipated shortfalls rather than observe famines, and the world food economy will naturally shift overnight from trade to hoarding.
China would harden seasonal fertiliser controls into outright export bans, Russia and Belarus will restrict their own flows, and any state with captive stocks of grain, potash, phosphates, or agrochemicals would begin treating them as strategic assets rather than tradable goods.
Brazil is presented as the worst case because it combines immense agricultural output with a dependence on imported fertilisers and pesticides; once those inputs are withheld by countries prioritising domestic survival, Brazil’s fungicide- and herbicide-dependent production model begins to fail, and a major export basin is pulled out of the world market at the worst possible moment.
For chronic food importers such as Egypt, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the shock becomes a balance-of-payments crisis in the strictest sense, since they would face soaring grain and energy prices, collapsing purchasing power, depleted reserves, and the mathematical impossibility of buying enough food in a market defined by physical scarcity rather than ordinary volatility.
A Hormuz naphtha blockade is a famine mechanism camouflaged as a shipping disruption, because once the hydrocarbon-calorie nexus is broken at the feedstock level, the failure travels from crops to markets, and from markets to states, where they eventually land on people and their calorie requirements.
BTX-derived herbicides, insecticides, fungicides and heavy aromatic solvents keep modern monoculture operational. Modern agriculture cant exist without them.
El Niño’s impacts are geographically uneven, though uniformly catastrophic, yet they are large enough to matter through trade and stock dynamics:
WMO notes that El Niño typically brings severe drought to Australia, Indonesia and parts of southern Asia while increasing rainfall in parts of southern South America, and crop-yield studies find that the El Niño-Southern Oscillation materially influences yields across large parts of South Asia, Latin America and Southern Africa, with global mean maize, rice and wheat yields tending to shift downward or sideways during El Niño years even when soybean responses are mixed.
In practical terms, that means heat stress, water stress and disordered planting calendars raise the marginal value of every fungicide, insecticide and herbicide application precisely when the blockade has made them scarce or unusable; FAO and WFP further note that El Niño-linked drought and high temperatures can trigger outbreaks of transboundary pests and diseases, and in the recent Southern African drought farmers in the hardest-hit countries lost, on average, at least half their crops.
The interaction is therefore multiplicative: El Niño won't create a separate crisis running alongside the petrochemical shortage, it synchronises weather stress, biological pressure and agrochemical scarcity across already exposed food systems, accelerating inventory exhaustion, hardening price spikes, and pulling forward the turn to hoarding, export controls and emergency rationing.
Remember I'm not trying to predict what will unfold here because it's too complex to call and a doomer for my taste, all I provide are the facts so folk can assess it for themselves.
Regional Vulnerability Matrix
The collision of acid-driven fertiliser rationing and El Niño climatic stress generates asymmetric risk across the global agricultural landscape.
An assessment mapping these top eight regions on a dual-axis framework, evaluating fertiliser import dependency alongside extreme El Niño exposure, reveals critical clusters of sovereign risk and supply chain vulnerability.
Regions heavily dependent on sea-borne spot markets that also fall within the historical strike zones of Pacific temperature anomalies face a high likelihood of systemic agricultural failure.
The following matrix evaluates the top eight most exposed agricultural basins based on their structural dependency on imported crop nutrients and their meteorological susceptibility to El Niño-induced extremes. Here is a ready reckoner by region :
Primary Compounding Mechanisms
The severity of this polycrisis stems from the simultaneous nature of the supply and climate shocks, as well as the mechanistic way they amplify each other at both the field and supply-chain levels.
The interplay of chemical scarcity, biological requirements, and global logistics creates a landscape in which disruptions rapidly escalate into system failures.
Reduced Application Rates vs. Heightened Per-Hectare Nutrient Demand
Under normal climatic conditions, commercial crops possess a baseline nutrient requirement to achieve optimal yields.
However, under extreme weather stress, such as the severe drought and heat anticipated across the Western Pacific, or the waterlogging expected in South America, plants actually require highly optimised, if not elevated, macro- and micro-nutrient profiles to build root resilience, maintain cellular turgor, and survive. Paradoxically, the unprecedented surge in fertiliser prices forces producers into aggressive rationing.
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) notes that granular urea prices in the Middle East spiked 19% in a single week in early March 2026, while Egyptian urea surged 28%. Furthermore, US domestic sulphur prices surged 165% year-over-year to over $650 per metric ton.
Faced with these ruinous economics, farmers are forced to drastically reduce application rates per hectare. This creates a fatal agronomic divergence: crops are receiving the lowest nutrient inputs precisely when climatic stress demands the highest biological resilience. Because fertiliser yield response is highly non-linear, even modest reductions in application under drought conditions will trigger disproportionately severe crop failures.
Timing Mismatches with Planting Windows
Modern agricultural supply chains are rigidly dictated by inflexible biological clocks. In regions like Australia, Indonesia, and the American Midwest, planting windows for winter grains and dry-season crops are narrow.
The geopolitical necessity of rerouting maritime trade around the Cape of Good Hope, bypassing the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, adds approximately 18 to 22 days to global shipping schedules.
Even if a physical product is secured at a premium, this delayed delivery frequently results in the fertiliser arriving and being applied outside the optimal window. Nutrients applied too late in the crop development cycle fail to translate into biomass or grain yield, effectively rendering the highly expensive inputs functionally useless and locking in yield destruction for the season.
Price and Logistics Spirals
The systemic nature of the disruption has ignited a self-reinforcing logistics and cost spiral that goes far beyond the base commodity price. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint that handles 20 million barrels of oil per day, 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG), and 50% of global seaborne sulphur, has simultaneously spiked bunker fuel costs and created a frantic scramble for alternative bulk shipping capacity.
Furthermore, war-risk insurance premiums for vessels transiting adjacent high-risk zones have surged from 0.25% to as high as 10% of the total hull value, with coverage resetting every seven days. Though let's face it that'll start mattering again when the ships start moving again.
Ag producers face a triple-inflationary bind: the underlying commodity price of the fertiliser has doubled, the maritime freight costs have multiplied due to longer routes and insurance hikes, and the domestic diesel fuel required for on-farm machinery application has spiked.
It was already a marginal business for many.
Political Allocation Dynamics (Fertiliser vs. Pure Mining)
As sulphuric acid rapidly transitions from an abundant, cheap industrial chemical to a critically scarce strategic resource, sovereign governments are intervening directly in market allocation.
China’s decision to implement a comprehensive halt on smelter by-product sulphuric acid exports from May 2026 is an explicit political choice. Chinese smelter economics have deteriorated to a negative US$77 per tonne for Treatment and Refining Charges (TC/RC). Historically, acid exports subsidised these operations.
Beijing has chosen to prioritise domestic fertiliser manufacturing and agricultural autonomy over the export revenues of its smelting sector, effectively removing 4.65 million tonnes (roughly 15% of global seaborne supply) from the market.
In resource-rich developing nations like Indonesia and those in Central Africa, intense domestic political pressure is mounting to divert any available acid away from lucrative critical-mineral extraction (such as copper and nickel) and toward domestic agriculture to stave off food inflation and civil unrest.
This political allocation weaponises the reagent supply chain, transferring the shortage directly onto the balance sheets of multinational mining companies. That's another subject that I'll write about later in the week, but many major producers in the gold, REE, and copper sectors use acid in their production process.
Third-Order & Polycrisis Amplifiers
The interaction of these primary mechanisms causes a cascade of third-order amplifiers that propagate across borders, industries, and asset classes, embedding the polycrisis deep into the global economic structure.
I'm not forecasting this; we are literally tied to the tracks, and we can already hear the train.
Climate models indicate that the impending super El Niño will distribute extreme weather asymmetrically: severe drought in some basins and torrential flooding in others.
Both extremes critically undermine fertiliser efficacy, creating a phenomenon of "double nutrient loss." In drought-stricken regions (e.g., Australia, Southern Africa), water acts as the essential solvent.
Without sufficient soil moisture, applied fertilisers cannot dissolve and enter the root system, stranding expensive capital as inaccessible chemical complexes in the topsoil.
Conversely, in regions experiencing El Niño-induced flooding (such as the South American Pampas), excess precipitation rapidly flushes highly soluble nitrogen and phosphate inputs out of the root zone before plant uptake can occur.
This results in severe agricultural runoff, triggering downstream eutrophication of waterways, while leaving the intended crop nutrient-starved and vulnerable.
Fisheries–Livestock–Fertiliser Loop
The El Niño oceanic anomaly fundamentally alters deep-water upwelling, particularly along the western coast of South America, a shift that is biologically fatal to the Peruvian anchoveta biomass.
Recognising the imminent threat of warming coastal waters, the Peruvian Production Ministry (PRODUCE) has already slashed the total allowable catch (TAC) for the first 2026 North-Central season to 1.9 million metric tons, a 36% reduction from the previous year.
Because the Peruvian anchoveta is the foundational species for global fishmeal and fish oil production, this collapse creates a protein deficit in global livestock and aquaculture feed markets.
Fishmeal by-products are highly sought after as premium organic fertilisers and soil conditioners. The simultaneous loss of synthetic phosphates (due to the acid/sulphur geopolitical shock) and organic substitutes (due to the El Niño fisheries collapse) forces global agribusinesses into an impossible procurement environment, driving up the cost of all protein and crop outputs.
Multi-Year Soil Nutrient Mining Legacy and 2028–2030 Yield Hangover
When farmers are forced to apply insufficient fertiliser due to exorbitant costs, crops instinctively "mine" residual reserves of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium stored in the soil profile to sustain growth. While this biological mechanism may temporarily buffer yields in 2026, it systematically depletes the soil's biochemical bank account.
Agronomic models demonstrate that continuous nutrient mining rapidly degrades soil organic carbon content, compromises the microbial biome, and destroys soil structure. Replacing these depleted legacy reserves is way more expensive and biologically complex than maintaining equilibrium.
Consequently, the extreme under-application forced by the 2026–2027 crisis guarantees a persistent "yield hangover", a structural suppression of global agricultural productivity that will extend through 2028 to 2030.
This situation caps maximum theoretical yields globally, regardless of whether weather patterns normalise or input prices stabilise in the future.
Energy-Transition Double-Bind
Sulphuric acid is the critical solvent required for hydrometallurgical leaching across the critical minerals sector.
The current reagent shortage has already triggered severe bottlenecks in the supply chains essential for the global energy transition. In the DRC, copper solvent extraction and electrowinning (SX-EW) operators, cut off from traditional Zambian sulphur routes, are facing transport premiums of $150–$200 per tonne for acid, severely compressing margins. Some miners, like Ivanhoe, are well prepared; others will struggle severely.
In Indonesia, which accounts for over 60% of global nickel production via acid-intensive High-Pressure Acid Leach (HPAL) processing, operators, heavily reliant on Middle Eastern sulphur (with some holding only 1-2 months of inventory), are facing a critical sulphur shortage.
Kazakhstan's Kazatomprom, the world's dominant uranium producer utilising In-Situ Recovery (ISR) technology, has already been forced to lower production guidance through 2026 due to direct structural deficits in sulphuric acid supply.
Concurrently, El Niño-driven droughts routinely cripple hydroelectric power generation, the primary baseload energy for many smelters and mines globally. This double-bind throttles the production of copper, nickel, and uranium exactly as global decarbonisation mandates accelerate.
Just when it's experiencing significant new demand.
Asymmetric Macro Winners/Losers
The dual shock fundamentally restructures the global commodities hierarchy, creating market asymmetries. The definitive losers are merchant-dependent agricultural importers and non-integrated downstream producers who must buy raw reagents on the volatile spot market.
Conversely, fully integrated, captive-acid producers with vertically integrated supply chains, such as The Mosaic Company (dominating North America and Brazil) and OCP Group (Morocco), emerge as beneficiaries, capturing margins by controlling the rock, the acid, and the final fertiliser product.
Geopolitically, nations capable of circumventing blockades, such as Iran, are capitalising on the chaos; having resumed nitrogen production in early 2026, Iran is capturing vast geopolitical leverage as desperate global buyers overlook international sanctions to secure critical urea supplies.
Though Iran's advantage is most likely very short-lived
Insurance/Reinsurance Capacity Crunch and Spillovers
Global agribusiness is underpinned by complex insurance and reinsurance mechanisms, which are currently fracturing under the weight of compounding, correlated systemic risks.
The 2026 super El Niño, arriving on top of historic asset accumulation in hazard-prone areas, is pushing aggregate losses beyond the absorption capacity of traditional risk-transfer models.
The US Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) has seen record liability protection of $159.3 billion across 561 million acres, exposing global reinsurers to tail risk.
In response to these non-diversifiable, systemic climate shocks, major reinsurers are tightening underwriting criteria, raising attachment points, and entirely withdrawing capacity from high-risk agricultural zones.
This capacity crunch forces agribusinesses to accept higher financial risk or transition to alternative models, such as parametric insurance, effectively draining critical liquidity from the agricultural sector precisely when capital is most required to adapt to climate stress.
Geopolitical "Fertiliser Diplomacy", Export Bans, and Migration Triggers
As domestic food security dominates national security agendas, global trade is fragmenting via aggressive "fertiliser diplomacy." China's May 2026 sulphuric acid export ban, Russia's suspension of fertiliser exports through April 2026, and immediate export restrictions from Turkey, alongside potential bans from India, highlight a rapid shift toward resource nationalism.
This environment effectively weaponises agricultural inputs. The secondary effect is devastating for fragile, import-dependent states in West and Central Africa, the Sahel, and the broader Middle East. With domestic food production collapsing under the weight of unaffordable inputs and El Niño-induced drought, hyper-inflation in local food markets will spark civil unrest. Arab Spring 2.0 is likely a global event.
The World Food Programme warns that the compounding shocks could push an additional 45 million people into acute hunger by mid-2026. It could be much, much worse than this, but let's not get too far ahead of ourselves. Let's take our doom in a sober sequence.
The collapse of local agricultural economies serves as a primary push-factor, highly likely to trigger mass, irregular migration events toward Europe and North America throughout late 2026 and 2027.
Innovation Acceleration
Systemic crises often drive technological adoption. In response to the 2026 reagent and climate shocks, the deployment of capital-intensive agricultural technologies is likely to accelerate rapidly.
Precision agriculture technologies, utilising satellite spatial mapping, variable-rate fertilisation, and AI-driven soil health diagnostics, are moving from pilot stages to an absolute commercial necessity to maximise the biological efficiency of scarce inputs.
They will significantly reduce herbicide usage globally over the next decade. Concurrently, adoption rates for drought-tolerant and herbicide-resistant genetically modified (GM) crop varieties have saturated key markets, exceeding 96% in US soybeans and 92% in US corn , while drought-adapted legumes like chickpeas are seeing massive uptake in South Asia and Africa. Solutions like
I-Terra
Till then, though, closure of Hormuz means a contraction in global agricultural yields by physically severing the hydrocarbon throughput required for synthetic weed control.
Modern agrochemistry is a direct extension of Middle Eastern energy extraction, relying entirely on the continuous flow of naphtha into Asian cracking facilities to synthesise the benzene, toluene, and xylene that form the active molecular cores of herbicides.
Stripping millions of tons of intermediate chemical capacity from the market strands pre-refined precursors in the Persian Gulf and halts formulation lines for essential crop-protection agents.
This sudden deficit in physical plant capacity removes the chemical mechanisms required to eliminate competitive plant species (kill weeds), forcing a reduction in yield per hectare as the absolute baseline materials for modern agriculture become unavailable.
In the industrial sector, multi-billion-dollar investments are being fast-tracked into circular economy processes, notably the recycling of spent sulphuric acid from petroleum refining and the capture of sulphur dioxide from smelting off-gases.
However, this rapid technological shift risks leaving undercapitalised smallholder farmers behind, potentially fuelling the rise of dangerous black and grey markets for diverted or counterfeit agrochemicals.
Panama Canal Logistics Chokepoint
The logistics network supporting global food transport is a climate-driven chokepoint that threatens to slow North American output to Asian demand. The Panama Canal, which processes roughly 18% of US corn exports, 29% of US soybean exports, and 91% of US sorghum exports, relies entirely on freshwater from Gatun Lake to operate its locks.
The impending El Niño event threatens to drastically reduce rainfall in the Panamanian watershed. NOAA forecasts indicate a 50% risk that El Niño conditions in 2026 will reach an intensity sufficient to force canal authorities to implement severe capacity and draft restrictions.
If transits are throttled, as witnessed during the 2023–24 drought, when daily transits plummeted to just 24 vessels. US agricultural exports will be forced to take the significantly longer and more expensive Cape of Good Hope route, adding up to 22 days of transit time.
This bottleneck amplifies global freight competition, strands inventory at sea, and introduces extreme pricing volatility into global grain markets exactly when regional supplies are most fragile.
Quantifiable Risk Scenarios
Based on current data aggregates, historical shock modelling, and leading economic indicators, the following baseline and severe quantifiable scenarios are projected for the late 2026 through 2027 macro-cycle.
Global Fertiliser Availability Shortfall
Baseline Scenario: A 12–15% global deficit in phosphate and nitrogen availability. This is driven by China’s firm removal of approximately 15% of global seaborne sulphuric acid supply, coupled with the partial, highly expensive substitution of Middle Eastern sulphur via alternative routes.
Severe Scenario: A 20–25% absolute deficit. If the Strait of Hormuz remains entirely closed past Q3 2026, the ongoing lock-up of 50% of global seaborne sulphur will exhaust downstream inventories, triggering widespread force majeure declarations across phosphate processing facilities in North Africa, India, and Latin America.
Yield Impacts on Key Commodities
Maize: 10–15% yield reduction in heavily exposed regions (such as Southern Africa and Central America) due to a combination of high nitrogen requirements and vulnerability to El Niño-induced drought.
Wheat: 15% aggregate yield reduction in Australia, with highly variable impacts across the US Plains, heavily dependent on localised drought progression and heat-stress days.
Rice: 5–10% global yield suppression. While some specific Southeast Asian basins may see marginal gains, severe disruptions to the Indian monsoon and water shortages in western Indonesia pose massive downside risks to total regional tonnage.
Palm Oil: 10–20% yield reduction in Indonesia and Malaysia. This mirrors historical precedents from the 1997 "super" El Niño, driven by extreme dry-season conditions, water-table depletion, and widespread plantation wildfires.
Sulphuric Acid, Naphtha and Super El Niño Polycrisis
The global agricultural and industrial complex is heading into a poly shock, with an upstream sulphuric acid and Naphtha supply crisis colliding directly with a forecasted severe El Niño, generating generational system risks for 2026–2027.
Sulphuric acid is a critical upstream chokepoint; approximately 45% of global consumption is dedicated to the wet-process production of phosphoric acid for phosphate fertilisers.
This chemical bottleneck is currently being compressed by the near-total closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for approximately 49% to 50% of sulphur & Naphtha flows, and by China’s unprecedented mandate to halt all smelter-by-product sulphuric acid exports from May 2026 to protect its domestic agriculture.
India has instituted domestic prioritisation for its fertiliser producers amid annual sulphuric acid demand exceeding 20 million tonnes. This upstream acid deficit opens up a stacked risk exposure, heavily penalising merchant-dependent consumers while favouring captive, integrated producers, and forcing a geopolitical allocation that prioritises food-security fertilisers over pure critical-mineral mining (already inducing visible strain in Chilean/DRC copper SX-EW, Indonesian nickel HPAL, and Kazakh uranium ISR).
This input-side supply collapse coincides with strong atmospheric teleconnections: meteorological consensus (NOAA CPC, IRI, ECMWF) confirms ENSO-neutral conditions will persist through June 2026, transitioning to an El Niño event by May–July 2026 with a 75% probability. Climate meteorology of this type is notoriously difficult to predict exactly, though this has the hallmarks of the strongest in a generation, possibly the strongest since
1877-78
.
The convergence of higher nutrient application costs and climatic stress guarantees widespread yield destruction, forcing global agribusiness and sovereign risk systems into a cascading polycrisis spanning food security, delays in the green-energy transition, and severe macro-financial spillovers.
Significant declines in crop yields are shaping up to be severe. The secondary impacts, such as food inflation, transport difficulties through
Panama
Plants, Fertiliser and El Niño. How they interact.
Next year's agricultural crisis is a trap in which a global sulphuric acid and naphtha shortage collides with extreme El Niño droughts and floods.
Most people assume a thirsty plant needs less fertiliser, but to survive heat, crops actually need specific "survival nutrients."
They need phosphorus to give them the energy to quickly grow deep roots to chase receding underground water, and potassium to act as microscopic pumps that tightly close their leaf pores so they don't sweat to death.
These nutrients are naturally locked inside hard rocks and can only be made digestible for plants by dissolving them in massive amounts of sulphuric acid, which is cut off by global trade blockades.
Without this acid, farmers are cornered with very few viable workarounds. They can't just dump heavy concentrations of substitute chemical salts into dry dirt, because those salts will actually reverse the flow of water and suck the remaining moisture right out of the plant's roots (a fatal reaction called "fertiliser burn").
They also can't compensate by simply using cheap nitrogen, because excess nitrogen tricks the plant into growing large, thirsty leaves that act like giant wicks, drying the crop out even faster (known as "haying off").
Farming is about formulas and processes; you can't just skip parts without consequences. Most of the time, you can't skip any part without a crop disaster
Ultimately, because the world is missing a single industrial acid, we are stripping our crops of their only internal defence mechanisms at the exact moment the extreme climate demands them.
So the timing of this poly crisis is really poor. There is no worse time to run out of fertiliser than in a heat wave that is lining up to be
epic.
These are the pathways we need to watch:
📷Provide a caption (optional)
Pestilence, Herbicide and Pesticide, and how they are even a bigger risk to Food Security
Public discussion tends to linger on natural gas and the Haber-Bosch process, as if fertiliser were the whole story, yet the deeper vulnerability lies in the petroleum-derived agrochemical chain, where light and heavy naphtha feed the benzene, toluene, and xylene streams that make synthetic crop protection possible.
Those chemicals form the foundation of the recipe for pesticides and herbicides, without which modern agriculture can't exist at a scale capable of feeding the human population on Earth.
Roughly 1.2 million barrels per day of naphtha move through Hormuz, equal to about 48 million metric tons a year, and the paper’s central claim is brutally simple: if that flow is cut, the result is disruption of the basis on which crop yields depend.
A supply chain breakdown might begin in the refineries and steam crackers, pass through aromatic solvents and active ingredients, and end in failed harvests, shattered food trade, and sovereign financial breakdown on a planetary scale.
The system is concentrated, geographically and technically, and because East Asia sits at the point where stranded Gulf feedstock becomes a globally indispensable chemical output.
China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan absorb the bulk of these naphtha flows, with more than 60 per cent of Northeast Asia’s seaborne imports coming from the Middle East Gulf, South Korea sourcing as much as 77 per cent of its total requirement from that region, and Japan drawing more than 70 per cent of its imported volume from the same corridor.
The idea that a deficit can be patched over by improvisation collapses under inspection: bypass pipelines were built for crude, not for rerouting specialised refined products at scale; Russian supply is constrained by sanctions, fleet limits, and voyage times; the United States Gulf Coast exports LPG in strength but does not possess the spare naphtha pool needed to replace a 48 million ton annual loss.
Asian crackers and reformers, which usually carry less than a month of feedstock inventory, therefore move from exposure to force majeure within weeks.
The consequence is a blow to the two processes that sustain the aromatics pool: catalytic reforming of heavy naphtha, which produces reformate rich in toluene and xylene, and steam cracking of light naphtha, which yields pyrolysis gasoline rich in benzene.
Once both channels are starved, the world loses roughly 15 to 19 million metric tons of BTX, an immediate 10 to 15 per cent contraction in global aromatics, with that loss propagating through every dependent downstream chain.
The crisis is not confined to abstract feedstock scarcity but runs straight through the practical question of whether herbicides and pesticides can be literally made and deployed.
Benzene is the underlying molecular scaffold from which chlorobenzene, aniline, and nitrobenzene are derived, and those intermediates in turn sit inside the synthesis pathways for major herbicides, fungicides, and insecticides, including compounds such as 2,4-D, atrazine, anilazine, dichloran, and broader triazole and strobilurin classes. Yet synthesis is only half the problem.
In many ways, this is a more critical bottleneck than fertiliser because pure active ingredients are often lipophilic, unstable, and unusable in field conditions unless they are dissolved in high-boiling aromatic solvents such as Aromatic 100, 150, and 200, each drawn from the C10 to C12 heavy aromatic fractions of catalytic reformate.
These are the solvents that keep emulsifiable concentrates in solution, let the spray remain on the leaf or insect long enough to penetrate, and prevent the active ingredient from precipitating into inert sludge inside the farmer’s tank.
Without them, pesticides cease to function as usable agricultural tools. The usual fantasy of substitution through coal-to-chemicals or methanol-to-aromatics also fails, because those routes are too inefficient, too catalyst-limited, too capital-intensive, and too slow to replace a missing aromatic pool of this size within a single crop cycle.
Once that chemical protection wears off, the biological logic follows.
Modern crops have been bred under conditions of intensive chemical defence, meaning they carry the yield ambitions of industrial agriculture without the hardiness required in an unprotected ecological contest. Or simply, they can't grow without them.
Remove herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides, and the field won't become less efficient; it reverts to open warfare among crops, weeds, insects, nematodes, fungi, bacteria, and viruses, with the crop suddenly exposed and structurally ill-prepared.
This reveals some yield-loss baselines, 34 per cent potential destruction to weeds, 18 per cent to animal pests, and 16 per cent to pathogens, and then translates those pressures into crop-by-crop collapse.
Maize, with a global baseline of about 1.23 billion metric tons, loses 45 per cent of its value, erasing 553.5 million tons. Wheat, from 799.33 million tons, loses about half, destroying 399.6 million. Rice loses roughly 135 million tons, soybeans another 158 million tons, and the combined biomass destroyed totals about 1.246 billion metric tons.
The calory math is harsh: 1,970 trillion kilocalories vanish with maize, 1,334 trillion with wheat, and 486 trillion with rice, for a total of around 3,790 trillion kilocalories, equal to the annual energy requirements of roughly 3.79 billion people. Nor does the damage stop at direct human consumption, because maize and soy are also the feed base of the livestock economy, so the loss of grain becomes the forced liquidation of poultry and swine herds, and with that, the destruction of one of the last buffers of stored protein and dairy calories.
Some of the missing naphtha could be displaced by ethane, propane, butane/LPG, alternative liquid feeds, non-Hormuz naphtha streams, and upgraded pyrolysis oil or bio-naphtha, while some pesticide products could be shifted into SC, WG, EW, OD, or SL formulations using alternative co-solvent systems. It's probably of no consequence that
China's import of ethane
from the US has skyrocketed.
But none of those routes reproduces, on short notice and at a global scale, the same volume and product slate of naphtha-derived BTX aromatics and heavy formulation solvents.
Commodity markets will price in future scarcity immediately, governments will act on anticipated shortfalls rather than observe famines, and the world food economy will naturally shift overnight from trade to hoarding.
China would harden seasonal fertiliser controls into outright export bans, Russia and Belarus will restrict their own flows, and any state with captive stocks of grain, potash, phosphates, or agrochemicals would begin treating them as strategic assets rather than tradable goods.
Brazil is presented as the worst case because it combines immense agricultural output with a dependence on imported fertilisers and pesticides; once those inputs are withheld by countries prioritising domestic survival, Brazil’s fungicide- and herbicide-dependent production model begins to fail, and a major export basin is pulled out of the world market at the worst possible moment.
For chronic food importers such as Egypt, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the shock becomes a balance-of-payments crisis in the strictest sense, since they would face soaring grain and energy prices, collapsing purchasing power, depleted reserves, and the mathematical impossibility of buying enough food in a market defined by physical scarcity rather than ordinary volatility.
A Hormuz naphtha blockade is a famine mechanism camouflaged as a shipping disruption, because once the hydrocarbon-calorie nexus is broken at the feedstock level, the failure travels from crops to markets, and from markets to states, where they eventually land on people and their calorie requirements.
BTX-derived herbicides, insecticides, fungicides and heavy aromatic solvents keep modern monoculture operational. Modern agriculture cant exist without them.
El Niño’s impacts are geographically uneven, though uniformly catastrophic, yet they are large enough to matter through trade and stock dynamics:
WMO notes that El Niño typically brings severe drought to Australia, Indonesia and parts of southern Asia while increasing rainfall in parts of southern South America, and crop-yield studies find that the El Niño-Southern Oscillation materially influences yields across large parts of South Asia, Latin America and Southern Africa, with global mean maize, rice and wheat yields tending to shift downward or sideways during El Niño years even when soybean responses are mixed.
In practical terms, that means heat stress, water stress and disordered planting calendars raise the marginal value of every fungicide, insecticide and herbicide application precisely when the blockade has made them scarce or unusable; FAO and WFP further note that El Niño-linked drought and high temperatures can trigger outbreaks of transboundary pests and diseases, and in the recent Southern African drought farmers in the hardest-hit countries lost, on average, at least half their crops.
The interaction is therefore multiplicative: El Niño won't create a separate crisis running alongside the petrochemical shortage, it synchronises weather stress, biological pressure and agrochemical scarcity across already exposed food systems, accelerating inventory exhaustion, hardening price spikes, and pulling forward the turn to hoarding, export controls and emergency rationing.
Remember I'm not trying to predict what will unfold here because it's too complex to call and a doomer for my taste, all I provide are the facts so folk can assess it for themselves.
Regional Vulnerability Matrix
The collision of acid-driven fertiliser rationing and El Niño climatic stress generates asymmetric risk across the global agricultural landscape.
An assessment mapping these top eight regions on a dual-axis framework, evaluating fertiliser import dependency alongside extreme El Niño exposure, reveals critical clusters of sovereign risk and supply chain vulnerability.
Regions heavily dependent on sea-borne spot markets that also fall within the historical strike zones of Pacific temperature anomalies face a high likelihood of systemic agricultural failure.
The following matrix evaluates the top eight most exposed agricultural basins based on their structural dependency on imported crop nutrients and their meteorological susceptibility to El Niño-induced extremes. Here is a ready reckoner by region :
Primary Compounding Mechanisms
The severity of this polycrisis stems from the simultaneous nature of the supply and climate shocks, as well as the mechanistic way they amplify each other at both the field and supply-chain levels.
The interplay of chemical scarcity, biological requirements, and global logistics creates a landscape in which disruptions rapidly escalate into system failures.
Reduced Application Rates vs. Heightened Per-Hectare Nutrient Demand
Under normal climatic conditions, commercial crops possess a baseline nutrient requirement to achieve optimal yields.
However, under extreme weather stress, such as the severe drought and heat anticipated across the Western Pacific, or the waterlogging expected in South America, plants actually require highly optimised, if not elevated, macro- and micro-nutrient profiles to build root resilience, maintain cellular turgor, and survive. Paradoxically, the unprecedented surge in fertiliser prices forces producers into aggressive rationing.
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) notes that granular urea prices in the Middle East spiked 19% in a single week in early March 2026, while Egyptian urea surged 28%. Furthermore, US domestic sulphur prices surged 165% year-over-year to over $650 per metric ton.
Faced with these ruinous economics, farmers are forced to drastically reduce application rates per hectare. This creates a fatal agronomic divergence: crops are receiving the lowest nutrient inputs precisely when climatic stress demands the highest biological resilience. Because fertiliser yield response is highly non-linear, even modest reductions in application under drought conditions will trigger disproportionately severe crop failures.
Timing Mismatches with Planting Windows
Modern agricultural supply chains are rigidly dictated by inflexible biological clocks. In regions like Australia, Indonesia, and the American Midwest, planting windows for winter grains and dry-season crops are narrow.
The geopolitical necessity of rerouting maritime trade around the Cape of Good Hope, bypassing the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, adds approximately 18 to 22 days to global shipping schedules.
Even if a physical product is secured at a premium, this delayed delivery frequently results in the fertiliser arriving and being applied outside the optimal window. Nutrients applied too late in the crop development cycle fail to translate into biomass or grain yield, effectively rendering the highly expensive inputs functionally useless and locking in yield destruction for the season.
Price and Logistics Spirals
The systemic nature of the disruption has ignited a self-reinforcing logistics and cost spiral that goes far beyond the base commodity price. The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint that handles 20 million barrels of oil per day, 20% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG), and 50% of global seaborne sulphur, has simultaneously spiked bunker fuel costs and created a frantic scramble for alternative bulk shipping capacity.
Furthermore, war-risk insurance premiums for vessels transiting adjacent high-risk zones have surged from 0.25% to as high as 10% of the total hull value, with coverage resetting every seven days. Though let's face it that'll start mattering again when the ships start moving again.
Ag producers face a triple-inflationary bind: the underlying commodity price of the fertiliser has doubled, the maritime freight costs have multiplied due to longer routes and insurance hikes, and the domestic diesel fuel required for on-farm machinery application has spiked.
It was already a marginal business for many.
Political Allocation Dynamics (Fertiliser vs. Pure Mining)
As sulphuric acid rapidly transitions from an abundant, cheap industrial chemical to a critically scarce strategic resource, sovereign governments are intervening directly in market allocation.
China’s decision to implement a comprehensive halt on smelter by-product sulphuric acid exports from May 2026 is an explicit political choice. Chinese smelter economics have deteriorated to a negative US$77 per tonne for Treatment and Refining Charges (TC/RC). Historically, acid exports subsidised these operations.
Beijing has chosen to prioritise domestic fertiliser manufacturing and agricultural autonomy over the export revenues of its smelting sector, effectively removing 4.65 million tonnes (roughly 15% of global seaborne supply) from the market.
In resource-rich developing nations like Indonesia and those in Central Africa, intense domestic political pressure is mounting to divert any available acid away from lucrative critical-mineral extraction (such as copper and nickel) and toward domestic agriculture to stave off food inflation and civil unrest.
This political allocation weaponises the reagent supply chain, transferring the shortage directly onto the balance sheets of multinational mining companies. That's another subject that I'll write about later in the week, but many major producers in the gold, REE, and copper sectors use acid in their production process.
Third-Order & Polycrisis Amplifiers
The interaction of these primary mechanisms causes a cascade of third-order amplifiers that propagate across borders, industries, and asset classes, embedding the polycrisis deep into the global economic structure.
I'm not forecasting this; we are literally tied to the tracks, and we can already hear the train.
Climate models indicate that the impending super El Niño will distribute extreme weather asymmetrically: severe drought in some basins and torrential flooding in others.
Both extremes critically undermine fertiliser efficacy, creating a phenomenon of "double nutrient loss." In drought-stricken regions (e.g., Australia, Southern Africa), water acts as the essential solvent.
Without sufficient soil moisture, applied fertilisers cannot dissolve and enter the root system, stranding expensive capital as inaccessible chemical complexes in the topsoil.
Conversely, in regions experiencing El Niño-induced flooding (such as the South American Pampas), excess precipitation rapidly flushes highly soluble nitrogen and phosphate inputs out of the root zone before plant uptake can occur.
This results in severe agricultural runoff, triggering downstream eutrophication of waterways, while leaving the intended crop nutrient-starved and vulnerable.
Fisheries–Livestock–Fertiliser Loop
The El Niño oceanic anomaly fundamentally alters deep-water upwelling, particularly along the western coast of South America, a shift that is biologically fatal to the Peruvian anchoveta biomass.
Recognising the imminent threat of warming coastal waters, the Peruvian Production Ministry (PRODUCE) has already slashed the total allowable catch (TAC) for the first 2026 North-Central season to 1.9 million metric tons, a 36% reduction from the previous year.
Because the Peruvian anchoveta is the foundational species for global fishmeal and fish oil production, this collapse creates a protein deficit in global livestock and aquaculture feed markets.
Fishmeal by-products are highly sought after as premium organic fertilisers and soil conditioners. The simultaneous loss of synthetic phosphates (due to the acid/sulphur geopolitical shock) and organic substitutes (due to the El Niño fisheries collapse) forces global agribusinesses into an impossible procurement environment, driving up the cost of all protein and crop outputs.
Multi-Year Soil Nutrient Mining Legacy and 2028–2030 Yield Hangover
When farmers are forced to apply insufficient fertiliser due to exorbitant costs, crops instinctively "mine" residual reserves of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium stored in the soil profile to sustain growth. While this biological mechanism may temporarily buffer yields in 2026, it systematically depletes the soil's biochemical bank account.
Agronomic models demonstrate that continuous nutrient mining rapidly degrades soil organic carbon content, compromises the microbial biome, and destroys soil structure. Replacing these depleted legacy reserves is way more expensive and biologically complex than maintaining equilibrium.
Consequently, the extreme under-application forced by the 2026–2027 crisis guarantees a persistent "yield hangover", a structural suppression of global agricultural productivity that will extend through 2028 to 2030.
This situation caps maximum theoretical yields globally, regardless of whether weather patterns normalise or input prices stabilise in the future.
Energy-Transition Double-Bind
Sulphuric acid is the critical solvent required for hydrometallurgical leaching across the critical minerals sector.
The current reagent shortage has already triggered severe bottlenecks in the supply chains essential for the global energy transition. In the DRC, copper solvent extraction and electrowinning (SX-EW) operators, cut off from traditional Zambian sulphur routes, are facing transport premiums of $150–$200 per tonne for acid, severely compressing margins. Some miners, like Ivanhoe, are well prepared; others will struggle severely.
In Indonesia, which accounts for over 60% of global nickel production via acid-intensive High-Pressure Acid Leach (HPAL) processing, operators, heavily reliant on Middle Eastern sulphur (with some holding only 1-2 months of inventory), are facing a critical sulphur shortage.
Kazakhstan's Kazatomprom, the world's dominant uranium producer utilising In-Situ Recovery (ISR) technology, has already been forced to lower production guidance through 2026 due to direct structural deficits in sulphuric acid supply.
Concurrently, El Niño-driven droughts routinely cripple hydroelectric power generation, the primary baseload energy for many smelters and mines globally. This double-bind throttles the production of copper, nickel, and uranium exactly as global decarbonisation mandates accelerate.
Just when it's experiencing significant new demand.
Asymmetric Macro Winners/Losers
The dual shock fundamentally restructures the global commodities hierarchy, creating market asymmetries. The definitive losers are merchant-dependent agricultural importers and non-integrated downstream producers who must buy raw reagents on the volatile spot market.
Conversely, fully integrated, captive-acid producers with vertically integrated supply chains, such as The Mosaic Company (dominating North America and Brazil) and OCP Group (Morocco), emerge as beneficiaries, capturing margins by controlling the rock, the acid, and the final fertiliser product.
Geopolitically, nations capable of circumventing blockades, such as Iran, are capitalising on the chaos; having resumed nitrogen production in early 2026, Iran is capturing vast geopolitical leverage as desperate global buyers overlook international sanctions to secure critical urea supplies.
Though Iran's advantage is most likely very short-lived
Insurance/Reinsurance Capacity Crunch and Spillovers
Global agribusiness is underpinned by complex insurance and reinsurance mechanisms, which are currently fracturing under the weight of compounding, correlated systemic risks.
The 2026 super El Niño, arriving on top of historic asset accumulation in hazard-prone areas, is pushing aggregate losses beyond the absorption capacity of traditional risk-transfer models.
The US Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) has seen record liability protection of $159.3 billion across 561 million acres, exposing global reinsurers to tail risk.
In response to these non-diversifiable, systemic climate shocks, major reinsurers are tightening underwriting criteria, raising attachment points, and entirely withdrawing capacity from high-risk agricultural zones.
This capacity crunch forces agribusinesses to accept higher financial risk or transition to alternative models, such as parametric insurance, effectively draining critical liquidity from the agricultural sector precisely when capital is most required to adapt to climate stress.
Geopolitical "Fertiliser Diplomacy", Export Bans, and Migration Triggers
As domestic food security dominates national security agendas, global trade is fragmenting via aggressive "fertiliser diplomacy." China's May 2026 sulphuric acid export ban, Russia's suspension of fertiliser exports through April 2026, and immediate export restrictions from Turkey, alongside potential bans from India, highlight a rapid shift toward resource nationalism.
This environment effectively weaponises agricultural inputs. The secondary effect is devastating for fragile, import-dependent states in West and Central Africa, the Sahel, and the broader Middle East. With domestic food production collapsing under the weight of unaffordable inputs and El Niño-induced drought, hyper-inflation in local food markets will spark civil unrest. Arab Spring 2.0 is likely a global event.
The World Food Programme warns that the compounding shocks could push an additional 45 million people into acute hunger by mid-2026. It could be much, much worse than this, but let's not get too far ahead of ourselves. Let's take our doom in a sober sequence.
The collapse of local agricultural economies serves as a primary push-factor, highly likely to trigger mass, irregular migration events toward Europe and North America throughout late 2026 and 2027.
Innovation Acceleration
Systemic crises often drive technological adoption. In response to the 2026 reagent and climate shocks, the deployment of capital-intensive agricultural technologies is likely to accelerate rapidly.
Precision agriculture technologies, utilising satellite spatial mapping, variable-rate fertilisation, and AI-driven soil health diagnostics, are moving from pilot stages to an absolute commercial necessity to maximise the biological efficiency of scarce inputs.
They will significantly reduce herbicide usage globally over the next decade. Concurrently, adoption rates for drought-tolerant and herbicide-resistant genetically modified (GM) crop varieties have saturated key markets, exceeding 96% in US soybeans and 92% in US corn , while drought-adapted legumes like chickpeas are seeing massive uptake in South Asia and Africa. Solutions like
I-Terra
Till then, though, closure of Hormuz means a contraction in global agricultural yields by physically severing the hydrocarbon throughput required for synthetic weed control.
Modern agrochemistry is a direct extension of Middle Eastern energy extraction, relying entirely on the continuous flow of naphtha into Asian cracking facilities to synthesise the benzene, toluene, and xylene that form the active molecular cores of herbicides.
Stripping millions of tons of intermediate chemical capacity from the market strands pre-refined precursors in the Persian Gulf and halts formulation lines for essential crop-protection agents.
This sudden deficit in physical plant capacity removes the chemical mechanisms required to eliminate competitive plant species (kill weeds), forcing a reduction in yield per hectare as the absolute baseline materials for modern agriculture become unavailable.
In the industrial sector, multi-billion-dollar investments are being fast-tracked into circular economy processes, notably the recycling of spent sulphuric acid from petroleum refining and the capture of sulphur dioxide from smelting off-gases.
However, this rapid technological shift risks leaving undercapitalised smallholder farmers behind, potentially fuelling the rise of dangerous black and grey markets for diverted or counterfeit agrochemicals.
Panama Canal Logistics Chokepoint
The logistics network supporting global food transport is a climate-driven chokepoint that threatens to slow North American output to Asian demand. The Panama Canal, which processes roughly 18% of US corn exports, 29% of US soybean exports, and 91% of US sorghum exports, relies entirely on freshwater from Gatun Lake to operate its locks.
The impending El Niño event threatens to drastically reduce rainfall in the Panamanian watershed. NOAA forecasts indicate a 50% risk that El Niño conditions in 2026 will reach an intensity sufficient to force canal authorities to implement severe capacity and draft restrictions.
If transits are throttled, as witnessed during the 2023–24 drought, when daily transits plummeted to just 24 vessels. US agricultural exports will be forced to take the significantly longer and more expensive Cape of Good Hope route, adding up to 22 days of transit time.
This bottleneck amplifies global freight competition, strands inventory at sea, and introduces extreme pricing volatility into global grain markets exactly when regional supplies are most fragile.
Quantifiable Risk Scenarios
Based on current data aggregates, historical shock modelling, and leading economic indicators, the following baseline and severe quantifiable scenarios are projected for the late 2026 through 2027 macro-cycle.
Global Fertiliser Availability Shortfall
Baseline Scenario: A 12–15% global deficit in phosphate and nitrogen availability. This is driven by China’s firm removal of approximately 15% of global seaborne sulphuric acid supply, coupled with the partial, highly expensive substitution of Middle Eastern sulphur via alternative routes.
Severe Scenario: A 20–25% absolute deficit. If the Strait of Hormuz remains entirely closed past Q3 2026, the ongoing lock-up of 50% of global seaborne sulphur will exhaust downstream inventories, triggering widespread force majeure declarations across phosphate processing facilities in North Africa, India, and Latin America.
Yield Impacts on Key Commodities
Maize: 10–15% yield reduction in heavily exposed regions (such as Southern Africa and Central America) due to a combination of high nitrogen requirements and vulnerability to El Niño-induced drought.
Wheat: 15% aggregate yield reduction in Australia, with highly variable impacts across the US Plains, heavily dependent on localised drought progression and heat-stress days.
Rice: 5–10% global yield suppression. While some specific Southeast Asian basins may see marginal gains, severe disruptions to the Indian monsoon and water shortages in western Indonesia pose massive downside risks to total regional tonnage.
Palm Oil: 10–20% yield reduction in Indonesia and Malaysia. This mirrors historical precedents from the 1997 "super" El Niño, driven by extreme dry-season conditions, water-table depletion, and widespread plantation wildfires.
2027 Food-Price Inflation Range
Global institutions are already tracking the early tremors of this inflation cycle. The FAO Food Price Index ticked up 0.9% in February 2026, and specific inputs like urea surged nearly 46% month-on-month into March.
If the dual shock holds its current trajectory, models project global fertiliser prices will average 15–20% higher through the first half of 2026. This input pressure is projected to push baseline food price inflation up by 2 to 4 percentage points in developed markets through 2027.
In emerging markets, local food inflation could spike by 15–25% year-on-year, driven by the compounding effects of currency depreciation against a strong US dollar, exorbitant freight costs, and local yield failures.
Balance-of-Payments Pressure
Emerging markets that are structurally reliant on open-market grain and fertiliser imports (e.g., Egypt, Pakistan, and broad swaths of Sub-Saharan Africa) face severe macroeconomic deterioration.
Sovereign capital reserves will be rapidly depleted as governments attempt to subsidise basic nutrient inputs for local farmers while simultaneously paying premiums to import replacement food calories. This dynamic will invariably lead to severe balance-of-payments crises, potential sovereign defaults, and forced debt restructurings through multilateral institutions by late 2027.
Strategic Implications
The synthesis of deep geoeconomic supply fragmentation and super El Niño climate risk dictates a highly volatile 18-to-36-month strategic horizon. Navigating this environment requires corporate and sovereign risk desks to position aggressively for the following realities:
Food-Security Hot Spots and Humanitarian Flashpoints
The Sahel, West and Central Africa, and the broader Middle East will unquestionably emerge as the epicentres of humanitarian catastrophe. With over 52 million people already projected to face acute food insecurity in West and Central Africa alone, and global acutely food-insecure populations tripling since 2016 to nearly 300 million, the complete lack of affordable inputs ensures local harvests will fail. International aid organisations will face a severe funding deficit, as the purchasing power of humanitarian budgets is degraded by global food inflation. Expect political instability, regime fragility, and weaponised migration to dominate the security landscape in these corridors.
Winners and Losers: Integrated vs. Merchant Producers
The era of just-in-time, merchant-reliant chemical procurement is functionally over. Vertically integrated producers holding captive rock, sulphur, and acid processing capabilities are unequivocally the winners of this macro cycle. Companies like The Mosaic Company, OCP, and entities operating inside China's protectionist umbrella will exert monopolistic pricing power and capture historic margins. Conversely, non-integrated players and developing nations relying entirely on spot-market procurement will suffer severe margin compression and widespread operational failures.
Ripple Effects: Copper, Nickel, Uranium, and Green-Tech
The global energy transition is structurally dependent on the continuous, cheap supply of sulphuric acid. The diversion of acid to agricultural preservation, combined with extreme transport premiums and import dependencies, will chronically throttle the output of critical minerals. Supply deficits in DRC copper, Indonesian HPAL nickel, and Kazakh ISR uranium will inevitably trigger price spikes across base and battery metals. Automakers and green-tech manufacturers must prepare for extended supply chain delays and radically revise cost assumptions for their electrification targets through 2030.
Policy and Market Signals
Sovereign actors will increasingly utilise blunt trade controls to manage domestic inflation. The trajectory suggests an escalation in protectionist policies, leading to a permanent balkanisation of global agricultural commodity markets. The strategic imperative for agribusiness is to rapidly onshore supply chains, invest heavily in circular-economy acid recycling, and mandate the adoption of precision agronomic technologies to fundamentally reduce reliance on reagents.
While the convergence of wartime chokepoints, sulphuric-acid and naphtha shortages, and a probable strong El Niño creates a genuinely dangerous multiplicative polycrisis for global agriculture in 2026–2027, it is equally important to recognise the substantial adaptive capacity of modern food systems.
History demonstrates that when confronted with severe input and climate shocks, markets, farmers, and governments respond with speed through strategic reserves, emergency policy interventions, accelerated adoption of precision agriculture and drought-tolerant genetics, black- and grey-market arbitrage, and partial supply-chain substitutions.
Vertically integrated producers and certain surplus nations will likely weather the period far better than the most exposed import-dependent regions. What worries me most are poorer nations that have fewer of those options.
The downside risks to yields, food security, and critical mineral supply chains are materially elevated and clearly justify urgent contingency planning; outright global famine or systemic agricultural collapse remains an emerging major risk rather than the central expectation. Though we should acknowledge that this is unfolding as the worst food security risk that many generations have faced since WW2.
The ultimate severity will be determined by both the intensity and duration of the shocks and by the effectiveness of human and institutional responses to them.
What makes the coming polycrisis uniquely dangerous is its near-perfect synchronisation.
A strong El Niño imposes heat and drought on crops; it also sharply increases their biological requirements for precisely the inputs now in shortest supply.
Under extreme weather stress, plants need higher levels of phosphorus to drive deep root growth toward receding soil moisture, more potassium to regulate stomata and prevent fatal water loss, and far more intensive herbicide, insecticide, and fungicide protection to fend off weeds, pests, and pathogens that proliferate in disordered climates.
Yet the sulphuric-acid bottleneck is restricting fertiliser production while the naphtha/BTX shortage is simultaneously strangling the aromatic solvents and active ingredients that make those crop-protection chemicals functional in the field.
This creates a destructive mismatch: peak biological demand colliding with constrained chemical supply at the exact moment modern high-yield varieties are least able to tolerate any shortfall. The interaction is multiplicative, not additive — and that is why the timing could hardly be worse.
Watch List: Leading Indicators
To confirm or mitigate this polycrisis trajectory over the next 6 to 18 months, strategic risk desks must relentlessly monitor the following concrete leading indicators:
NOAA Niño-3.4 SST Anomalies: A sustained temperature reading above +2.0°C by August/September 2026 will mathematically confirm the "super" El Niño trajectory, locking in extreme yield destruction across the Southern Hemisphere.
China Customs Export Data: Complete enforcement of the May 2026 sulphuric acid export halt is the baseline expectation. Any signs of quota easing or political exemptions will immediately signal a bearish reversal for global reagent pricing.
Persian Gulf Shipping Volumes and War-Risk Insurance Premiums: Continuous monitoring of the Lloyd’s Joint War Committee classifications and premium rates. A sustained premium at or above 5% to 10% of hull value effectively maintains a de facto commercial blockade regardless of the status of physical military operations.
Lake Gatun Water Levels (Panama Canal): Tracking daily draft allowances and transit slot auctions. A drop back toward the critical 78–79 foot threshold will indicate severe El Niño drought impacts, signalling the immediate throttling of US Gulf grain exports to Asia and a corresponding spike in global freight rates.
Peruvian Anchoveta Biomass Assessments: Ongoing evaluations from IMARPE regarding the Q4 2026 secondary fishing season. Further TAC reductions below the already compromised 1.9 million metric ton limit, or outright season cancellations, will definitively confirm the destruction of the fisheries-livestock-fertiliser organic loop.
1 Enoch 80:2-3
"And in the days of the sinners the years shall be shortened, and their seed shall be tardy on their lands and fields, and all things on the earth shall alter, and shall not appear in their time: And the rain shall be kept back and the heaven shall withhold it."
What impact do you think resource scarcity, rising prices or extreme weather events in coming years will have on climate consciousness (the understanding, acceptance and development of knowledge about the aptly named "poly crisis" of climate change, ecological collapse, physical pollution, etc) in Europe, the USA and Canada (or maybe the wider imperial core?***)
rebloog for reach?
Climate Denialism will grow, Climate Consciousness will grow
Climate Denialism will decrease, Climate consciousness will decrease
Some Aspects of Climate Denialism will grow, but not others
Some Aspects of Climate Consciousness will grow, but not others
Both Denialism and Consciousness will decrease (Climate Apathy?)
Other (Discuss)
Voting ended onMay 13
***the focus on the northern hemisphere "highly developed" nations is with respect to geography I am familiar with, as well as high historic emissions per capita, as well as their investments in imperialism. While inclusion of countries like Australia, Japan or New Zealand is appreciated, I'm not as well read on the effects of the polycrisis on these countries specifically (well I am on NZ), though I can likely assume similar to east and southeast Asia more widely. I'm also open to the idea that due to usamerican cultural/political hegemony, their reaction could take similar forms even if they are hit worse. I would love discussion and critique
Clearview AI’s founders always intended to target immigrants and the political left. Now their digital dragnet is in the hands of the Trump
This is why we don't bring phones to protests. This is why you should be obscuring your face. MASK THE FUCK UP. And switch it up!
Gait recognition is also a thing. If you are concerned about opsec, consider more than just your appearance, but also your physical mannerisms and gait.
Noam Chomsky Reveals How Much Time Is Left Until the End of Organized Humanity
In this video, Noam Chomsky explores the deep causes of the global crisis, analyzing the role of political and economic institutions and offering concrete solutions to address humanity's uncertain future.
In contrast, my approach, because I'm a liberal and therefore, as [Perry Anderson] sees it, also situational or occasional, simply latches onto particular moments. He describes my work as being formulated “in medias res, ” in the midst of things. He sees me as a left-liberal with a problem regarding structure, and he views this as a deficiency—a gap, a blind spot in my thinking. I would simply respond that I do have an intellectual problem with structure. But that is not a weakness or simple failure on my part. As our preceding discussion about polycrisis, Latour, Beck etc suggested I have a necessarily incomplete but nevertheless capacious historical explanation for why structure is at this particular moment not transparently given to us. This is necessarily formulate in in medias res. And my question back to him would be: how can anyone who considers themselves a Marxist intellectual believe that they think and act in anything other than in medias res? How can a materialist imagine they are not in medias res? We are thrown into history, living in history in medias res—that’s not a choice, nor a methodological stance. It’s our fate; it’s an existential condition.
Frankly, I see his stance as an expression of a degenerate academic Marxism that imagines itself perched in some ivory tower, observing the world and understanding the deep structures of history from a privileged vantage point. That is no more or less in medias res. It is just a particularly precious, secluded angle from which to view the world. My own preference is to dispense with that conceit and to own, embrace, tackle and engage with what is everyone’s condition: i.e. being within the system, within the world. We are endogenous to that world. From this perspective, at any given moment, the question is what structures are relevant to our analysis. This is the Latourian move again: you tell me what your crisis is or what your context is, and I’ll tell you who and where you are—or vice versa.
Is this the word we need to describe unprecedented convergences between ecological, political and economic strife?
Sometimes words explode. It is a safe bet that, before 2022, you had never even heard the term ‘polycrisis’. Now, there is a very good chance you have run into it; and, if you are engaged in environmental, economic or security issues, you most likely have – you might even have become frustrated with it. First virtually nobody was using polycrisis talk, and suddenly everyone seems to be. But, as often happens, people seem to mean quite different things with the word. So, what does ‘polycrisis’ mean? The term reverberated at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Sharm El-Sheikh in November 2022, and in Davos the following January, as The New York Times noted. In the Financial Times, Jonathan Derbyshire chose it for his 2022 ‘Year in a Word’ piece, defining ‘polycrisis’ as a collective term for interlocking and simultaneous crises. Then 2023 opened with the World Economic Forum adopting this buzzword for its Global Risks Report, highlighting how ‘[c]oncurrent shocks, deeply interconnected risks and eroding resilience are giving rise to the risk of polycrises’. The report explores the interrelation of geopolitical, environmental and sociopolitical risks. The World Economic Forum used the term to advertise the report, with headlines like ‘We’re on the Brink of a “Polycrisis” – How Worried Should We Be?’ or ‘Welcome to the Age of the Polycrisis’.
