In an important passage, [Levinas] writes: ‘Existence is not synonymous with the relationship with a world; it is antecedent to the world. In the situation of an end of the world the primary relationship which binds us to Being becomes palpable’. In this passage, Levinas is assigning a reality to existence that is not dependent on there being a world in the first place. Rather, existence precedes the birth of the world, marking a constant presence that is at once immersed in the world of things but at the same time resistant to being identified with those things. For this reason, ‘Being is essentially alien and strikes against us. We undergo its suffocating embrace like the night, but it does not respond to us’. At the same time, this pre-human existence also emerges in ‘the twilight of the world’ whereupon the appearance of the subject folds back upon its disappearance.
Dylan Trigg, The Thing: A Phenomenology of Horror, pg. 48

















