#pyrrhonism

[philosophybits]

Another species of mitigated scepticism which may be of advantage to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the Pyrrhonian doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding.

David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

[wal-haz]

Sextus emphasizes that the skeptic is an investigator. Others either arrive at theories (dogmatism) or at claims about inapprehensibility (negative dogmatism—that the matter investigated is beyond one’s capacity to decide, and so is unknowable). But the skeptic continues to investigate (PH 1.1–4). Investigation is described as setting appearances and thoughts into opposition (PH 1.8) (Morison 2011 offers a reconstruction of skepticism that takes its starting–point from this description), and as the application of the various sets of Modes (PH 1.36–186).  Skepticism does not have teachings, but it is a philosophy. Many of the thoughts the skeptics arrive at are expressed in the skeptical formulae (PH 1.13–15; 187–209). The starting–point (archê) of skepticism is divergency—anômalia. The proto-skeptics are disturbed by the discrepancies they encounter, and begin to investigate (PH 1.12). They hope to gain quietude by settling what is true and what is false. But then they have a surprising experience. Encountering disagreement where several views appear to be of equal weight (isostheneia), they find themselves unable to decide things, give up, and experience tranquility (ataraxia) (Striker 1990 [1996]; Nussbaum 1994). The skeptic’s end (telos) is tranquility in matters of belief (kata doxan) and moderate affection (metriopatheia) in matters that are forced upon us (PH 1.25–29). That is, skeptics can free themselves from those kinds of turmoil that come with holding beliefs. They cannot free themselves from freezing, thirst, or pain. But they suffer less than others, for they do not add the belief (prosdoxazein) that, for example, pain is bad. The skeptic must explain how, without belief (adoxastôs), they can be active. Sextus says that skeptics follow appearances, and that is, that they adhere to the fourfold ways of life (PH 1.21–24).  Nature supplies them with perception and thought; necessary affections compel them (for example, thirst guides them to drink); they go along with traditions and customs; and they can do technical things by having been instructed in skills. The notion of appearances is also central to Sextus’ account of how the skeptic can speak. Without making assertions, a skeptic reports (apangellein) like a chronicler (historikôs) what appears to them now (PH 1.4).

Ancient Skepticism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

[zen-bites]

For the person who believes that something is by nature good or bad is constantly upset; when he does not possess the things that seem to be good, he thinks he is being tormented by things that are by nature bad, and he chases after the things he supposes to be good; then, when he gets these, he falls into still more torments because of irrational and immoderate exultation, and, fearing any change, he does absolutely everything in order not to lose the things that seem to him good. But the person who takes no position as to what is by nature good or bad neither avoids nor pursues intensely. As a result, he achieves ataraxia (tranquility).

Sextus Empiricus

[jewelersblood]

Ataraxia: the untroubled and tranquil condition of the soul; freedom from anxiety or troubles; complete undisturbedness.

Pyrrho

[geopolicraticus]

TODAY IN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Franciscus Patricius and Historical Pyrrhonism   

Thursday 25 April 2024 is the 495th anniversary of the birth of Franciscus Patricius (25 April 1529 – 6 February 1597), who was born on this day in 1529. Patricius is known in Italian as Francesco Patrizi of Cherso (sometimes spelled with one “z” and sometimes with two), and known in Croatian as Franjo Petriš or Frane Petrić (he came from the island of Cres).

Franciscus Patricius was a literal renaissance man who wrote a number of treatises and dialogues on philosophical topics common to his time, distancing himself from Scholasticism by attacking the authority of Aristotle, and advocating a radical form of skepticism that has been called historical Pyrrhonism.

Quora:              https://philosophyofhistory.quora.com/ 

Discord:           https://discord.gg/r3dudQvGxD

Links:               https://jnnielsen.carrd.co/

Newsletter:      http://eepurl.com/dMh0_-/

Text post:        https://geopolicraticus.substack.com/p/franciscus-patricius-and-historical        

Video:              https://youtu.be/KyprDepQHpU                  

Podcast:          https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/nick-nielsen94/episodes/Franciscus-Patricius-and-Historical-Pyrrhonism-e2it99o

[wal-haz]

“The notion of appearances gains great importance in Pyrrhonian skepticism, and poses difficult interpretive questions (Barney 1992). When something appears so-and-so to someone, does this for the skeptics involve some kind of judgment on their part?  Or do they have in mind a purely phenomenal kind of appearing?  The skeptical proposals (that the skeptic adheres to the plausible, the convincing, or to appearances) have in common their appeal to something less than full-fledged belief about how things are, while allowing something sufficient to generate and guide action.”

Ancient Skepticism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

[bhb-equanimitimmarcescible]

J’avais le numéro II et III depuis des années mais il me manquait le I. Qu’est-ce qu’on ferait pas sans Amazon. #philosophy #philosophie #hellenistic #pyrrhon #pyrrhonism #epicure #epicurism https://www.instagram.com/p/BoxXgLYAwg0/?utm_source=ig_tumblr_share&igshid=ku9pvdh4khuy