seen from Norway
seen from China
seen from Germany
seen from Spain
seen from Egypt
seen from United States
seen from South Korea
seen from China
seen from Spain
seen from Brazil
seen from United States
seen from Sweden
seen from Italy
seen from Belgium
seen from Germany
seen from Singapore
seen from United States
seen from Belgium
seen from United States
seen from United States
‘Bossware is coming for almost every worker’: the software you might not realize is watching you
Scalable efficiency in full bloom: Computer monitoring software is helping companies spy on their employees to measure their productivity – often without their consent
La surveillance en ERP
La surveillance est primordiale dans certains établissements recevant du public, tels que les banques et les hôpitaux. De ce fait, des agents de sécurité et de prévention peuvent être engagés pour assurer la protection des biens et des personnes.
Crédit photo : RyanMcGuire de Pixabay
Week 11: Given the amount of surveillance, can social activism prevail in China?
Because of the occurrence of COVID-19 epidemic, every person's life was completely disrupted, and the world was largely affected because of it. This is due to that fact that people are forced to stay at home throughout the outbreak in terms to safeguard the community in a safe way and seek overall matters get back to its normal state as soon as possible.Also, social media usage has totally increase tremendously during the epidemic period while mostly people are so used to scrolling over social media and acquiring the latest news information regardless of any content topic since the COVID-19 breakout. Based on the survey of US social media users, around 29.7percent of respondents said they spent an extra 1-2 hours each day on social media, then another 20.5 percent utilized social media for 30 minutes to an hour longer each day than normal while, only 1.6 percent of respondents increased their usage by less than 15 minutes. To this, it is due to coronavirus epidemic, which resulted in stay-at-home orders and social isolation across the country, prompted increased social media usage (Statista Research Department 2021), therefore activism started shift to social media leading to social activism towards online.
Let’s briefly go through what does social activism means.
Social activism, a purposeful action aiming at promoting long-term social and political change is referred to as social activism. Those people who are passionate about a cause might become a social activist by attempting to adversely impact positive and effectual changes. The term of social activism is rightly regarded to rectify those wrongdoings under unjust attitudes and behaviors that has an influence on humankind aspect. Also, it is used to show supports or opposes one side of a controversial argument regarding of the content topic (Brenman & Sanchez 2014).
The surveillance of China landscape nowadays
With the continuous technological breakthroughs, China is the typical surveillance state, with cameras on every street corner and bots monitoring every web page. The China’s government think that undertaking through this path, they will be able to foresee and prevent threats to the government. China has a vast and extensive surveillance network, as reported by Chinese state media, at least 16 cities, municipalities, and provincial capitals already had begun to use a face recognition system that can detect the nation's whole 1.4 billion-strong population with 99.8% accuracy (Carlson & Ivanescu 2021). In addition, China’s facial recognition system has proven to be very effective; for example, according to the state media Xinhua News Agency, it was reported that Nanchang police in southern China quickly found and arrested a wanted suspect during a popular event attended by 60,000 people earlier before (Ma 2018).
Back to the main topic, can social activism prevail in China with this massive surveillance level?
With this amount of surveillance, I believe it will be hard for social activism to succeed in China because of the China’s government sort of control and surveillance, hence it might be incredibly difficult for activists to engage in those social activities. Due to the extensive surveillance, it is difficult to participate in social activism activities even if they are initiated. Because anything happens, the China polices can immediately rush to the scene, which proves that the China polices are very efficient, so to say nothing of that social activism can prevail in this country of China. Not only that, despite that people could use VPNs to change their account IP address to get over the obstacles, nevertheless it doesn’t help. As we all know, social media such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram can be said to be the most frequently used social media platforms, but in China, the use of these social media is prohibited due to social credit risks such as misappropriation and illegal tracking. Furthermore, even though carrying out social activities through the social media that China approved, however, China’s online surveillance system is highly technical, which they could instantly detect the sensitive content or information and those sensitive keywords would be filtered from search engines (Markuson 2021). If people insist on publishing such content topics, they may have to bear the possible consequences, such as permanent banning of social accounts, or in the worst case, they will face criminal prosecution.
In short conclude,
Given the extent of surveillance in China, social activism action is immensely difficult to prevail for China citizens. Because of all the wrongdoings people make online, whether it is social activism or other actions, anyone's personal information can be easily obtained instantly under the currently intently monitored social media sites. Therefore, even if we all have freedom-expression, but we still must be cautious in wording or speech when publishing any content topic in order to avoid unnecessary trouble.
Reference List
Statista Research Department 2021, ‘Additional daily time spent on social media platforms by users in the United States due to coronavirus pandemic’, 28 January, viewed 24 November 2021,<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1116148/more-time-spent-social-media-platforms-users-usa-coronavirus/>.
Brenman, M & Sanchez, TW 2014, ‘Social activism’, Springer Link, viewed 24 November 2021,<https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-94-007-0753-5_2729>.
Carlson, R & Ivanescu, I 2021, ‘China’s paper tiger surveillance state’, TheDiplomat, 30 April, viewed 26 November 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/chinas-paper-tiger-surveillance-state/
Ma, A 2018, ‘China is building a vast civilian surveillance network – here are 10 ways it could be feeding its creepy ‘social credit system’, 29 August, viewed 26 November 2021,<https://www.businessinsider.com/how-china-is-watching-its-citizens-in-a-modern-surveillance-state-2018-4>.
Markuson, D 2021, ‘What is the best VPN for China?’, NordVPN, 23 October, viewed 26 2021, <https://nordvpn.com/blog/vpn-for-china/>.
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Texas Woman Killed After Boy, 8, Accidentally Fires Rifle.
PALESTINE, Texas — Authorities say an East Texas woman was fatally shot after an 8-year-old boy picked up a rifle and it accidentally discharged at a home.
Anderson County Sheriff Greg Taylor says the boy picked up a rifle while in a room with the woman's husband, who was cleaning weapons Saturday. The bullet hit 23-year-old Carmen Danielle Morris in the head. She was in another room.
The Elkhart woman died Sunday at a hospital.
Taylor said the boy was a relative of Morris' husband but was not the couple's child.
Taylor says it's believed the incident was a tragic accident.
Surveillance Cameras Installation Los Angeles.
A “Black Box” for your Body?
UPDATE: Allstate was recently granted a US patent for a "driving-behavior database that it said might be useful for health insurers, lenders, credit-rating agencies, marketers and potential employers." The program is just in the patent stage for now, but the company says: "the invention has the potential to evaluate drivers' physiological data, including heart rate, blood pressure and electrocardiogram signals, which could be recorded from steering wheel sensors." Similarly Jaguar/Land Rover has a number of projects in process which are intended to monitor and assess driver focus and brain activity; analyze physiological data; and incorporate predictions of expected behaviour, all in the name of making driving safer (or so we're told).
Permission has been granted in a Canadian personal injury case has been to introduce FitBit data into evidence – the collected fitness tracking information will be run through an analytics program in order to compare it to activity levels of the general population. The idea, in this instance, is to be able to quantitatively demonstrate the effects that the plaintiff’s injury has had on her abilities and activity.
Sounds simple right? She has the data, she’s volunteering it, and being able to ground her claim with data is likely to be quite persuasive.
Why should we worry about this? What is concerning is the broader potential implication—situations where the data is *not* volunteered but subpoenaed. Consider situations where the activity data isn’t used to support an individual claim, but rather to undermine or even dismiss someone’s entitlement to relief.
Let’s face it – we have seen and continue to see a trend towards admitting as evidence social network posts and similar information, even where “privacy settings” have been utilized in an effort to keep the information private. This information has been ruled to be presumptively public no matter the expression of a contrary intention by the poster. Given that, it seems likely that the same presumption of publicness will apply to the data generated by FitBits, heart rate monitors, pedometers, smartphone fitness apps, and other devices that collect and record personal fitness/performance information.
The notion of the quantified self is an alluring idea, but ultimately it is a new iteration of an old quandary. It starts with the assertion the more information we can collect and track, the more we can know. Building on this, we see the growth of the common belief that with this information we can better control our bodies, perfect them.
Essentially, this represents a normalization of surveillance—only at the level of individual body processes, and it is we who are surveilling ourselves.
Concern about surveillance and its effect on those who are surveilled is not new nor is it unreasonable. The use and misuse of surveillance data has led to unexpected disclosures, and, in some cases, to the reinforcement of stereotypes and inequalities.
In our fascination with the quantified self, it is important to ensure that the information we choose to collect—for our own purposes—does not become the equivalent of an airplane’s “black box”, a public record out of our control and potentially used against us.
A “Black Box” for your Body?
Permission has been granted in a Canadian personal injury case has been to introduce FitBit data into evidence – the collected fitness tracking information will be run through an analytics program in order to compare it to activity levels of the general population. The idea, in this instance, is to be able to quantitatively demonstrate the effects that the plaintiff’s injury has had on her abilities and activity.
Sounds simple right? She has the data, she’s volunteering it, and being able to ground her claim with data is likely to be quite persuasive.
Why should we worry about this? What is concerning is the broader potential implication—situations where the data is *not* volunteered but subpoenaed. Consider situations where the activity data isn’t used to support an individual claim, but rather to undermine or even dismiss someone’s entitlement to relief.
Let’s face it – we have seen and continue to see a trend towards admitting as evidence social network posts and similar information, even where “privacy settings” have been utilized in an effort to keep the information private. This information has been ruled to be presumptively public no matter the expression of a contrary intention by the poster. Given that, it seems likely that the same presumption of publicness will apply to the data generated by FitBits, heart rate monitors, pedometers, smartphone fitness apps, and other devices that collect and record personal fitness/performance information.
The notion of the quantified self is an alluring idea, but ultimately it is a new iteration of an old quandary. It starts with the assertion the more information we can collect and track, the more we can know. Building on this, we see the growth of the common belief that with this information we can better control our bodies, perfect them.
Essentially, this represents a normalization of surveillance—only at the level of individual body processes, and it is we who are surveilling ourselves.
Concern about surveillance and its effect on those who are surveilled is not new nor is it unreasonable. The use and misuse of surveillance data has led to unexpected disclosures, and, in some cases, to the reinforcement of stereotypes and inequalities.
In our fascination with the quantified self, it is important to ensure that the information we choose to collect—for our own purposes—does not become the equivalent of an airplane’s “black box”, a public record out of our control and potentially used against us.
A “Black Box” for your Body?
Permission has been granted in a Canadian personal injury case has been to introduce FitBit data into evidence – the collected fitness tracking information will be run through an analytics program in order to compare it to activity levels of the general population. The idea, in this instance, is to be able to quantitatively demonstrate the effects that the plaintiff’s injury has had on her abilities and activity.
Sounds simple right? She has the data, she’s volunteering it, and being able to ground her claim with data is likely to be quite persuasive.
Why should we worry about this? What is concerning is the broader potential implication—situations where the data is *not* volunteered but subpoenaed. Consider situations where the activity data isn’t used to support an individual claim, but rather to undermine or even dismiss someone’s entitlement to relief.
Let’s face it – we have seen and continue to see a trend towards admitting as evidence social network posts and similar information, even where “privacy settings” have been utilized in an effort to keep the information private. This information has been ruled to be presumptively public no matter the expression of a contrary intention by the poster. Given that, it seems likely that the same presumption of publicness will apply to the data generated by FitBits, heart rate monitors, pedometers, smartphone fitness apps, and other devices that collect and record personal fitness/performance information.
The notion of the quantified self is an alluring idea, but ultimately it is a new iteration of an old quandary. It starts with the assertion the more information we can collect and track, the more we can know. Building on this, we see the growth of the common belief that with this information we can better control our bodies, perfect them.
Essentially, this represents a normalization of surveillance—only at the level of individual body processes, and it is we who are surveilling ourselves.
Concern about surveillance and its effect on those who are surveilled is not new nor is it unreasonable. The use and misuse of surveillance data has led to unexpected disclosures, and, in some cases, to the reinforcement of stereotypes and inequalities.
In our fascination with the quantified self, it is important to ensure that the information we choose to collect—for our own purposes—does not become the equivalent of an airplane’s “black box”, a public record out of our control and potentially used against us.
